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Abstract
This study analyses the impact of trolling on journalists in the Australian news
media between 2015 and 2021, mapping its emergence and the responses of a
variety of stakeholders. By 2015, trolling had cemented itself as a complex social
issue prevalent in media discourse and has been the subject of a growing body of
media and communications research over two decades.
A grounded theory approach, informed by feminist critical theory, functionalism
and Ackoff’s (1974) Systems Theory, was used to investigate the impact of trolling
on victims, and responses to trolling by anti-trolling campaigners, Twitter,
Facebook, newsrooms, and the legal profession. Ackoff’s theory suggests that
social problems cannot be resolved by considering stakeholders in isolation, and
that a multi-site or multi-level approach to a problem is more likely to succeed.
The research process included interviews with 10 trolled journalists, and content
analysis of a range of archival evidence relevant to the other stakeholders, such as
news articles, statements by social media companies, and Australian legislation.
At points where professional insight into the results of the content analysis was
required, the research included interviews with relevant experts.
The results of the research include identification of types of trolling frequently
encountered by journalists; documentation of widespread frustration with
Twitter’s inconsistent enforcement of policies that ban abusive content on its
service; and acknowledgement of Facebook’s attempts to address multiple
stakeholders involved in trolling and cyber-bullying. Newsrooms’ responses were
categorised into ten themes that address the needs of various stakeholders, and
an analysis of the relevant current Australia legislation found that while a range
of statutes can be drawn upon, their use in relation to trolling has been scarce to
date, with experts suggesting that more education of the public and law
enforcement officers would enhance legal protection.
This study concludes that trolling is a wicked problem, meaning it is
complex, dynamic, and difficult to navigate; thus, resolution strategies should
involve collaborative approaches by multiple key stakeholders.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Journalists have always suffered abuse; however, the physical, psychological,
professional, and economic effects of trolling illustrate the severity of the problem.
Abuse and harassment have become commonplace for many Australian
journalists, not only because of the interactive function of Web 2.0, but as a
broader reflection of current politics, economics, and ideologies. Women are
disproportionately targeted by trolls, with more frequent and aggressive attacks.
Using grounded theory, this study adopts a systems approach, informed by
feminist critical theory and functionalism, to address each stakeholder group:
trolled journalists, anti-trolling campaigns, social media organisations,
newsrooms, and legal.
Trolling is a complex social problem because it involved the actions of many
people, on many people, and is intertwined with broader issues including freedom
of the press, freedom of speech, rape culture, and workplace health and safety. The
rise of participatory journalism mechanisms, including social media, have enabled
audiences to speak back to journalists with greater intensity and anonymity than
ever before. The trolling phenomenon is tangled up with speech rights and
increasing public critiques of social institutions, like the media, as well as rising
tides of disinformation. In 2022, the digital abuse and harassment of journalists
is an enduring problem that requires further systematic research to determine the
true scope, scale, and potential resolutions to the problem.
1.1

Overview

This research, a study of the emergence and impacts of and responses to trolling
in the Australian news media, was conducted over six years from 2015 to 2021,
and provides the first comprehensive analysis of ‘trolling’ abuse and harassment
of journalists in the Australian news media industry, mapping its evolution,
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impacts, and industry responses. This mixed-methods study uses the grounded
theory approach (described in the chapter 3 methodology section) to code both
qualitative and quantitative data, from which developing patterns emerge for
further thematic analysis. Data collection methods of in-depth interviews, archival
evidence and thematic content analysis were included. The timing of this study
was fortuitous, given the expeditious growth of technological innovation and
subsequent economic restructures of journalism globally over the period of this
study. By the conclusion of the study, trolling had cemented itself as a complex
social issue prevalent in workplace dialogue, with growing academic research yet
no universally recognised resolution.
1.2

Trolling: a key term

While the term troll is widely used throughout Australian news media (Binns,
2017; Bossio & Holton, 2021; Gardiner, 2018; Lewis, Zamith & Coddington, 2020;
Martin & Murrell, 2020; Martin & Murrell, 2021), an academic understanding of
the term was still evolving, resulting in various definitions of its meaning (Phillips,
2015; Tyler, 2012). While definitions of trolling have evolved in the last seven
years, when this study commenced in 2015, less had been written and the chief
concern of people writing about the social problem was distinguishing trolling
behaviour from cyber-bullying and other newsroom interactivity. As Golf-Papez
and Veer wrote in 2017, at that point “there had been little discussion about what
trolling actually is” (p. 1). Consequently, the definition selected for this study in
2015 was Johnston’s (2014) definition: “trolling is a deliberate attempt to upset
or anger someone online” (para. 4) as this was in accord with the context given by
West (2015) and Ford (2015). This definition is also similar to the one Golf-Papez
and Veer (2017) used, which is that “trolling involved deliberate, deceptive and
mischievous attempts to provoke reactions from other online users” (p. 1).
1.3

Epistemology

This applied research study integrates epistemological theory to examine trolling
in social contexts, an approach that lays the foundation from which grounded
theory emerges (Weerakkody, 2015). The epistemology, or theory of knowledge
(Crotty 1998; Hamlyn, 1995; Maynard, 1994) this study is applied is constructivist

Chapter 1 Introduction

2

theory to better understand the phenomenon of trolling. Constructionism posits
that “no objective reality or truth” exists and “reality is socially constructed”
(Weerakkody, 2015, p. 10). This research following Phillips (2015) investigates
the social construction of trolling. The way trolling has been socially constructed
has evolved and been tracked by this study that began with the researcher’s
emersion in the preliminary data set from which the statistical analysis emerges.
1.4

Theoretical framework

As this study describes the complex social issue of trolling in various digital spaces
of news media, multiple paradigms have been adopted to form a cohesive
theoretical framework for the study. This theoretical approach is comprised of
three key paradigms: feminist critical theory, Ackoff’s (1974) systems theory, and
functionalism. These three key theoretical frameworks underpin the research and
are used to examine and investigate various groups of stakeholders affected by
trolling. Each of these three key paradigms are briefly introduced below, and
further clarified in the literature review. In Figure 1, feminist critical theory is
shown to relate to victim and campaign responses; functionalism to relate to social
media platforms, newsrooms, and legal responses; and Ackoff’s systems theory to
relate to all stakeholder groups. The research theoretical framework, which this
study calls the trolling paradigm, is depicted below in the following diagram:
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Figure 1
The Trolling Paradigm

For brevity this theoretical approach will be referred to throughout the study as
the trolling paradigm.

1.4.1 Feminist critical theory
The first theoretical framework underpinning this research process is the feminist
critical paradigm and was selected as women are more often and more
aggressively trolled than men. Critical theory examines power relations within
social phenomenon to empower those adversely affected by patriarchy and
racism (Horkheimer, 1972), while feminist theory critiques and resists oppressive
social power relations pertaining to gender (Allen, 1999). Adopting a feminist
critical theoretical perspective, this study examines patriarchal ideologies in
relation to trolling to identify sexism and racism embedded in trolling content and
behaviour, which is often aimed at female journalists (Binns, 2017; Gardiner,
2018; Lewis, Zamith & Coddington, 2020; Martin & Murrell, 2020; Martin &
Murrell, 2021).
1.4.2 Ackoff’s systems theory
The second theoretical framework underpinning this research process is Ackoff’s
(1974) systems paradigm. Ackoff’s systems theory sees society as a system where
individual parts must work together in synergy to ensure the system runs
efficiently. In order to provide a comprehensive understanding of the social
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problem of trolling, the study will examine each individual element as subsections
in order to have a comprehensive understanding of the systemic complexity of
trolling.
Figure 2
Stakeholders from the Trolling Paradigm categorised by levels in Ackoff’s (1974)
Systems Model

Legal
Ackoff’s term: Environmentalisation
(Governance Level)

Social media
platforms
Ackoff’s term: Humanisation
(Support / Peer / Community
Level)

Newsrooms
Family and peers
Community
Campaigns

Ackoff’s term:
Self-control
(Individual
Level)

Trolled journalists
Trolls

For brevity this framework will be referred to throughout the study as the systems
model. At Ackoff’s (1974) “self-control” level (p. 20), or the study’s coined
individual level, are the victims; the trolled journalists, and the perpetrators of the
problem; the trolls. At Ackoff’s (1974) “humanisation” level (p. 34), or the study’s
coined support, peer, and community level, are groups which are able to offer
support to the individuals experiencing the problem which include newsrooms,
family,

peers,

community

and

campaigns.

At

Ackoff’s

(1974)

“environmentalisation” level (p. 54), or the study’s coined governance level, is
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legal and, increasingly more so, social media platforms. At the highest level, social
institutions have the power to implement policies, regulations, and/or laws that
inhibit trolling behaviours. Each chapter of the study addresses an individual
stakeholder, and the discussion section explores the systematic interactions and
interdependencies between stakeholders. Analysis of relationships between
stakeholder groups is critical to Ackoff’s (1974) System Theory that suggests a
holistic approach that works on the problem at all levels is needed to address
social problems such as trolling.
1.4.3 Functionalist theory
The third theoretical framework, complementary to Ackoff’s systems theory, is the
functionalist paradigm. Functionalism is a theory of mind, here used in
sociological terms to explain the behaviour of those trolling journalists and argues
that a perpetrator’s behaviour is directly related to the consequence of that
behaviour (Spencer, 1893; Parsons, 1977; Macionis 1995). When applied to
trolling, functionalism, with its focus on how parts of a social system interact,
provides a lens through which to examine online trolling behaviour. Such a
perspective provides grounds for the study’s argument that the anonymity
afforded by the internet presents a lack of consequence for the perpetrators, and
therefore contributes to the increased frequency and extent of explicit trolling
content.
1.5

Rationale

This study was inspired by the first trolled journalists to speak out. In 2015,
feminist writer for the US publication Jezebel Lindy West and Australian feminist
writer and regular columnist for The Daily Telegraph Clementine Ford, were
among the first to articulate that trolling was a social problem specifically effecting
working journalists. While some literature argues that trolling is a natural
consequence of freedom of speech (Thompson, 2019), others have reported that
‘don’t feed the trolls’ is a frequently suggested coping strategy (March, 2016) . A
study by Martin and Murrell (2020) found that trolled journalists were expected
to develop resilience on the job. However, West (2015) and Ford (2015) had
criticised reliance on personal resilience of journalists and the adage ‘don’t feed
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the trolls’ suggesting these approaches gravely underestimated the depth of the
problem. The alarm raised by West and Ford indicated a need for action on the
part of people other than the trolled journalists themselves. Ackoff’s system
theory framework provides a pathway to determining who the other stakeholders
are and analysis using this framework can determine what actions need to be
taken in order alleviate the problem. To access the extent of the impact of trolling
on Australian journalists, research needed to be conducted to determine the scale
and scope of the problem. And so, this became the first stage of my research
project. As the alarm had been raised by journalists working in newsrooms, a
grounded approach was deemed necessary to be sure to capture the lived
experience of journalists encountering trolling. Guided by the Ackoff framework,
the study looks at a range of stakeholders and the actions with regards to trolling.
This would enable the research to identify gaps that are sites of potential action
on the part of stakeholders of various levels of the framework.
1.6

Aims and significance

The study aimed to examine how the trolling of Australian journalists (and its
characterisation as a social problem) emerged as a topic of social discourse; to
investigate the impacts on Australian journalists and whether these impacts were
gendered; to document responses by other stakeholders involved with the social
problem. This study is significant in that it is the first systemic data collection and
analysis of trolling in the Australian news media. The intention was to contribute
to the development of practical resolutions to the problem of trolling based on
academically rigorous evidence. In a multilayered approach, this study has
canvased opinions about best-practice journalism in the workplace and suggests
specific implementation strategies that Australian journalism educators could
employ in their curricula, addressing the lack of content currently available. In
doing so, this study contributes to the preparation of journalism students for a
workplace in which trolling is prevalent.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
This literature review will expand on the three key paradigms that make up the
Trolling Paradigm. Subheading will include the feminist context of the research,
rape culture, the systems theory context of research, Ackoff’s Systems approach,
and the functionalist paradigm. The section will also explore the concept of
trolling as a research focus through explanation of the evolution of definition and
understanding, evolution of use in the Australian news media, and gaps in
academic literature. While digital media trolling is explored through discussions
about news transition from print to online, interactivity and anonymity, trolling
victims are also looked at through exploration of both trolled journalists and
Australian female trolled journalists specifically. As this study is based on
grounded theory (as detailed in the next chapter) which requires cycles of data
gathering and theoretical development, each stage brought to light new issues. For
example, the issue of racism was raised in the investigation of anti-trolling
campaigns. Literature about these supplementary issues is explored in context in
the relevant chapters. As a result, this literature review is limited to exploration of
issues that were evident at the outset of the research.

2.1

Feminist context of the research

Feminist scholars have had a focus on critiques of power and violence, and more
recently on the problems of intersectionality and social and cultural exclusion. In
order to provide context for this study, it is important to provide a brief historical
overview of feminist theory. The first two decades of the 2000s have been a time
of exciting, fast-moving developments in feminist politics (Lewis, 2018). As
outlined by Munro (2013), the suffrage endured by first-wave feminist leaders in
the early twentieth century is widely documented throughout academic literature,
addressing property ownership and the right to vote (para. 2). Second-wave
feminism in the early 1960s gradually turned its attention to women’s equality in
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wider society, coining the phrase ‘the personal is political’ and highlighting the
impact of sexism and patriarchy on the private lives of women, further breaking
down gender stereotypes (para. 2). Second-wave feminism was often criticised
because it appeared to assume that women were one homogenous (white, middleclass) group, sidelining women of colour (Blackwell, 2011; Butler, 2013; Munro,
2013). In the early 1990s third-wave feminism was born, heavily influenced by
academic investigations of queer theory, which suggested gender and sexuality
are socially constructed. However, third-wave feminism has been criticised for its
individual emancipation focus (para. 2). Most recently, commentators argue that
the internet itself has enabled a new shift into fourth-wave feminism. Judy
Wajcman (2004) is one of a number of feminist scholars suggesting that
technologies are gendered in both their design and use. As study by Fichman and
Sanfilippo (2014) found that “men and women react differently to online trolling
and their perceptions of the impact of trolling on online communities vary” (p. 1).
Therefore, from this perspective, it makes sense to use a feminist lens that
considers potential differences between genders when investigating trolling of
journalists.
Aune and Refern (2013) suggest some feminists point their fingers at ‘the media’
“as if they are a static body of white men sitting in a Hollywood mansion who lock
the doors when they see women coming down the path” (p. 171) but in reality,
feminism is complex, and patriarchy is a “wicked problem” (Ritchey, 2013, p. 1).
Munro (2013) suggests the internet has created a “call-out culture” (p. 23) in
which sexism and misogyny can be challenged, a continuing influence of thirdwave feminism. Lewis (2018) critiques the idea of “waves of feminism”, suggesting
“woven tapestry” (p. 23) as a more accurate description of feminism, representing
the interconnectivity of ideas drawn upon over a century of feminism in
conjunction with post-structuralist, post-feminist and post-colonialist theories.
Lewis argues that the concept of ‘waves of feminism’ depicts each “new wave [as]
a homogenous whole, washing away the old, displacing the outdated wave; this
does not do justice to the rich variety of feminist thought” (p. 23). Despite
widespread critical analysis about its exact categorisation, fourth-wave feminism
shares many of the concerns and diverse feminist perspectives developed over the
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last century. This thesis will adopt the term contemporary feminism to reflect
feminism’s many waves. Contemporary feminism is not only about layers of
complexity – but the need to recognise intersectionality, and the different harms
that trolling can do to women – and people – from non-Anglo, non-CIS
backgrounds.
Although Redfern and Aune (2013) highlighted that some news publications
regularly deem feminism to be “dead” (p. 1), Lewis (2018) disputes this idea and
argues “contemporary feminist activists continue to address a range of enduring
inequalities” (p. 31). Redfern and Aune (2013) suggested the feminist principles
of “equality, fairness and non-discrimination” (p. 5) are adopted by younger
Australians today as part of socially accepted, cultural norms. The women’s
movement of the twentieth century has much to teach those interested in
combating gender inequality and female-targeted harassment in this century,
such as trolling of woman in the media. This thesis adopts a feminist paradigm to
analyse discrepancies in the frequency and severity of trolling in comparison to
victim gender. While similar differences may emerge from studies that investigate
other characteristics such as race, ethnicity, age, geographic location and
prominence, this level on analysis was beyond the scope of this research.
Together, education and law reform can help combat destructive social attitudes
(Binns, 2017; Gardiner, 2018; Lewis, Zamith & Coddington, 2020; Martin &
Murrell, 2020; Martin & Murrell, 2021) and this research will help identify gaps in
responses to date.
2.1.1 Rape culture
One of the missions of second-wave feminism was to end the blanket of silence
shrouding rape and to bring it to public attention. In Lindy West’s (2015) Jezebel
column, she said for years she had endured rape threats. Many of these were
specifically in response to columns about rape culture in the routines of some
comedians. Rape culture is defined by Wright (2015) as an ethos that “exists in a
society or environment in which common social beliefs, attitudes and morals
normalise sexual violence, encourage people to associate sex with violence, and
minimise the seriousness of sexual abuse” (p. 5). Nearly thirty years after Susan
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Brownmiller (1975) brought rape to international attention with her pioneering
treatise Against our will: men, women and rape, society is faced with the continuing
proliferation of glamorised images of rape in the public domain. From the
eighteenth-century onwards, rape has been perceived as a crime “in its nature
commonly secret” (Ferguson, 1987, p. 91). Employing second-wave feminism
rhetoric, Griffin (1981) said it was time to break the “conspiracy of silence” (p. 4)
about the real impact of rape. This is what West (2015) was doing in her columns
and her commentary about rape jokes. Therefore, consideration of rape culture
and its roots provides context for understanding the motivations and behaviour
of trolls and the reactions of victims. This study sought to consider the impact of
rape culture on the lived experience of trolled Australian journalists.
Discussions of literary and filmic depictions of rape have been particularly prone
to pivot on the question of whether such graphic depiction of sexual violence is
necessary. Horeck (2013) suggests the representation of rape is perhaps because
of the “high emotional and political stakes involved in reading and watching rape
in contemporary culture” (p. 8), particularly in the wake of feminist
consciousness-raising on the subject, forcing a new understanding of the
interrelationship between the imaginary and the real (p. 6). Despite cultural
tolerance of rape in virtual fantasy such as gaming, virtual rape culture exposed
itself in the real-world in 2006. An example of the transformation of the virtual
into the real occurred when an Australian group of teenage boys filmed the sexual
assault of a teenage girl. The perpetrators used the footage to produce a DVD
distributed to suburban Melbourne schools for $5 and later on Internet sites for
up to $60, with excerpts also made freely available on YouTube (Cunningham,
2006). The video recording shows the young men urinating on the girl, setting her
hair on fire, throwing her clothes into a river and forcing her to participate in sex
acts, with the credits listing the ‘actors’ involved. Eight of the youths were charged
in the Melbourne Children’s Magistrates Court in 2007 with assault,
manufacturing child pornography, and procuring sexual penetration by
intimidation. At the trial and sentencing of the young men responsible, the victim
said she was terrified she would be recognised in public and that her life had been
changed forever (Medew, 2007). This notable case caused widespread shock and
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outrage and marked the start of a growing public awareness of, and scholarly
attention to, the ways in which sexual violence is used in the context of digital
technologies in Australia. Ten years on, according to Powell and Henry (2017), the
combination of accessibility to the internet through smartphone popularity and
widespread participation in online social networks has provided a platform for
the perpetration of sexual harassment, abuse, and violence. Powell and Henry
further suggest it is “unsurprising” (p. 2) that digital technologies might also be
used as tools to facilitate sexual-based harms, and that sex-based trolling in the
Australian news media industry is often a “daily occurrence” (p. 2).
Rape culture and its manifestation as sexual abuse online is a subject that needs
to be approached from an interdisciplinary standpoint (Horeck, 2013) and
examined in an array of fields and disciplines. Adopting an interdisciplinary
approach, this study draws upon Ackoff’s (1974) systems approach and feminist
theory. Following the lead of Wajcman (2004) this study fuses feminism and
constructivist theory. The social constructivist approach views technology as
being shaped by human action, and interaction and human action as being
reciprocally shaped by technology (Hughes, 1986; Pinch & Bijker, 1984). Wajcman
(2004) adds that this human action is gendered as are its results. To provide
clarity about how gendered online abuse has manifested in a grounded context,
this study maps the evolution, impacts of, and responses to, trolling as a social
issue. However, gendered online abuse is only one aspect of the trolling of
journalists (others include political, religious, and economic) and is a
manifestation of larger social inequalities. The impacts of trolling can, and often
does, silence female journalists, further diminishing gender equity and freedom of
speech (Ireton & Posetti, 2018).

2.2

Systems theory context of the research

Applied research seeks to solve social problems, and Weerakkody (2015) suggests
this often relates to the professional practice of journalism, media production and
policy making (p. 314) In addition, Heath and Bryant (2000) regard theories as
maps that societies use to better understand a given problem, which can
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sometimes contribute to a more comprehensive explanation, improvements and
possible future resolution. They further suggest that without research findings,
theory is mere speculation (p. 5). This applied research study integrates systems
theory throughout the research process so it can more systematically explore the
actors, interactions and interdependencies that might indicate effective responses to
trolling of journalists.
2.2.1 Ackoff’s systems approach
Organisational theorist Russell Ackoff’s (1974) systems approach to social
problems that he called “messes” (p. 21) evolved through observation of how
society has handled problems, such as crime and poverty, over time. Looking back
through history, Ackoff described the Middle Ages (the 5th to the late 15th
centuries) as focussed on survival with minimal action taken towards solving
social problems. The Machine Age (early-to-mid 20th century) was described as an
age in which problems were broken down into parts that were addressed
individually, without consideration of their interconnectivity. He was critical of this
style of thinking and pointed to problems that arose from failures to consider issues
holistically. In today’s parlance the term ‘victim blaming’, which victimology
researchers Cramer et al (2013) define as the “attribution of blame toward
victims” (p. 1), would refer to this type of fragmented approach.
He then coined the term the “Systems Age” (1974, p. 228) to describe the time from
the mid 20th century to 1974 and beyond. The Systems Age he proposed was based on
the doctrine of “expansionism” (p. 12) that claims all objects, events, and experiences
are parts of larger wholes. It turns attention from fragmented elements to
wholes with interrelated parts and levels. This systems approach, described by
Ackoff, underpins this study that explores how the social problem of trolling, in the
context of journalism, manifests and can be tackled on many levels.
Ackoff (1974) suggested that social problems operate on different levels and
claimed resolution attempts failed when levels were targeted exclusively. He
suggested

social

problems

can

be

more

effectively

addressed

when

stakeholders are categorised into purposeful groups. These groups can then be
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the

arranged into levels based on their proximity to the harm arising from the
problem, and their power to take action. While acknowledging that social
problems will always arise and that some old problems will continue to resurface,
this thesis adopts the principle that action based on understanding the
interconnected nature of social problems is the key to best-practice management
and harm minimisation.
He arranges the purposeful groups of stakeholders into a three-level hierarchical
system: self-control (p. 20); humanisation (p. 34); and ‘environmentalisation’ (p.
54). The self-control level refers to the individual experiencing the problem and
the extent to which those people can resolve the problem by taking action
themselves. The humanisation level refers to the support or social group in close
proximity to the individual experiencing the problem (victim or perpetrator). This
level can include family, friends, colleagues, peers, and supporting community
groups. The environmentalisation level refers to social institutions with power to
make rules, regulations and laws that inhibit certain behaviours. These levels are
illustrated as they are applied to this study in Stakeholders from the Trolling
Paradigm categorised by levels in Ackoff’s (1974) Systems Model in Figure 2 (on p.
5). Although there has been some disparate discussion of tackling the problem of
trolling at each of these levels individually (Martin, 2018; Dineva and Breitsohl,
2021), no studies as of yet have analysed trolling using a systems approach that
might form the foundation of a more coordinated and synthesised response, as
this study intends.
While Ackoff’s theory may appear dated and inappropriate for use in a
contemporary thesis about rapidly evolving new media, its multilayered approach
still has relatively current practical research applications (Badal, 2006; Bernstein,
2011; Eriksson, 2004; Houghton & Metcalfe, 2010; Koller, 2013; Lumbo, 2007;
Nuzzaci, 2010). Ackoff’s approach is relevant to this topic because of the need for
a systemic analysis to identify sites of potential action. While stakeholder analysis
is widely used in media studies, Ackoff’s layered model was considered more
appropriate because the vast differences between the various stakeholders, which
range from multi-national corporations to individual freelance journalists.
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Therefore, Ackoff’s widely used systems approach for analysing social problems
is a relevant and practical conceptual framework for this thesis.
2.2.2 Wicked problems
Trolling presents as a wicked problem that interwines conflicting issues such as
press freedom and free speech, that makes effective solutions difficult to navigate.
More recently the term wicked problems have been used to describe social
problems that are unstable, evolving and difficult to solve (Camillus, 2008). Many
researchers (Vernon, 2012; Beutler, 2021) have linked Ackoff’s description of
complex problems as ‘messes’ with Rittel’s (1972) description of these problems
as ‘wicked’. Beutler (2021) cited both Ackoff and Rittel in describing
messes/wicked problems as:
Complex sets of problems in which many different potential
issues are intertwined or linked. They defy normal problem
solving. Wicked problems involve incomplete or
contradictory knowledge, differing values, multiple
assessments of the situation, and a range of stakeholders
with relationships among them.
(p. 1)
Phillips (2015) and Rodriguex (2015) recognised “online abuse isn’t a
technological problem; it’s a social problem that just happens to be powered by
technology” (para. 17). More specifically, trolling has also been described as a
social problem (Bartlett, 2013; Poon, 2008; Macfadyen, 2014) and a wicked one at
that (Charman-Anderson in Funnell, 2014), because it involved the actions of
many people, on many people, and is intertwined with broader issues including
freedom of press, freedom of speech, rape culture, and workplace health and
safety. This indicates that a systems approach research framework is justified for
this study.
Raising awareness is a key strategy in addressing wicked problems such as
trolling, which are complex, dynamic, and difficult to navigate. Wicked problems
go beyond the capacity of any one organisation to understand and respond to and
working across agency boundaries is increasingly important in tackling them
(Australian Public Service Commission, 2007). Changing the behaviour of large
groups of people requires a collaborative approach by multiple stakeholder
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groups and poses challenges for traditional approaches, given the fluctuating
dynamics of the online environment (Australian Public Service Commission,
2007). The range of traditional levers used to influence behaviour, including
legislation, fines, taxes, other sanctions are often part of the solution, but these
alone may not be sufficient. More innovative, personalised approaches are likely
to be necessary to motivate individuals to actively cooperate in achieving
sustained behavioural change. Wicked problems are frequently unstable,
constantly evolving, and have no clear solution (Camillus, 2008); therefore,
developing effective ways to tackle them is an evolving art.
2.2.3 Functionalist paradigm
Initially considered as a systems level of analysis, the functionalist paradigm is
now considered a stand-alone paradigm. Early critics Carey and Kreiling (1974)
argue functionalism was ensnared by logical pitfalls; however, its adoption within
scholarly media research in the twenty-first century (Azeem, 2017; Gregerson,
2017; Teklu, 2014) suggests the theory is an elementary concept, espoused to
intelligibly substantiate findings. In further support, Weerakkody (2015)
concludes functionalism is often applied to research integrating both social and
media studies, enabling the researcher to effectively access how and why social
issues such as trolling arise and what response strategies should be improved or
implemented.
Crucially in sociological research, functionalism argues that the reason people act
in a specific way is a direct result of the known consequence of that given
behaviour. This is the basis of the uses and gratifications theory (Blumler & Katz,
1974), which sees an “active audience” (Blumler, 1979, p. 13) consuming media
messages for both its associated functions (uses) and pleasures (gratifications),
replacing the preconceived image of the audience as “passive victims” of the media
(p. 10). Blumler argues the uses and gratifications approach of the early 1960s
revitalised the measurement of media effects that was “too often voiced in a sort
of theoretical vacuum” (p. 15) and could not foresee the development of the twoway communication model of the internet. Functionalism stems suggests users
engage with escapist media content for pleasure, such as reality television,
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romance, and sport; however, in the case of trolling this thesis will argue that
pleasure is also linked to the intentional harm of others. Weerakkody (2015) says,
“we may do something unfair towards others because we know it hurts them,
which is pleasurable to us” and further adds “some people may be more willing to
hurt others if they were assured of no negative repercussions” (p. 30). The
anonymity enabled by the internet provides a known lack of consequences (Suler,
2004), and a functionalist reading of trolling would suggest that trolls may be
more willing to hurt others because of the known absence of negative
repercussions, thus contributing to the frequency and extent of explicit and vulgar
content.

2.3

Concept of trolling as research focus

2.3.1 Evolution of definition and understanding
As the phenomena of the trolling of journalists emerged, so too did attempts to
describe and define it. The first definitions were colloquial ones. By 2015,
journalists, such as Johnston (2014) had formulated a definition based on
emerging understanding of the term, and by 2017, researchers such as Golf-Papez
and Veer had formulated one of the early academic definitions. Since then,
academic definitions have evolved. By 2021, Martin and Murrell discuss trolling
as a challenging form of “dialogic journalism” (p. 845) which they propose “as a
future framework for analysing news conversation’s complex dynamics online,
and the dynamics of cultivating communicative interaction and response”.
Published in 2015, Whitney Phillips’s This is why we can’t have nice things:
Mapping the relationship between online trolling and mainstream culture is one of
the first academic trolling studies to map the relationship between online trolling
and mainstream culture. Phillips explains the evolution of the term troll from its
origins of mythology in early periods, and fishing in 2003, to its use to describe
vile cyber bullying in 2007 (p. 11). Phillips primarily finds “an increasing number
of academics and journalists began joining the conversation, but initially there
were very few sources to pull from” (p. 38) indicating that in 2015 supporting
academic literature was still rare. Phillips operationally defines trolling for the
purpose of her study, her definition of trolling as TBA was deemed too narrow to
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capture the experiences of journalists in Australia so Johnston’s (2014) was used.
While Phillips defines trolling, solutions to the issue do not fall within the scope of
her study, and she “looks forward to further research that tackles these
unanswered questions” (p. 168). This study responds to this call.
2.3.2 Evolution of use in the Australian news media
Events that first brought the word trolling into news headlines is Australia
concerned the 2012 attempted suicide and 2014 suicide of Charlotte Dawson
(ABC, 2014). Since then, the use of the term seemed to proliferate but no analysis
of this process had bene conducted, so this became one of the aims of this study.
Use of the word ‘troll’ has increased in both media reporting and newsroom
dialogue. In 2012 coverage of her, Dawson flagged several key issues including
discrepancies in the understanding of how to deal with trolling and sparked calls
by the Federal Coalition for uniform laws across Australia (Connelly & Keene,
2012), leveraging her fame with accounts of personal abuse to inject trolling
discussions into workplace dialogues beyond newsrooms. Concurrently, the
trolling of the then Prime Minister Julia Gillard in 2012 was also influential and led
to the first Australian regulation of social media companies (Matheson, 2013;
Morrissey & Yell, 2016). From there onwards, trolling attacks became more
widely reported, and the term ‘troll’ propelled itself into the Australian media
spotlight as a new buzzword (Thompson, 2019). However, it was not until two
years later when Dawson in 2014 took her own life, allegedly because of continued
trolling abuse, that trolling cemented itself as a social issue, not just simply a form
of cyber abuse. To date, the use of the word ‘troll’ in the Australian news media
has little academic literature. This study responds to this omission and begins to
map the evolution of the term from the first mention of the word ‘troll’ in 2009, to
2015 through thematic content analysis described in the research design section
3.2.1.1 of this thesis (on p. 32).
2.3.3 Evolution of academic literature on trolling
Early discussions of trolling in academic literature emerged in digital
communication studies in 1997 (Tepper, 1997; Donath, 1997) that recognised the
key role that deception played in trolling. In further exploration of this idea,
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Dahlberg (2001) said:
Deception in deliberation occurs in situations in which a
participant intentionally misleads others into believing that
intentions, needs, desires, and interests have been honestly
presented. This is quite a widespread problem in online
discussion groups. Sometimes called trolling, identity
deception in cyberspace aims to embarrass, anger, and
disrupt. It is often undertaken merely for amusement but is
sometimes driven by more ‘serious’ motives including
political goals.
(para. 34)
When this study commenced in January 2015, research about trolling in
journalism studies was still developing in peer-reviewed literature. Although
media professionals agreed about its prominence and had heard of trolling
anecdotally, no data mapped the emergence, impacts of and responses to trolling
in the Australian news media, which this study aimed to do. The escalating
frequency of trolling had heightened public awareness of the problem and,
subsequently, began to attract academic attention to try to understand and
resolve the phenomenon. Initial research progressed from trolling within online
gaming communities (Thacker & Griffiths, 2012; Jane, 2015) to encompass all
social media platforms (Alim, 2014; Tsantarliotis, Pitoura & Tsaparas, 2016). 2015
emerged as a year of notable scholarly contribution. Phillips (2015) summarised
history and suggested the behaviour reflected a cultural problem. Also in 2015,
research emerged from Australian journalist, award-winning author, and
internationally renowned scholar of misogyny, gender, and technology-facilitated
violence, Dr Emma Jane who reported, “a dramatic increase in a type of vitriolic
discourse notable for its hostile affect, explicit language and stark misogyny”
(Jane, 2015, para. 1). By 2016, her book, Misogyny online: A short and brutish
history, further explored the worldwide phenomenon of gendered cyberhate as a
significant discourse that had been overlooked and marginalised. In a major
contribution, Jane’s (2018) research identified online abuse as an occupational
health and safety issue.
Criticism emerged in 2017 with Beckett (2017) who suggested “conflating jokes
and death threats made it difficult to legislate or create effective polices” (para. 8)
and condemned the media’s misuse of the term trolling. By this time, research had
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widely established that women were more likely than men to receive insults or
threats (Binns, 2017; Jane, 2016) and Binns (2017) further found “women had
stronger emotional reactions to abuse” (p. 183). Research progressed from
documenting and defining the problem, to discussions about underlying root
causes that were likely embedded far deeper within societal ideologies of
feminism, racism and other forms of discrimination against minority groups
(Jones, Trott & Wright, 2019; Schapals & Bruns, 2019). Claire Wolfe’s Online trolls,
journalism and the freedom of speech: Are the bullies taking over? drew particular
attention to the threat trolls pose to feminism and the freedom of speech. As
research on comment moderation emerged as both a newsroom practise and a
topic of research (Barnes, 2018; Gardiner, 2018), anti-feminist attitudes were
again revealed. Research by Gardiner (2018) found that moderated articles
written by females attracted a higher percentage of blocked comments regardless
of the subject of the article. Labelled as “the paramedics of the internet” (White,
2022, para. 1), content moderators were a temporary coping strategy, rather than
an effective deterrent, and continual exposure to hostile discourse began to have
harmful impacts on the moderators (Ruckenstein & Turunen, 2019; Steiger et al,
2021). Although increased engagement with audiences in comment streams likely
has economic benefits, Wright, Jackson, and Graham (2019) reported that trolling
made online interactions more difficult for journalists, through time constraints
and lower perceived value. Research by Masullo Chen and Chen (2019) also
discussed the interplay between news overload and consumption. In what
Gardiner (2018) described as a paradoxical challenge for comment space, Wright,
Jackson and Graham (2019) concluded the costs for journalists were generally
thought to outweigh the benefits of participation. In further support, research by
Lewis, Zamith and Coddington (2020) found the more journalists were trolled, the
more likely they were to perceive audience interaction as less valuable. Bossio and
Holton (2021) found hostile interactions with audiences online has increased
anxiety and frustration. As a result, journalists’ have changed the way in which
they use social media by disconnecting from, rather than terminating, their
accounts (Bossio & Holton, 2021).
More recent studies continue to frame trolling as a complex feminist issue (Duyn,
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Peacock & Stroud, 2019) with Lewis, Zamith and Coddington (2020) reporting “as
greater targets of the worst forms of abuse, women face a greater burden in
deciding if and how to respond to online harassment” (p. 1047). Research has
progressed from describing the problem and its effects on stakeholders, to
potential strategies to reduce trolling online. Training and education emerged as
a critical role to reduce the impacts of, and exposure to, trolling in journalism
practise. Research by Martin and Murrell (2021) suggested dialogic interactions
are a fundamental part of the future of journalism and, therefore, trolling needs to
be ethically managed. While some journalists understand the relationship
between resilience training and positive mental health, the majority are not clear
about its potential and how it might be taught (Martin & Murrell, 2020).
Journalism education needs to be innovative and transformative to address the
normalisation of dialogic interaction on social media and the challenges it
presents (Martin & Murrell, 2021). While research has not found a universal
solution, the ‘wickedness’ of social problems means there may never be one
(Camillus, 2008). Research is yet to define a systems-based approach to trolling
that addresses key stakeholder groups and their interdependences. This study
begins to explore potential sites for intervention to support a public-service
profession where trolling has emerged as a widespread yet unresolved issue.

2.4

New media and trolling

2.4.1 News transition from print to online
News transition from print to online has been the focus of research since the
1990s. Although some researchers such as Bowd (1997) suggest “online
newspapers are, in the age of computer communications, a logical successor to
print” (p. 58), the presence of both in the current media landscape suggests there
is some overlap in the progression from paper to online news. Bowd describes the
strength of online news as its “ability to include vast amounts of news and
information” (p. 60) and distribute this information efficiently without the time
constraints and geographical restrictions of print news. For some time,
commentators (Saffo, 1992; Matheson, 2004; Gillmor, 2004) welcomed the
internet as a medium that promotes active participation rather than passive
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consumption, and, as a result, has the potential to help create a more democratic
and representative public sphere (Thurman & Hermida, 2010). The popularity of
online news is supported by researchers Liu, Tseng and Chen (2015) who
proposed news distributed via social media has become an “important
communication platform in our daily life” (p. 1) with researchers Shamma,
Kennedy and Churchill (2010) further claiming that “microblogging concurrently
with live media events is becoming commonplace” (p. 331) and a habitually
accessed news source. Although a fundamental role of journalism is to create
public debate about significant societal issues, Martin and Murrell (2021)
highlighted journalists have faced considerable challenges in generating
productive, civil online conversations with their audiences. Bossio and Holton
(2021) suggested the labour required to engage in social media practices leads to
‘social media fatigue’ (p. 2476) as journalists are required to navigate the incivility
of dialogue. Some news organisations have been unable to sustain the cost of
moderation, legal and reputation risks (Huang, 2016) associated with comment
streams, that attract audience critique, aggressive commentary, information
overload and security concerns (Martin & Murrell, 2021). Bossio and Bebawi
(2016) reported most news organisations recognise the importance of social
media to the production and dissemination of news, and therefore encourage
active use by journalists to promote to and engage with their audiences. This
participatory journalism creates “collaborative initiatives” (p. 150) that
encourages citizens to contribute to stories that supplement professional
journalistic work. Nora Martin (2015) reported digital journalism facilitates
richer and more expansive storytelling, with connectivity between experts,
journalists, and the public. In 2022, social media plays a pivotal role in how
Australian journalists and news media organisations engage with their audiences.
With the evolving business model of digital media, continued research is required.
2.4.2 Interactivity and trolling
In the online environment, interactivity immerses content creators and readers
within a two-way communication model where readers can respond to a news
article instantaneously in an interactive environment, predominantly designed to
engage readers more than traditional media sources were able to. While more
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recently in 2021 Martin and Murrell discuss dialogic journalism as a framework
for understanding the dynamics of newsrooms interactions, this study uses
interactivity to capture the broad shift from publications involving one way
communication to the opening of feedback from audiences. Vine (2012) claims
that newsrooms regard interactivity as a beneficial technique for news
distribution, suggesting “editors appear to be enthusiastic about social
networking capabilities, and are embracing, or ready to embrace, interactivity
such as that offered by Facebook and Twitter” (p. 170), with most Australian news
organisations embracing interactivity as an asset to news circulation, including
The Sydney Morning Herald, Herald Sun, The Age, ABC, BBC and The Guardian.
These evolving and proliferating interactive news forums analysed and
categorised in greater detail by Martin and Murell (2020 & 2021) encouraged
readers to use promotional features including ‘share’, ‘like’, ‘follow’ and ‘comment’
in response to articles about topics of personal interest in order to connect with
other readers of similar interest, and thereby further increasing readership. Carey
(2014) describes these two-way communication models as having “high levels of
perceived satisfaction” (p. 121) and links this to higher news readership retention
rates:
Many new companies have recognised the potential of
harnessing social media interactivity to increase exposure
to new stories and create online following . . . many
researchers have placed interactivity among the key
components necessary to understand new media
technologies.
(Carey, 2014, p.121)
The interactive function that online news provides can be leveraged as a
marketing strategy to promote an article to its target audience. Newsrooms
monitor this interactivity to structure and refine future articles to those best
received by the public, to ensure maximum readership exposure. The dynamic
relationship that social media platforms permit provides readers with a sense of
their importance, thus building rapport between the reader and the news
provider and creating a sense of community between like-minded readers (Bossio
& Holton, 2021; Bossio & Bebawi, 2016). However, trolling has emerged as a
problem resulting from this online interactivity.
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2.5.3 Anonymity and trolling
As a mechanism for egalitarian debate, anonymity can be incredibly valuable
(Arvanitakis, 2015), yet as a facilitator of intense vitriol, anonymity threatens to
undermine its central democratic function (Priestley, 2015). Anonymity provided
by social media platforms has become a springboard for inflammatory comments,
and when left unmonitored, comments have the potential to intensify, with
extreme examples illustrating the ferocity and vulgarity trolling can escalate to:
“holes like this make me want to commit rape out of anger” (West, 2015, para. 1)
“choked to death with Satan’s dick” and “you are clearly retarded, I hope someone
shoots then rapes you” (Ryan, 2014, p. 2 & p. 8). Trolling behaviour can be
positioned along a continuum of harassment in online environments that also
includes cyber bullying. Suler’s (2004) The online disinhibition effect highlighted
that inappropriate vocabulary is more frequently and intensely used in online
communication channels than in face-to-face ones, and further suggested those
who use the online realm for communication “loosen up, feel less restrained and
express themselves more openly” (p. 321), primarily because of the anonymity
afforded by online platforms. Martin (2013) stated that unacceptable behaviour is
further encouraged by removing the risk of “social sanctions” and “physical
assault” (para. 3) when communicating online, encouraging the provocative
vocabulary and vicious nature of trolling. Martin added that the absence of an
immediate consequence further promotes trolling: “common wisdom dictates
that people are more aggressive, rude and forthright online because they’re
anonymous and can act as unpleasant as they like without immediate
consequence” (para. 3). An inconsistency of consequences between websites, and
the absence of any consequences at times, indicated as areas of concern and
potential further exploration.

2.5

Trolling victims

2.5.1 Trolled journalists
While feminist writers such as Jezebel’s Lindy West (2015) flagged that dealing
with trolling had become a “common part” (para. 2) of journalism practice, and a
frequently overlooked workplace issue, its ongoing presence as a problem was
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confirmed by Martin and Murrell (2020 & 2021) and Lewis, Zamith and
Coddington (2020). One of the first places that trolling established itself as a
notable workplace issue was in the newsroom of the feminist led publication
Jezebel, in August 2014. Prior to this, only sporadic examples of trolling were
published globally. Speaking out about the problem in an article letter, the
feminist publication states:
This practice is profoundly upsetting to our commenters
who have the misfortune of starting their day with some
excessively violent images, to casual readers who drop by
to skim Jezebel with their morning coffee only to see
hardcore pornography at the bottom of a post about
Michelle Obama, and especially to the staff, who are the only
ones capable of removing the comments and are thus, by
default, now required to view and interact with violent
pornography and gore as part of our jobs. None of us are
paid enough to deal with this on a daily basis.
(Jezebel 2015, para. 3)
By 2014, rape and death threats, such as those received at Jezebel, were becoming
more common in online discourse (Ryan, 2014). Other prominent trolled
journalists began to speak out including Finnish YLE journalist Jessikka Aro who
was investigating the existence of pro-Russian troll factories in 2014 when she
was targeted by trolls, both online and in real-life in, with an extensive harassment
campaign that continued for years (Yates, 2017). By 2015, West (2015) suggested
that being trolled had become a daily occurrence for practicing journalists and had
developed into an industry norm. “I’m told, a constant barrage of abuse is just part
of my job. Shrug. Nothing we can do. I’m asking for it, apparently” (para. 1). West’s
sarcastic undertones illustrate her resentment of the onslaught of acrimonious
online abuse when simply doing her job. Ryan (2014), a colleague at Jezebel,
highlighted that West was not alone in the barrage she endured, saying, “like most
women on the internet, I get told that I should be raped or murdered or set on
fire… more frequently than most people would be comfortable with” (para. 2).
Since West (2015) and Ryan’s (2014) articles were published, a number of reports
have backed their claims that the first trolling victims, in overwhelming numbers,
were journalists (Binns 2017; Gardiner, 2018; Lewis, Zamith & Coddington, 2020;
Martin & Murrell, 2020; Martin & Murrell, 2021). With sarcasm, West further
asserts that harassment of this nature would not be acceptable within any other
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profession.
Being harassed on the internet is such a normal, common
part of my life that I’m always surprised when other people
find it surprising. You’re telling me you don’t have hundreds
of men popping into your cubicle in the accounting
department of your mid-sized, regional dry-goods
distributor to inform you that – hmm – you’re too fat to
rape, but perhaps they’ll saw you up with an electric knife?
No? Just me?
(West, 2015, para. 2)
In addition, West argues trolling is unjustly accepted as a newsroom
inconvenience, and this grave understatement does not accurately reflect the
severity and scope of the problem. The issue is that newsrooms and media
companies are not doing enough to document and respond to abuse (Martin &
Murrell, 2020; Martin & Murrell, 2021) and the formation of policy responses is
still underway. Some approaches have been tried but there is not yet a broadly
recognised best-practice response. Media coverage of trolling debates has
encouraged critical dialogue to spill into academic discourse, exacerbated by the
fact that journalism is going through a period of unprecedented turmoil driven by
technological change (Tanner et al, 2014). Trolling discourse is not sequential; it
is messy, and the debate now seeps through professions beyond journalism and
extends beyond local borders, now being evident on a global scale.
2.5.2 Trolling and gender
Although the growth of the digital landscape offers new opportunities for
feminism, enabling those who were traditionally excluded from public
communication practices, such as women, access to a platform encouraging
democratic public civil engagements, it is also tainted by familiar forms of
misogynistic abuse and harassment. Notable Australian trolled journalist
Clementine Ford (2017) said the backlash that inevitably accompanies online
discourse finds new and creative ways to manifest (para. 2). In 2016, the Media
Entertainment Arts Alliance survey found 41% of women said they had been
harassed, bullied or trolled on social media, while engaging with audiences;
several were silenced, or changed career. As females are more frequently victims
of targeted abuse, particularly those who express feminist views (Ford, 2017;
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Noyes, 2017; West, 2015; Ryan, 2014; Aune & Refern, 2013; Penny, 2012; Tyler,
2012) increased academic, media and political attention echoes longstanding
gender inequalities: “Online abuse of women may be a twenty-first century issue,
but its roots grow from much older forms of sex-based harassment and misogyny”
(Tyler, 2012, para. 1). Tyler also suggests misunderstanding the problem,
independent of its patriarchal origins, “overlooks and trivialises the harm it
causes” (para. 1). In support, Jane and Vincent (2017) argue that misogyny online
constitutes attempts to silence women through intimidation, coercion and selfcensorship (p. 68). Consensus from Lewis (2018), Jane and Vincent (2017) and
Priestley (2015) is that trolling is not simply a new phenomenon, but a new face
of more enduring patriarchal practices, including the ignominious history of the
silencing of women. Priestley further suggests women who express their right to
have a voice online, “threaten the longstanding, traditional notions of power”
(para. 1). Trolling has resurfaced feminist discussions in popular culture (Redfern
& Aune, 2013); however, Lewis (2018) warns that while the returned attention to
feminist concerns is welcome, experience of patriarchal systems teaches us to be
cautious about hopes of complete elimination.
Voices from early victim accounts echoed in global news articles, stressing the
psychological impact on victims. The pioneers of public awareness and debate
about trolling in the Australian news media were women. Four years before Lindy
West’s (2015) article, which prompted this research, was published, Australian
trolled journalist Karalee Evans (2011) voiced the same concerns, asking “when
did faceless men decide it was acceptable to take it upon themselves and threaten
women online with death threats, rape threats, violence and sexism?” (para. 5).
Evans (2011) suggests trolling is an extension of sexism, adding online
harassment “is not a new thing, it existed even in the days of MySpace and
GeoCities, what seems to be on the rise is compliance trolling and the phenomena
of anonymous digital misogyny” (para. 5). In support, other Australian trolled
journalists began to respond, with Elmo Keep (2012) speaking out:
What many women writers have in recent days come
forward to share as the online abuse they suffer at the
fingertips of losers, is not funny. Incitements to rape are not
funny. To threaten someone with any kind of physical

Chapter 2 Literature review

27

violence is not funny. To wish someone, or their family or
pets dead, is not funny. To invite someone to commit
suicide is not funny. It's not funny no matter what the
context, or the person saying it. It's just not, it's missing that
essential humour ingredient: being in any way funny
(Keep, 2012, para. 6).
Australian trolled journalist Meagan Tyler (2012) also spoke out, saying “trolling
has captured the attention of the mainstream media” and the “cyber abuse of
women is finally getting noticed” (para. 2). By 2012, intensive misogynistic
comments became the catalyst for the first Australian female journalists (Evans,
2011; Keep, 2012; Tyler, 2012) to speak out. From this came traction within the
Australian news media and the debate snowballed (Thompson, 2019). The impact
of trolling spread beyond the newsroom and into the victim’ personal lives,
inflicting anger and hurt. Australian trolled journalist, Ginger Gorman, voiced
further concerns about the professional and economic harms of trolling to women,
stating “gendered cyberhate silences women and constrains their ability to find
jobs, market themselves, network, socialise, engage politically and partake freely
in self-expression and self-representation” (Gorman, 2019, p. 71). Trolling has
cemented itself as a significant current workplace issue for Australian journalists
in 2022 that requires academic research to inform each stakeholder group of the
best response strategies. Although Evans (2011) called for answers to reverse this
vile and abusive digital sexism (para. 18) back in 2011, academic research has not
yet provided solutions to effectively protect Australian journalists from trolls. This
study begins to address this continued call. When this study commenced in 2015,
the impetus behind it was the calls from journalists, combined with emerging data
from the Media Entertainment Arts Alliance (2016) which indicated it was a
complex problem. Ackoff’s framing of social problems posited that other positions
of power in the field were worthy of analysis, and so the tiered approach was
adopted. Since the commencement of the study, the body of research has grown
and more recent studies (Binns 2017; Bossio & Holton, 2021; Bossio & Debawi,
2016; Gardiner, 2018; Lewis, Zamith & Coddington, 2020; Martin & Murrell, 2020;
Martin & Murrell, 2021) have found more evidence of the need for greater
understanding and action.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
This chapter introduces the specific research questions and the methodological
approach used to address them. As the literature review demonstrated, by the
commencement of this research in 2015 trolling in the news industry was being
described as a social problem and attempts to understand it were in nascent
stages. This study sought to contribute to understanding trolling as s social
problem. The chapter will also discuss ethical considerations and the limitations
of this research process.
3.1

Over-arching research question

How did trolling emerge in the Australian news industry, what were the impacts
on journalists, and stakeholders’ responses to it?
Ackoff’s system’s approach to societal problems (1974) was adopted to ensure the
investigation was holistic and did not miss key stakeholders or focus
inappropriately on specific stakeholders such as victims. Adopting this model
generated a set of research questions focussed on the different levels in Ackoff’s
model. In this way the model is a true framework for the thesis. The questions
derived from consideration of stakeholders at each level of the model are listed
below.
3.1.1 Research sub-questions
Emergence - Question A
How can the evolution of trolling in the Australian news media between 2009 and
2017 be described?
Impacts - Question B
What are the impacts for trolled journalists in the Australian news media?
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Campaign responses - Question C
How can the evolution of anti-trolling campaigns within the Australian news media
be described?
Twitter responses - Question D
What policy and feature changes were implemented by Twitter in response to
trolling from its launch in 2006 to 2019?
Facebook responses - Question E
What supportive strategies, operational modifications and corporate reform were
implemented by Facebook in response to trolling?
Newsroom responses - Question F
What strategies were implemented by Australian news organisations in response to
trolling?
Legal responses – Question G
What Australian laws can be used by journalists to prosecute a troll?
Each of these questions is addressed in a chapter of the thesis. The chapter order
is grounded in the data from chapter 4.1 which focussed on the emergence of
trolling and was the first part of the research completed. From this data it became
clear that victims were initiating calls for the issue to be addressed and were a
logical starting point in the stakeholder analysis. Their views are discussed in
chapter 4.2. The emergence data showed that their calls coalesced into campaigns
which are the focus of chapter 4.3, and pressured social media companies to
respond, with Twitter the focus of chapter 4.4 and Facebook the focus of chapter
4.5. The emergence data also showed newsrooms as explored in chapter 4.6 were
slower to release information about anti-trolling strategies and their response
times were slower as strategies were backed by academic research which takes
time to formulate. The emergence data showed legal responses in chapter 4.7
emerged last, with the nationally agreed upon Model Defamation Amendment
Provisions 2020, Online Safety Act 2021, and Social Media (Anti-Trolling) Bill 2022
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that began to more adequately address trolling.
3.2

Research design

3.2.1 Methodological approach
Although predominantly using qualitative data, proposed as a viable means of
research for media studies in an array of academic literature (Altheide &
Schneider, 1996; Brennen, 2017; Crotty, 1998; Gough-Yates, 2003; Lindoff, 1995;
Percy, Kostere & Kostere, 2015), this multi-method study uses the data collection
methods of in-depth interviews, archival evidence, and thematic content analysis,
each of which incorporates a quantitative and qualitative data component,
discussed later in further detail.
Weerakkody (2015) suggests a mixed-method approach increases the validity and
reliability of data collected, and enables a more comprehensive discussion,
understanding and critique of research (p. 32), known as methodological
triangulation (p. 32) or crystallisation (Wimmer & Dominick, 2011, p. 64). To
provide a comprehensive analysis, triangulation is adopted to incorporate all
three data collection elements of in-depth interviews, archival evidence, and
thematic content analysis. The complexity of trolling invites meticulous
investigation, which can only be achieved using different and complementary
methods to ensure each aspect of the multifaceted problem is addressed.
First introduced by sociologists Glaser and Strauss (1967), and further developed
by Strauss and Corbin (1990), the grounded theory approach to the analysis of
qualitative data, selected for this study, refers to the method of using a systematic
set of procedures to code data into named categories to discover patterns among
them (Weerakkody, 2015, p. 301). Identifying correlations allows social patterns
to be conceptualised and compared. An inductive approach is first used to form
substantive codes for initial data, and from this emerging theory, the next step of
the data collection can be deduced. Glaser and Strauss’s (1967) work The discovery
of grounded theory is one of the most cited methodologies in social sciences, cited
more than 149,447 times at the conclusion of 2021 on Google scholar by the
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conclusion of this study. Grounded theory is used as a methodology in journalism
research, including in the widely referenced PhD theses of Martin (2004) and
Glynnild (2006).
Google was emerging as a useful research tool in academic literature (Piasecki,
Waligora & Dranseika, 2018; Robertson et al, 2018; Ormen, 2015). Although
personalisation algorithms may change which results are presented as top, it
would not affect the total number of articles retrieved by the Google search. Bias
risk was limited as no Google accounts were active at the time, and the research
was conducted before 2016 when Google targeting was less sophisticated.
3.2.1.1

Emergence – Question A

The research design strategy which addresses: How can the evolution of trolling in
the Australian news media between 2009 and 2017 be described? applies the
thematic content analysis method. To map the evolution of trolling in the
Australian news media, thematic content analysis, a descriptive collation, analysis
and presentation of qualitative data (Anderson, 2007), was selected to analyse
three prominent Australian news websites with different owners from 2009 to
2017: smh.com.au; news.com.au; and abc.net.au. Using Google as a search tool, the
search inquiry site:smh.com.au "troll" -"movie" -"fishing" was applied for each of
the news websites. Results from this search provided a list of trolling-related news
articles for each calendar month between January 2009 and December 2017
inclusive. The monthly frequency of trolling-related articles was recorded for each
news website, eliminating any articles unrelated to the research topic, providing
quantitative raw data. The top three Google ranked trolling-related articles for
each news website were identified and recorded in Microsoft Word, providing
qualitative raw data. Applying thematic content analysis, suggested by Gering
(2015) as an appropriate method for arranging texts into a unified and
generalised coding structure which, in turn, can be transformed into a database,
the 528 articles were coded onto an Excel spreadsheet, using pattern code or open
coding (Miles & Huberman, 1984, 1994; Weerakkody, 2009). The raw data set was
cleaned according to coding principles for coding rigor before analysis and
discussion.
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3.2.1.2

Impacts – Question B

The research design strategy which addresses: What are the impacts for trolled
journalists in the Australian news media? applies the mixed methods of thematic
content analysis and in-depth interviews. A deliberate network sample was made
of ten industry professionals, between the ages of 23 and 65, five males and five
females. Each had at least five years’ experience in the journalism field and selfselected as being a trolling victim. Three participants had written publicly about
being trolled, two were known to supervisor Dr Kayt Davies, three were identified
by contacting the Chief of Staff from ABC, 9 News Perth, Seven West Media, and
Network Ten in Subiaco, and two were known to participants via snowball
sampling. These participants were selected for semi-structured interviews of
approximately an hour duration. The participants were asked questions about
their personal experiences with trolling in the workplace. Participants reflected
on any negative personal impacts, identified any workplace support systems in
place, and specified any training they received from university or their employers.
Responses were then analysed for emerging themes in conjunction with the
theoretical frameworks employed in this thesis.
3.2.1.3

Responses to trolling

Through a grounded theory approach described by Weerakkody (2015), the study
“develops theories to explain a specific real-life problem or phenomena (trolling)
by systematically analysing patterns, themes and common categories observed in
qualitative data” (p. 301). From the systematic data analysis derived from the
thematic content analysis and in-depth interviews of Questions A and Question B,
six key stakeholders groups emerged as actively responding to trolling within
Australian news media being: victims (addressed in Question B); anti-trolling
campaigns; social media platforms; newsrooms; the law; and educational
resources. These five remaining groups will be addressed individually as part of
this research’s use of Ackoff’s (1974) systems approach, within five subsequent
research designs, each exploring a different level of the social problem trolling.
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3.2.1.3.1

Campaign responses – Question C

The research design strategy uses mixed methods of thematic content analysis
and archival evidence. Using Google as a search tool, the terms: “troll” +
“campaign” were investigated with the location set Australia. From analysis of the
first ten pages, totalling 100 articles, 13 significant campaigns were identified as
archival evidence. Activist responses were plotted on a timeline that documents
and illustrates the evolution of anti-trolling campaigns in the Australian news
media. Campaigns drew attention to risks of allowing trolling to go unchecked,
provided context for newsrooms experiences, and illustrated that the problem
was systemic, rather than discrete episodes, which was best addressed through
the application of a systems approach.
3.2.1.3.2

Twitter responses – Question D

The research design strategy which addresses Question D: What policy and feature
changes were implemented by Twitter in response to trolling from its launch in 2006
to 2019? applies mixed methods of thematic content analysis and archival
evidence. The study used collected data from chapter 4.1 (on p. 39) as a starting
point. Of the 528 articles in the thematic content analysis, 17 mentioned Twitter
response to trolling on its platform in some capacity and were deemed relevant
for inclusion. Of these, five further discussed or made comment on aspects of
particular response strategies. To obtain further data, Twitter’s website was
explored, and relevant information was retrieved from three sections: About Us,
Help Centre and Blog. On each of these pages the search function was used to
investigate the terms: “troll” “bully” and “abuse”. This led to a further 16 relevant
articles which were included for analysis. Although Google was also used as a
search tool with the search inquiry: “troll” + “Twitter” + “response” and retrieved
3,120,000 results, on closer analysis of the first ten pages totalling 100 articles,
only one additional response strategy was found.
3.2.1.3.3

Facebook responses – Question E

The research design strategy which addresses: What supportive strategies,
operational modifications and corporate reform were implemented by Facebook in
response to trolling? applies mixed methods of thematic content analysis and
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archival evidence. Of the 528 articles in the thematic content analysis of this study,
31 articles mentioned Facebook’s response to trolling on its platform in some
capacity and were deemed relevant for inclusion. Of these, 14 articles discussed
or made commented on aspects of particular response strategies. To obtain
further data, Facebook’s website was explored, and relevant information was
retrieved from three sections: About Us, Safety Centre, and Help Centre. On each
of these pages the search function was used to investigate the terms: “troll” “bully”
and “abuse”. This led to a further 25 relevant articles which were included for
analysis. Although Google was also used as a search tool with the search inquiry:
“troll” + “Facebook” + “response” and retrieved 3,520,000 results, on closer
analysis of the first ten pages, totalling 100 articles, no new response strategies
were found that had not already been identified in the previous methods of this
chapter.
3.2.1.3.4

Newsroom responses – Question F

The research design strategy which addresses: What strategies were implemented
by Australian news organisations in responses to trolling? applies mixed methods
of thematic content analysis and interviews. Four industry experts were selected
and contacted, two were available to interview. All selected industry experts were
Australian. Media academic Dr Jenna Price, who in 2019 completed a PhD on
feminist digital activism in Australia and its account of fatal violence against
women, and lecturer and media academic whose research focused on online
community management, Dr Jennifer Beckett, were both interviewed. In addition,
academic and journalism educator Julie Posetti who co-wrote the handbook for
online safety in journalism practice (Ireton & Posetti, 2018), and UNESCO
researcher and digital journalism academic Associate Professor Fiona Martin,
were unavailable to interview. Participants were reached through academic and
industry contacts. The semi-structured interviews went for approximately one
hour and provided both quantitative and qualitative data. Each participant was
asked to respond with an agreement level represented by a numerical value on a
scale of one to ten, quantitative data regarding Australian newsroom guidelines
was provided. Predominantly employing open-ended questions, robust
qualitative data was acquired. Newsrooms ABC, 9 News Perth, Seven West Media,
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and Network Ten in Subiaco were contacted and asked about their policies in
response to trolling. ABC policies were found on their website. Seven West Media
and Network Ten dealt with matter internally on a case-by+case basis, and 9 Perth
(formerly Fairfax Media) refused twice to provide a copy of their handbook for
online safety produced by Julie Posetti. In addition, developing patterns regarding
the use and effectiveness of newsroom support systems were drawn upon from
the in-depth interviews of Question B and the thematic content analysis for
comparison and discussion.
3.2.1.3.5

Legal responses – Question G

The research design strategy which addresses: What Australian laws can be used
by journalists to prosecute a troll? applies mixed methods of thematic content
analysis and interviews. In interviews with two selected Australian media law
experts lawyer Mark Polden and Professor Mark Pearson, authors of the most
widely used media law textbook in Australia A Journalist’s Guide to Media Law: A
Handbook for Communicators in a Digital Age (2019). Participants were asked to
consider which current Australian laws could be drawn upon to prosecute trolls.
Participants reflected on any notable prosecution examples, discussed legal
pathways for trolled victims, and considered the legal impacts of trolling in
Australian newsrooms. In addition, participants reflected on the evolution of these
laws from 2009 to 2019, and concluded with personal judgements concerning the
law’s accessibility, effectiveness and adequacy in a society where trolling remains
pervasive. Through investigation of legislative websites, the collection of archival
evidence revealed which Australian laws could be drawn upon to prosecute a troll.
In the subcategories of criminal and civil, federal, and state, the number of
Australian laws were tallied to generate quantitative data. A description of these
laws provided qualitative data for comparison and discussion. From this data set,
one criminal law, and one civil law flow chart were constructed to provide a
practical reference for a trolled journalist to follow, while highlighting notable
areas of concern within the Australian legal system.
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3.3

Ethical considerations

An ethics application was obtained from Edith Cowan University after review by
the university’s Human Research Ethics Committee. Research did not commence
until ethics approval was granted. There was considered to be minimal risk to all
participants.
This study took into consideration the sensitivity of responses and implemented
full anonymity for all victim interviewees. This allowed unaltered descriptions of
trolling recounts, without fear of backlash from trolls, judgement by peers, and
importantly, repercussions from their employers. Results were deidentified
through coding referred to participants by number within the text of the research
ensured the best platform for data accuracy and depth of rich data.
3.4

Limitations

The findings are limited to the Australian news media. A comprehensive
investigation about the extent of trolling globally fell beyond the scope of this
research. While Suler (2004) and Barnes (2018) have sought to understand the
motives and behaviour of trolls as a stakeholder group, it was deemed beyond the
scope of the study to include analysis of them. The research period of 2015 to 2021
is also a limitation of the study, and further investigation about the application and
effectiveness of Australia’s emerging trolling laws in 2022 (as introduced and
discussed in chapter 4.7 on p. 265) is recognised as a valuable area of future
analysis. As qualitative responses reached a point of saturation, ten victim impact
interviewees in chapter 4.2 were considered adequate to frame the personal and
professional implications of trolling in contemporary journalism. However,
greater depth could be achieved through supplementary academic interviews that
further discuss the implementation and effectiveness of trolling response
strategies by key stakeholder groups. In the newsroom chapter 4.5 two of the
industry experts selected to interview were not available, time limitations
restricted more extensive interviews, and newsrooms refused access to policies.
While grounded theory could encompass the study of everything, the content
analysis research process required selections to be made to control the scope of
the undertaking. These selections and limitations are described in their relevant
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chapters. I hope this study will indicate directions for future research to address
the escalating need for a synthesised approach to trolling in both Australia news
media, and newsrooms around the world.
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Chapter 4.1
Emergence
Results and Discussion
A content analysis of 528 news articles
Question A - How can the evolution of trolling in the Australian news media
between 2009 and 2017 be described?
Abuse and harassment have become commonplace for many Australian
journalists, not only because of the interactive function of Web 2.0, but as a
broader reflection of current politics, economics, and ideologies. Contemporary
journalists are increasingly obligated to leverage the interactive internet functions
for community building, self-branding, and readership engagement to increase
circulation that trolling itself derives from (Bowd, 2016). In an epidemic of
harassment, the study reveals some of the first documented insights, trends and
themes emerging and further intensifying within the frontline battle faced by
journalists as a collective part of modern journalism practice in Australia.
To map the evolution of trolling within the Australian news media, thematic
content analysis, a descriptive collation, analysis, and presentation of qualitative
data (Anderson, 2007) was selected to analyse articles about trolling from three
prominent Australian news websites with different owners from 2009 to 2017:
smh.com.au; news.com.au; and abc.net.au. Using Google as a search tool, the
search inquiry site:smh.com.au "troll" -"movie" -"fishing" was applied to each of the
news websites. Analysis of more than three news websites fell beyond the scope
of this study. Results from this search provided a list of trolling-related news
articles. These articles were commonly journalists self-reflecting about their
trolling experiences, often from a feminist perspective. The frequency of articles
for each calendar month between January 2009 and December 2017 inclusively
were recorded for each news website, eliminating any articles unrelated to the
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research topic, providing quantitative raw data. The top three trolling-related
articles as ranked by Google search for each news website were identified and
recorded in Microsoft Word, providing qualitative raw data. Applying thematic
content analysis, suggested by Gering (2015) as an appropriate method for
arranging texts into a unified and generalised coding structure which, in turn, can
be transformed into a database, the 528 articles were coded onto an Excel
spreadsheet, using pattern code or open coding (Miles & Huberman, 1984, 1994;
Weerakkody, 2009). The raw data set was cleaned according to coding principles
for coding rigor before analysis and discussion.
4.1.1 Quantitative data results
To find patterns in media coverage, a histogram was created using Microsoft Excel,
plotting the frequency of trolling-related articles in the Australian news media
between 2009 and 2017. On the Y axis, the total number of news articles
containing the word ‘troll’ as listed by the Google search engine were recorded for
each calendar month, and further cleaned to remove any irrelevant articles from
the data set such as ‘fish trolling’. The data was displayed in monthly increments
along the X axis to allow for comparison between frequency spikes and notable
trolling incident dates. News.com is displayed orange, SMH in blue, ABC in green.
Figure 3
Frequency of Trolling Articles in the Australian News Media
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Note: The histogram displays the total number of trolling-related news articles
retrieved on the Google search engine for each month between 2009 and 2017.
Each graph is displayed in parallel for instant comparison. ABC, shown in green,
had the lowest frequency and was therefore displayed in the foreground of the
graph. SMH, shown in blue, had the second highest frequency and was therefore
placed in the middle ground of the graph. News.com, in orange, had the highest
frequency and was therefore displayed in the background of the graph.
A collection of 528 articles was selected for content analysis. Before reporting the
results of that study, data describing the set of articles was analysed. The line
graph below shows a comparison between the frequencies of SMH, News.com and
ABC trolling-related news articles in the thematic content analysis of this study.
Displayed in yearly increments on the X axis, a linear regression line was plotted
for each data set, indicating a positive correlation for each respective news
website, meaning the number of trolling articles increased across all three news
websites between 2009 and 2017.. SMH is displayed in blue, News.com in orange,
and ABC in green.
Figure 4
Frequency of Trolling Related News Articles in the Thematic Content Analysis of
this Study
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Note: The data does not present the total number of trolling-related news articles
in the Australian news media. The line graph displays the frequency of trollingrelated news articles identified in the thematic content analysis of this study each
year between 2009 and 2017.
Trendlines from the above graph show the data set is not ‘normalised’ and,
therefore, parametric tests would not generate any valid findings. Mumby (2002)
suggests parametric tests are considered by some academics to have more
statistical power than nonparametric tests. But Kitchen (2009) argues that
“nonparametric tests are much more powerful than their parametric counterparts
when the underlying distributions are heavy tailed or have extreme skewness” (p.
571) and this skewness is evident in the data distribution of this study.
Nonparametric tests that analyse median values, rather than mean values, are
therefore better suited for this dataset. Bryman and Cramer (2009) and Panik
(2012) consider nonparametric tests coupled with further qualitative analysis
suitable for social science studies such as this doctoral study.
The content of the identified trolling articles in the thematic content analysis was
further analysed to unpack details about the victims and the trolling comments
received. The gender of the trolling victims identified in the thematic content
analysis was analysed using the Mann-Whitney nonparametric test. The test was
conducted. However, the male trolling victims identified in the thematic content
analysis of this study scored 29.5 and the female trolling victims identified in the
thematic content analysis of this study scored 51.5 respectively, meaning the
gender distributions difference was not statistically significant (Mann–Whitney U
= 17, n1 = n2 = 9, P < 0.05 two-tailed).
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Figure 5
Gender Comparison of Trolling Victims in the Thematic Content Analysis of this
Study.

Female

118
(22%)

251

Male

(46%)
Redacted
Unknown
Gender
Identities

174
(32%)

Note: The data does not present the total number of trolling-related news articles
on the Google search engine. The pie graph displays a gender comparison of the
trolling-related news articles identified in the thematic content analysis of this
study each year between 2009 and 2017.
To illustrate victim gender frequencies, a pie chart, displayed in Figure 5, above
was created using Microsoft Excel. The pie chart above shows the ratio of trolling
victims in the thematic content analysis of this study to be 46% female, 32% male,
and 22% with their identity redacted. In the data-coding process, fourteen articles
contained both male and female victims. These fourteen articles were
subsequently included in the victim count for both genders, and one article
contained a transgender person, and was included in the count for the gender they
identified as, in this case female. Genders of 22% of trolling victims mentioned in
the 528 articles are unknown, as they were not identified in original published
article, or had redacted their identification from the article by anonymising the byline after publication at the time of the thematic content analysis in 2017.
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The line graph below shows the frequency of trolling-related articles containing
rape threats in yearly increments between 2009 and 2017 and separated by
gender. Male victim gender is moderately correlated with rape threats (displayed
in blue), female victim gender is strongly correlated with rape threats (displayed
in pink), and 100% of the 118 redacted identities (displayed in grey) were
subjected to rape threats, indicating the strongest positive correlation.
Figure 6
Comparison of victim gender and frequency of rape threats in the thematic content
analysis of this study
35
Number of trolling related news articles in the thematic
content analysis of this study
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Timeline of the thematic content analysis from 2009 to 2017

Note: The data does not present the total number of trolling-related news articles
in the Australian news media. The line graph displays gender comparison of the
trolling-related news articles identified in the thematic content analysis of this
study each year between 2009 and 2017. Regression lines are not displayed
beyond 0 on the Y axis as a negative number of identified articles is not a
possibility.
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The line graph on the following page shows the frequency of trolling-related
articles of death threats over the same time period. Male and female positive
correlation pattern trends are reflected in both rape and death threat graphs.
However, the unknown gender trend shows a low positive correlation, with less
reported incidences.

Figure 7
Comparison of victim gender and frequency of death threats in the thematic
content analysis of this study
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Note: The data does not present the total number of trolling-related news articles
in the Australian news media, however, displays the gender comparison of the
trolling related news articles identified in the thematic content analysis of this
study each year between 2009 and 2017. Regression lines are not displayed
beyond 0 on the Y axis as a negative number of identified articles is not a
possibility.
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The study considered classifying some types of trolling as more harmful or severe
than other types as unethical, because all trolling is potentially harmful and can
have differing levels of impact depending on the receiver’s personality and life
experiences, their level of support, and the frequency of attacks. Therefore, the
data set was coded into two categories of ‘insults’ and ‘threats of physical attack’.
Trolling content considered sexist, misogynist, body shaming, homophobic,
ableist, political or racist were categorised as ‘insults’, and trolling content
containing rape and death threats were categorised as ‘threats of physical attack’.
The study does not suggest that one category is worse than the other but has
divided trolling articles into the two respective groups for the purpose of
describing a pattern in the data set.
Excluding victims with redacted identities, binary logistic regression was used to
analyse the remaining 425 victims. The results indicate that female victims are
significantly more likely to receive insults than male victims: Female (χ2(1)
=1.246, p < 0.001) Male (χ2(1) = -0.124, p = 0.177). The results also indicate that
female victims are significantly more likely to receive threats of physical attack
than male victims: Female (χ2(1) =1.246, p < 0.001) Male (χ2(1) = -0.124, p =
0.729).
However, with 22% of victims with redacted gender identities (totalling 118
people), the above results may not truly reflect the scope of the gender imbalance
in being subjected to different types of trolling. Although results regarding this
portion of data are not definitive, trend patterns can be reported for further
analysis, comparison, and discussion about the extent of the problem. Of the 22%
portion of redacted gender identities, Pearson’s correlation coefficient indicated a
positive correlation between the number of trolling articles containing:
•

rape and death threats, r = 0.832, n = 528, p < 0.001

•

rape and sexist comments, r = 0.489, n = 528, p < 0.001

•

rape and misogynist/anti-feminist comments, r = 0.337, n = 528, p < 0.001

•

rape and body shaming comments, r = 0.252, n = 528, p < 0.001

•

rape and homophobic comments, r = 0.172, n = 528, p < 0.001

This data suggests a significant portion, and possibly all, of the redacted gender
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identities are likely to be female, further shifting the gender skew.
Figure 8
A significant portion of the 118 victims with redacted gender identities are likely to
be female
Correlations of redacted gender identities
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Note: The positive correlations between articles containing rape threats in
addition to death threats, sexist comments, misogynist/anti-feminist comments,
body shaming or homophobic comments are highlighted in red.
4.1.2 Quantitative thematic analysis
Frequency
The histogram in Figure 3 (on p. 40) provides a visual representation of the
emergence of trolling in the Australian news media. The first notable spike in
September 2012 followed the attempted suicide of Charlotte Dawson on August
30, 2012. From then onwards, the term ‘troll’ snowballed until it was featuring
frequently in mainstream media dialogue by the conclusion of 2017. The
histogram also describes visual discrepancies between the three Australian news
websites of the thematic content analysis with News.com publishing the most
trolling related articles across the time-period totalling 839 articles, followed by
the SMH with 644 articles, and notably far less frequently was the ABC totalling
250 articles. The thematic content analysis revealed News.com and the SMH often
published trolling related articles quicker than the ABC due to an eagerness to
publish news stories first. The importance of timeliness as a news value is evident
throughout the news reporting techniques of the SMH and News.com, with
successive articles often accumulating on the same trolling topic as additional
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updates transpired. The ABC habitually provides a rich descriptive reporting
technique, publishing articles less quickly but with more detail, including multiple
comments and content from sources (Jolly, 2014).
Consistencies in the data shape of the three news websites suggest the number of
trolling topics may be similar, however the number of corresponding articles to
each trolling topic may vary due to differences in news reporting styles. The linear
regression trendlines in Figure 4 (on p. 41) reflects a positive relationship,
indicating the existence of the dependent variable: the frequency of trolling
related articles, and the independent variable: time. It is important to highlight
that regression analysis does not suggest a cause-and-effect relationship between
the variables but does indicate the extent to which variables are associated with
each other.
Gender
The pie chart in Figure 5 (on p. 43) provides a visual representation of the trolling
victim gender imbalance, with 46% of trolling victims in the thematic content
analysis of this study being female, and 32% male. From a feminist perspective,
these numbers alone are alarming and evidence the misogynistic online culture
described by West (2015), Ford (2017), Noyes (2017), Ryan (2014), Keep (2012)
and Evans (2011). However, by unpacking the data, a potentially greater
imbalance is revealed. 22% of the trolling related articles had redacted the
victim’s identity in 2017 when the thematic content analysis data was gathered,
and consequently exact gender analysis was not possible. These articles were
commonly journalists self-reflecting about their trolling experiences, often from a
feminist perspective.
By analysing trolling content in the 528 online articles, the study can begin to
compare the potential victim impact of trolling experienced by people of different
genders. The data indicates females are more likely to receive trolling rape threats,
with 52 females and 13 males receiving comments of this nature. The data reveals
100% of the 118 gender redacted victims were subjected to rape threats, inferring
a significant portion of this gender population may possibly be female, further
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skewing the gender imbalance. The line graph in Figure 6 (on p. 44) additionally
supports this interpretation, with the female line graph reaching a climax in 2016
and then falling in 2017, yet the male and redacted genders trolling frequencies
both continue to rise. This abnormal decline in the number of recorded female
victims receiving rape threats may indicate the time when female victims began
to redact their identity due to the overwhelming impact of these comments,
therefore subtracting from the female overall incidence rate and distorting the
true gender imbalance. The line graph in Figure 7 (on p. 45) shows female victims
are more likely to receive death threats in comparison to male victims. This
supports the inference that a significant portion of the redacted gender population
may be female, because the same abnormalities of data preceding 2016 is evident
where the female trend again shows an unexpected decline when both the male
and redacted gender victims continue to rise.
In summary, the binary logistic regression results suggest trolling content
categorised by this study as either ‘insults’ or ‘threats of physical attack’ are more
likely to be received by female victims. Furthermore, when the three coalescing
dynamics are considered:
•

the female victim linear regression trendlines in Figure 6 (on p. 44) and
Figure 7 (on p. 45)

•

thematic content analysis data showing 100% of the 118 redacted victim
gender population were subjected to rape threats, and

•

Pearson’s correlation coefficient table in Figure 8 (on p. 47) indicating a
positive correlation between rape threats and death threats, rape threats
and sexist comments, rape threats and feminist comments, rape threats
and body shaming, and rape threats and homophobic comments.

The data infers a significant portion of the redacted gender population may be
female. Although inferences regarding this redacted gender portion of the data are
not definitive, it is important to consider that if a significant portion of the
redacted gender population is female as this study proposes, initial findings may
not reflect the true scope of the gender imbalance.
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4.1.3 Qualitative data results – a timeline of events
From the thematic content analysis of this study, a timeline of key trolling events
in the Australian news media emerged, with phases of development identified as
follows:
Embryonic period (1982 to 1999)

Page 52

From the introduction of the internet in 1982 to the introduction
of Web 2.0 in 1999.
Incubation period (1999 to 2006)

Page 52

From the introduction of Web 2.0 to the introduction of Twitter
in 2006.
Manifestation period (2006 to November 2011)

Page 53

From the introduction of Twitter in 2006 to the viral antitrolling campaign #mencallmethings by Sady Doyle on Twitter
in November 2011.
Social problem period (November 2011 to February 2014)

Page 55

From the viral anti-trolling campaign #mencallmethings by
Sady Doyle on Twitter in November 2011 to the suicide of
Charlotte Dawson in February 2014.
Social epidemic period (February 2014 to June 2016)

Page 61

From the suicide of Charlotte Dawson in February 2014 to the
election campaign of Donald Trump in June 2016.
Saturation period (June 2016 to December 2017)

Page 62

From the election campaign of Donald Trump in June 2016 to
the conclusion of the thematic content analysis in December
2017.
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Chronological timeline of the evolution of trolling in the Australian news media derived from chapter 4.1 data

Figure 9

4.1.4 Qualitative thematic analysis
In order to describe the evolution of trolling in the Australia news media, a
timeline was constructed. Key events were identified to map the shape of the
emergence of trolling, from which time periods were created for further analysis
and discussion.
Embryonic period (1982 to 1999)
The embryonic period is identified as the time period prior to the introduction of
Web 2.0 in 1999. In this period, the interactive internet was in its embryonic state
and the key interactive functions of Web 2.0 required for trolling of journalists to
emerge were limited. ABC Online launched its first website in 1995; however, it
was not until 1997 that its first online discussion forum was introduced, followed
by the New York Times in 1996, and BBC Online in 1997. The rise of the bulletin
board system and forums emerged as a mechanism for interactivity and critique
of journalists. News transition from print to online has been the focus of research
since the 1990s, and although online news has been considered the “logical
successor” to print (Bowd, 1997, p. 58), the presence of both formats in the
current media landscape suggests there is some overlap in the progression from
paper to online news. The ability to include vast amounts of news and information
and distribute this information efficiently without the time constraints and
geographical restrictions print news entails, are notable strengths of the online
domain.
Incubation period (1999 to 2006)
The incubation period is identified as the time period from the introduction of Web
2.0 in 1999 to the launch of Twitter in 2006, which includes the launch of
Facebook in 2004. This period saw an explosion of forums and later commenting
sections as news media moved to a blogging style template for interaction. At this
point, the technology was struggling with the interactive functions of Web 2.0, but
interactive capacity was limited by the underdevelopment of social media
platforms in existence. It emerged that guidelines were needed to keep online
interactions with journalists civil during the time-period that Margo Kingston
edited WebDiary for The Sydney Morning Herald in July 2000 (WebDiary, 2020).
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Potential perpetrators, therefore, had the technological advancements to troll;
however, there were extremely limited platforms on which to interact with
victims. O’Sullivan and Heinonen (2008) outline the internet as a fast-evolving
field, presenting unexplored areas and changing conditions for research analysis.
However, there was a lack of research during the early stages of the incubation
period, and this enabled trolling to emerge as an unforeseen symptom of the swift
progression to unexplored interactive environments.
Manifestation period (2006 to November 2011)
Reciprocal functions of Web 2.0 redefined journalism and news transitioned from
a linear process to a two-way communication model (O’Sullivan & Heinonen,
2008), in which readers could respond instantaneously, immersed in an
interactive environment. This shift in the function of journalism enabled by new
technology was called participatory journalism by Reich (in Singer et all, 2011)
who spoke about user-generated content become part of the product that news
organisations distributed. “Some journalists described comments as a necessary
evil. Comments, they felt, were necessary to attract audiences and thus survive
financially. But comments also were evil because their standards of expression
were seen as intolerable” (p. 103). Although news organisations were adapting to
the new world of participatory journalism that encouraged reader input, this
process enabled negative feedback as well as positive. In this time-period, news
environments were predominantly designed to engage readers more than
traditional media sources had. Vine (2012) claimed newsrooms initially regarded
interactivity as a beneficial technique to news distribution: “editors appear to be
enthusiastic about social networking capabilities, and are embracing, or ready to
embrace, interactivity such as that offered by Facebook and Twitter” (p. 170).
However, they did not yet foresee the emergence of trolling and the impacts this
would bring. News websites initially encouraged readers to use interactive
features including ‘share’, ‘like’, ‘follow’ and ‘comment’ in response to their
articles, enabling readers with similar interests to connect. Subsequently, this
interactivity promoted and increased the readership of a given article. Falling
advertising revenues have resulted in media organisations having to work harder
to build loyal readerships and create an audience to respond to advertising, in
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order to keep the business model afloat. New media tactics are, therefore,
attractive to publishers due to their contribution to revenue. In 2014, Carey
described the two-way communication model as having “high levels of perceived
satisfaction” (p. 121) and links this to higher news readership retention rates:
Many news companies have recognised the potential of
harnessing social media interactivity to increase exposure
to news stories and create online following . . . many
researchers have placed interactivity among the key
components necessary to understand new media
technologies. (Carey, 2014, p. 119)
At this time, interactivity was highlighted as a crucial factor promoting an article
to its target audience. As a result, newsrooms monitored communications to
structure and refine future articles to those best received by the public to ensure
maximum readership exposure. The dynamic relationship that a comment stream
enabled provided readers with a sense of importance and created a rapport
between the reader and news provider. This continues, to some extent, to present
day. It does this by allowing readers to express their opinions and to provoke
conversation with other members of the public. This often prompts an exchange
of ideas and/or public debate in an open online forum. In the manifestation period,
this was the exact function from which trolling would emerge.
The manifestation period is identified as the time-period preceding the 2006
launch of Twitter and Facebook. Twitter was launched first and is a popular, userfriendly platform where online interaction could occur instantaneously on a
global scale. Twitter engendered the required elements of technological
advancements, coupled with the widespread public uptake, from which trolling
stemmed and flourished. In this time-period, the term ‘trolling’ first emerged in
Australian news media published by the SMH in July 2009, by News.com
September 2009, followed by the ABC in February 2010. Trolling content within
the manifestation period was sporadic, and the term was not yet comprehensively
understood. Trolling began to appear concurrently in the Australian legal system
in this time-period, with the first arrested Australian troll, Bradley Paul Hampson,
charged in May 2010, and jailed in March 2010 for posting child porn on tribute
pages for dead children. Disparate academic discussion on the issue emerged in
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2011, yet academic literature was still developing (Seelhoff, 2007; Singer et al,
2011).
Social problem period (November 2011 to February 2014)
The social problem period emerged as a critical phase of the trolling evolution and
established key themes for comprehensive analysis. The central factors that arise
out of this time-period are interactivity, the gatekeeping role, viral news, and
celebrity theory, which are further discussed and critiqued below.
Interactivity hinders the gatekeeping role of journalists
In this time-period, interactivity ruptured the journalist’s gatekeeping role, and
this was the defining factor of the social problem period. The gatekeeping role is
documented extensively in journalism education texts. Errington and Miragliotta
(2011) outline the three main functions of journalism: to act as a “political
watchdog”, “information provider”, and “facilitator of the public sphere” (p. 8).
The third function is of particular interest in relation to the interactivity of new
media where social media websites provided the platform for interaction between
journalists and their audiences, thus enabling and encouraging unhindered
conversations. In this time-period, interactive new media consolidated its role as
a facilitator of the third function of journalism. Globalisation has connected people
on a universal scale and academic discussions suggest interactivity is not a mere
strength of new media but an essential part of its fundamental purpose (Errington
& Miragliotta, 2011; Larsen, 2014). Comment streams are discussed in the
newsrooms responses in chapter 4.6 and continue to play an active role in this
function and are suggested as an important part of journalistic democracy.
Journalist Larsen (2014) discussed the growing extent to which this function was
being implemented and how it was perceived by the public and workplace
journalists: “the internet has democratised the art of critique . . . the removal of
media and publishing gatekeepers has increased the number of diverse voices
being heard and opened up more issues” (para. 3). Larsen (2014) claimed twoway communication models in relation to news distribution, such as comment
streams, allow the public to publish unmonitored content. This is echoed in Suler’s
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(2004) Online Disinhibition Effect research that suggested the “atmosphere and
philosophy (of the ungoverned internet) contributes to the minimising of
authority” (p. 324). With fewer, or no, trained journalists effectively performing
their role as the gatekeepers, Larsen (2014) warned that this function is subject
to abuse. Others claimed it has led to the rise of trolling itself, raising questions
about the gatekeeping role. Domingo et al (2008) suggested issues such as trolling
will inevitably arise if “the gatekeeper role is not maintained and enforced by
professional routines and conventions that are said to guarantee quality and
neutrality of institutional journalism” (p. 325), an assertion also supported by
Reese and Ballinger (2001), Shoemaker (1991) and Singer (2005). However, as
news moved online, the application of this function became difficult to enforce.
The debate between industry professionals still exists about both the need for, and
application of, the gatekeeper function. Steyn (2015) advocates for reducing
journalist’s function as gatekeepers, citing Bill Gates saying, “the internet is
becoming the town square for the global village of tomorrow” (para. 1), and
highlights that the new global workplace should be embraced, not restricted.
Cassidy (2006), however, notes that the “gate keeping theory. . . is certainly one of
the most enduring in mass communication research” (p. 6) and suggests that it
may continue to be so.
Gatekeeping is possible on websites that media companies own or control, where
a news organisation owns their URL and to some extent their Facebook and
Twitter accounts. The gatekeeping role is important, firstly, to reduce the risk of
defamation, contempt of court, racial vilification, obscenity, and harassment as
well as the other legal risks associated with being a publisher. Facebook has
created a management tool a user may select, where prior consent is required for
another person to post content on his or her own account. Most popular social
media websites including Facebook and Twitter continually update their user
functions and policies to counterbalance negative impacts of the interactive
environment as they arise, a theme addressed in Questions D and E of this study.
However, queries are raised here as to how much employers do control and
should control what their employees say on social media. Conflicting opinions
abound: “trolling with the intent to encourage active debate, without a pre-
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determined malicious nature, is a healthy part of the public sphere’ (Funnell, 2012,
p. 15); academic dialogue evaluates the importance of free speech counter
arguments (Koerner, 2013; Savage, 2014) with Hylton (2014) saying, “freedom of
speech does not mean freedom from consequences, just because you (may) have
the legal right to speak your mind, does not entitle you to say whatever you want”
(para. 1). However, in a media world with a nascent community of social media
editors performing the role of gatekeepers attempting to manage characters
wearing the masks of anonymity protesting about their rights to free speech, legal
consequences were difficult to enforce. This topic is further unpacked in Question
G of this study in chapter 4.7.
The emergence of viral anti-trolling campaigns
Here, amongst interactivity and functionality debates, the social problem period is
identified as the time-period from November 2011 when trolling was thrust into
the Australian news media headlines by feminist Sady Doyle’s (2011)
#mencallmethings anti-trolling campaign (Griffin, 2011). Doyle originally
published the campaign in 2009 on the feminist blog website Tiger Beatdown
(Doyle, 2009) but received minimal media traction at that time (Gibson, 2011),
falling in the manifestation period where only sporadic examples existed, and the
term ‘trolling’ had not yet been identified within popular discourse as a social
problem. However, in the social problem period two years later, the two key
ingredients of timing and increased public interest were topical and the campaign
went viral, pushing widespread criticism and debate into the community
discourse of Australian living rooms, workplaces, and schools. Sady Doyle can be
considered a pioneer of the anti-trolling revolution, who other notable public
figures emulated, simultaneously challenging trolls by speaking out and initiating
awareness campaigns.
Workplace and public backlash
In this social problem period, Australian radio host Kyle Sandilands was publicly
accused of trolling and through intensive public backlash, lost a $2 million annual
Holden sponsorship (Dixon & Waters, 2011). This is a clear example of trolling’s
high social importance at this time. Amidst this period, a defining event occurred
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in August 2012, when tv presenter Charlotte Dawson attempted suicide after a
Twitter exchange with Monash University employee Tanya Heti, who told Dawson
to "go hang yourself” (Lee, 2012). Heti was immediately suspended by her
employer, demonstrating that employers and institutions were recognizing what
was at the time called cyber-bullying, as a danger and as an unacceptable
workplace behaviour. This key event demonstrated the sheer enormity of trolling
impacts, which by now were universally recognised to spill from the virtual into
the real world. This event resulted in global headline news, contributing to
international awareness and discussion of the social problem. Shortly after,
Dawson arose as the #SayNoToBullying campaign ambassador, publicly
recognised as an Australian role model and trolling victim speaking out against
cyber bullying and mental health (Connelly et al, 2012). The important role
Dawson played in shaping the way trolling was discussed in the Australian news
media is unpacked in the next few paragraphs, via contextualization in celebrity
theory.
Celebrity theory
Globalisation of news media has transformed celebrities from admired
personalities to powerful agents of social change, with extensive reach across
socioeconomic, political, and cultural boundaries (Brown & Fraser, 2003). During
the past 50 years, academic literature has observed that those who wield the
greatest social influence have evolved from being traditional heroes such as
political, religious, and military leaders, to being celebrities (in many western
cultures) (Boorstin, 1961; Braudy, 1986; Campbell, 1988; Gamson, 1994). Widely
documented links with advertising success infest universal celebrity theory, with
mass media platforms enabling consumer awareness and encouraging favourable
attitudes towards endorsed products (Atkin & Block, 1983; Freiden, 1984;
Friedman & Friedman, 1979; Kamins, 1990; Tripp, Jensen, & Carlson, 1994).
According to Monbiot (2016), when leveraged as “powerful means of persuasion”
(Brown & Fraser, 2003, p. 99), actors and models now receive disproportionate
attention, “capturing much of the space once occupied by people with their own
ideas” (para. 8). Marketing literature refers to the “halo effect” around celebrities,
where people have a very positive view of celebrities; and when products or
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particular health practices are recommended or endorsed, the golden glow of the
celebrity is transferred to the products or practice (Howard, 2017, para. 50).
Economic literature recognises the concept of “signalling,” where celebrity
endorsements are employed to clarify optimal products in a saturated
marketplace, providing a cognitive shortcut to an otherwise very complicated
decision (para. 51). Although a number of scholars addressed the influence of
celebrities on culture from an historical-critical perspective (Boorstin, 1961;
Braudy, 1986; Gamson, 1994), very few communication theorists and researchers
have systematically explored the effects of celebrities on individual and social
values, beliefs and behaviour (Brown & Fraser, 2003, p. 97), an emerging role of
the celebrity in the digital age.
The cultural obsession with celebrity does not “lie quietly beside personal values,
it takes their place” (Monbiot, 2016, para. 5). Emerging celebrities are becoming
the dominant social leaders of our time, influencing prosocial and antisocial
behavioural norms mirrored by and reflected in society (Xu, Reijnders & Kim,
2021). Now recognised by both profit and non-profit organisations (Brown &
Fraser, 2003), the celebrity role has evolved from endorsed product promotion to
social beliefs and behaviour influence. “When celebrities speak, it seems the world
listens, even when it comes to personal and public health” (Howard, 2017, para.
1). A prominent, measurable example was Charlie Sheen’s HIV-positive
announcement on the 17th of November 2015. Research by Ayers et al (2016)
found Sheen's public announcement corresponded with 1.25 million people
searching HIV-related information on Google, the greatest number ever recorded
in the United States, and sales of in-home HIV-testing kits simultaneously reaching
record highs. Howard (2017) points out that although “the findings show a
correlation, not a direct causation” (para. 17), this case study is notable in the
annals of celebrity theory, as Sheen (2015) did not make an immediate call to
action for the public to get tested or use condoms, and public health groups did
not use him as a face to raise HIV awareness. However, this swiftly but organically
manifested in social culture. By contrast, a similar HIV announcement by
American basketball star Majic Johnson in 1991, when Internet use was limited
and HIV was less familiar, only spurred questions and conversations, and no
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measurable public action resulted. The notable discrepancies in the 1991 lack of
action, and 2015 action in response to similar HIV announcements highlight the
new celebrity role: to empower and facilitate social change, supported by the
popularity and increased use of the Internet. In an additional example, Angelina
Jolie's 2013 double mastectomy announcement (Payne, 2013) appears to have
had a positive influence on public health through breast cancer awareness, despite
possibly influencing an uptick in expensive, unnecessary genetic testing for the
rare BRCA1 gene (Howard, 2017, para. 20). Typically, public health advertising
uses “top-down strategies” (para. 54) with the most effective messages believed
to come from the experts at the top of the information hierarchy. However, both
Sheen in 2015 and Jolie in 2013 are examples of organic media events, amongst
others, that defy the “top-down strategies,” suggesting social messages are best
received by the public when they come from the bottom, from people who are not
health experts. Howard (2017) further suggests “when celebrities speak out about
health-related issues, it resonates (with the public) because they are speaking as
humans, with just as much vulnerability to health impacts as anyone else” (para.
53). While evidently not qualified as doctors, in recent years celebrities have
managed to assert both positive and negative impacts, whether intentionally or
not, on societal attitudes towards public health and discourse. Eight of the 528
articles in the thematic content analysis of this study mentioned Charlotte
Dawson, who emerged who emerged as a key celebrity who pioneered the
emergence of broad public awareness, contributed to discourse, and altered in a
positive, exponential nature the shape of trolling awareness in the Australian
news media.
Celebrities are often vital components of entertainment education campaigns.
Since the objective of the entertainment education communication strategy is to
increase knowledge of a personal or social need, influence attitudes, or change
overt behaviour through entertainment (Singhal & Rogers, 1999) (Brown &
Fraser, 2003, p. 108). Two days after Dawson’s attempted suicide in 2012, she
became the ambassador of the #SayNoToBullying campaign, educating
adolescents, and the wider community, about the dangers of online interactions
and how to cope as a victim more effectively. Dawson was able to personalise a
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private issue, often endured alone, and through speaking out was able to connect
with the public beyond what the words of an educational campaign alone could
(Connelly et al, 2012). Brown and Fraser (2003) suggest “a celebrity can become
so closely identified with a social issue that the person and issue can become
synonymous” (p. 100). Some celebrities become central to communication
campaigns through their own personal tragedies or battles with disease, as in the
case of basketball player Earvin “Magic” Johnson, actor Michael J. Fox, and cyclist
Lance Armstrong (Brown & Fraser, 2003, p.109). Charlotte Dawson’s trolling is
another example of this link. The successful collaboration between celebrities and
educational campaigns has been a way to reduce the impact and occurrence of
trolling. Anti-trolling campaigns, and the use of celebrities, will be further
unpacked in Question C of this study in chapter 4.3.
Social epidemic period (February 2014 to June 2016)
Trolling was further thrust into the public spotlight after the February 2014
suicide of Charlotte Dawson as a result of trolling (Webb, 2014). Subsequently,
trolling emerged as a ‘hot topic’ for discussion and buzzword in news headlines,
opening conversations and debates about online cyber bullying. Although reports
had begun to emerge including UNESCO researchers Barton and Storm’s (2014),
Fernando (2014) and Friedersdorf (2014), the true scope of trolling-specific social
impacts on Australian journalists were not yet comprehensively understood by
the public. A social epidemic is defined as “a sudden, widespread occurrence of a
particular phenomenon” (Levine Grater, 2009, para. 3). Dawson’s 2014 suicide
was a catalyst for an exponential increase in trolling articles in the Australian
news media, as demonstrated by the thematic content analysis raw data in this
chapter. Trolling emerged as a buzzword with widespread use in popular
discourse, but this also resulted in a diluted meaning. The understanding of the
term evolved to a less specific association with any form of unwelcomed online
interaction, such as persistent disagreement with political views, rather than
referring to a deliberate and sustained online attack. Also in this period, the
gendered nature of trolling became evident with reports by the Media
Entertainment Arts Alliance (2016), Pew Research Centre (Duggan, 2017) and
Gender Equity Victoria and Media Entertainment Arts Alliance (2019)
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documenting women were trolled more than men. These conversations revealed
the extremes of intense vitriol being shared online and subsequent victim impacts,
and this further amplified the sense that trolling had become a social epidemic.
Key events in this period include:
•

In August 2014, the Gamergate saga sparked one of the most infamous and
vicious trolling attacks ever reported, when in the context of the high
pressure Silicon Valley game industry, Eron Gjon, the ex-boyfriend of
gaming developer Zoe Quinn, posted her public information on his blog,
which inadvertently started the gaming-industry culture war (Grow,
2015).

•

In February 2015, Lindy West published an article in The Guardian, What
happened when I confronted my cruellest troll, inspiring this research study
(West, 2015).

•

In June 2015, Clementine Ford posted a nude photo of herself with “Hey
#Sunrise get fucked” written across her chest, accusing Sunrise of victim
blaming. This prompted 20-year-old troll Ryan Hawkins to call her "lesbian
scum" and threaten on Facebook to rape and bash her. His threats made
international news and prompted discussions about victim impacts and
potential legal ramifications as Ford pressed criminal charges (Ford,
2015).

•

In August 2015, Former federal Labor leader Mark Latham resigned as a
columnist for Fairfax Media’s Australian Financial Review after being outed
for trolling several prominent Australian female journalists including
Annabel Crabb, Mia Freedman, Leigh Sales and Lisa Wilkinson (Di Stefano,
2015).

Saturation period (June 2016 to December 2017)
The research identified the saturation period as commencing with Donald Trump’s
2016 election campaign and victory. During this year, the term troll flooded global
news media, and the meaning of the term broadened. Trump used Twitter to an
extent never seen before in an election of this scale, sharing what was often called
out by others to be false information. In 2016, major publications headlines
included The New Yorker’s: Trolls for Trump, The Guardian’s: Invasion of the troll
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armies, from Russian Trump supporters to Turkish state stooges, and The
Washington Post’s: How the trolls won 2016. These were part of a tsunami of
concerned journalism and commentary about the role internet contributors had
played in democratic processes further echoed by the then Prime Minster Julia
Gillard’s intervention with social media companies that played a major role in
opening up the debate publicly (Hunt, Evershed & Liu, 2016). However, increased
media traction of trolling resulted in a dilution of the meaning of the term, and
concern about electoral impacts diverted attention from victim impacts. The
meaning of trolling shifted from a deliberate online attack on a person to a broader
meaning including sharing fake news. However, victims continued to feel impacts
prompting Jezebel writers such as Lindy West to leave Twitter declaring in January
2017, that Twitter is "unusable for anyone but trolls, robots and dictators” (West,
2017). In the same month, Australian journalist Jenny Noyes called for women to
hold a Twitter strike in support of West (2017). This led to some journalists
leaving the platform. The tsunami of coverage and dilution of meaning made it no
longer feasible to continue the content analysis process used to this point without
compromising the reliability of the analysis.
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Chapter 4.2
Impacts
Results and Discussion
Responses to in-depth interviews with ten trolled journalists in
2015
Question B - What are the impacts on trolled journalists in the Australian news
media?
The study provides some of the first comprehensive analysis of the dangers faced
by many Australian journalists working in the news media. The study describes
the types of violence and threats journalists often encounter daily and considers
how these incidents affect their ability to conduct their journalism practice.
Identified emerging trends from reported incidents reveal the extent of emotional
and behavioural impacts, and suggestions aim to improve the ways in which the
safety concerns of journalists are addressed.
The research design strategy applied mixed methods of thematic content analysis
and in-depth interviews. A deliberate network sample was made of ten industry
professionals, between the ages of twenty-three and sixty-five, five males and five
females. Each had at least five years’ experience in the journalism field, selfselected as being a trolling victim and willingly offered their experiences. These
participants were selected for semi-structured interviews of approximately an
hour duration. The participants were asked questions about their personal
experiences with trolling in the journalism industry. Participants reflected on any
negative personal impacts, identified any workplace support systems in place and
specified any personal training they received from university or their employers.
Responses were then analysed for emerging themes in synthesis with respective
theoretical frameworks for discussion and critique. As qualitative responses
reached a point of saturation, ten victim impact interviewees were considered
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adequate to frame the personal and professional implications of trolling in the
Australian news media.
4.2.1 In-depth interview results
Qualitative and quantitative data results from in-depth interviews indicate that all
participants reported a level of distress after their trolling experience. However,
the intensity of personal impacts varied between participants, indicated by
differences in the wording and tone of individual responses. While responses to
some questions were unanimous, responses to other questions were diverse, and
emerging themes can be identified from the data to present a collective narrative
of participants’ responses. The following findings display the study’s theoretical
approach and group the interview responses within these emerging themes.
Comments presented in this section have been edited for concision and to ensure
anonymity.
The emerging themes identified from the in-depth interviews include: the
prevalence of trolling, emotional impacts, behavioural impacts, newsroom
impacts, and future impacts. These themes were reflected upon and linked within
the study’s theoretical framework. The study found that feminist activists first
spoke out about trolling to acknowledge the emotional and behavioural impacts
and spotlight trolling as a significant social problem that required action from
stakeholders at multiple levels. By 2016 when trolling was established as a social
problem, the content analysis of 528 news articles from chapter 4.1 showed the
focus of news content shifted from advocacy for change, to more systemic
reporting of how stakeholder groups were responding. Although the feminist
critical paradigm encompasses all themes because it identifies the overarching
patriarchy, the infographic below marks the shift in the focus from feminist
activism, to a systems approach as displayed below.
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Figure 10
Identified emerging themes linked with theoretical framework

Participant responses to in-depth interview questions were grouped and
presented within the thematic categories below. This study’s definition of trolling
was outlined to participants before each interview commenced.
Prevalence of trolling
Asked if trolling had become prevalent in the Australian media industry, all ten
participants indicated that it had. These are some of their responses.
•

It’s becoming a very big issue.

•

I don’t think it’s probably right to accept that it’s going to happen as
people shouldn’t do it, but it is going to happen.

•

We cop quite a lot of abuse.

•

Trolling itself has become a significant issue.

•

It’s more prominent than ever before.

•

It’s part and parcel of the job.

•

Trolling is evident everywhere you look really.

When asked how many times they had personally experienced trolling, all 10
participants noted the ubiquitous nature of trolling in the journalism industry.
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Their experiences of trolling have been collated to provide quantitative data for
analysis. Figure 11 below illustrates their range of answers, with comments
highlighting the extent of trolling’s frequency, including:
•

It’s almost too high to count.

•

We cop a huge onslaught.

Figure 11
Frequency of trolling comments received by participants
How many times have you been trolled?
Once
Tens of times
Hundreds of times
Thousands of times

n=10
1
2
6
1

%
10
20
60
10

Trolling terminology
As the trolling examples discussed in the literature review included political
insults, rape threats and attacks based on appearance, participants were asked
what trolls had said to or about them. Their responses about the nature of the
comments or the target of the criticism are listed in Figure 12 and clustered into
categories in Figure 13 below.

Figure 12
Clustered trolling comments received by participants
Categorised trolling content
Appearance
Politics
Intelligence
Sexual promiscuity
Homophobia
Racism
Death threats
Rape threats

No of participants who mentioned each
category
5
4
4
3
3
2
2
1
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50
40
40
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30
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20
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Figure 13
Specific trolling content received by participants
Participant
1
2
3
4
5

6
7
8
9
10

Specific trolling terms and phrases received by participants coded into themes
fucking black cunt, left tard, fucking left tard, hand wringing left tard,
uneducated cunt, poof, white racist, prick, child fucker, cunt, fuck you, tosser,
get a life.
scrag, slut.
lefty scum, Tony Abott hater, typical Fairfax bullshit, typical Fairfax journo,
Fairfax propaganda.
skinny, homophobic, poofter, gay, pseudo.
fat, old, ugly, you have the worst teeth I have ever seen, dirty feminist, full of
dumb shit, booze loving slut, dyke, lessos, homosexuals, quifter, gay, poofterism
should be illegal, dyke answer me this why do you always dress like men, do
you not understand this is how poofters and dykes coax children into their
perverted way of life, you should seek a cure for your illness, how can anyone
listen to a man who sticks his dick in another man’s ass, as my favourite singer
the late great Frank Sinatra said female journalists are no better than two dollar
hookers that about sums you up, I think faggots like you love to be offended, it’s
strange how the poofter Muslims are trying to take over however being a
poofter in Muslim countries receives the death penalty, I hope you die, all you
need is a good cock up you, you’ll get my cock up you in a minute, you are
angling to get a root, delusional, mental illness, fake, cunt, misogynous, pathetic,
go get a real job.
slut, hoe, skank, worthless piece of shit.
fat, ugly.
do some work for a change you idiot.
lefty, idiot, retard, what would you know, get fucked, fuck head.
fat cunt, I hope you die, fuck you.

Trolling as a consequence of interactivity
All ten participants also linked the rise of trolling with the growth of online media.
Comments that highlight this include:
•

Trolling is like a bushfire that very easily runs out of control because of
the social media component.

•

Social media is used every day by almost everyone, so it’s quite
prevalent.

•

Social media has put us in direct contact with people we might describe
as trolls.

•

Trolls were out there before, sending nasty letters to newspapers that
would never have seen the light of the day. We now, as journalists, have
encountered them personally, almost daily, because of social media.

•

It’s a massive change as there was no social media when I began.

•

It is easier for people to do that these days as all they have to do is use
a keyboard and they can remain anonymous.
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•

Social media has enabled trolling to become more viable, and therefore
more prominent.

•

Trolling has only existed with the implementation of social media.

Asked which media platforms were used to troll them, participants gave the
answers illustrated in Figure 14 below.
Figure 14
Platforms that participants received trolling content on
Answers
Twitter
Facebook
Comment Streams
Email
Telephone

No of participants who mentioned each platform
10
10
9
7
3

%
100
100
90
70
30

Emotional impacts of trolling
Asked about specific instances of trolling and their emotional effects, all of the
participants spoke freely, some cried as they related the stories, and all spoke with
emotional pauses and inflection as they described the events and impact.
Comments illustrating a moderate distress level include:
•

At this point I was fairly emotionally run out… someone suggested for
me to inform the police, so I did.

•

I do get really depressed about the state of humanity.

•

In a personal sense, I felt a little affected by it.

•

I know rationally that that hate is coming from an internal place of selfloathing, it’s not about me, it’s about them. They have a way at hitting
you at your lowest, I guess, so that was shit.

•

Here’s me, writing about Tony Abbott who is quite manly, and he’s
doing a charity bike ride which is a very manly thing, so it was a rogue
attack at my personal appearance, as I am myself quite petite in a way,
I’m not a big guy, and you can see that in my profile picture, so people
took it upon their selves to insult me for that.
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•

At the time I took it quite badly but in hindsight it probably wasn’t a
huge deal.

•

It’s difficult not to take it to heart, but you mustn’t.

Comments illustrating a high distress level include:
•

This man has sent me rape threats before, this man has had a past
history, and he’d been up in court for racist remarks, how horrific.

•

I came home in tears that day.

•

The emails were getting progressively more unpleasant, and I began to
question whether or not I could handle it.

•

I literally said fuck this and walked away from the business. I went away
to the south coast and surfed every day. I still had to work every day,
but I took some time to get my head around how to best deal with it and
what we can do better.

•

There was one who said I have the worst teeth I have ever seen. That
really got to me, as I wasn’t really confident with my smile, I needed
braces but never got any. I mean I’m a 40-year-old fairly confident
woman who isn’t usually bothered by those things, but I went to the
toilet and cried after that.

•

It was so intense and such a huge onslaught; I couldn’t even follow most
of it as I simply couldn’t keep up with the emails let alone the social
media chain.

All ten respondents suggested they had become emotionally hardened over time
indicating the development of a coping strategy as supported by research findings
of Masullo et al (2020) and Martin and Murrell (2020). Some comments that
illustrate this include:
•

I’m used to getting attacked by The Australian or the conservative press
almost every day now. I’ve become immune to it.

•

I now have the opposite reaction [to feeling distressed], I actually enjoy
it, I get a genuine kick when readers flip out about something I wrote.

•

It neither shocks nor bothers me frankly, I think people make too much
of a fuss about it.
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•

Not long term, we can all have a laugh about it.

•

It hasn’t bothered me as much as others I know

Behavioural impacts of trolling
All participants had changed their behaviour in some way as a result of being
trolled, suggesting current training and workplace support strategies are not
adequate. Such changes are illustrated as follows:
Personal behavioural changes
•

One participant joined the gym [after receiving insults about physique].

•

One participant considered cosmetic surgery.

Workplace behavioural changes
•

One participant started trolling the trolls themselves.

•

Four participants stopped checking social media.

•

One participant took two days off work after each of their articles is
posted.

•

One participant implemented a more caring and sensitive approach
towards sources.

•

One participant no longer enjoyed active debate online and no longer
interacted with readers online.

•

One participant had considered quitting.

Resilience as a journalist
All ten participants suggest the common advice of “don’t feed the trolls” is
inadequate. Seven participants stressed the need to be resilient as a journalist.
Comments that illustrate this include:
•

Harden up.

•

Don’t be too princess about it.

•

You need be thick skinned.

•

It’s easy enough to ignore it.
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Two participants suggested that, if a journalist is going to respond, they should
only engage with certain trolls. Comments that illustrate this include:
•

You need to learn to pick your battles.

•

It’s important to check their credibility before engaging in a critical
debate. Check their Twitter account first, if they have no followers or
have the little blue man as their profile, chances are they are a mindless
troll, rather than an opinionated member of the public.

Newsroom impacts of trolling
Trolling workplace training
All participants mentioned that there were no workplace support systems in place
for trolling specifically, with eight labelling this as inadequate. However, two
participants, both under 25 years old, said trolling was “briefly mentioned” as part
of their recent cadetship.
Comments illustrating that current workplace support strategies are not adequate
include:
•

I went and got drunk.

•

I said fuck this and I left work for a month to go surfing.

•

I don’t think anyone knows what the correct support system would be.

•

Trolling needs to be addressed on case-by-case scenario.

•

I’ve certainly had no training.

•

Trolling training, haha, what is that?

Trolling workplace support
None of the ten respondents sought specific counselling, diagnosis, or medication
in relation to their experiences, with only three participants being familiar with
the Dart Centre for Journalism and Trauma, a resource centre that conducts
seminars, training and support programs for journalists who cover violence,
conflict, and tragedy around the world.The most common support systems
utilised by all ten respondents were those of family, friends, and work colleagues.
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Future impacts of trolling
Educational impacts
Of the seven participants who went to university, none received any training
specifically in relation to trolling. Nine participants suggested that strategies for
coping with trolling should be included within the university curriculum.
Two comments that raised the issue of training for trolling were:
•

By saying that universities should implement more training would
mean that I know what they currently do, which I don’t... maybe they
need better viability for this stuff. Especially for those coming into a
higher profile role, there should be some sort of preparation, however
I don’t know how formal that needs to be.

•

I’m not sure if it’s needed specifically, it’s the same with any bullying,
and there is no one-size-fits-all answer.

Suggested future of trolling
All ten participants predicted that trolling is a part of the future of journalism. Six
participants suggested trolling frequency and intensity would increase, with some
comments, as follows:
•

I see a bright and vibrant future (said with irony)

•

It’s not going to die down anytime soon.

•

It’s not going away.

•

It feels as though it is getting worse.

•

I think trolling will grow with the growth of social media.

Three participants suggested it is going to continue at the acknowledged current
high frequency, with comments including:
•

I don’t see it’s getting any worse than it is now, I feel this may be our
peak; however, in the same breath, it’s not going to get any better any
time some.

•

I feel it’s probably going to stay the same, at least for the next while.

•

Well, it’s not going to go away anytime soon, but at the same time it’s
not new.
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One participant suggested it would fluctuate based on the political climate at the
time with the comment:
•

I do think it will fluctuate. For example, we are about to go into a
political campaign, so for political journalists it makes everything more
heated, so it will really take off over that official 6 to 8-week period and
then ease off. As a political journalist, it really depends on the political
environment at the time.

One participant did not provide any definitive answer, and speculated with the
comment:
•

I can’t predict the future but again people with these crazy opinions
have always existed.

4.2.2 Thematic analysis - a narrative of participants’ collective experiences
Prevalence of trolling
The collective experiences of participants were first observed from a functionalist
perspective, and then were observed with the addition of the feminist critical
theory perspective later. As a result, themes emerged from the data and are now
discussed in this thematic analysis section. A functionalist perspective would
argue that the anonymity provided by the internet presents a lack of negative
consequences for a troll, which contributes to the vast prevalence of explicit
trolling content online.
In 2015, when the interviews were conducted, examples of trolled Australian
journalists had only recently begun to surface throughout mainstream media
reporting as outlined in the literature review (on p. 24). Public acknowledgement
of the rising problem spilled from newsroom dialogue to open public debate,
asserting trolling as a prominent social issue. Although there was public
consensus about its presence within the online realm, the impacts of trolling were
a developing research area. Research by Stroud et al (2015) and Martin and
Murrell (2020) investigated expectations of journalists to be “resilient”, as
described by seven participants, and further discussed engagement with online
perpetrators. However, with all ten participants labelling trolling as a “significant”
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workplace problem and describing the suggestion to ignore trolls as an
“inadequate” coping strategy, the scope of the problem begins to materialise from
the data.
This is a crucial time-period in relation to the evolution of trolling because
multiple factors coincided in a ‘perfect storm’. These factors include: the timeperiod, developing research, no universally recognised response, leading to
trolled journalists feeling confused and overwhelmed. Participants were
interviewed at an important time-period in the evolution of trolling in the
Australian news media, with trolling having recently transitioned beyond the
social problem period, into the social epidemic period as described in the
emergence findings of this study. The thematic discussion section previously
defined this social epidemic period as a time that reflects a surge in frequency of
trolling related articles in the Australian news media. As the circulation of trolling
related academic research was limited in 2015, and with seventy percent of this
study’s participants experiencing trolling over one-hundred times individually, it
is understandable that nine of the participants felt “overwhelmed”, which can be
considered a fair reflection of the concerns of the greater community at this time.
All ten participants described trolling as a “significant” and/or “problematic”
workplace issue at the time, however, through subtleties in tone and phasing, two
participants suggested that trolling had become an accepted by-product of
Australian journalism practice, with Participant 3 reporting, “it’s part and parcel
of the job.” The frustration with increasing exposure to trolling as part of their
daily workplace environment, and a lack of refined knowledge of effective coping
strategies meant many of the first journalists such as Lindy West (2015) were
encouraged to speak out, writing and publishing their own personal experiences.
This pushed trolling discourse into mainstream public debate.
Anonymity provided by the internet
While some online aggression is not anonymous and is explained by Rost et al
(2016) who used social norm theory to explain why people “engage in online
firestorms in order to defend higher order moral principles” (p. 24). They claim
that non-anonymity helps to gain recognition, increases persuasive power, and
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mobilises followers. However, they acknowledge the widely held perceptions that
anonymity can exacerbate negative behaviour in online spaces. It is the position
that anonymity does play a part that was affirmed by the participants in this study.
One respondent emphasised the intensity of trolling provoked by its anonymous
nature and used the metaphor for trolling of “a bushfire that very easily runs out
of control.” This argument holds that the lack of negative consequences for the
troll intensifies trolling’s manifestation online.
Here, the two theoretical paradigms intersect and, in conjunction with one
another, frame the narrative of participants’ collective experiences.
Trolling terminology
Observing trolling from a feminist perspective, patriarchal trends emerging from
the data can begin to be unpacked. In a strategic network sample, half of the
selected participants were female to allow gender comparison with theoretical
reflection from the feminist paradigm. Distinct differences in the ferocity and
classification of trolling examples were reported by participants of differing
gender. All five female participants categorised their trolling experiences as
sexually demeaning, with “slut”, “hoe”, “skank” and “fat” being some of the
representative examples of trolling language, and one female participant further
describing a threat of rape, echoing anecdotal examples of such threats in the
literature review (Masullo Chen & Lu, 2019; Gardiner, 2018; Ryan, 2014; West,
2015). As distinct from accounts of patriarchal oppressive trolling by female
participants, rape threats were not reported by any male participants, with three
male participants reporting the political slur “left”, and two male participants
reporting the sexual orientation slur “poof”. Although it is important to note that
all trolling examples are deemed by this study as offensive, the data shows more
descriptive and vulgar language of a sexually explicit nature was directed towards
female participants.
Emotional impacts
The feminist and functionalist paradigms have both been considered when
discussing the emotional impacts of victims. However, the increased prevalence
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of trolling through interactivity and anonymity, as argued from the functionalist
paradigm, suggests emotional impacts will still arise regardless of gender. The
data reveals all five male, and five female participants reported a varied level of
emotional impact, from moderate to severe. Of the three participants who
reported high levels of distress, one was male, and disclosed, “I literally said fuck
this, and walked away from the business, I’m going away, and I went to the south
coast and surfed every day.” The data suggests emotional impacts of trolling are
not gender-specific, and can affect victims in different ways, causing varying levels
of distress.
While based on a small sample the findings show that all participants were
distressed by being trolled, female participants expressed higher levels of distress
linked with two crucial factors, an increased frequency of trolling coupled with
severe and vulgar content. This confirms the applicability of the feminist
paradigm. Findings suggest a combination of these two crucial factors provides
the highest level of distress and were experienced by predominantly female
participants. This high level of distress was evident in comments from two female
participants who admitted to crying as a result of being trolled. The findings from
these participants show emotional impacts were higher amongst females who
experienced the two crucial factors: severity and high frequency.
The data further revealed all participants felt the need to become emotionally
hardened over time as a coping strategy. Individual coping strategies suggested in
the data led into the next emerging theme, the behavioural impacts.
Behavioural impacts of trolling
In this section, the study’s three theoretical paradigms begin to work in unison,
with the addition of the third theoretical perspective, Ackoff’s systems theory
paradigm. Ackoff’s system theory suggests social problems can be broken down
into levels that can be individually addressed as part of the whole system. The
behavioural changes of the interviewed trolled journalists, such as changing their
physical appearance and removing themselves from online discussions, can be
seen as a part of this system in the infographic in Figure 15 below which illustrates
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the differing levels of the trolling system identified in this study.
Figure 15
Identified emerging themes within Ackoff’s systems model
FUTURE IMPACTS
•
•
•

overarching level

NEWSROOM
IMPACTS

support level

•

victim
level

Educational
Legal
Democracy and public
debate

Training and support

BEHAVIOURAL IMPACTS
•
•

Personal
Workplace

EMOTIONAL IMPACTS

Personal behavioural impacts
All participants reported behavioural changes that in some way reduced
interactions with readers as a result of being trolled. It is not only important to
highlight the participants’ physical behavioural changes, such as “joining a gym”,
but also their deeper underlying psychological changes. The psychological
impacts emerged due to the personal nature of the indepth-interview process. One
participant was comfortable enough to divulge her battle with self-esteem as a
direct impact of abuse categorised as appearance-based and revealed that she
contemplated cosmetic surgery. In the sample group of 10, the data indicated that
trolling categorised as appearance-based resulted in the highest level of personal
change, equally affecting male and female participants, with two participants’
admissions supporting this analysis.
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Workplace behavioural impacts
All participants reported a certain level of workplace behavioural change as a
result of being trolled. Moderate workplace changes included one participant
mentioning “they no longer enjoy active debate online” and “no longer interacted
with readers online”. Significant workplace changes included four participants
stating that they “no longer check their email”, a communication avenue many
professions are required to utilise daily, journalists being no exception. One
participant “took two days off work” and another participant “took a month off
work” after being trolled, which are additional examples of trolling related
distress adversely impacting upon journalism practice. The most serious
workplace behavioural change in the study was noted when one participant
further revealed they had “considered quitting” their job as a direct result of
trolling. This study has identified that to cease practicing as a journalist due to the
psychological and physical distress of trolling is considered the pinnacle or worstcase scenario and the most extreme potential workplace behavioural change as
supported by Jane’s (2015) work on online harassment as a workplace health and
safety issue. This systematic silencing of trolled journalists is labelled by Citron
(2014) as hate crime and adds to the sense of alienation from society. This
suppression of free speech, limited by decisions to “be more cautious”, “less vocal”
and “hold back on arguments” in response to trolling impacts both career
progression and the ability to play an equal part in society of affected journalists.
Seven participants reported the necessity of “resilience” as a workplace coping
strategy and an expected industry norm for journalists as supported by Martin
and Murrell (2020). When questioned on the effectiveness of resilience as a coping
strategy, all participants questioned its longevity in withholding trolling-related
distress. All participants labelled the commonly suggested advice “don’t feed the
trolls” as inadequate.
Newsroom training and support
All participants indicated they had changed their behaviour in some way as a
result of being trolled and would undertake further training and workplace
support strategies if offered. Regarding support, all participants mentioned there
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were “no workplace support systems in place for trolling” alone, with eight
participants further labelling this as “inadequate”. With an overwhelming
emphasis on the confusion brought about by having no universally agreed upon
and recommended newsroom response to trolling, one participant revealed they
“went and got drunk” as a coping strategy, with another reflecting his thoughts at
the time of the trolling in the comment: “I said fuck this and I left work for a month
to go surfing.” The most common support systems all ten respondents utilised
were that of family, friends, and work colleagues. The in-depth interviews
revealed that the support from family and friends was mostly on a personal and
emotional level.
Educational impacts
At the time of interviews (2015), the weight of trolling behavioural and workplace
impacts was not yet comprehensively understood in the industry, although
researchers such as Phillips (2015) and Reagle (2015) were starting to reveal the
extend of the issue. However, the significant need for the consideration and
inclusion of trolling in journalism education was not reflected in the common texts
used as a teaching basis for the multiple journalism courses taught in various
Australian universities. Two of the youngest participants, both under 25 years old,
said trolling was “briefly mentioned” as part of their recent cadetship, indicating
trolling was beginning to be recognised as a workplace problem. However, a
negligible amount of evidence-based research at the time provided effective
coping strategies. All participants predicted that trolling would be part of the
future of journalism, and nine participants suggested trolling should be included
within current university courses as supported by Martin and Murrell (2021). To
effectively include this in the curriculum, further research is required. This study
responds to this call and provides data for educational institutions to draw upon
when implementing a focus on trolling into their curriculum. Legal impacts,
democracy and public debate are addressed in Question G in chapter 4.7 of this
study (on p. 265).
Through analysis of interview transcripts, this chapter has described the impacts
of trolling on ten Australian journalists, providing clarity about an important
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stakeholder in the trolling paradigm. While the focus on individuals is important,
the resolution to the trolling problem cannot be left to one level of the systems
model, therefore other stakeholder groups need to be explored. The next chapter
will investigate anti-trolling campaigns in the Australian news media.
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Chapter 4.3
Campaign Responses
Results and Discussion
A chronological timeline of anti-trolling campaigns
Question C - How can the evolution of anti-trolling campaigns within the
Australian news media be described?
Researchers have shown how unfettered free markets routinely manifest negative
social phenomena, from the gender pay and promotion gap (Hanusch, 2013;
Media Entertainment Arts Alliance, 2016), to the rise in casualisation in
journalism employment (Jericho, 2018), which has particularly affected women
(Ross, 2016), to patriarchy that tolerates abuse (Cusmano, 2018; Posetti et al,
2021). Gender-based abuse of women can be considered an inevitable aspect of
the lack of regulation of digital communications platforms, as comments fuelled
with hatred and vitriol drive traffic and attention to social media platforms and
news websites (Phillips, 2015). This study describes how anonymity has
exacerbated the trolling problem through the dehumanisation of internet users,
but the underlying root cause is likely to be embedded far deeper within societal
ideologies such as racism and other forms of discrimination including ageism and
the bullying of children. These broader problems have many specific
manifestations, including the trolling of journalists. Discussion of them provides
context for this study’s analysis of the trolling of journalists. In context, it is
understandable that the first anti-trolling campaigns that emerged to combat the
abuse, both globally and in the Australian news media, were motivated by
feminists. In an explorative process using grounded theory, this idea will be
unpacked through thematic analysis, discussion, and critique in the following
section.
The research design strategy involved mixed methods of thematic content
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analysis of 528 trolling related news articles and archival evidence. Using Google
as a search tool, the terms: “troll” + “campaign” were investigated with the location
set Australia. From analysis of the first ten pages of the Google search results,
totalling 100 articles, 13 significant campaigns were identified as archival
evidence. Activist responses were plotted on a timeline that documents and
illustrates the evolution of anti-trolling campaigns in the Australian news media.
Commentary patterns emerging from thematic analysis of this data are compared
with the evolution timeline and are presented in an additional infographic.
4.3.1 Qualitative data results
A chronological timeline of significant anti-trolling campaigns in the Australian
news media was mapped to correspond with the periodical trolling phases
identified in this study. Identified campaigns were divided into those based on
sexism and those based on racism, and are displayed in Figure 16 on the following
page.
It is important to highlight that the timeline used for comparison between the
identified trolling time periods and the anti-trolling campaigns concludes at the
end of 2017. The study recognised this time-period as the saturation period, due
to the overwhelming amount of trolling-related content that obscured the other
journalism-related trolling that is the subject of this study (as section 4.1 detailed).
Prominent anti-trolling campaigns beyond 2017 were not excluded from the
thematic discussion and will still be referenced as further supporting analysis,
although they do not appear in the chronological timeline of Figure 16.
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Chronological timeline of evolution of anti-trolling campaigns in the Australian news media derived from chapter 4.3 data

Figure 16

4.3.2 Qualitative and quantitative thematic analysis
Natural progression of social movement campaigns
The natural progression that many social problems follow shaped the path of the
anti-trolling campaigns in the Australian news media. Put simply, there can be no
opposition to a problem until the problem itself has been recognised. Social
movements challenge social problems, therefore, the social problem of trolling
must already be present in society, in both understanding and prevalence, for
campaigns to be developed as a response strategy against it.
Reflection of society
Consensus among academics and industry professionals, also noted in Australian
journalism education, suggests the “media as a reflection of society” (Bowman,
2014, p. 48). This study recognises this truism and further suggests that if the
media is in fact a reflection of society, trolling may be considered a reflection of
the negative parts of that society. Jane (2015) and Gorman (2019) echoed these
sentiments and suggested the manifestation of technology-enabled abuse reveals
some unpleasant ‘deep-rooted’ human behaviour. If this is true, then the racism,
sexism and condoning of violence identified as themes from the study of the antitrolling campaigns would appear to reflect the broader social issues in Australia
over the time of this study.
Feminist campaigns
As suggested in the section 4.1 and 4.2 findings, the first trolling attacks in the
Australian news media feminists were the first to identify the problem of trolling
and to engender an anti-trolling or troll-oppositional discourse. Feminism as a
movement actively provokes conversations concerning gender equality, and
representatives are often the first to identify new emerging issues and raise
awareness of their presence and impact in society. With feminism’s main intention
to stimulate public awareness of gender imbalances that may not yet be
recognised or universally understood by the general population, it is rational to
propose this group would receive criticism from people who are content with or
benefit from the social norms at the time. Feminists who rebut the status quo and
disrupt collective ideologies by questioning patriarchy or white male often receive
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the first negative trolling comments, which this study’s findings have shown can
quickly escalate from critical debate to severe and extensive abuse in Chapter 4.1.
The logical progression of widespread feminist-based trolling attacks led to the
first anti-trolling campaigns being spearheaded by feminists.
The section 4.1 findings further suggest trolling in response to feminist writing or
journalists who present at feminist are more frequent in the Australian news
media. This trend is supported by the findings of this section and is reflected in
the chronological timeline in Figure 16 (on p. 84), showing seven of the thirteen
identified key anti-trolling campaigns are feminist-based. Multiple feminist
trolling victims are referenced within each identified anti-trolling campaign,
representing a collective group of females challenging the unacknowledged and
social oversight of the widespread impacts, accentuating its prevalence at the
time.
#Mencallmethings: the pivotal campaign
Sporadic trolling examples documented in the manifestation period began to plot
the emergence of trolling and comprise the individual components that
accumulate in trolling’s ‘perfect storm’. The ‘perfect storm’ was the point when
mentions of trolling peaked, propelled by victims speaking out attracting
increased media coverage and subsequent heightened public awareness. The
philosophical concept of the episteme developed and articulated by Foucault
(1971) in The Order of Things can be used to contextualise and explain the
importance of the pivotal #mencallmethings campaign in shaping the evolution of
trolling in the Australian news media. Foucault (1971) used the word episteme to
describe the knowledge and thoughts possible in a given culture at a given time.
He explains that epistemes can change over time (giving examples of how the 16th
Century episteme gave way to the 17th Century episteme). This highlights the
significance of timing and unconscious structures for a social problem to attain
public recognition. Foucault noted that a “slow long effort to bring reflection upon”
(p. 195) issues can cause evolution on the level of the episteme. Timing and
changes in social construction of acceptable online behaviour are crucial within
any given society for a problem to surface as a universally recognised issue. In the
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identified manifestation period on November 7, 2006, Sady Doyle first published
the #mencallmethings article calling for action on trolling; however, the article did
not accomplish any traction within the media or public discourse. However, on
November 20, 2011, the #mencallmethings article was republished with an
explanatory foreword to provide context and went it viral. From this it can be
inferred that the social conditions and the social construction of trolling had
changed to allow widespread publicity of an article/campaign that had failed five
years prior. This significant milestone was identified by the study as the precise
start of the social problem period. The campaign cemented trolling as a recognised
social problem from which all other anti-trolling campaigns followed. The
timeless characteristic of online publishing enables a given article to sit dormant
online and resurface at a later date when epistemic conditions permit widespread
mainstream media traction.
#MeToo campaign: the shifting episteme
While it is not specifically about trolling, the #MeToo campaign spread online and
expressed dissatisfaction with patriarchal attitudes and behaviour. It is the
broader context of the call out culture and new intolerance in which the antitrolling campaigns emerged. The discussion of sexual harassment in the
workplace is significant throughout feminist history and theory, and intersected
with the campaigns identified in this study. Observing mainstream media from a
feminist perspective requires reflection on the media representations of women.
Redfern and Aune (2013) suggested the present “raunch culture” (p. 52) is fuelled
by the media’s tolerance of (and profit from) the objectification of women, with
The Sun’s page three topless women being a blatant example. After receiving
widespread public criticism and 100,000 petition signatures, the misogynistic
page three articles ceased on March 29, 2017. Further evidence of objectification
is found throughout the descriptive vitriolic language aimed at against female
journalists online. Redfern and Aune (2013) further state “women’s visibility in
popular culture does not mean women are valued, safe from violence or equal” (p.
8), and exposed flaws in the preconceived ideology of a cohesive society. Gender
inequality and workplace sexual harassment continue to emerge in the thematic
content analysis of this study, and pattern-coded data can be compared against
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the #metoo movement for further reflection and discussion. Campaigns around a
single issue have the potential to impact upon some people and can result in
specific legislative changes. In addition, a study by Levy and Mattsson (2022)
found the #MeToo movement had resulted in a higher propensity to report sex
crimes. Also using data from the US, Szekeres, Shuman and Saguy (2020) found a
decreased dismissal of sexual assault following #MeToo. This shows that
campaigns in synergy create a more collective message and are more difficult for
society to ignore. It is the cumulative effect that creates public discourse, provokes
community debate, incites criticism and academic inquiry, and can result in an
altered social tolerance or a shift in the episteme. Figure 17 on the following page
displays the cumulative effect of the anti-trolling campaigns identified in this
study that could have influenced social intolerance of workplace sexual
harassment. Legal change can be seen as a milestone in the evolution of social
intolerance for an issue. The #MeToo and associated movements prompted more
widespread acceptance and use of the laws against online abuse as discussed in
research by Atwater (2018) and Smith and Ortiz (2021).
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chapter 4.3 data

The cumulative effect of the identified anti-trolling campaigns on shaping universally accepted social tolerance of workplace sexual harassment derived from

Figure 17

As suggested in Foucault’s (1971) notion of the episteme, this ‘perfect storm’ arose
and enabled the eventual success and social uptake of the #MeToo movement.
Although “Me Too” was first mentioned in 2006 by Tamara Burke to bring
awareness of sexual abuse of women of colour on My Space, the ineffective twoway communication model, along with limited algorithm patterns of the
previously popular social media platform, did not result in any notable media
traction. The second identified key event in the #MeToo movement was in 2015
when Italian model Ambra Gutierrez first publicly reported Harvey Weinstein for
sexual abuse; however, the media was quick to victim blame and portrayed
Gutierrez as an opportunist. The third identified key event in the #MeToo
movement was in 2016 when Ukraine journalist Anastasia Melnichenko
commenced the #IAmNotAfraidToSpeak campaign, highlighting the unacceptable
prominence of sexual harassment in the journalism workplace. The cumulative
effect of the debate snowballed and escalated the #MeToo movement into one of
the most influential feminist-led campaigns of the generation. On October 15,
2017, Alyssa Milano posted on Twitter following widespread accusations of
predatory behaviour by Harvey Weinstein, encouraging others to share their own
stories to shine the spotlight back on workplace harassment. Milano wrote, “if you
have been sexually harassed or assaulted write #MeToo as a status, then we give
people a sense of the magnitude of the problem.” On Twitter, #MeToo had been
used more than 200,000 times in 24 hours and over 500,000 times in 48 hours
(Sini, 2017). On Facebook, #MeToo was used by more than 4.7 million people in
12 million posts in the first day (Park, 2017), many of these were celebrities. The
presence of celebrity (discussed in the emergence findings of section 4.1.3)
further amplified media traction and public awareness. Coupled with Foucault’s
(1971) episteme theory, the intricate nature and complexity of social structures
must be considered when studying any substantial social change.

Chapter 4.3 Campaign responses results and discussion

90

The influence of campaigns on cultural views
The persistence of feminist-led campaigns became the catalyst and repeatedly
pressured workplace sexual harassment back into public discourse for debate.
This continued persistence influenced the public to re-evaluate its standing on the
issue. By applying thematic analysis, this study has identified three stages of social
change in response to campaigns:
1. public awareness of the issue
2. cultural tolerance of the issue being questioned through exposure to
victim examples and debate in mainstream discourse.
This evolves to
3. a new public intolerance of the issue and active distain for those who
do not adhere to new ideology
A once commonly accepted social norm emerges as a newly outed, unacceptable
social behaviour, embedded in the new belief system of that society. These
developmental stages describe how societies mature and evolve, with examples of
similar progression patterns including people of colour’s right to vote, people of
colour’s right to own land, women’s right to vote, women’s right to drive in Dubai
[2019], and recently, in Australia, those who identify as LGBTQI’s right to marry
[2017], women’s right to legal abortion [2019], and those suffering from a
terminal illness’s right to euthanasia [2019]. This cluster of issues fit with the
notion of intersectionality, which has been often used by feminist scholars. It was
first described by Crenshaw in 1989 to describe how overlapping systems of
power, such as race, class, gender, and sexuality, marginalise groups (Cooper,
2016).
Australian racism culture in 2015
As some of the journalists interviewed in chapter 4.2 said they had been trolled
with racist comments, it is relevant to discuss recent discourse about racism in
Australia. As defined in the 2017 Cyber racism and community resilience strategies
for combating online race hate by academics Andrew Jakubowicz, Kevin Dunn, Gail
Mason, Yin Paradies, Ana-Maria Bliuc, Nasya Bahfen, Andre Oboler, Rosalie Atie
and Karen Connelly, “race is quintessentially a social and cultural construct,
drawing on local and global historically significant markers of difference to justify
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unequal relations of power” (p. 21). This broad understanding of racism will be
adopted by this study. Racism is a social issue, and as Ackoff’s (1974) systems
theory suggested, “operates at many levels in the social ecology of modernity, from
the broad panorama of global difference and power to the internal dynamics of
cognition and identity in the individual” (p. 21). Race is “deeply embedded in
psychological menus people draw on” (p. 21) when making conscious or
subconscious decisions about their own beliefs, behaviours and opinions of
others. By classifying and separating groups based on particular attributes such
as ethnicity, religion, appearance or sexual preference, power imbalances have the
potential to be leveraged against minority groups, and from this racism emerges.
While Islam is a religion its expression in some cases connects with ethnic
practices. Therefore, in this study, trolling based on Islamic identity is examined
alongside racist trolling.
A clustered group of four anti-trolling campaigns that were categorised as antiracist-based were identified in 2015 within the social epidemic period. From this
clustered group, professions of trolling victims were identified to be different, and
were documented to include: an Australian ambassador, a politician, an athlete
and an academic. The anti-racist content of these anti-trolling campaigns was
analysed to determine what racial groups the trolled victims identified with, to
begin to analyse the motives behind the trolling abuse that the campaigns
responded to. Race and religious based anti-trolling campaigns were further
categorised into two themes: Indigenous-based and Islamic-based. Two antitrolling campaigns were categorised into each category respectively and are
displayed in Figure 18 on the following page.
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Figure 18
A snapshot of the race and religious based anti-trolling campaigns identified in 2015

SOCIAL EPIDEMIC PERIOD
February 2014 to
June 2016

Note: The racism-based anti-trolling campaigns were identified in the thematic
content analysis of this study. The snapshot displays the social epidemic period
portion of the Chronological timeline of the evolution in the Australian news media
derived from chapter 4.1 data in Figure 9 (on p. 51).
Indigenous-based trolling and Islamic-based trolling themes that emerged from
Figure 18 (displayed above) prompted the further analysis and investigative
discussion that follows.
Indigenous-based racism
Contemporary Indigenous-based racism in Australia emerged as the by-product
of colonialism. Community attitudes have historically transformed slowly and
unevenly, with the 1967 Referendum being the pivotal example in which 90.77%
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of Australians overwhelmingly voted to amend the Constitution to allow the
Commonwealth to make laws for Indigenous people and include them in the
census (Parliament of Australia, 1967). “The significance of the 1967 Referendum
has been somewhat obscured by a number of myths which include the
misconceptions that the Referendum granted Indigenous people citizenship, the
right to vote, wage equality and access to social security, among other things”
(Thomas, 2017, para. 11). However, in terms of practical significance, its principal
outcome was to raise the expectations of Indigenous rights and welfare in the
Australian public sphere. Although subsequent legislation, including the Racial
Discrimination Act (1975), the Commonwealth Racial Hatred Act (1995) and the
Human Rights Equal Opportunity Commission Act (1986) (legal findings are
discussed further in chapter 4.7 on p. 265) aimed to outlaw racial discrimination
in the Australian community, the Australian political climate continues to tolerate
racism. The apology to the Stolen Generation by then Prime Minister Kevin Rudd
on February 13, 2008, remains a prominent example of transformational cultural
views towards racial equality. However, the political ambiance at this time was
not universal, with politician Peter Dutton boycotting the apology suggesting it
would not deliver “tangible outcomes” (Flitton, 2018, para. 26) for Indigenous
Australians. Subsequently he admitted he had overlooked the apology's
significance. Another recent example surfaced in 2019, when Pauline Hanson
voiced her disrespectful attitude towards Indigenous culture, calling for
Indigenous leaders to disregard their sacred beliefs and overturn a ban on
climbing Uluru, likening the prevention of climbing the sacred rock to closing
Bondi Beach (News Corp Australia, 2019a). News Corp Australia may have
removed the name of the journalist who published this article as a preventative
response to trolling. Consequently, the author cannot be referenced by name.
Political journalist for The Guardian and Indigenous trolling victim Jack Latimore
(2018) stated, “Australia is a far more racist country than its political class like to
admit” (para. 2). He further claimed that the racism he observed “is no anomaly”
(para. 8) and his observation supports this chapter’s findings. The animosity
expressed by these prominent political figures lingers due to community leniency
and has materialised as a plethora of racist abuse online.
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Additional Indigenous-based anti-trolling campaigns identified in this study
beyond the conclusion of the chronological timeline in December 2017 include the
April 5, 2019, Melbourne Football Club Banner which read “We are taking a stand
against trolls by tearing through tweets on our way to kick goals” (Lerner, 2019,
para. 1). Broadcast on national television before the Australian Rules Football
game commenced, the term troll was commonly used and understood, cementing
itself in the Australian lexicon of 2019.
Islamic-based racism
Australia’s population reached 25.5 million people by the conclusion of 2019
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2019), and as the population continues to grow,
it is also becoming more culturally diverse. The most recent 2016 Census report
can be analysed to establish demographic trends at the time. The Census data
verified Australia’s cultural diversity in 2016, with a population derived from
more than 190 different countries, who spoke more than 300 different languages
(Jeyaratnam, 2018). In response to the Census question “Is it a good thing for a
society to be made up of different cultures?”, 80.4% of the population agreed, 4.4%
of disagreed, and 15.3% neither agreed nor disagreed. However, difficulties arise
with the practical implementation of diversity within Australian society
throughout subsequent questions of the report, that highlight the complex nature
of the issue. In response to the Census question “should all migrants be accepted
regardless of where they came from?”, 53.3% of the population agreed, 23.4%
disagreed, and 23.3% neither agreed nor disagreed. This data suggests a
conditional acceptance of some cultures but not others, and possibly indicates the
subsection of society from where the racism discussion emerges. Attitudes about
which cultures have the right to be accepted within Australian culture, and
furthermore, who has the right to determine which cultural groups are accepted
or not, would arise within this conservative group. In response to the Census
question, “should people from racial, ethnic, cultural and religious minority
groups behave more like mainstream Australians?”, 48.7% of the population
agreed, 18.5% disagreed, and 32.8% neither agreed or disagreed. This data
further revealed the depth of the cultural diversity conflict, but most troubling was
that the report found 32% of survey respondents had “negative” feelings towards
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Muslim Australians, and 22% said they had “negative” feelings towards
Australians of Middle-Eastern heritage (Jeyaratnam, 2018). Although anti-Islamic
sentiments are seen as unacceptable by some Australian as evidenced by
#IstandwithMariam (Stewart, 2015), examples can still be found in mainstream
media and are voiced by some prominent Australian public figures.
The 2019 Australian political climate continues to tolerate Islamophobia when
voicing right-wing attitudes of politicians Tony Abbott, Peter Dutton and Pauline
Hanson. In 2015, Islamic leaders were furious at Tony Abbott’s suggestion that
“the community does not do enough to stamp out extremism” (Medhora & Safi,
2015), accusing the then Prime Minister of promoting hatred and inflaming
racism. In 2016, Peter Dutton said, “it was a mistake bringing Lebanese refugees
to Australia” (Burton-Bradley, 2017, para. 1) and suggested Australia’s
immigration policy should exclude those from Lebanese-Muslim backgrounds,
linking the ethnic group with terrorism-related offences. The comments angered
many. Pauline Hanson’s continued racist comments began in her 1996 maiden
speech to Parliament, when she called for the abolition of multiculturalism and
claimed, “we are in danger of being swamped by Asians” (Hanson, 2016, para. 6).
More recently, in 2016, Hanson claimed, “now we are in danger of being swamped
by Muslims” (para. 6), pushing for an immigration ban, and she controversially
said, “go back to where you came from” (para. 1). In 2017, Hanson attended the
Federal Senate dressed in a black burka in an attempted stunt to support calls to
ban the Islamic outfit. The then-Attorney General George Brandis reprimanded
Hanson and rebuked her sharply for causing offence to a faith community. Brandis
stated, “to ridicule that community, to drive it into a corner, to mock its religious
garments, is an appalling thing to do, and I would ask you to reflect on your
behaviour” (Murphy, 2017) and received a standing ovation from Parliament for
doing so. This public reprimand suggested an intensifying refusal of racism and
Islamaphobia. In support of the growing rejection of and dissent against the
continued racist behaviour of some Australian politicians, Latimore (2018)
suggested the need for accountability for their actions and further stated, “there
can be no reconciliation until politicians acknowledge the harmful impacts of race
baiting” (para. 1). Political journalist Katherine Murphy (2016) further suggested
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the media’s role in stamping out racism is crucial, and proposed that the continued
presence of Hanson’s views within mainstream media normalised extreme
ideologies and had the potential to render racism acceptable, “comprehending
Pauline is not the challenge, engaging constructively with Hansonism is” (para. 1).
The effect on the public of constant exposure to extremist views such as Hanson’s
needs to be monitored by the media. Chopra (2018) suggested, “the prospect of
PM Peter Dutton should be our wake-up call” (para. 1) and suggested the need for
journalists to critique politicians in the media in order to keep society’s moral
compass in check on key issues. The extensive anti-islamic trolling that targeted
journalist and former Muslim Australian of the Year Susan Carland from 2015 to
2016 was a prime example, with Carland saying “social media, in particular
Twitter, was toxic for women and Muslims” (Mannix, 2015, para. 4).
While vilification has been legally acknowledged since the 1980s with the
integration of 18C into Australian legislation, racist trolling has seeped into global
public debate, and although once considered an unfortunate consequence of the
freedom Web 2.0 provided, public concern has shifted, and media coverage has
magnified the understanding of racism-based impacts. Although the prevalence of
racism within Australian culture is widely reported throughout news media, legal
pathways towards prosecution or compensation are not universally understood,
and incidences are often left unprosecuted. Legal responses to trolling will be
discussed in further detail in chapter 4.7 (on p. 265). While the high court decision
in the defamation case Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd v Voller (2021) 392 ALR
540 may reduce trolling that vilifies based on race, these effects are yet to be
documented. This High Court case arose from vilification of Dylan Voller (Fairfax
Media Publications Pty Ltd, Nationwide News Pty Ltd, Australian News Channel Pty
Ltd v Voller (2020) NSWCA 102; (2021) HCA 27), the subject of a news articles
published on Facebook, by several prominent news media organisations.
Protecting children from trolling: part of shifting the episteme
While cyberbullying has not been discussed in detail in this thesis, its trajectory is
similar to that of trolling (Jeffrey, Peltier & Vannest, 2020) and some anticyberbullying campaigns worked in unison with anti-trolling campaigns to shift
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attitudes about the acceptability and harmlessness of online abuse. Legal and
policy concerns about trolling/cyberbullying arose first with children, who are
viewed as one of our most vulnerable social groups. As a result cyberbullying
education campaigns developed in the early 2010s (Foody, Muthanna & Carlbring,
2015). While the chronological timeline in Figure 16 (on p. 84) concluded in 2017,
in 2018 two campaigns called ‘Dolly’s Law’ and ‘Carly’s Law’ received
considerable media attention. Through thematic analysis protecting children from
trolling emerged as a key theme for discussion. Amy “Dolly” Everett became the
ambassador for the Australian outback hat company Akubra at 8 years of age, but
on January 3, 2018, at 14, committed suicide after suffering continued online
bullying. The teenage suicide became global news and Dolly became the
recognised face of trolling’s greatest potential impact: the loss of a child’s life. The
event became the final catalyst that forced the Australian Government to act,
leading to research funding and crucial law reform known as “Dolly’s Law,”
discussed in chapter 4.7 on legal responses (on p. 265). While the High Court
decision of September 2021 may reduce trolling that vilifies, these affects are yet
to be documented. In further supporting efforts to reduce child-based trolling,
subsequent campaigns arose that called to ban smart-phone use in schools
(Zimmerman & Bita, 2018) and called for a criminalisation of trolling that would
include executing a social media order on perpetrators that would ban them from
using social media websites (The Daily Telegraph, 2018).
While cyberbullying campaigns achieved rapid legal reform for children, antitrolling campaigns did not. However, anti-trolling campaigns were able to support
victims by breaking down a sense of isolation and encouraging them to speak
about their experiences. This accords with the research Levy and Mattsson (2022)
and Szekeres, Shuman and Saguy (2020) who documented effects of the #MeToo
movement. Measurable action from all social levels, working in unison, is a
practical application of Ackoff’s (1974) systems theory, but sadly it was only
employed after a child’s life was lost. A similar example of a delay in a synthesised
approach is evident in the progression of Carly’s Law. In 2007, 15-year-old Carly
Ryan was murdered after being groomed online by predator Garry Francis
Newman, who was later sentenced to life in prison. The story became global
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headline news and Carly's mother, Sonya Ryan, initially began campaigning in her
community and local news, which then progressed online and by 2017 received
international news coverage, to raise awareness of online safety and for stronger
laws to protect children online. Ten years later, on June 15, 2017, Carly’s Law was
passed in Federal Parliament and a new offense made it a crime to plan to harm a
child under 16 and, in particular, targeted predators who misrepresent their age.
This provided police with the power to intervene before a predator has the chance
to act and before a child is harmed. Foucault’s (1971) theory of the episteme can
be applied to explain the time lag of law reform with Carly’s Law, implemented
after ten years of campaigning in 2017, as opposed to Dolly’s Law implemented
after 11 months in 2018. The ideal conditions for social change arose due to an
accumulation of factors including:
•

a cumulative intolerance to trolling after the 2015 suicide of Charlotte
Dawson

•

the study’s identified saturation period (described on p. 62) when
discussion pertaining to frequent and severe trolling content was
abundant in public discourse and,

•

the 2018 suicide of 14-year-old Amy “Dolly” Everett.

The identification of trolling as an escalating social problem pushed the issue to
breaking point, and all levels of Ackoff’s (1974) systems theory responded.
Applied in unison with Foucault’s (1971) theory of the episteme, the ideal timing
for social change resulted.
In both examples mentioned, the Government did not respond until a child’s life
was lost. Inaction is not an adequate contribution to prevention strategies. For
effective solutions to emerging social problems, faster recognition and mitigation
strategies are necessary, before life is lost, young or old. The loss of a child’s life
should not need to be the catalyst for change. Academics, researchers, the
government, and the public need to identify potential problems and their
corresponding solution strategies quicker in order to generate a multi-level
response before an issue escalates to a level where any life is lost as a result.
This chapter has outlined 13 significant anti-trolling campaigns providing clarity
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about action taken at the support level of the trolling paradigm. These actions
include calls for legal changes that in some cases were successful, shifting
epistemic understanding about the harms associated with online abuse, and
identifying the issue. The first steps towards solving a wicked problem are naming
and acknowledging the problem (Camillus, 2008), which the anti-trolling
campaigns facilitate. Multiple stakeholders can actively influence trolling at
different levels of the systems model, and separate analysis is important to
provide a grounded view in line with Ackoff’s (1974) assertion that social
problems involve impacts and reactions on multiple levels. The next chapter will
investigate Twitter’s responses to trolling. Due to the scope of this study, it was
not possible to analyse every social media platform used to distribute published
articles by journalists and news organisations in Australia. The study, therefore,
selected two social media platforms as the focus of further investigation, analysis,
discussion, and critique. The chapter 4.2 findings from interviews with 10 trolled
journalists (as described on p. 64) revealed that Twitter and Facebook were the
two predominant media on which trolling content was received. These findings
were further supported by documented examples from trolling victims within the
chapter 4.1 findings (as described on p. 39) and through systemic calls for action
directed at the two companies within the chapter 4.3 findings (as described on p.
82).
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Chapter 4.4
Twitter Responses
Results and Discussion
Thematic critical analysis of Twitter responses
Question D - What policy and feature changes were implemented by Twitter in
response to trolling from its launch in 2006 to 2019?
This study has documented widespread frustration with Twitter’s inconsistent
enforcement of policies that ban abusive content on its service, and subsequent
refusal to publicly explain or account for its actions and decisions. Despite
multiple requests from academics (see, for example, Phillips, 2015; Jane, 2015;
Citron, 2014; Barnes, 2018), Twitter has refused to release any data about the
frequency of trolling on the service, how (or if) the company responds to reported
abuse and, furthermore, what training procedures are in place for moderators.
The adoption of this measured approach obscures the extent of the problem and
critics would like Twitter to be more open to independent analysis of its
moderation policy and processes. Although Twitter’s 2021 transparency report
(Twitter, 2021) gives some insight about its removal of violating content including
hate speech, abuse and harassment, its refusal to provide full operational
transparency has fuelled growing discontent amongst users and the public and
put pressure on the social media platform to respond before users cease use of the
service (West, 2015; Quinn, 2021; Stevenson & Howcroft, 2021). By 2021, Twitter
had been more vocal about introducing anti-trolling features and strategies than
any of the social media platforms (Milmo, 2021), however, it could be far more
open about its moderation processes. Collecting and independently analysing data
is the first step in establishing Twitter’s accountability for failing to protect the
human rights of its users online. This is relevant to the trolling of journalists in
Australia because many Australian journalists were, during the period of this
study, expected to use the platform for both work and personal branding. This
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study identifies archival evidence of Twitter’s responses to trolling and collates
this limited amount of accessible data as part of the first step towards academic
analysis and critique of Twitter’s response.
Highlighting the continuing role social media will play in the future of journalism,
a 2020 Muck Rack survey found that 85% of journalists considered Twitter the
most valuable social network (Muck Rack, 2020). In addition, the Pew Research
Centre found in 2017 that 58 per cent of internet users who have experienced
online harassment said their most recent experience occurred on a social
networking site or app, such as Twitter or Facebook, both platforms which
journalists are expected to engage with as part of their professional practice
(Duggan, 2017), while the second most common setting, at 23 per cent, was in the
comment section of websites. Therefore, the study selected Twitter and Facebook
as the two social media platforms that are independently addressed in Chapter 4.4
and Chapter 4.5 of this study. The Digital News Report 2021 (Parks et al, 2021)
confirmed that Facebook and Twitter were the two social media platforms most
used for news access with YouTube coming in third place. Because of scope
limitations, YouTube was not analysed in this study.
Twitter and Facebook were addressed with separate research questions as their
individual response strategies to trolling differed in several areas, including
management acknowledgement, response times, number of strategies, type of
strategies, depth of strategies and initiating research. The two research questions
are indicated below:
1. Twitter responses to trolling in the Australian news media were addressed
with Question D: What policy and feature changes were implemented by
Twitter in response to trolling from its launch in 2006 to 2019? Results and
discussions are displayed in Chapter 4.4 on the pages that follow.
2. Facebook responses to trolling in the Australian news media was
addressed with Question E: What supportive strategies, operational
modifications and corporate reform were implemented by Facebook in
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response to trolling? Results and discussions are displayed in the 4.5
Facebook findings of this study (on p. 139).
The research design strategy which addresses Question D: What policy and feature
changes were implemented by Twitter in response to trolling from its launch in 2006
to 2019? applies mixed methods of thematic content analysis and archival
evidence. The study used collected data from chapter 4.1 (on p. 39) as a starting
point. Of the 528 articles in the thematic content analysis, 17 mentioned Twitter’s
response to trolling on its platform in some capacity and were deemed relevant
for inclusion. Of these, five further discussed or made commented on aspects of
particular response strategies. To obtain further data, Twitter’s website was
explored, and relevant information was retrieved from three sections: About Us,
Blog and Help Centre where its policies are posted. On each of these pages the
search function was used to investigate the terms: “troll” “bully” and “abuse”. This
led to a further 16 relevant articles which were included for analysis. Although
Google was also used as a search tool with the search inquiry: “troll” + “Facebook”
+ “response” and retrieved 3,120,000 results, on closer analysis of the first ten
pages totalling 100 articles, only one additional response strategy was found.
Thematic analysis of the 36 articles retrieved as archival evidence grouped
Twitter responses into three categories: policy responses, feature responses and
managerial responses, which are independently documented chronologically and
explored in the sections that follow. Emerging commentary patterns were
integrated with the infographic of the evolution of trolling in the Australian news
media for comparison, in-depth discussion and critique.
Defining terminology
This study adopts the following definition of the term policy: “a deliberate system
of principles to guide decisions and achieve rational outcomes” (Klewes, Popp &
Rost-Hein, 2017, p. 57). Policies are adopted by social media platforms, such as
Facebook and Twitter, to outline the organisation’s statement of intent that
governs the protocols and procedures implemented in both the Terms of Service
and Rules of Engagement on the platform. However, policy does differ from rules
or law. “Terms of service represent a non-legal avenue of recourse for professional
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communicators wanting redress against trolls and troublesome users who might
be damaging their brands and reputations on social media” (Pearson & Polden,
2015, p. 87). Although exact terms of service vary between platforms, policies give
each social media company the right to suspend user accounts for what it deems
to be misuse or misbehaviour (p. 87). This study defines the term feature as a
distinctive attribute or aspect of a good or service that sets it apart from similar
items (“Feature,” n.d.). Social media platforms use technological features that
determine how the applications function. Over time, Facebook and Twitter have
adapted their user interface features to reinforce company policies and enhance
both the usability and safety of users on their platforms (Hutchinson, 2017).
4.4.1 Qualitative and quantitative data results
Clustered groups of responses emerged from thematic analysis applied to
management responses (when management made public statements), policy
responses (when adaptions of policy were announced), and feature responses
(when features of the platform were changed) and were categorised into twelve
chronological stages, and are listed below.
Stage one:

Twitter’s first acknowledgement that trolling occurs on
its platforms.

Stage two:

Twitter declares trolling as a continuing problem.

Stage three:

The reporting method for abusive content is
streamlined.

Stage four:

CEO declares responsibility for trolling on the service.

Stage five:

A phone number verification is required for all users.

Stage six:

The quality filter feature is implemented

Stage seven:

New accounts filtered for previously flagged content.

Stage eight:

The Trust & Safety Council is introduced.

Stage nine:

Accounts that promote violence are prohibited.

Stage ten:

CEO declares public accountability for progress.

Stage eleven:

Flagged accounts are muted.

Stage twelve:

Technology experts Smyte are introduced.
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The twelve chronological stages with their respective management, policy and/or
feature responses are outlined in detail below. These descriptions are drawn upon
as qualitative data for further thematic analysis, discussion, and critique in this
section.
Stage one: Twitter’s first acknowledgement that trolling occurs on its
platforms.
•

Policy response

(September 14, 2012)
From this study’s functionalist analysis, it is important to consider why
consequences arise, and three days after The Daily Telegraph launched its
#StopTheTrolls campaign Twitter made its first policy trolling response. Twitter
amendment to their Rules of engagement, which stated, “technical abuse and user
abuse is not tolerated on Twitter.com, and will result in permanent suspension”
(Twitter, 2012, para 1). This 2012 statement marked significant progress in six
years, after the first Twitter Rules in 2006 had stated, “we do not actively monitor
and will not censor user content” (Twitter, 2006, para. 1). The first Twitter Rules
were short, consisting of 568 words in total, with one sentence to describe
appropriate behaviours that covered the following policies: Impersonation,
Privacy, Violence and Threats, Copyright, Unlawful Use, Serial Accounts, Name
Squatting, Malware/Phishing, Spam, and Pornography. Although extreme
examples of trolling may have been covered within these initial rules, it was not
until the abuse and harassment policy was added that trolling was able to be
addressed.
•

Management response

(September 14, 2012)
The policy update was accompanied by Twitter’s first management response that
directly addressed trolling, again in response to accumulating pressure
surrounding the #StopTheTrolls campaign that launched three days prior coupled
with the Federal Government’s calls for Twitter to establish an Australian outpost
to deal with community concerns (Hildebrand & Matheson, 2012). In a statement
to the The Daily Telegraph, Twitter spokeswoman Rachel Bremer said, “we take
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this issue extremely seriously and have recently updated our abuse policy to make
targeted abuse against our terms of service” (Hildebrand & Matheson, 2012, para.
3). The findings revealed this policy ‘update’ was, in fact, a new policy that was not
mentioned in the prior Twitter Rules.
Stage two: Twitter declared trolling as a continuing problem.
•

Management response

(August 15, 2014)
Twitter’s vice-president of trust and safety Del Harvey responded to the trolling
of Zelda Williams, the daughter of actor Robin Williams, with the statement, “we
will not tolerate abuse” (Twitter, 2014, para. 3).
•

Policy response

(August 15, 2014)
Twitter stated it would expand policies regarding self-harm and private
information and improve support for family members of deceased users
(Tsukayama, 2014).
Stage three: The reporting method for abusive content is streamlined.
•

Feature response

(December 2, 2014)
Twitter’s updated features streamlined its abuse reporting method, allowed users
who were not directly targeted by the abuse to have the ability to report it, added
a ‘blocked accounts’ page that allowed users to view and edit accounts they had
blocked, and prevented blocked users from viewing the profiles of the people who
blocked them.
Stage four: CEO declared responsibility for trolling on the service.
•

Management response

(February 2, 2015)
In direct response to Lindy West’s (2015) article, What happened when I
confronted my troll cruellest troll, published in The Guardian earlier on this day,
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Twitter’s CEO Dick Costello admitted the platform had failed trolling victims on
his Twitter account:
We suck at dealing with abuse and trolls on the platform and
we've sucked at it for years. It's no secret and the rest of the
world talks about it every day. We lose core user after core user
by not addressing simple trolling issues that they face every day.
I'm frankly ashamed of how poorly we've dealt with this issue
during my tenure as CEO. It's absurd. There's no excuse for it. I
take full responsibility for not being more aggressive on this
front. It's nobody else's fault but mine, and it's embarrassing.
We're going to start kicking these people off right and left and
making sure that when they issue their ridiculous attacks,
nobody hears them. Everybody on the leadership team knows
this is vital.
(Costello, 2015, @dickc Twitter)
•

Management response

(February 3, 2015)
One day after his statement, Costello stated he was “ashamed” (McGrath, 2015,
para. 1) of how the company handled trolling and declared personal responsibility
for its manifestation on the platform, further stating on his Twitter account:
Let me be very very clear about my response here. I take
PERSONAL responsibility for our failure to deal with this
(trolling) as a company. I thought I did that in my note, so let me
reiterate what I said, which is that I take personal responsibility
for this. I specifically said, ‘it's nobody's fault but mine’.
(Costello, 2015a, @dickc Twitter)
and added in a subsequent post:
We have to be able to tell each other the truth, and the truth
that everybody in the world knows is that we have not effectively
dealt with this problem even remotely to the degree we should
have by now, and that's on me and nobody else. So now we're
going to fix it, and I'm going to take full responsibility for
making sure that the people working night and day on this have
the resources they need to address the issue, that there are clear
lines of responsibility and accountability, and that we don't
equivocate in our decisions and choices.
(Costello, 2015a, @dickc Twitter)
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Stage five: A phone number verification is required for all users.
•

Feature response

(March 13, 2015)
Twitter introduced a new verification method to combat troll accounts. A phone
number verification was now required for all new accounts. Previously, all that
was required was an email address, which could be obtained with no verification
at all.
Stage six: The quality filter feature is implemented
•

Feature response

(March 23, 2015)
Twitter launched a ‘quality filter’ aimed to “remove all tweets from users’
notification timelines that contain threats, offensive or abuse language, duplicate
content, or are sent from suspicious accounts” (Welch, 2015, para. 1) and is
displayed in Figure 19 below.
Figure 19
Twitter’s quality filter feature for users

Found on Verge's website (2015), based on a Twitter post (2015).
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Stage seven: New accounts filtered for previously flagged content.
•

Policy response

(April 22, 2015)
Twitter revised a former policy that prohibited “direct specific threats of violence
against others” adding the phrase “or promot[ing] violence against others”. The
amendment meant any user who shared another user’s threat was now infringing
the Twitter policy. This updated policy aimed to eliminate the loophole used by
trolls who circulated other users’ threatening comments (Doshi, 2015).
•

Feature response

(April 22, 2015)
In addition to the aforementioned policy change on the same day, Twitter
simultaneously announced a new feature to help identify abusive content and
limit its potential reach. The feature analysed the age of a Twitter account and
compared the similarity of content between previously reported threats. This
feature was designed to stop trolls immediately setting up another account when
they have been previously reported and blocked. This new feature allowed
Twitter to freeze an account until the user deleted the flagged tweet.
Stage eight: The Trust & Safety Council is introduced.
•

Management response

(February 10, 2016)
Twitter introduced the Trust & Safety Council to deal with harassment and cyber
bullying on the platform. The council was initially made up of 40 organisations
around the world, four of which were Australian-based (Ockenden, 2016).
Stage nine: Accounts that promote violence are prohibited.
•

Policy response

(November 18, 2017)
Twitter updated its policies to reduce hateful conduct and abusive behaviour. The
first policy change was a new rule against violence and physical harm. This
ensured specific threats of violence or calls for serious physical harm, death, or

Chapter 4.4 Twitter responses results and discussion

109

disease inflicted on an individual or group would now be in violation of Twitter’s
policies.
The second change expanded on Twitter’s Hateful Conduct policy and rules
against abusive behaviour to now include rules to prohibit users promoting
violence against other users, directly attacking or threatening other users on the
basis of their group characteristics, as well as engaging in abusive behaviour that
harasses, intimidates, or uses fear to silence another person’s voice. Twitter
updated its rule against abusive behaviour to state:
Any account that abuses or threatens others through
their profile information, including their username,
display name, or profile bio. If an account’s profile
information includes a violent threat or multiple slurs,
epithets, racist or sexist tropes, incites fear, or reduces
someone to less than human, it will be permanently
suspended.
(Twitter Safety, 2017, para. 3)
In a further update promoted on its website’s blog as an active strategy against
trolling, Twitter expanded its hateful conduct policy to state:
Hateful imagery will now be considered sensitive media
under our media policy. We consider hateful imagery to
be logos, symbols, or images whose purpose is to
promote hostility and malice against others based on
their race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, or
ethnicity/national origin. If this type of content appears
in header or profile images, we will now accept profilelevel reports and require account owners to remove any
violating media.
(Twitter Safety, 2017, para. 4)
Stage ten: CEO declared public accountability for progress.
•

Management response

(March 1, 2018)
Twitter stated its new approach was to “improve the health of the conversation”
on its platform as direct response to trolls. Jack Dorsey, co-founder and CEO of
Twitter, stated, “We’re committing Twitter to help increase the collective health,
openness, and civility of public conversation, and to hold ourselves publicly
accountable towards progress” (Dorsey, 2018, @jack Twitter).
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Stage eleven: Flagged accounts are muted.
•

Feature response

(May 15, 2018)
Twitter introduced new features to fight malicious automation and spam. This
feature muted tweets from trolls, making them less visible to users. This feature
policy recognised that some trolling content did not violate any Twitter policy but
did distort and detract from public conversation, particularly in communal areas
like conversations and search. Twitter identified certain patterns of behaviour
associated with troll-like accounts, including a user who signs up for multiple
accounts at once, or users who repeatedly tag people that do not follow them in
tweets. These ‘signals’ were identified by an algorithm and were tied to the
behaviour of a user not the content of the tweets themselves. When identified,
Twitter placed the account in ‘quarantine,’ where any of their interactions were
selectively hidden from other users, unless specifically searched for by selecting
the ‘show more replies’ button under a tweet. It is important to note this did not
remove the comments, but the problematic content was obscured.
Stage twelve: Technology experts Smyte are introduced.
•

Feature response

(June 21, 2018)
Twitter partnered with technology experts Smyte, which specialise in safety, spam
and security issues, to combat trolling on the platform. Twitter released a
statement, “Smyte has dealt with many unique issues facing online safety and
believes in the same proactive approach that we’re taking for Twitter: stopping
abusive behaviour before it impacts anyone’s experience” (Twitter Safety, 2017,
para. 3). Twitter further stated, “Smyte’s products will help us address challenges
in safety, spam and security more quickly and effectively. Their review tools and
processes will be powerful additions to our own tools and technology that help us
keep Twitter safe. We’ll integrate this technology to strengthen our systems and
operations” (para. 4).
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4.4.2 Thematic critical analysis
The next step was a thematic critical analysis of Twitter’s responses to trolling.
The responses were individually critiqued in chronological succession through
which emerging themes within this timeline were integrated for discussion to
provide a robust commentary for contextual analysis. The subsequent discussion
begins by exploring themes that developed before the first documented Twitter
response in order to provide the contextual framework for a judicious and
vigorous evaluation. The study then provides a collective narrative of Twitter
responses to trolling, each followed with a critique. Through the grounded theory
approach, additional themes materialised, and these are discussed within the
textual timeline of the progressive commentary. The thematic and critical analysis
is predominantly qualitative; however, quantitative evaluation of time periods is
also incorporated.
Initial slow response to trolling
The increasing presence of trolling on Twitter is well documented in chapter 4.1
findings (as described on p. 39); chapter 4.2 findings (as described on p. 64); and
chapter 4.3 findings (as described on p. 82). Yet, no immediate remedy to
increasing trolling was implemented by Twitter in response to calls for action.
This study has identified key events and through quantitative analysis determined
an approximate timeline of this initial response period. The study determined
Twitter took 6.5 years initiate its first documented policy response to trolling after
its launch on March 21, 2006. To analyse Twitter responses more specifically in
the Australian news media, the study referenced the previously constructed
Chronological timeline of the evolution of trolling in the Australian news media
derived from chapter 4.1 data (see Figure 9 on p. 51). The study determined
Twitter took three years and two months from the first documented The Sydney
Morning Herald news article referencing trolling, published on July 15, 2009,
before its first documented policy response to trolling on the September 14, 2012.
An infographic to display these findings is presented in Figure 20 below.
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Figure 20
A timeline of Twitter’s first response to trolling

Note: The time lag of Twitter’s first response is illustrated by the
addition of the bold black arrow lines. The snapshot displays the
manifestation period and social problem period portion of the
Chronological timeline of the evolution in the Australian news media
derived from chapter 4.1 data in Figure 9 (on p. 51).
The study concedes it would be impossible to identify the first trolling incidence
on the Twitter platform due to a variety of factors. Two primary complications
include the vast amount of content on Twitter, and the subjective nature of trolling
that results in discrepancies between what users deem to be harassment and what
users considered to be a difference of opinions and vigorous debate. However, the
first incident was determined to fall within the incubation period (as described on
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p. 52). The study can isolate Australia’s first trolling incident to within a threeyear timeline: between Twitter’s launch in 2006 and the first documented The
Sydney Morning Herald news article referencing trolling, published on July 15,
2009 (Moses, 2009, para. 1). However, without this exact date, the study can still
spotlight continued Twitter inaction. After the first referenced trolling articles in
the Australian news media, numerous personal accounts by both Australian and
international journalists were published in the manifestation period of this study
(as described on p. 53). These echoed requests for Twitter to respond, yet these
entreaties did not result in any publicly documented action. Twitter took a
considerable amount of time to implement any policy or feature changes, although
the increasing presence of trolls using its platform to find and abuse victims was
indisputable if we take media coverage as the evidence.
Beneficiary of trolling
The study explored possible motives for the continued inaction and found
evidence illustrating that Twitter was a beneficiary of trolling in the initial stages
of its evolution. Some initial victims engaged in conversation with abusers as a
defensive tactic (West, 2015), which further fuelled user interaction on the
platform and increased the popularity of the platform at the time. Croteau (2019)
suggested users have the tendency to overshare online which heightens the
potential to reveal vulnerabilities open to criticism, and further proposed a large
portion of content is posted for validation, whether sought consciously or
unconsciously. Social theory goes some way to explain this desire for acceptance,
be it in person or online. In a society “addicted to like” (para. 6), users are far more
likely to respond to negativity over positive comments as a reactive process of our
desire and fundamental need for acceptance. In addition to the briefly explored
theory spotlighting user engagement with abusers, the increased frequency of
trolling-related news articles published in the Australian news media during the
manifestation period of the study (as described on p. 53) had little deterrent effect
as the popularity of the platform continued to increase each year up until 2018
(Dean, 2022). The study, therefore, suggests that Twitter was a direct beneficiary
of trolling in the initial stages of its evolution, and data suggests Twitter may have
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made a selective decision to delay its response to boost engagement (Phillips,
2015).
From the social problem period (as described on p. 55) that commenced in
November 2011, the frequency of trolling in the Australian news media rapidly
increased (as displayed in Figure 3 on p. 40) and news reporting exposed the
severe negative impacts of trolling. The beneficiary position of Twitter that
enabled trolls to flourish on their platform began to alter, as negative commentary
permeated public discourse, with implications for the reputation of the service.
The study identified widespread statements of users threatening to leave the
platform including West (2017), Noyes (2017) and Vanian (2017). It was not until
effects on Twitter’s popularity and commercial viability were evident that any
responsive action was initiated.
Cumulative external pressure
The cumulative pressure on Twitter began on August 30, 2011, when Sady Doyle’s
#mencallmethings campaign went viral, flooding the platform with anti-trolling
sentiments from users. Exactly one year later, after the attempted suicide of
Charlotte Dawson on August 30, 2012, the #SayNoToBullying campaign also went
viral, further escalating deeper anti-trolling sentiments and bringing these to the
forefront of conversations beyond the platform itself, including to the Australian
news media and the wider community. The pinnacle of Twitter’s externally
mounting pressure in Australia emerged two weeks later on the September 11,
2012, when The Daily Telegraph published its own anti-trolling campaign
#StopTheTrolls, which received global media traction, urging Twitter to act and
reveal the identity of trolls to authorities for prosecution. This campaign provoked
further calls for Twitter to act and is discussed in detail in chapter 4.6 (on p. 219).
On the same day:
•

The Daily Telegraph published a further article that stated, “Twitter must
be held accountable”.

•

Acting Prime Minister Wayne Swan stated, “the #StopTheTrolls campaign
is a very worthwhile initiative by The Daily Telegraph that the Australian
Government fully supports” (Jones & Byrnes, 2012, para. 4).
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•

Communication Minister Stephen Conroy said, “Twitter may think they're
above Australian laws, but ultimately good corporate citizens do not
behave this way. They should co-operate with law enforcement authorities
to prosecute trolls who break the law” (Hildebrand & Matheson, 2012,
para. 7). Senator Conroy further suggested, “Twitter should follow
Facebook's lead and establish a staff presence in Australia, so they are
more receptive to community concerns” (para. 8).

It was not until the cumulative external pressure from journalists, campaigns,
newsroom, and the government were directed towards Twitter that the
organisation itself initiated a response to trolling. Twitter’s identified response
with be discussed and critiqued below, from stage one to stage thirteen.
Stage one: Twitter’s first acknowledgement that trolling occurs on its
platform
The first identified response to trolling by Twitter was categorised in this study as
both a management response and a policy response. Immediately after direct calls
to action from The Daily Telegraph, Acting Prime Minister Wayne Swan and
Communication Minister Stephen Conroy, Twitter released its first response to
trolling. The new 2012 policy was the first operational change by Twitter to
combat trolling content on the social media platform. Twitter spokeswoman
Rachel Bremer said, “we take this issue extremely seriously and have recently
updated our abuse policy to make targeted abuse against our terms of service”
(Hildebrand & Matheson, 2012, para. 3). However, in criticism of the statement,
Hildebrand and Matheson (2012) suggest, “Bremer did not specify when the
policy was updated or what specifically had changed” (para. 4). This study’s
findings provide the documented data that revealed there was no policy in direct
relation to abuse prior to Bremer’s statement. This policy ‘update’ was in fact a
new policy that was not mentioned in the prior Twitter Rules. The first Twitter
Rules were short and consisted of 568 words in total, with one sentence to
describe the appropriate behaviours for each of the ten categories that this study
has previously listed (see p. 90). One example was the thirteen-word Violence and
Threat policy: “You may not publish or post direct, specific threats of violence
against others” (Twitter, 2006, para. 1). The study acknowledges extreme
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examples of trolling may have been covered within these initial rules, but that it
was not until this abuse and harassment policy was announced on September 14,
2012, that Twitter addressed personalised attacks regarding gender, race,
sexuality, appearance or political views. Trolling was recognised by Twitter to fall
beyond the acceptable standard, and it should be reported for potential removal.
Twitter’s (2012) new rule of engagement at the time clearly stated: “Technical
abuse and user abuse is not tolerated on Twitter.com and will result in permanent
suspension” (para. 1). This was a significant change from the previous guideline:
“We do not actively monitor and will not censor user content” (Twitter, 2006,
para. 1), which did not outline any repercussions for non-compliance. This
evidence suggests that the “recent changes” Bremer was referring to were in
response to the mounting pressure accruing from the #StopTheTrolls campaign
that had been launched days earlier. This policy change enabled both users and
Twitter itself to respond to trolls by removing their content and profiles from the
platform.
Stage two: Twitter declares trolling as a continuing problem
The second response to trolling was categorised by the study as a management
response and a policy response. Two years and one month passed between the
Twitter’s first response to trolling on September 12, 2012, and the second
response to trolling on August 11, 2014. This study identifies this time-period to
advance from the social problem period to the social epidemic period. During the
time-period between Twitter’s first and second response to trolling, many
examples of trolling are documented in the news articles data set of this study, yet
no further action was undertaken by Twitter. Emerging themes suggest Twitter
was not proactive in the fight against trolls. Twitter was simply reactive after
external pressures mounted to such a point that Twitter’s inaction began to
tarnish the company’s standing. Only then were subsequent management
statements made and new policies implemented. Left without external pressures,
thematic analysis indicates Twitter may not have responded when it did, and it
may have left trolls to flourish on its platform unmonitored.
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Twitter’s second response to trolling corresponded with a sharply increased
frequency of articles in public discourse globally and locally, with discussions
outlining not simply its abundance but also its associated problematic nature
within the Australian news media and broader society in general. Twitter’s second
response to trolling corresponded with public outcry over Zelda Williams leaving
the platform on August 13, 2014, after receiving horrific trolling abuse. Targeting
online abuse of Zelda Williams was identified as a key event, further discussed
below.
Trolling of Zelda Williams
Zelda Williams fell victim to abusive Twitter trolls after the death of her father,
famous actor Robin Williams, on August 11, 2014. Williams reportedly received
“one rape threat per minute” (Brown, 2014, para. 6) and announced she would
leave the social networking platform for a “good long time” (para. 6). Although the
trolling of Zelda Williams is globally recognised as a significant example of trolling
affecting the evolution of trolling globally, the event was not covered in the
Australian news media to the extent that it was evident in the Chronological
timeline of the evolution of trolling in the Australian news media derived from
chapter 4.1 data (see Figure 9 on p. 51). As the aim of this study was to illustrate
the trolling evolution in the Australian news media, the dataset for the creation of
Figure 9 focussed on profession (as a journalist) and location (in Australia) and
publication (SMH, ABC or News.com) as the main inclusion criteria. Because this
incident occurred in the United States of America, the study deemed the incident
to fall outside of the Australian news media scope. However, as there was
considerable relevant discourse (Dewey, 2014; Sparrow, 2014), it has been
included in Figure 21 for context and further discussion and critique irrespective
of its materialisation outside of Australian borders. From comparison, the Zelda
Williams trolling has been added to a snapshot of Figure 9 and is displayed in
Figure 21 below.
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Figure 21
A snapshot of the trolling of Zelda Williams

Note: Zelda Williams’s trolling incident is highlighted in orange within
the clustered examples marking at the peak of the social epidemic
period. This snapshot displays a portion of the study’s Figure 9
Chronological timeline of the evolution in the Australian news media
derived from chapter 4.1 data on (p. 51).
This particular trolling example received global widespread media coverage and
set a turning point for public discourse expressing universal distress over
Twitter’s inaction at the time. The study identified a number of triggering factors
that provoked the widespread public outcry in support of Zelda Williams. Robin
Williams (her father) was an admired actor, and the public mourning of his death
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induced a sense of obligation to protect his daughter, as indicated in published
online discourse. Williams was recognised for his extrovertedly happy
demeanour, and it was additionally confronting when his private struggles with
depression were revealed as the motives for suicide. This further fuelled the
collective compulsion to protect his daughter. In a direct response to this public
pressure, four days after the passing of her father, Twitter’s vice-president of trust
and safety, Del Harvey, responded with the statement, “we will not tolerate abuse”
(para. 3) and indicated Twitter would expand its policies regarding self-harm and
private information and improve support for family members of deceased users.
The timing of this announcement further illustrates its crisis communications
response, and spotlights the causal relationship between the platform’s financial
motives and its limited strategies to address trolling.
Continued stage two: Twitter declared trolling as a continuing problem –
critical analysis
The study identified the notorious Gamergate Saga as an episode of extended,
systematic, global trolling. While unrelated to the study’s focus on the trolling of
Australian journalists, it was instigated on the same day as Twitter’s second
response detailed above and therefore was of relevance. The Gamergate Saga was
included in the study’s Chronological timeline of the evolution of trolling in the
Australian news media derived from chapter 4.1 data (see Figure 9 on p. 51) as a
universally recognised example of severe, targeted abuse that defined the
evolution of trolling on a global scale. Although the Gamergate Saga itself began in
the United States of America, a significant portion of critical research about the
incident has been conducted by Australian academic Dr Emma Jane, an Associate
Professor at University of New South Wales. Jane’s (2015) extensive
investigations and analysis of the Gamergate Saga has been both published and
cited by others in journal articles, news reports, and in academic discussions on
the topic of trolling globally. For this reason, this study selectively included the
Gamergate Saga in the timeline although its materialisation fell outside of
Australian borders. On August 15, 2014, troll Eron Gjoni published his first
diatribe against ex-girlfriend Zoe Quinn on multiple websites, including
Something Awful and Penny Arcade. After receiving an immediate ban, Gjoni
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continued the onslaught of abuse through anonymous message boards including
4chan, Reddit and Twitter. However, the most prolific vitriolic harassment
emerged on the Twitter platform. It is important to note that the Gamergate Saga
did not have a direct impact on Twitter’s response strategy, as Gjoni published his
first trolling attack on the same day that Twitter announced its second policy
update. However, it does spotlight the peak of the trolling era in the Australian
news media identified by this study as the social epidemic period (described on p.
61). This study therefore suggests the first two response strategies Twitter had
implemented in 2012 and 2014 were insufficient to adequately address the surge
of trolling on its platform, as examples of sadistic trolling persisted and flourished
across the platform, including the Gamergate Saga. According to academic and
criminologist from the University of Western Sydney, Michael Salter (2010)
Twitter was unable to protect users from their abusers and facilitated the
snowballing trajectory of trolling, through functionality flaws that resulted from
unchanged features and futile safeguarding policies. These functionality flaws
enabled trolls to overwhelm users' ability to individually block the large number
of fake accounts used to distribute malicious messages. This study’s findings echo
Salter who, in his published 2019 research Crime, Justice and Social Media, labelled
Twitter's architectural design as “conducive to abuse and exploitation” (p. 19).
Salter also advocates that delays in Twitter’s trolling response were financially
motivated as this study also suggests. Salter explains:
Crucial to this discussion is the status of social media as a
network of corporate platforms that profit from the
commodification of user data. Communication of social
media is induced by software architecture that actively
encourages the publication and circulation of private,
emotive, or provocative material (such as trolling) that
drives market share and revenue. It is within the tension
between communication and commodification that online
abuse takes shape and meaning, and exerts its impacts on
users and public debate.
(Salter, 2019, p. 18)
This study suggests that Twitter had not actively engaged with the growing
concerns for calls to action from numerous stakeholders, including its users,
journalists, academics, news organisations, governments, and the broader
community. As the Gamergate Saga transcended its original victim, Zoe Quinn, to

Chapter 4.4 Twitter responses results and discussion

121

encompass other female game developers, such as Brianna Wu, demands for
Twitter to act were loud (Stuart, 2014). This was reported across the Australian
news media (Noyes, 2014; McGrath, 2014), yet no further action resulted. In an
interview published by The Guardian, Brianna Wu suggested Twitter was
responsible for facilitating harassment and challenged the platform to improve its
responsiveness to complaints (Stuart, 2014). This study suggests further Twitter’s
policy and feature updates were in reaction to the growing dissatisfaction of users,
leading to a decrease in usership and subsequent decreasing revenue. As a
revenue-led company, Twitter was reactive in its response to trolling.
Legal exemption
The study acknowledges Twitter’s legal exemption from media regulation in the
US as a contributing factor to the platform’s delayed response to trolling. Twitter
has no legal obligation to police malicious content such as harassment and threats,
as protection by US law states that social media platforms assume no liability for
content posted by third-parties of their service under Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act (1996). Likewise, Australian laws do not provide a
universal solution to suggestions of platform liability, and the debate in 2019
surrounding defamation law reform continues. On November 20, 2019, Australia’s
Attorney General Christian Porter announced plans to make platforms such as
Twitter and Facebook liable for the content posted by third parties as part of a
wide range of planned defamation law reform (Taylor, 2020, para. 8). The first
tranche of legislation was due to be introduced in June of 2020, but the Covid-19
pandemic delayed the government’s action, and no resolution was yet known at
the conclusion of 2021. In relation to such legislation, the study addresses legal
responses as a standalone stakeholder, including interviews with key figures in
media legal ethics, at length later in the discussion chapter (see section 4.7 on p.
265).
Stage three: The reporting method for abusive content is streamlined
Twitter announced a collaboration with Women, Action and the Media (WAM,
2014) on November 6, 2014, that encouraged users to report harassment on an
external website for severity assessment before selected escalation back to
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Twitter. This study excluded this collaboration from Twitter’s documented
trolling responses for two reasons. The New York non-for-profit group was not
considered to fall under the Australian scope and, unlike Zelda Williams, did not
have considerable relevant discourse in the content analysis to validate inclusion
in this study. Additionally, the external reporting function that was provided gave
negligible additional service over Twitter’s direct reporting function that was
already provided. Attempts to outsource its content regulation did nothing to
address the intrenched architectural issues of the platform itself, it just created an
additional inbox for complaints to be submitted to. The collaboration is noted,
however, but it was not included it in the documented list of Twitter responses to
trolling.
The third response to trolling, (categorised by this study as a feature response),
occurred in 2014 when Twitter received widespread criticism for its poor
handling of trolling on the service. Technology publication The Verge described
the problem as Twitter’s “weak response to violent threats” (Newton, 2014, para.
1). Subsequently, on December 2, 2014, Twitter announced four feature changes
for reporting of abuse on the platform, which circulated 500 million tweets every
day at the time (Twitter, 2014, para. 2). The first improvement was to streamline
the harassment reporting process, which had previously required a nine-part
questionnaire, as displayed in Figure 22 on the following page.
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Figure 22
Twitter’s nine-part questionnaire for reporting abuse in 2014

This image was produced by Twitter in 2014 on their blog (Twitter, 2014).
Although the process still required complaints to be reviewed manually, the
condensed method enabled Twitter to identify and remove trolling content and
perpetrators from the platform more efficiently (Twitter, 2015). In addition to the
shortened reporting process, users who observed abuse targeted towards others
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but who were not directly involved, could flag trolling content. Improved
algorithms considered behavioural signals that now included reports from
bystanders and used those signals to sort and prioritise the severity of threats for
faster response. For example, if 100 users all reported the same tweet, the
algorithm would escalate an expedited response. Twitter’s emerging challenge
was to ensure users were not “gaming the system” by reporting as abusive the
tweets they simply disagreed with (Newton, 2014, para 5). Twitter also
introduced a ‘blocked accounts’ page displayed in Figure 23 below. This feature
allowed users to view and edit accounts they had previously blocked providing
control over specific content viewed by users.
Figure 23
Twitter’s block feature introduced in 2014

This image was produced by Twitter in 2014 on their blog (Twitter, 2014a).
In addition, Twitter prevented blocked users from viewing the profiles of the
people who blocked them in an attempt to protect the privacy of its users. In a
corresponding statement, Twitter said “we are nowhere near being done making
changes in this area” (Twitter, 2014, para. 5), admitting further changes were still
required to adequately address its continued trolling problem.
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Stage four: CEO declares responsibility for trolling on the service
The fourth response to trolling was categorised by the study as a management
response. By February 2, 2015, the Gamergate Saga had escalated to a global scale,
and the evolution of trolling in the Australian news media had surpassed the
halfway point of the study’s identified social epidemic period (described on p. 61).
Trolling examples were evident on this particular microblogging platform, yet no
viable Twitter responses to eliminate its presence had been successful.
In direct response to Lindy West’s article, What happened when I confronted my
troll cruellest troll, which was published earlier on this same day, February 2,
2015, Twitter’s CEO Dick Costello admitted on his Twitter account the platform
had failed trolling victims (as noted in full on p. 107). Key remarks of the 127-word
admission included, “we suck at dealing with abuse”, “I'm frankly ashamed of how
poorly we've dealt with this issue”, and “it's nobody else's fault but mine, and it's
embarrassing” (Costello, 2015, @dickc Twitter). Although published by the UKbased news organisation The Guardian, West’s (2015) article was the inspiration
for this study and therefore has been included in the study’s Chronological timeline
of the evolution of trolling in the Australian news media derived from chapter 4.1
data (see Figure 9 on p. 51) for comparison. This notable incident sparked
academic criticism and debate amongst journalists about trolling as an
acknowledged part of the Australian media workplace environment at the time
(Tiku & Newton, 2015). West inspired Australian journalist Noyes (2017) to speak
out about the impacts of daily rape threats and death threats, which are an
acknowledged although uncomfortable and toxic element of the job (as discussed
in section 2.5.1 on p. 24). Although Costello’s “we suck” statement did not coincide
with any feature or policy changes, it was the first public statement in which the
platform took responsibility for trolling. The following day, February 3, 2015, two
subsequent statements further declared Costello’s “personal responsibility” for
the prevalence of trolling on Twitter; however, no functional changes were
announced. Three days later, on February 6, 2015, Twitter released a report that
labelled trolling as a serious threat to its popularity and subsequent profitability
and reported a decline in active users. Twitter’s average monthly users fell by 4
million in the final three months of 2014, down to 288 million users (Twitter,
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2015). The sudden quick succession of Costello’s responses preceding the
damning report may reflect his prior of knowledge of the report and a financial
motivation for Costello’s statements.

Twitter’s sudden response to trolling,

therefore, seemed to not solely emerge from inherent or external ethical
pressures, but to be driven by financial losses from decreased usership and
subsequent reduced profit margins. Once online abuse began to affect the bottom
line of the company, its efforts to resolve it were visibly accelerated. This study
identified that amongst Twitter’s earliest responses to trolling, the first, second
and fourth responses appear to be clearly financially motivated.
Stage five: a phone number verification is required for all users
The fifth response to trolling was categorised by the study as a feature response.
Newly declared financial declines drove a swift response to trolling that the
previous six years and eight months of ethical pressures could not alone achieve.
After declaring the financial impact of trolling on February 6, 2015, Twitter took
just 35 days to respond on March 13, 2015, to combat trolling. In comparison,
Twitter took nearly seven years from the first documented Australian trolling
example in the The Sydney Morning Herald on July 15, 2009, before this feature
response to trolling changed on March 13, 2015.
Twitter now required a phone number verification for all new accounts. An email
address was all that was previously required, and new accounts could be obtained
with no verification. In support of Twitter’s response, IT publication The Verge
explained “email addresses are relatively easy to obtain, but phone numbers are
harder. By checking the phone numbers against a list of banned users, Twitter
could be able to keep more abusers and harassers from creating accounts”
(Newton, 2015, para. 1). In cases where a user was found to be harassing others,
their account could be temporarily banned until a phone number was provided
and checked against a list of known trolls to decide whether a full ban was
necessary (Russell, 201, para. 4). The new verification method was specifically
introduced to combat fake accounts used by trolls, a problem Brianna Wu had
flagged and publicly urged Twitter to address in the previous year (Stuart, 2014).
This was the first response that required accountability of users; however, critics
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at the time suggested users could simply purchase a pre-paid sim card or use an
app such as Burner, which provides a temporary phone number free of charge as
a loophole (Higgins, 2015). In support, technology critics TechCrunch agreed and
labelled the response “not a perfect solution, but a positive step forward” (para.
4).
Stage six: the quality filter feature is implemented
Twitter’s sixth response to trolling was categorised as a feature response and
came in quick succession, ten days after the previous feature change
announcement of stage six. On March 23, 2015, Twitter implemented the Quality
Filter, aimed to remove all tweets that contain threats, offensive or abusive
language, duplicate content, or are sent from suspicious accounts from users’
notifications timelines (Welch, 2015, para. 1).
Technology critics at the time suggested this was “not a radical new tool” (Shu,
2015, para. 4), but rather an extension of another feature for verified users called
“tailored filtering” (para. 4), which allowed users to select an edited version of
their timeline notifications based on certain factors, with the most influential
being interactivity frequency. Content from accounts with most interactions were
displayed on the platform, and accounts with no engagement were shadow
banned. The new quality filter extended this functionality to all notification
options, including the expletives and vulgar language commonly featured in
trolling. From a strategic standpoint, it was logical for Twitter to make this feature
available for verified users, primarily because these accounts had the most
followers and garnered the highest proportion of trolls (Shu, 2015, para. 5).
However, genuine non-verified users also had to cope with bullying on the
platform and were not protected by this feature.
On July 24, 2019, Twitter announced, “we’re removing Quality Filter from search
settings because people told us the filter was confusing and they didn't want it”
(para. 1). Tech critics suggested the feature may not have been “confusing”, but
rather that the functionality of its algorithm had difficulty in practical
implementation, as the company never offered any details on the algorithms used

Chapter 4.4 Twitter responses results and discussion

128

to help determine what was considered a low-quality tweet (Miller, 2019, para. 3).
The filter may have prioritised accounts that users were uninterested in, reducing
the platform popularity amongst users that thrives with provocative content. The
study proposed Twitter should have reworked its algorithm in order to achieve
its initial objectives rather than removing the feature.
Stage seven: new accounts filtered for previously flagged content
Twitter’s seventh response to trolling was both a policy and feature response
aimed to reduce hateful conduct and abusive behaviour by revising a former
policy on April 22, 2015, expanding its description to further state users could not
“direct specific threats of violence against others or promot[ing] violence against
others.” The amendment meant any user who shared another user’s threat was
now infringing the Twitter policy, which became a problem for feminists who
shared abuse to shame the abuser. This updated policy aimed to eliminate the
loophole used by trolls to circulate other users’ threatening comments, which
allowed accounts to spread trolling content without personal liability or
repercussions. The implementation of this policy also aimed to reduce the
potential influence of mob mentality identified in interviews with stakeholders
and analysis of online commentary, that created bonds and a sense of camaraderie
between trolls, as well as offering a sense of support between abusers. Mob
mentality, also known as pack or herd mentality, was identified through thematic
analysis as a critical underlying theme for further analysis and discussion below.
Facilitating online mob mentality
Biological evidence denotes humans as social beings, with the lateral prefrontal
cortex of the brain often enforcing compliance with social norms (Yin et al, 2017).
This compliance is an important part of evolutionary psychology, as complex
social structures are the foundations of survival (Ruff, Ugazio & Fehr, 2013).
However, this fundamental conformity can lead to the acceptance of, or
participation in, emerging negative behavioural patterns such as trolling.
Social influence literature has shown that people choose to conform, because they
explicitly desire to adhere to the expectations of their group, in a process of
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“normative influence” (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). This decision is often an
unconscious, automatic process resulting in behavioural mimicry. Imitation is
traditionally characterised by personal interactions; however, the online domain
has facilitated the means for virtual transgression. In a society “addicted to likes”
(Croteau, 2019, para. 6), the desire to be accepted can impact the ability of users
to be objective in the face of harassment and may contribute to heightened
tolerance of fear of rejection within the social dynamics that online forums
provide. In a 2014 study of social defaults, Hu et al concluded, “just as observing
others' behaviour can induce behavioural mimicry, observing others' choices can
induce choice mimicry and may cause these choices to become default options” (p.
747). This description suggests social theory concepts materialise online and have
the ability to shape the behaviour of platform participants. Unmonitored, this
influence has the potential to accelerate the manifestation of a social problem,
masked by a shield of perceived tolerance.
The social context of online platforms such as Twitter can exogenously create
vitriolic environments leveraged by online abusers. The unconscious nature of
this process may be a contributing factor to its lack of recognition in current
strategies to address trolling and is a suggested area for further investigative
research in practical application. Understanding the influence social default has
on behaviour, both on and offline, consciously and unconsciously, is critical to
combat the threatening and degrading rhetoric disseminated on Twitter.
Continued stage seven: new accounts filtered for previously flagged
content
In addition, Twitter announced a feature to help identify abusive content and limit
its potential reach by analysing the age of Twitter accounts and comparing the
similarity of content between previously reported threats. This feature was
designed to stop trolls immediately setting up another account when they have
been previously reported and blocked. These fake accounts were recognised as
troll minefields years prior (Seddon, 2014). Despite this, Twitter delayed the
implementation of any combative strategy to the known problem until April 22,
2015, nine years after Twitter’s initial launch, and eight years and nine months
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after the first documented trolling article in the Australian news published in The
Sydney Morning Herald on July 15, 2009. This study again highlights and criticises
Twitter’s continued delayed response to effectively keep trolls and their vitriolic
behaviour off the service. This new feature allowed Twitter to freeze an account
until the user deleted the flagged tweet. This study criticises Twitter’s soft
resolution approach to ‘freeze’ accounts with flagged content, in preference to an
immediate deletion. However, the study further acknowledges the wicked aspect
of content regulation makes it impossible to completely ban individuals if they
have access to new account creation via phone spoofing and disposable email
addresses. The study suggests the continued delays of responses indicate Twitter
is a benefactor in the circulation of disruptive content to increase circulation and
use of the service.
Stage eight: the Trust & Safety Council is introduced
The eighth response to trolling was categorised as a management response. Seven
of the thirteen identified stages developed within the social epidemic period of the
study (described on p. 61): from Twitter’s second response to trolling on August
11, 2014, marking the beginning of stage two, through to the eighth response on
February 10, 2016, marking stage eight. As trolling incidents flooded the platform,
Twitter announced the implementation of a Trust & Safety Council, as the
saturation period approached (described on p. 62). Introduced to monitor
harassment and cyber bullying, the Council was initially made up of 40
organisations from around the world, four of which were Australian-based
(Ockenden, 2016). By 2020, the council comprised of 48 organisations, five of
which were Australian-based. These Australian organisations were: The Alannah
and Madeline Foundation; Beyond Blue; Bravehearts; Project Rockit; and
ReachOut Australia but in 2019 Council members said the group was ignored
(Matsakis, 2019).
Stage nine: accounts that promote violence are prohibited
Twitter’s ninth response to trolling was a policy response that developed at the
end of the saturation period (as described on p. 62) when trolling examples in the
Australian news media were most frequent. On November 18, 2017, Twitter
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updated its policies with a new rule against violence and physical harm. The new
policies prohibited specific threats of violence and abusive behaviour that
harassed, intimidated, or used fear to silence another user on the service. In
addition to offensive text, hateful imagery was also recognised as hostile and
outlawed from the service (Twitter Safety, 2017). All malicious content reported
to Twitter in breach of the new policies would now result in the author’s
permanent suspension.
The harder stance was a significant jump from stage seven, where troll accounts
were reprimanded with a “freeze” until the reported content was removed, and
the user could continue using the service. This was the first Twitter response to
directly acknowledge targeted abuse toward minority groups and labelled the
subcategories of “race, religion, disability, sexual orientation and ethnicity”
(Twitter Safety, 2017, para. 3) as areas of particular concern, identified and
supported by the findings in chapter 4.2 (on p. 64). Although numerous examples
of racist trolling (Blackwell, 2015), religious trolling (Pearson, 2012), disabilitybased trolling (Bullen, 2016), sexuality-based trolling (West, 2015; Ford, 2016)
and ethnicity-based trolling (Phillips, 2015) were evident years prior and
provided clear evidence of targeted abuse towards marginal groups on the
platform, it was over a year into the saturation period before Twitter finally made
the acknowledgement and initiated the policies in responsive action.
Stage ten: CEO declares public accountability for progress
Twitter’s tenth response to trolling and was a management response. On March 1,
2018, Twitter stated their new approach was to “improve the health of the
conversation” on its platform as a direct management response to trolls. Jack
Dorsey, co-founder and CEO of Twitter, stated, “we’re committing Twitter to help
increase the collective health, openness, and civility of public conversation, and to
hold ourselves publicly accountable towards progress” (Dorsey, 2018, @jack
Twitter). With this statement, Twitter declared public accountability for the
progress towards identifying and removing trolls from the platform.
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This response was the first recorded beyond this study’s thematic content analysis
displayed in Figure 9: Chronological timeline of the evolution of trolling in the
Australian news media derived from chapter 4.1 data (on p. 51). Although Twitter
had previously declared responsibility for trolling on the service in on February 2,
2015 (as identified in stage four), three years and one month later the platform
extended their declaration from responsibility to accountability for abuse on their
service. However, the profound statement alone did not offer any support for
victims. The statement did not provide an action plan and did not define any
measurable ways to access the platform’s progress. In short, the statement was
one of hope rather than an accountable progression method.
Stage eleven: flagged accounts are muted
Twitter’s eleventh response to trolling was a feature response. On May 15, 2018,
Twitter introduced new techniques to fight malicious automation and spam by
muting the content tweeted by trolls on users’ accounts. This function did not
remove trolls from the platform, though it made them less visible to users. Twitter
identified certain patterns of behaviour associated with troll-like accounts,
including users who signs up for multiple accounts at once, or users that
repeatedly tag people that do not follow them in tweets. Identifying emerging
behavioural characteristics was developed by Twitter as a key tactic to isolate
trolling accounts, placing flagged accounts into ‘quarantine’. If a user specifically
selected the ‘show more replies’ button under a tweet, all comments would appear
including those of trolls.
In critique, the study suggests the muting function of flagged accounts was not a
standalone feature response, but an extension of two previously identified stages.
The first was an extension of the stage seven: new accounts filtered for previously
flagged content. Literature surrounding the muting feature response named two
key behavioural patterns the algorithm scanned for. The first behavioural pattern
the algorithm scanned for was users who sign up for multiple accounts at once.
The second behavioural pattern the algorithm scanned for was people who
repeatedly tag people that do not follow them in tweets. This was a new function
not considered by any of the prior stages.
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The second was an extension of stage six, the ‘quality filter’ feature, that aimed to
remove all tweets from users’ notifications, timelines that contained threats,
offensive or abuse language, duplicate content, or were sent from suspicious
accounts. However, this feature did not remove all trolling content, as some
content, although offensive, did not breach any of Twitter’s policy and this is why
it was not removed. From cracks in the ‘quality filter’, the ‘muting function’
followed, where content that was not deemed offensive enough to be removed
from the platform but was still problematic, was muted. The study proposes the
argument that if content was deemed problematic enough to be flagged and
hidden, why was it not deemed offensive enough for removal by Twitter in the
first place? Twitter’s choice to mute rather than remove trolls suggests financial
benefit was again a motivation for inaction, as interactivity from active debate
about trolling on the platform led to increased usership and subsequent increased
profit margins.
Stage twelve: technology experts Smyte are introduced
Twitter’s twelfth identified response to trolling was categorised by the study as a
management response and a feature response. On June 21, 2018, Twitter
announced its partnership with technology experts Smyte, who specialise in
safety, spam, and security issues, to combat trolling on the platform. Although the
statement was made by Twitter’s management team and did not disclose any
exact feature changes, the study identified the operational and technical elements
provided by Smyte (not detailed in this study) would additionally classify the
change as a feature response. In the same statement, Twitter declared the health
of the conversation remained their top priority. However, the continued presence
of trolling on the platform, coupled with the minimal implemented response
strategies documented in this study, would challenge that claim. Twitter’s
partnering with an external company may suggest it was struggling to effectively
control the escalating trolling problem and that its internal structure could not
cope with the onslaught of trolling. This further suggests that previous response
attempts by the company were insufficient. Having outsourced its own regulation
may suggest Twitter was ill-equipped to have any effective impact on trolling and
may have contributed to its continued delayed reactions. In this study, both the
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viability and ethics of continuing to operate a company unable to control such a
persistent snowballing problem is brought into question.
Twitter response excluded from data set
Twitter further stated an additional response to trolling on June 26, 2018, to
combat malicious automation and spam; however, this study does not consider
the “four new measures” to be new features. Twitter’s announcement outlined
previous stages and provided no additional policy or feature changes. The
announcements are described as follows.
1. The first measure was to “reduce the visibility of suspicious accounts in
Tweet and account metrics”, reinstating stage eleven’s flagged accounts as
muted section.
2. The second measure was to “improve the sign-up process, with new
accounts being required to confirm either an email address or phone
number when they sign up”, reinstating stage five’s phone number
verification requirement for all users.
3. The third measure stated, “auditing existing accounts for signs of
automated sign-up” and restating stage seven’s filtering of new accounts for
previously flagged content section.
4. The fourth measure focussed on the “expansion of our malicious behaviour
detection systems to include automated detection of suspicious account
activity,” including automatically flagging Twitter accounts that tweet an
exceptionally high-volume of the same hashtag, or the same @username
without a reply from the account mentioned, restating stage eleven’s muted
flagged accounts. In this section, Twitter stated two behavioural patterns
that the algorithm scanned for. The second behavioural pattern was people
who repeatedly tag people who do not follow them in tweets. This
proposed “new measure” was therefore deemed not to be new.
With the frequency of trolling continuing to increase at this time (Dean, 2022),
Twitter’s inability to implement any new policy or feature changes indicate that
the platform is incapable of delivering a universal comprehensive prevention
response strategy for victims, or that it is unwilling to.
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Effectiveness of Twitter responses
The nature of grounded theory research is difficult because social problems are
messy. This study has gone some way towards identifying the evolution of
responses over time; however, further research would be needed to establish
which responses are most effective. The study identified that Twitter’s responses
were designed with two objectives: firstly, to protect users from trolls, and
secondly, more often to protect Twitter from the bad press, corporate damage and
loss to share prices associated with hosting trolling.. Twitter’s initial three
responses deflected responsibility and avoided any significant action. Nine years
after its launch, Twitter finally declared partial responsibility for trolling, and its
ensuring proceeding responses evolved from self-preservation, to more actively
protecting its users. However, response strategies were not considered by this
study to be proactive, but to be reactive to a financially undesirable event.
Reflecting on the practical application of Twitter’s responses to trolling, the study
offers the following findings:
•

Management responses have the least potential impact to safeguard users
from trolls.

•

Policy responses have a moderate potential impact against trolls by
prohibiting their behaviour.

•

Feature changes have the greatest potential impact as a combative strategy
to eliminate trolling on the platform.

•

Future research may be most effective if directed towards how to best to
implement feature strategies on social media and measure their actual
impact.

A robust and comprehensive evaluation of the effectiveness of Twitter responses
to trolling is beyond the scope of this study. Further research would be required
for broader conclusions about effective practice to be drawn. However, by
reflecting on the findings the study can provide preliminary suggestions, as
follows:
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1. To protect the Twitter platform from trolls, the study’s preliminary
findings suggest the following features may be the most influential
existing strategies, and are considered of equal importance:
•

Stage five’s feature that requires a phone number for verification.

•

Stage seven’s feature that filters new accounts for previously flagged
content.

2. To protect Twitter users from trolls the study’s preliminary findings
suggests two complementary features in a synthesised approach may
have the greatest potential impact. In a two-step process, the first
suggested step is the removal of trolling content that contains abuse
language, duplicate content, or that is sent from suspicious accounts
achieved when users implement:
•

Stage six’s quality filter feature.

The second consecutive suggested step is to hide any trolling content that
was not removed by the previous step, achieved when users implement:
•

Stage eleven’s feature that mutes flagged accounts.

3. To protect Twitter users from trolls, the study’s preliminary findings
suggest the response with the greatest potential to combat trolling with
a standalone strategy is:
•

Stage six’s quality filter feature.

This chapter has outlined Twitter’s ten types of responses to trolling, providing
clarity about an important stakeholder in the trolling paradigm. While many other
companies offer training for journalists in the safe and effective use of Twitter
(Duggan, 2017; Committee to Protect Journalists, 2018; International Federation
of Journalists, 2019), this study found minimal evidence of action on Twitter’s
behalf between 2009 to 2019 to protect journalists from trolls. The next chapter
will investigate the other leading social platform Facebook and its responses.
These analyses provide a grounded view in line with the systems model that
suggests social problems require actions on multiple levels. In this analysis the
social platforms sit arguably between governance and support levels of the
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trolling paradigm with actions by fellow users falling under support, and
regulatory actions by the social media companies functioning as governance.
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Chapter 4.5
Facebook Responses
Results and Discussion
Thematic content analysis of Facebook responses
Question E - What supportive strategies, operational modifications and corporate
reform were implemented by Facebook in response to trolling?
As previous chapters have demonstrated, the prevalence of online abuse and
harassment and its disproportionate adverse impact on women has been evident
since the internet’s popularisation in the 1990s. Facebook is one of the leading
social media platforms for driving traffic to news websites in Australia, with 33
percent of Australians using Facebook for general news in 2021, down from 46
percent in the early days of this study in 2016 (Park et al, 2021). This chapter
analyses Facebook’s publicly stated intentions to manage trolling.
The research design strategy that addresses the research question: What
supportive strategies, operational modifications and corporate reform were
implemented by Facebook in response to trolling? applies mixed methods of
thematic content analysis of archival evidence. The study used collected data from
some of the articles collected for the analysis presented in chapter 4.1 (see p. 30)
as a starting point. Of the 528 articles in the thematic content analysis, 31
mentioned Facebook’s response to trolling on its platform in some capacity and
were deemed relevant for inclusion. Of these, 14 further discussed or made
comment on aspects of particular response strategies. To obtain further data,
Facebook’s website was explored, and in May 2020, relevant information was
retrieved from three sections: About Us, Safety Centre, and Help Centre. On each
of these pages the search function was used to investigate the terms: “troll” “bully”
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and “abuse”. This led to a further 25 relevant articles that were included for
analysis, bringing the total to 56. Although Google was also used as a search tool
with the search inquiry: “troll” + “Facebook” + “response”. In May 2020, this
retrieved 3,520,000 results, on closer analysis of the first ten pages totalling 100
articles, no new response strategies were found that had not already been
identified in the previous methods of this chapter. Thematic analysis of the 56
articles grouped Facebook responses into five categories: support strategies,
feature strategies, functional strategies, research strategies and corporate
approach strategies, which are independently explored in the sections that follow.
Determining data for inclusion
The study first determined the parameters governing information that was
considered to be trolling-related and, therefore, included in the data set. It was
noted that Facebook often used the terminology ‘cyber-bullying’ in preference to
‘trolling’ in the material on its website. Therefore, the research analysed the
content of each piece was analysed to determine which of the cyber-bullying data
should be included in the data set rather than filtering for the exact terminology
used by Facebook. The literature review of this study evaluated the various
definitions of trolling cited in the literature and determined that trolling is best
defined by Johnston (2014) who described it as “a deliberate attempt to upset or
anger someone online” (para. 4). Johnson’s description was selected as the key
definition of the study to determine which pieces of content that Facebook
categorised as cyber-bullying would be classified by the study as trolling. Through
this deductive method, qualitative and quantitative data was identified for
thematic analysis, for discussion and critique.
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Facebook responses strategy outline
The study applied thematic analysis to responses to trolling retrieved from
archival evidence on Facebook, revealing five categories listed below. For a
comprehensive analysis, individual response strategies were collectively analysed
within their respective categories, providing robust data for in-depth exploration,
discussion, and critique.
Thematic analysis of the 56 articles retrieved as archival evidence grouped
Facebook responses into five categories which are independently explored in the
sections that follow.
Facebook support strategies

Page 142

Facebook feature strategies

Page 161

Facebook functional strategies

Page 174

(automated software to the backend process)
Facebook research strategies

Page 196

Facebook corporate approach strategies

Page 203
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4.5.1 Facebook support strategies
Facebook support strategies in response to trolling were explored first. The study
identified six support strategies that form the qualitative data results of this
section. Itemised in chronological order below, the list outlines the resources
implemented by Facebook that Australian journalists can use when trolled.
1. Facebook Safety Advisory Board
Initiated on December 6, 2009
2. Facebook Safety Centre
Initiated on April 13, 2010
As an extension of the established Safety Centre, Facebook integrated the
additional two resources.
3. Facebook Parents’ Portal
Initiated on December 13, 2016
4. Facebook Youth Portal
Initiated on May 15, 2018
Despite the introduction of the Parents’ Portal and Youth Portal, these resources
are not particularly relevant to Australian journalists seeking to access
information in response to being trolled as part of their work. The portals are cited
here to illustrate the adoption a multi-levelled systems approach by Facebook.
5. Be Bold Stop Bullying Campaign
Initiated on November 2, 2012
6. Facebook Bullying Prevention Hub
Initiated on November 6, 2013
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Emerging themes within each of the six identified support strategies are
individually analysed, discussed and critiqued in the following sections.
Facebook Safety Advisory Board support strategy background
The Facebook Safety Advisory Board was the first support strategy implemented
in response to trolling. To provide context for analysis, the study provided a brief
background and summarised its role below from descriptions on Facebook’s
website: https://www.facebook.com/help. Launched on December 6, 2009, the
Facebook Safety Advisory board was comprised of leading internet safety
organisations that provided expertise, perspective and insights to inform, guide
and shape the approach to online safety on the platform (Facebook, 2009).
Established to advise and implement best-practices on the service, the board
suggested resources, tips, and tools for users to implement in response to trolling
(Facebook, 2020a). These suggestions were refined and regularly updated.
However, it is unknown if Australian journalists viewed or used them.
Facebook Safety Advisory Board support strategy quantitative data
The study analysed which countries were represented on the Facebook Safety
Advisory Board. The first panel was comprised of five organisations, all of which
were from western cultures:
•

Four were based in the United States of America.

•

One was based in England.

By January 1, 2020, after eleven years of operation, the number of organisations
on the board had risen from five to eleven. Although representative countries had
diversified over time, they were still predominantly western, representing 72% of
the panel (eight of the eleven):
•

One was based in Australia named Project Rockit. However, this
organisation aimed content towards children and youth educators
which was not relevant to working journalists (Project Rockit, 2020).

•

One was based in New Zealand.

•

Three were based in the United States of America.

•

Two were based in England.
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•

One was based in Europe (with three office locations in France,
Luxemborg and Portugal).

•

One was based in Taiwan.

•

One was based in Brazil.

•

One was based in India.

While Facebook claimed in 2020 that the Facebook Advisory Board consisted of
“organisations from around the world” (2020a, para. 1), 193 countries are
recognised by the United Nations, yet only 10 countries are represented on the
board. An analysis of global usage of Facebook (Statista, 2021) reveals that seven
of the top ten countries with the highest number of Facebook users were excluded
from representation on the board. The findings revealed that Facebook’s claim
was misleading and did not accurately reflect the true distribution of users around
the world.
This disproportionate representation was further explored. For comparative
analysis, Australian Facebook usage data was identified and calculated as a
representative portion:
•

Global Facebook users

100%

2.603 billion

•

Australian Facebook users

0.79%

11.23 million

The findings revealed that Australians comprised 0.79% of Facebook users, yet
comparatively represented 9% (1 of the 11) of representative organisations on
the Facebook Advisory Board. The findings support the suggestion of a western
bias.
In contextual consideration, India was identified as the country with the highest
number of Facebook users, and their representative portion was calculated for
further comparative analysis:
1. Indian Facebook users

17.2%

346.2 million

The findings revealed that India as a standalone country comprised 17.2% of total
Facebook users yet represented 9% (one out of eleven) of the Facebook Advisory
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Board, equal to Australia. The findings identified a biased skew towards the
inclusion of affluent nations on the Facebook Advisory Board. Only three of the
eleven organisations (27%) specifically the ones from India, Taiwan and Brazil,
represented developing nations. The study suggests this substantial skew does
not accurately reflect the global distribution of Facebook users, and subsequent
support strategies provided by the board may not proportionally represent the
most effective responses to trolling for non-westernised regions.
Facebook Safety Advisory Board support strategy thematic analysis
Through thematic analysis of quantitative data results about the Facebook Safety
Advisory Board from 2009 to 2020, four themes emerged including western bias,
internet censorship, discriminative leverage, and affluence bias that are discussed
and critiqued in the following sections.
Western bias
With five of the initial organisations on the Facebook Advisory Board based in the
United States (80%), a western bias was established within the foundational
processes that govern the site. Considering the company was founded in
Cambridge, Massachusetts in January 2004, it is a logical that the Advisory Board
was first established in the US. However, as usage of Facebook spread globally, the
number and location of organisations represented on the board diversified but did
not expand in proportion to the service’s global distribution. On critical the
examination of data and subsequent statistics, the study suggests that the
appointed Facebook Advisory Board in 2020 did not accurately reflect a
representative sample of global users of the service. This indicated that
Facebook’s claim to represent organisations from “around the world” as
misleading. This allows for trolling of journalists based on race to be unchecked.
Internet censorship
Although the scope of this study does not permit a comprehensive analysis of
global internet censorship, it cannot critique the disproportional representation
of the board, and Australia’s subsequent proportional representation within it,
without first considering which countries have access to the platform. An
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infographic from a 2019 study by Freedom House illustrates the comparative
variances of the identified accessibility theme for contextual analysis. Figure 24
displayed below depicts contrasts within global internet censorship, and
spotlights jurisdictions of particular authoritative control.
Figure 24
The state of internet freedom around the world in 2019

(Statista, 2019)
The map indicates the global distribution of internet freedom identified by the
study, evaluated on the basis of three categorical considerations: obstacles to
internet access, limitations of online content, and violations of user rights. The
report highlights China as the worst abuser of internet freedom from 2016 to 2019
inclusively. China encouraged and magnified trolling behaviour on the internet by
“promoting hate speech, breaching privacy issues and malicious spreading of false
information” (Richter, 2019, p. 1). The study confirmed Facebook restrictions
remain in place for China, Iran and Syria, and in further oppressive control, North
Korea has enforced complete internet restrictions. Australia, along with many
western allies that include the United States of America and the United Kingdom,
was considered to have unrestricted access to the internet. The report was critical
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of the role of social media and flagged the absence of universal responsibility and
cohesive action a threat to society. “Social media allows ordinary people, civic
groups, and journalists to reach a vast audience at little or no cost, but they have
also provided an extremely useful and inexpensive platform for malign influence”
(Shahbaz & Funk, 2019, p. 2). This global communication platform has been
leveraged by trolls. It is important that this study considers these factors when
analysing findings and drawing its conclusions.
Accessed by 2.603 billion people worldwide in 2020, Facebook is considered in
many countries an integral part of society, playing a fundamental role in governing
communication, engagement, and cultural evolution (Bonson, Royo & Ratkai,
2014). Over time, Facebook emerged as central part of citizens’ personal and
cultural identity (Seru & Magogwe, 2016). The interactivity that Facebook
designed to increase connectivity and transparency has triggered further
segregation and social divides of censored regions. China is representative of this
emerging divide, with strict government regulations meaning only 0.2% of its
1.404 billion population in 2020 have Facebook access, and only 4.1% of the
population have access to other foreign media platforms including YouTube,
Instagram, Pinterest and Twitter. In neighbouring Taiwan, there are no
restrictions and consequently 98.9% of Taiwan’s population use Facebook.
Differing political views on internet access may explain why Taiwan has a
representative on the Facebook Advisory Board and China does not. The study
spotlights the potential for victim impacts to intensify when experienced in areas
of imposed isolation enforced by media regulations and government authorities.
On May 16, 2021, intense debate about the treatment of women on platforms such
as a Facebook-like platform run by Weibo was sparked by the abuse of Xiao Meili,
who posted to Weibo a video of a man who threw hot liquid at her after she asked
him to stop smoking (Alto, 2021). Chinese activists who spoke out against the state
became the target of a torrent of vitriol for criticising or drawing attention to
human rights issues, particularly women’s rights. Feminist discourse prompted
vile abuse from regular citizens online, as well as from government officials and
state media (Davidson, 2021). Journalists reporting such topics were attacked,
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accused of being traitors, harassed by the distribution of fake nude photographs,
and threatened with harm to family members (Davidson, 2021). Researchers who
analysed propaganda activities, including Vicky Xiuzhong Xu, were also targeted
as China has imposed sanctions on scholars in further efforts to silence critics (Kuo
& Shih, 2021). Although the scope of the study limits an in-depth exploration of
this theme, anonymity is considered a key strategy to combat online abuse that
limitations on internet freedom shields.
Discriminatory leverage
The study showed that the Facebook Advisory Board predominately represents
users from westernised countries. A bias can be observed in the predominantly
western resources, advice, tools and materials Facebook provides. Some of the
literature that underpins discussion points included Salter, Adams, and Perez
(2017), who illustrated how racism can be produced and reproduced through
preference and selection. Only some resources were provided by Facebook in
languages other than English, which both signals the platform’s potential for
linguistic bias and, by extension, cultural bias. The complexities of different
cultures may not be adequately considered if support systems are viewed through
a narrow and western philosophical lens. Western perspectives may not have a
comprehensive understanding of cultural differences that may be targeted by
trolls. Failing to recognise and address the vulnerabilities of certain cultural
groups may undermine the effectiveness of Facebook’s support strategies.
Material provided by the Facebook Advisory Board may not be equally beneficial
for all users. A more nuanced understanding of the impact of trolling on
Facebook’s majority (non-white) audience could be gained by including greater
diversity on the board. A more multi-cultural approach including a range of
perspectives about the impacts of trolling would enrich education material and
could enhance user experiences on the service.
Affluence bias
In addition, this study suggests developed nations may have a greater funding
capacity for trolling research, and therefore be more able to effectively contribute
to safety procedures. This may potentially justify the greater percentage of
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western organisations represented on the Facebook Advisory Board. The
literature review for this study revealed that the first academic research on
trolling emerged from the United States, United Kingdom and Australia. From the
English literature language available, western journalists and their publishers
were among the first to speak out about trolling in their workplace, including the
American-based Jezebel, which published Lindy West’s 2015 article, What
happened when I confronted my cruel troll, that inspired this study. These examples
provided some of the first case studies for investigation by academic researchers,
including Australian Emma Jane (2015). This may perhaps justify the inclusion of
multiple organisations from westernised countries on the board; however, it does
not justify the exclusion of developing countries. The study suggests the
collaborative knowledge provided by organisations from a broader cross-section
of countries would improve Facebook’s responses to trolling.
Limitation
The study acknowledges the limitation of evaluating archival evidence published
in English only. Assessing Facebook responses in languages other than English fell
beyond the scope of this study. However, the study recognises developing nations
not represented on the Facebook Advisory Board may have different safety
services in response to trolling omitted from the analysis due to language barriers.
Facebook Safety Centre support strategy background
The Facebook Safety Centre was identified by the study as the second support
strategy in response to trolling. To provide context for analysis, the study
provided a brief background from descriptions on Facebook’s website:
https://www.facebook.com/safety. Launched on April 13, 2010, the Facebook
Safety Centre is an online information page dedicated to online safety and
providing links to related policies, tools and resources. The page works with
external experts including a Safety Advisory Board (described in the previous
discussion section) to gather user feedback to assist in the development of
updated response strategies to trolling on the platform. Facebook announced the
page, “quadrupled the safety content available, and created a cleaner, more
navigable interfaces to help users find answers to safety questions fast”
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(Facebook, 2010, para. 5). Both the appearance and useability of the page evolved
over time as more interactive features were added, including video content. For a
visual presentation of these changes, the study retrieved archival evidence the
original 2010 interface (displayed in Figure 25 on the following page) for
comparison with the most recent 2020 interface (displayed in Figure 26 on p.
151).
Figure 25
The initial interface of Facebook’s Safety Centre when launched in 2010

(Facebook, 2010)
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Figure 26
The 2020 interface of Facebook’s Safety Centre

(Facebook, 2020b)
In response to increased global usage, the Facebook Safety Centre was redesigned
and translated into 50 languages on October 24, 2016, guiding users through steps
to manage their interactions with other users using privacy and security tools
(Lunden, 2016). Despite these translations, the study reiterates there were few
non-western organisations represented on the Facebook Advisory Board that
produced this content, and generic information lacked cultural sensitivity.
As an extension of the established Safety Centre, Facebook integrated the
additional two resources: the Parent Portal and Youth Portal. Despite their
introduction, these resources are not particularly relevant to Australian
journalists seeking to access information in response to being trolled as part of
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their work. They are briefly described to illustrate the adoption of a multi-levelled
systems approach by Facebook.
Facebook Parents Portal support strategy background
Facebook Parent’s Portal was launched on December 13, 2016, and provided
parents with an education tool outlining its functions, along with a step-by-step
guide to sign up and connect with others on the service. The page also provided
basic advice about methods to help children safely navigate social media. While
the content did not exclusively focus on trolling, related material was provided
including an explanation of online privacy rights and demonstrations of “block”
and “report” features to limit interactions with trolls.
Facebook Youth Portal support strategy background
Facebook Youth Portal was launched on May 15, 2018, and aimed to provide a
guide for teenagers navigating the platform. Potential risks were flagged,
accompanied by educational material that suggested prevention methods in
addition to coping strategies. The page promoted discussion between users of the
same age, and suggested real-life experiences were more actively engaged with
and understood when heard through the voices of peers.
Facebook Safety Centre support strategy qualitative analysis
Facebook Safety Centre addressed individual strategies to three stakeholder
groups: youth, parents and educators. Evidence of these tailored strategies are
identified in the original interface in 2010, and the most recent interface in 2020.
Facebook’s provision of information for various types of stakeholders resembles
the Systems Theory approach described by Ackoff’s in 1974. In this strategy, the
Youth Portal and Parents Portal aim to protect young people from becoming
victims. They seek to mobilise young people, parents and educators to be active at
the support and community level of the model, and educators as curriculum
developers at the governance level. This approach underpins this thesis and
Facebook’s breakdown of the social problem into stakeholder groups in a cohesive
and multilayered approach may indicate a theory informed attempt towards a
grounded solution. This use or an integrated approach highlights the value of
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theory-informed practice, less evident in Twitter’s responses. Facebook’s
apparent use of theory in developing this response strategy may have contributed
to public consensus that Facebook had managed the trolling problem more
effectively in practical implementation than Twitter (Hildebrand & Matheson,
2012; Tiku & Newton, 2015).
Be Bold Stop Bullying campaign support strategy background
The Be Bold Stop Bullying campaign was Facebook’s third support strategy in
response to trolling. The campaign could also be classified as part of the Facebook
corporate approach strategy discussed later in section 4.5.5 of this chapter. A brief
background is summarised to provide context for analysis in descriptions from
articles about the Be Bold Stop Bullying App, which in 2021 no longer exists. On
November 1, 2012, Facebook launched the Be Bold Stop Bullying campaign in
Australia, following a similar petition in the United States that acquired over one
million signatures in support. Facebook’s campaign encouraged users to stand up
to online bullies by calling out their behaviour. The central feature of the campaign
was an interactive app where adults and children pledged to rally against bullying
by reporting abusive instances. Some examples of student pledges listed on the
app included, "I will take a stand when I see young people humiliating or hurting
each other," and “I will not use my phone or computer to spread rumours or say
hateful things, and I won't ignore it when others are cruel and intimidating”
(Marszalek, 2012, para. 4). Adults were encouraged by the app to dismiss the
misconception that bullying is simply "young people being young people" (para.
4) and to actively seek intervention. Integration with multiple stakeholders was
promoted, with adults encouraged to work with schools, coaches, and parents to
eradicate bullying, especially if their own child was involved. The app included an
interactive map displaying how many people had pledged to the campaign in each
Australian state or territory and provided information on practical resources
victims could access for help. Although the pledging process aligns with the
support/peer/community level of Ackoff’s system model, if it was implemented
on its own it could be seen as an abdication of responsibility to take action on the
governance level. This is called self-regulation in policy terms, however, none of
the ten participants in chapter 4.1’s interviews remembered this campaign. As
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Facebook seemed be also taking action on the governance level such as
adaptations to feature strategies, it was part of a more extensive multi-levelled
approach.
Be Bold Stop Bullying campaign support strategy thematic analysis
From the thematic analysis of qualitative data about the Be Bold Stop Bullying
campaign in 2012, the study identified four emerging triggers for corporate
responses including external pressure, accumulating negative publicity, selfgovernance, and misdirection, which are discussed and critiqued below.
External pressure
An external pressure theme was identified for discussion and critique. Facebook’s
Be Bold Stop Bullying campaign was launched after similar campaigns were
established by other news organisations and activist groups including the
#StopTheTrolls campaign. Only after external pressure was exerted via critical
commentary from victims, the Australian media and Australian law enforcement
did Facebook react, launching its own campaign. Facebook was not a forefront
leader regarding the anti-trolling campaigns described in detail in section 4.3 of
this study (on p. 82). The first campaigns that spoke out about the impact of
trolling and suggested response strategies to be implemented in both the public
and private realm were predominately spearheaded by female journalists who
expressed feminist views. However, Facebook did follow suit and launched its
own campaign after other stakeholders had taken the lead.
The #StopTheTrolls campaign is a notable Australian newsroom’s response to
trolling and is discussed in further detail in chapter 4.5 of this study (on p. 139).
However, the campaign is again briefly mentioned as a central part of this
discussion section to provide context for the external pressure mounting on
Facebook before its own Be Bold Stop Bullying campaign in response to trolling
was initiated. On December 11, 2012, the Australian publication The Daily
Telegraph announced the #StopTheTrolls campaign. The campaign suggested the
integration of a holistic approach to trolling was critical to any success by stating
“what we need is strong co-operation from governments, law enforcement and the
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community” (Roxon, as cited in Jones & Byrnes, 2012, para. 8). This approach
mirrored Facebook’s perspective at the time, and by 2014 Facebook had
introduced an “empathy team” to help its engineers and designers understand the
user experience (O’Reilly, 2014, para. 3). Both campaigns appear, in their calls for
action on multiple levels, to be influenced by systems theory thinking, as proposed
by Ackoff (1974). The campaign gathered multiple stakeholders who put external
pressure on Facebook to respond. The campaigns identified Government, law
enforcement, education, non-for-profit organisations, and celebrities as
stakeholder groups. In addition, the newsroom stakeholder group that launched
the initiative was also a stakeholder. This study identified two stakeholder groups,
the government and law enforcement, that were particularly critical of Facebook’s
inaction. Their critique is unpacked below.
Government criticism emerged through comments from the then Australian
Attorney-General Nicola Roxon in 2012, who called out Facebook’s inaction by
stating, “we need the assistance of US-based social networks” (Jones & Byrnes,
cited Roxon, 2012, para. 8). In additional criticism from the Government,
Australian Communications Minister Stephen Conroy in 2012 acknowledged
Facebook, unlike Twitter, had hired staff in Australia to address abuse
(Hildebrand & Matheson, 2012, para. 24) but suggested further action from the
platform was critical. Conroy addressed the need for the platform to disclose the
identities of flagged users, stating “[the platform] may think they are above
Australian law… [but] they should co-operate with law enforcement authorities to
prosecute trolls” (Conroy, cited in Hildebrand & Matheson, 2012, para. 24).
Law enforcement stakeholder criticism emerged with comments from Australian
police that confirmed its “limited ability to seek the identities or IP addresses of
anonymous abusers from social media platforms,” (Jones & Byrnes, 2012, para.
11). Victorian Police Commissioner Ken Lay expressed disdain for Facebook one
month before the Be Bold Stop Bullying campaign was launched. In early October
2012, Lay stated “the company had no social responsibility when it resisted calls
to take down pages the commissioner feared would undermine the trial of the man
accused of murdering Irish expatriate Jill Meagher in Melbourne” (Lay, as cited in
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Chirgwin, 2012, para. 5). These political statements indicate a lack of
synchronisation between social media platforms and Australian authorities,
contributing to the trolls’ ability to break the law and abuse their victims without
fear of prosecution. This external pressure from a widespread group of
stakeholders, amplified by The Daily Telegraph’s #StopTheTrolls campaign,
appears to have contributed to the shifting episteme prompted Facebook’s global
Be Bold Stop Bullying campaign as the corporation’s own response to trolling.
Accumulating negative publicity
Accumulating negative publicity was a theme identified for discussion and
critique. Disparate discussions about the presence and impact of trolling on
Facebook accumulated around 2011 in the social problem period, and swiftly
snowballed into widespread disapproval that was echoed throughout stakeholder
commentary in 2012. This rising choir of negative voices reached a crescendo with
the previously mentioned #StopTheTrolls campaign. In supporting evidence of the
growing hostility, Australian journalist Richard Chirgwin (2012) stated, “the Be
Bold Stop Bullying campaign launch gives Facebook some desperately needed
favourable publicity in the Murdoch press in Australia, which had the company in
the cross-hairs during its #StopTheTrolls campaign” (para. 5).
Self-governance
This study identified self-governance as a theme for discussion and critique. The
Be Bold Stop Bullying campaign encouraged all users to download an app that
invited users to pledge their alliance to cyber-kindness in the form of a petition.
Users were advised to report abusive instances to Facebook, through the standard
reporting functions. This study identified no new reporting features provided by
Facebook to accompany the campaign. In addition, the study identified that there
was no new accountability measure for users who signed up to the Facebook
campaign. There was no measurable means to determine if the pledged users
implemented the recommended strategies suggested by the campaign or not. The
campaign did, however, provide a forum for discussion of trolling and its impact
on victims, and enabled users to connect with others with a shared interest on the
topic. The campaign did increase awareness on the topic of trolling (Marszalek,
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2012) and provided support for trolling victims via referrals and prompted a more
comprehensive understanding of trolling in the community. However, the
campaign was not a methodical response to trolling, and this may have been a
result of the rush to launch due to mounting negative publicity from the external
pressures previously discussed. The study further suggests the campaign may
have been constructed as a response to the hostility rather than a response to
trolling and suggests the campaign could be more correctly labelled as a publicity
tactic that future research could analyse in more depth using situational crisis
communication theory (Coombs, 2007).
Misdirection
As discussed in the previous section, Facebook’s Be Bold Stop Bullying campaign
did not provide any additional technological changes or functionality
improvements to the service. Critics accused Facebook of directing the problem
externally, rather than dealing with the true cause of the problem. Chirgwin
(2012) accused the campaign of “flicking the problem to users” (para. 2) rather
than strategizing ways in which to remove the problematic content from the
platform. The root cause of the trolling problem may be the inability of social
media companies to adequately control their own service as supported by Binns
(2017), Bossio and Holton (2021), Duggan (2017) and Barnes (2018). Facebook
aims to provide an online platform for interactive discussion between users;
however, that online discussion, left unmonitored, is the pathway that trolls
exploit to reach victims. The Be Bold Stop Bullying campaign does not address this
key issue and directed attention away from its inability to remove abuse
distributed on the platform, its inability to protect users from abuse on the
platform, and its inability to provide a safe product for its users. If a physical
product or service was determined to fail in these three identified areas, it may be
recalled, removed, shut down until the problem was rectified or further
investigated by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission. However,
because the issue emerged within the online domain, a differing set of rules and
regulations apparently applied. The study identified a continued increase in
Facebook usership at the time (in 2012), suggesting that users overlooked the
cultural norms that would usually be associated with a physical faulty product or
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service simply because the service was online. Instead, public discourse did not
demand reprimand for Facebook’s inaction, and users continued to engage on the
platform and passively accepted its failure to keep people safe. This made it harder
for trolled journalists to leave.
Facebook Bullying Prevention Hub support strategy background
The Bullying Prevention Hub was identified by this study as the fourth support
strategy in response to trolling by Facebook. To provide context for analysis, a
brief background and summary of its role is provided below from descriptions on
Facebook’s website. On November 6, 2013, Facebook launched the Bullying
Prevention Hub. Developed in partnership with the Yale Centre for Emotional
Intelligence, the online information page was dedicated to the prevention of
harassment and provided clear and accessible resources that addressed three
separate stakeholder groups: teenagers, parents and educators. Stakeholder
groups were further sub-categorised by Facebook to provide tailored step-by-step
plans for users of differentiating circumstances.
1. Teenage support strategies were individually provided under the
headings:
•

If you’re being bullied

•

If your friend is being bullied

•

If you’ve been called a bully

2. Parent support strategies were individually provided under the headings:
•

My child is being bullied

•

My child is bullying others

3. Educator support strategies were individually provided under the
headings:
•

My student is being bullied

•

My student is bullying others

•

Prevention
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The layered approach to trolling is congruent with Ackoff’s (1974) System’s
Theory, although it omits police, legislation, journalists and celebrities as social
positions in the episteme. Teenage support strategies align with Ackoff’s selfcontrol/individual

level;

parent

support

strategies

align

with

the

humanisation/support level; and educator support strategies align with the
environmentalisation/governance level, whether it is to do with teachers
providing supportive spaces for trolling victims and/or their perpetrators. These
levels are illustrated in Stakeholders from the Trolling Paradgim categorised by
levels in Ackoff’s (1974) Systems model in Figure 2 (on p. 5).
Facebook Bullying Prevention Hub support strategy thematic analysis
From the thematic analysis of qualitative data, the simplification in the Be Bold
Stop Bullying campaign response was identified for further discussion. The stepby-step guides provided by the Bullying Prevention Hub suggested tactics to
prevent online harassment and provided methods to prompt conversations with
others about their experiences. While the simplicity of this information may have
helped some users, inversely, it may have undermined the severity of some
trolling experiences. While this seems counterintuitive it may have effected some
of the most vulnerable users, such as 14-year-old Amy “Dolly” Everett, who took
her own life after sustained cyberbullying. This notion was put forward by
O’Driscoll (2018) in her critique suggesting, “the advice [provided in the step-bystep guide by Bullying Prevention Hub] seems largely oversimplified” (para. 45)
and ineffective in practical application. For example, a scenario presented on the
Bullying Prevention Hub (included in the data for this section) suggested steps for
parents to take if their teenager was being threatened, but these did not include
any consideration of police involvement. The central theme of parental advice was
to report the offence to the victim’s school principal, which failed to address that
abuse can involve children who attend different schools. Trolling incidences that
originate beyond physical confinements of the schoolyard cannot be resolved
through mediation between the parties in person. The globalisation of the internet
has provided an avenue for transcontinental trolls, which the guides provided by
the Bullying Prevention Hub do not address. In further evidence of the
ineffectiveness of the suggestions offered, teenagers who have been accused of
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bullying are advised to apologise to their victim. Although apologies are not
necessarily bad ideas, the advice does not consider whether the severity of abuse
may constitute a crime. For these cases, perpetrators should not be encouraged to
seek out and apologise to the victim, but instead turn themselves over to law
enforcement or seek professional treatment, such as psychotherapy.
Facebook’s public figures policy was introduced in 2019 to encourage user
engagement with creators, authors, athletes, sports teams, musicians, bands,
journalists and celebrities (Smith & Goldman, 2019). However, the policy allowed
more critical commentary of public figures than of private individuals (Paul,
2021), which in 2019 included journalists. In 2021, Facebook modified its public
figures policy to specifically exclude journalists, with Facebook Global Head of
Safety, Antigone Davis, labelling journalists as “involuntary” public figures (Davis,
2021, para. 3). Facebook changed its approach on the harassment of journalists
and now, as of 2021, considered journalists to be in the public eye because of their
work rather than their public personas (Paul, 2021). Diaz (2021, October)
suggested the response was not triggered by activism, but in response to criticism
in the wake of whistleblower Frances Haugen's interview and Congressional
testimony stating, “as long as Facebook is operating in the shadows, hiding its
research from public scrutiny, it is unaccountable” (Shepardson & Bartz, 2021).
Although Facebook’s public figures policy was modified to exclude journalists and
therefore protect them from trolls, anecdotal evidence suggests it has not
eliminated the trolling of journalists on the platform (Price, 2022).
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4.5.2 Facebook feature strategies
Feature strategies were identified by the study as the second type of Facebook
response to trolling. The study identified sixteen feature strategies that Facebook
implemented on its platform in response to trolling, derived from the quantitative
and qualitative data results of this section. A complete list of every feature change
was not feasible, as documented archives available from Facebook.com were
incomplete, and the meticulous investigation required to independently produce
such an extensive inventory was not within in the scope of the study. However, it
provides a comprehensive list of features, from its launch in 2009 to the date of
analysis in May 2020. Information from Product Policy meeting notes that directly
addressed “keeping abuse off the service” (Facebook, 2018b, para. 1) at fortnightly
conferences were a significant contribution. The sixteen features that can be
actioned by Facebook users in response to trolling are listed below, and are
individually described later in the discussion section:
1. Hide comment
2. Snooze
3. Unfollow
4. Take a break
5. Mute
6. Remove user from Page
7. Remove user from Group
8. Delete comment
9. Unfriend
10. Ban
11. Disable posts
12. Profanity filter on Pages
13. Blocking words on Pages
14. Disable comments on private accounts
15. Block
16. Report
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These sixteen features provided qualitative data for further thematic analysis.
While recognising while no one solution is likely to work alone, to assess the
potential effectiveness of each feature in protecting trolling victims from abuse on
the platform, nine favourable attributes were identified. Attributes were defined
as favourable if they were potentially useful to journalists seeking to manage
trolling on Facebook. The study first compared which of the sixteen application
features had the highest number of favourable attributes; however, the results
were inconclusive as application features had similar number of favourable
attributes associated with them, as displayed in Figure 27 (on p. 165). Further
thematic analysis methods were required to expose and interpret meaningful
data.
Through a deductive process, each individual attribute was assessed to determine
its relative significance from the perspective of hypothetical trolled victims
formulated as an amalgam of the victims interviewed in the research presented in
section 4.2 of this study (on p. 64). Nine attributes on a scale from least favourable
to most favourable were identified. The study noted that abuse was often
perpetrated on Facebook two types of community pages including Groups (used
for people with common interests) and Pages (used for promotion of
organisations, businesses and public figures) that publications such as the ABC fall
under. The study recognised abuse published in these public spaces was more
problematic for a victim as the authority to remove content lay with the
administrators of the Group or Page. While journalists have the authority to
control trolling content on their own Page, and to some extent their newsroom’s
Pages, many media organisations have multiple accounts on Facebook with
different moderators. In addition, not all newsroom accounts are actively
moderated, even after the legal change resulting from the Dylan Voller case which
is discussed in more details in the legal chapter 4.7 of this study. Journalists can
also not control trolling on trolls personal Pages or the Pages of rival news
organisations (Price, 2022). The study, therefore, determined the authority to
implement the feature was the most influential favourable attribute and based on
this notion, ranked the nine attributes in descending order of importance:
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1. The victim has the authority to implement the feature.
2. All trolling content is deleted indefinitely.
3. The feature is actioned immediately.
4. An external moderator is not required.
5. An autonomous computing algorithm is utilised.
6. The troll cannot reach the victims again.
7. The feature is proactive deterrent.
8. The troll would be unaware that the victim implemented the
feature.
9. The interactive function of Facebook is not removed.
For a visual representation, the findings are presented in Figure 27 (on p. 165)
with the favourable attributes tiered from greatest impact in displayed in red, to
least impact displayed in pale yellow.
In addition, the study noted that abusive comments can be published on the troll’s
own personal profile, and therefore the authority to remove the content lies with
the abuser. In this instance, the study identified the only favourable Facebook
feature is ‘report’. Although the time required from actioning the report feature,
via external moderation, to eventual removal content is a critical adverse
attribute. However, the report feature does not exclude any user, and was able to
be implemented by all stakeholders, including private users (both victims and
observers), Group administrators and Page administrators. While the report
feature was therefore determined to be the most favourable Facebook feature in
response to trolling, two academic reports criticised Facebook’s inability to
respond appropriately to user reports of abuse. In 2019, a report by Amnesty
International UK found that more than half of reports lodged by women about
harassment on Facebook were met with no action from the social media company
(Noor, 2019). In addition, a 2021 report by researchers at the University of Sydney
who looked at Facebook’s response to hate-speech in Asia, recommended that:
•

Facebook extend its consultation with protected groups
on their experience and management of hate speech
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•
•
•

develop and publicise its trusted partners channel, so
that individuals and organisations have a direct hate
speech reporting partner for crisis reporting issues.
hold an annual regional hate speech roundtable for
stakeholder groups, and
recognise the role of page administrators as critical
gatekeepers of hate speech content, supporting their
improved regulatory literacy via training and education.
(Sinpeng et al, 2021)

Chapter 4.5 Facebook responses results and discussion

164

A table to show the tiered thematic analysis based on the 56 documents that mentioned Facebook’s responses to trolling derived from chapter 4.5 data

Figure 27
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A table to show the tiered thematic analysis based on the 56 documents that
mentioned Facebook’s responses to trolling
The findings revealed the continuation of the interactive function was the most
frequent attribute that 87.5%, 14 of the 16, of the features employed. This feature
was classified as the least important attribute, and highlights that the frequency
of application is not directly proportional to its efficacy in protecting a user from
abuse. The findings revealed immediate action was the second most frequent
attribute that 75%, 12 of the 16, of features encompassed. However, when
observing the attribute in isolation, the data reveals the pre-determined most
influential report feature does not incorporate this attribute. The study, therefore,
considered both the frequency of favourable attributes and the tiered ranking of
each favourable attribute as a framework to deduce the feature favourability
order, described in the order that Facebook introduced them as follows:
Least favourable Facebook features examined
1. Hide comment (reactive)
A victim can choose to hide an abusive comment. This means the user cannot see
the particular trolling content after initially seeing and clicking hide; however, the
content is still visible to the troll, and any users who are friends with the troll on
the platform. The troll would be unaware the comment has been hidden. The hide
comment feature can be actioned by private users, Group administrators and Page
administrators on Facebook. If the comment is on the victim’s private account, the
victim has the authority to apply the hide comment. For trolling content
perpetrated on a Group or Page, the respective administrators have the authority
to moderate the abusive content, not the victim.
2. Snooze (reactive)
A victim can choose to snooze an abuser. This means any content the abuser posts
would not appear on the victim’s newsfeed for thirty days. After this remission
period, the profile returns to standard notification settings without the abuser
being notified of the process. The snooze feature can be actioned by the victim.
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3. Unfollow (reactive)
A victim can choose to unfollow an abuser. This means any content the abuser
posts would not appear on the victim’s newsfeed. The unfollow feature can be
actioned by the victim.
4. Take a break (reactive)
A victim can choose to take a break from an abuser. Firstly, the equivalent
functions of the unfollow feature are applied whereby the victim can no longer see
the abuser’s posts on their feed. Secondly, the abuser can no longer view the
victim’s private posts. Thirdly, the victim is provided the additional privilege of
deleting past posts with the abuser. This feature was aimed to provide a safety net
for the ease of linked content to be removed for users in a relationship; however,
it can be utilised for anti-trolling purposes. The take-a-break feature can be
actioned by the victim.
5. Mute (reactive)
Group administrators can temporarily stop an abuser from posting or
commenting in their Group. The victim does not have the authority to apply the
mute feature. The mute feature can be actioned by Group administrators only.
6. Remove user from Page (reactive)
The ‘remove user’ function has different capabilities for Pages and Groups and
they have therefore been separated for isolated discussion and ranked
accordingly. Page administrators can remove an identified abuser from liking
their Page. However, Pages are public spaces and removed abusers can choose to
like the Page again. The victim does not have the authority to apply the feature,
which can only be actioned by Page administrators.
Favourable Facebook features examined
7. Remove user from Group (reactive)
Group administrators can remove an abuser from their managed Group
indefinitely. Removed members must request to join the Group again, which can
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be denied. The victim does not have the authority to apply the feature, which can
only be actioned by Group administrators.
8. Delete comment (reactive)
A victim can choose to delete an abusive comment. This removes the particular
comment from the platform. The delete comment feature can be actioned by
private users, Group administrators and Page administrators. The victim has the
authority to apply the feature to moderate the abusive content if perpetrated on
their personal profile. The victim does not have the authority to apply the delete
comment feature to moderate the abusive content if perpetrated on a Group or
Page, their respective administrators do.
9. Unfriend (reactive)
A victim can choose to unfriend an abuser. This means the abuser can no longer
comment on any of the victim’s private content. The unfriend feature can be
actioned by the victim.
10. Ban (reactive)
Page administrators can remove an abuser from a Page. The banned abuser is still
able to share Page content, but can no longer like, comment, message or publish
on the Page. The victim does not have the authority to apply the ban feature. The
ban

feature

can

be

actioned

by

Page

administrators

only.

11. Disable posts (proactive)
Page administrators can choose disable posts on their respective Page. The victim
does not have the authority to apply the feature unless the victim is the Page
administrator. The study recognised the main function of a Page is to promote a
business or public figure. When a Page applies the disable-posts feature, its
interactive function is completely removed. However, this interactive function is
important for community reach and engagement, which increases the popularity
of the product, service, or person that the Page promotes. Acting as a double-edge
sword, this interactive function is critical for the news media and journalists. The
study determined the feature detracts from a Page’s main objective to promote
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and took this reduced functionality into consideration when classifying the overall
favourability of the feature.
Most favourable Facebook features examined
12. Profanity filter on Pages (proactive)
Page administrators can choose to block a varying degree of profanity from
appearing on their Pages. The profanity filter is set at ‘general’ by default and can
be increased to medium or strong. Once selected, Facebook’s autonomous
algorithms instantly remove any post or comment that contains words and
phrases determined by Facebook that the community has previously marked as
offensive. Facebook continues the external moderation of the Page and
independently updates this process without the need for further input from Page
administrators. Profanities, racist expressions and hate speech are often blocked
with this feature. Victims do not have the authority to action the feature. In
addition, other users do not have an input on the level the page sets its profanity
filter. Some Page administrators may be unaware of the filter, or not know how to
apply the feature that is not turned on by default. In these instances, its function
as a feature to combat trolling is redundant. The reliance on Page administrators
to implement the feature is a significant limiting factor. These collective
obstructions were taken into consideration when classifying the overall
favourability of the feature.
13. Blocking words on Pages (proactive)
In addition to the profanity feature described above, Page administrators can
choose to block particular words or phrases from any post or comment published
on the Page. This enables certain groups to combat particular content that may be
inflammatory to the cluster of users frequenting a particular page. The feature
allows Page administrators to individualise a strategy against content that has the
potential offend their audience. Functionality restrictions require the input of
both singular and plural form of selected words for exclusion. In addition, the
exact spelling of each selected word can be excluded, slight variations in lettering
order by abusers may allow for the content to pass through. For example, abusers
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who replace the letter E in a word with the number 3 can bypass the algorithm
and the abusive content is still decipherable to users. The same limiting factors
that apply to the profanity feature, equally apply to the blocking words feature.
The study acknowledges that feature is only useful if Page administrators are
aware of the filter, know how to apply it successfully and, importantly, choose to
apply it. Otherwise, its function as a feature to combat trolling is redundant. These
collective obstructions were taken into consideration by the study when
classifying the overall favourability of the feature.
14. Disable comments on private accounts (proactive)
A user can choose the disable comments feature that usually appears below a post.
This means no user, or potential abuser, can comment on the post. The victim or
potential victim has the authority to select the remove-commenting feature for
any post on their private account. Additionally, victims have the authority to apply
the remove-commenting feature on posts they publish on any Group or Page. The
abuser still has options to target the victim including commenting on other posts
without the commenting function removed, commenting on profile photos, and
privately messaging the victim. The study therefore classified this function as a
most favourable feature due to its proactive functionality, but less favourable than
the block feature (detailed next), as it does not block the abuser from contacting
the victim entirely. Like the disable-posts feature, all interactive functions are
eliminated. The disable comments feature does not allow users to converse about
the particular topic, excluding all potential commentary, including the
constructively critical or supportive. The study noted that although the victim had
the authority to implement the feature, the reduced interactive function limited
communication with all users, not just potential abusers. If all posts implemented
this feature, Facebook would operate like a website rather than a social media
platform.
15. Block (reactive)
A victim can choose to block an abuser. This means the abuser can no longer view
any past or future content posted by the victim. The victim has the authority to
action the block feature. In addition, the feature can be applied by those who
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witness the abuse but are not directly targeted, including other private users,
Group administrators and Page administrators.
16. Report (reactive)
A victim or observer can choose to report an abuser. The victim has the authority
to initiate the report feature. However, the subsequent outcome of the feature is
subject to appraisal by Facebook’s moderation team. In addition, the feature can
be applied by those who witness the abuse but are not directly targeted, including
other private users, Group administrators and Page administrators. Once an
abuser is flagged and deemed to have breached Facebook’s Community Standards,
the content is removed, and the abuser may receive a temporary ban from the
platform. For multiple offences, the user may receive a permanent ban from
Facebook.
Facebook feature strategy thematic analysis
From the application of thematic analysis of qualitative and quantitative data
results, three themes emerged: authority, greater user control, and detailed
reporting process. These are discussed and critiqued below.
Authority
Facebook provided users with the ability to independently implement operational
tools such as the ‘delete comment’ and ‘block’ feature to immediately remove
abusive content from personal accounts without the requirement for an
intermediate moderator to access the content first. Although Facebook claims the
process “usually within 24 hours” (Facebook, 2021, para. 5), critics claim “a typical
time frame is anywhere from 48 hours to 45 days” (Webb, 2021, para. 5). This
functional ability did not prevent trolling content being received by victims on
Facebook; however, it did give users the ability to affect its instant removal,
without the need to seek authority from a Facebook moderator or Page admin.
The disable-comments feature provides users with greater content control.
Facebook provides the victim with the authority to remove comments, eliminating
the most common avenue trolls use to target victims. Support of the feature
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change is echoed in the structural changes on the websites of the many Australian
newsrooms that have also removed comment streams previously featured below
all published articles with the ABC in 2017 and Mumbrella in 2020. Comment
stream removal is described and analysed in the 4.6 newsroom responses chapter
(on p. 219). While reducing defamation risk, the study acknowledged that the
removal of the interactive comment stream function negatively impacts content
circulation and limits potential connections between posts and readers, who often
share content by tagging other users in comments sections. Balancing the benefits
of interactive functions with the detriments of trolling has proved problematic for
moderators, including Group and Page administrators. Third-party mediators
employed by newsrooms, whose objectives are to increase or sustain user
engagement, may be less inclined to implement the disable-post and disablecomments features in comparison to a targeted victim whose main objective is
safety from trolling. As Facebook users often have the authority to action its
features, the power balance is regularly tilted in the victim’s favour and provides
a deterrent for trolls, many of whom moved to platforms such Twitter that has
been regulated less. This suggestion is further unpacked in the discussion and
critique of the next theme.
Greater user control
From Facebook’s initial launch in 2004, users have had more control over
published content in comparison to other social media platforms such as Twitter
and Instagram. Although Facebook implemented the delete feature from its launch
date in 2004, 17 years later, in 2021, Twitter users still do not have the authority
to remove abuse and must report such content to an external moderator for
review. As discussed in chapter 4.4 (on p. 101) Twitter’s continued failure to
provide users with control has created a cesspit of abuse on the platform and lead
to many journalists advocating to cease use of the service (West, 2015; Hobson,
2019; Lieberman, 2020; Kannan, 2021). This study identified that the
functionality difference between the two platforms safeguarded potential trolling
victims on Facebook, but left Twitter users exposed. This precise feature may be
the determining factor that contributed to trolling flourishing on Twitter, and its
decreasing impact on Facebook by comparison.
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Detailed reporting process
Through thematic analysis of Facebook responses, Facebook’s detailed reporting
process emerged as a theme for discussion and critique. From its launch in 2004,
Facebook’s reporting process required victims to detail their experience through
multiple-choice questions, providing descriptive data for Facebook moderators to
respond to each individual complaint more efficiently. In addition, the detailed
reporting process yields more data for collective analysis which can be used for
generalised response strategies to trolling by the platform (Facebook, 2018b).
With more data comes a greater ability to identify triggering factors in the
behaviour of trolls, that can potentially enhance detection and removal of them
from the service.
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4.5.3 Facebook functional strategies results and discussion
Functional strategies emerged as the third Facebook response to trolling. The
study identified two functional strategies (and two sub-categories) that could
assist Australian journalists trolled on the platform. The qualitative data results of
this section are itemised below and are individually described later in the
discussion.
1. Personalised sign-up process
2. Machine learning and artificial intelligence
i. Image detection algorithm
ii. Language detection algorithm
Emerging themes within each of the two identified functional strategies (and two
subcategories) are individually analysed, discussed, and critiqued in the following
sections.
Personalised sign-up process functional strategy background
From the 56 articles retrieved as archival evidence in this chapter, the
personalised sign-up process was identified as the first Facebook functional
strategy in response to trolling. Through exploration of the personalised sign-up
process in 2020 on Facebook’s website https://www.facebook.com, the study
identified the minimum amount of information required to create a personal
Facebook account was a first name, last name, valid email address, password,
gender and date-of-birth. Although a profile picture was not a requirement of the
sign-up process, the platform strongly recommended one to be uploaded. A cover
photo was also not a requirement of the sign-up process, but again the platform
strongly recommended one to be uploaded. However, there was no identification
requirement for the profile picture or cover photo allowing uploaded pictures to
be random images. On June 15, 2012, Facebook added a phone number
verification requirement for all users, which included new sign-ups and
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previously existing accounts (Constine, 2012). The personalised sign-up process
was created to minimise fake accounts being created on Facebook. The study
identified that many victims were abused by fake accounts used by trolls to avoid
any personal repercussions of their abusive behaviour including Phillips, 2015;
West, 2015; Ford, 2016; Jones, 2017; Barnes, 2018; Gorman, 2019. However, while
the personalised sign-up process proved a hindrance to the formation of trolling
accounts on Facebook, it was not a complete prevention strategy.
Personalised sign-up process functional strategy thematic analysis
From the thematic analysis of documents published by Facebook between 2009
and 2019 about its policy updates to trolling, the personalised sign-up process
functional strategy, four themes emerged: fake accounts still permeate the
platform, some trolls use personal accounts; authentication tools can be exploited;
and there may be potential ulterior motives for phone number verification. These
themes are discussed and critiqued below.
Fake accounts still permeate the platform
While Facebook’s personalised sign-up process was more detailed than other
social media platforms, including Instagram (of the same ownership) and Twitter
when its phone number verification was introduced in 2012, the fact that fake
accounts still permeate the platform with Facebook deleting 3.2 billion fake
accounts in November 2021 (Rana & Paul, 2021) suggests the strategy is not a
comprehensive solution to deter trolls. More deliberate attempts to verify users
began to address concerns raised by academics that anonymity on social media
facilitated a culture of transgression and impunity in which abuse thrived (Salter,
2016). Although verification measures reduced the number of fake accounts being
created, the process was not impermeable and pseudonymous accounts used to
abuse journalists still infiltrated the platform. The issue was spotlighted in
campaign efforts on March 12, 2021, that called for legislation that made a verified
form of identification a mandatory element when creating a social media account
(Hutchinson, 2021). Continued public discourse about the verification process on
Facebook and other social media platforms highlights the issue as a significant
concern in contemporary journalism.
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Some trolls use personal accounts
As established in the literature review and supported by findings from interviews
with Australian trolled journalists in chapter 4.2 (on p. 64), trolls do not
exclusively use fake accounts to troll victims, and frequently engage in the abuse
of victims under their own names and identities. Some trolls actively seek to
publicise their abusive content on the platform and use their public identity to
increase exposure. Salter (2016) further supports this finding and suggests, “the
same publicity that is turned against the victim… is maximised to the benefit of the
perpetrator for whom the abuse acts as a kind of public and interactive
performance” (p. 51). This identity verification as a combative strategy is
therefore ineffective towards this group of abusers who reveal their identity.
Authentication tools exploited
Some of the authentication tools implemented to minimise the creation of fake
accounts can be used to target victims. Trolls are able to exploit the requirements
for profile pictures to identify minority groups based on appearance and cultural
beliefs (Mantilla, 2013). In the study’s previous 4.2 impacts response findings (on
p. 64) thematic analysis of these in-depth interviews revealed five out of the ten
interviewees received appearance-based trolling abuse on Facebook. This
appearance-based trolling was specifically facilitated by Facebook’s profile
picture. Without a profile picture, abusers would have less grounds to attack
another user’s physical characteristics, however, a journalists’ sex and racial
background can potentially be derived from by-lines or by their voice if on radio
or television. Although the study acknowledges the photograph is not a
requirement of Facebook’s sign-up processes, it does recognise that Facebook
strongly recommends and encourages all users to participate and upload a
personal photo. Furthering this, if an account is reported, even if incorrectly so,
Facebook requires the user to upload personal identification details to the service
to match their corresponding profile picture (Tiku, 2017). If the user does not have
a profile picture, the moderation team has no comparison, and the account may
not be cleared. Profile pictures are optional for any account that is not flagged;
however, when brought under question to resolve a dispute, as trolling commonly
entails, one is required for the trolls. However, one participant from the interviews
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conducted in chapter 4.2 of this study (on p. 64) revealed they were trolled
because of their appearance displayed in their profile picture. Trolls can also
exploit usernames that are commonly associated with certain ethnic regions to
discriminate and target specific groups of users for racist-based and religiousbased abuse. However, the benefits of reducing the number of fake accounts on
the platforms by implementing the authentication requirements seem to
outweigh its potential exploitation of the function by trolls.
Potential ulterior motives for phone number verification
The motives behind the introduction of the phone number verification
requirement were questioned, with some critics suggesting the strategy aimed to
“cash in on security fears” (Constine, 2012, para. 1) rather than to combat trolling
content on the service. In the wake of the Cambridge Analytica scandal, which
revealed that at least 87 million Facebook users had their public data used without
explicit consent (Gilbert, 2018) to influence elections including the 2016 US
Presidential election, critical debate emerged, placing the financial motives of the
platform in public discourse. However, in 2018, Facebook founder Mark
Zuckerberg declared “there’s a very common misperception about Facebook –
that we sell data to advertisers… we do not sell data to advertisers. We don’t sell
data to anyone” (Zuckerberg, as cited in Gilbert, 2018, para. 3). This study
acknowledges critics’ suggestions that Facebook could potentially on-sell user
data and utilise the information as a potential revenue stream; however, Facebook
refutes this and maintains that the primary objective of implementing phone
number verification was for user security and subsequent reduction in fake
accounts, recognised facilitators of abusive content.
Machine learning and artificial intelligence functional strategy background
This study first defined these two key terms from descriptions in the Oxford
English Dictionary (2021). Machine learning was defined as “the use and
development of computer systems that are able to learn and adapt without
following explicit instructions, by using algorithms and statistical models to
analyse and draw inferences from patterns in data”. Artificial intelligence was
defined as, “the theory and development of computer systems able to perform
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tasks normally requiring human intelligence, such as visual perception, speech
recognition, decision-making, and translation between languages”. Machine
learning is, therefore, a part of artificial intelligence; however, artificial
intelligence involves deeper processing that can attempt more complex problem
solving. Although a distinction between the two terms is important, the study
recognised they work in concert, as machine-learning models provide the building
blocks that inform artificial intelligence processes.
Facebook first used machine learning when it introduced the News Feed function
on September 5, 2006 (Manjoo, 2013). Although identifying faces is a relatively
simple task for humans, it had been a difficult task for computers to perform. By
integrating facial recognition technology on its platform, Facebook could suggest
friends that users could tag when uploading images (Hutchinson, 2015). By March
17, 2014, Facebook’s DeepFace project announced its image facial recognition
models could identify a human face from 800 million photographs in less than five
seconds with 97.25 per cent accuracy (Oremus, 2014). But it was not until June
15, 2015, with the launch of its photo-sharing service Moment, that Facebook
began openly talking about how its deep research into machine learning was
influencing new products (Higginbotham, 2016). Privacy concerns began to be
raised, as the new technology forced users to confront the unsettling fact that
Facebook could identify them out of more than a billion users in an instant. These
data-driven capabilities allowed Facebook to make its platform easier to use. But
they also enabled the company to keep people using its platform, which in turn
allowed it to sell more, and more effective, advertisements to users. To do this,
Facebook ran tens of trillions queries per day that made about six million
predictions per second (Higginbotham, 2016). These trillions of data points train
News Feed algorithms within hours, with learning models updated every 15
minutes to two hours in order to react quickly to current events (Higginbotham,
2016). That computers are able to analyse such vast amounts of information and
make independent judgements, is a disconcerting reminder that every aspect of
one’s digital life is being autonomised and dissected in ways that show advertisers,
researchers, and even governments a picture of our private thoughts and actions.
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Machine learning and artificial intelligence functional strategy data results
Technological advancements fuel the ability of machine learning and artificial
intelligence algorithms to better detect trolling images. This progression has been
gradual but, in recent years, significant progress has enabled companies such as
Facebook to embrace and attempt to implement the technology. It is important to
outline a brief history of this progression to provide the qualitative data for
analysis and comparison. The study analysed 56 articles retrieved as archival
evidence in this chapter as a starting point and drew supplementary data from
articles identified by using Google as a search tool for the terms “machine
learning” + “algorithm” + “artificial intelligence”. Key milestones of the evolution
of machine learning and artificial intelligence are listed below.
Algorithms surpassed humans at classifying the content of images on
February 4, 2015.
•

Microsoft announced that its algorithms had surpassed humans at
classifying the content of images (He et al, 2015).

•

Critics suggested the test was calculated in a way that favoured machines
(Thomsen, 2015).

•

An example of this bias included a question to sort 1,000 photos into 120
dog breeds, a process better suited to machine recognition.

•

However, the function fell short when required to understand and
interpret the meaning of the image, beyond a basic sorting process. Social
issues such as trolling are by nature complex, and it is this very complexity
where artificial intelligence failed (Simonite, 2018).

Artificial intelligence speech recognition was as claimed to be as good as
humans on October 18, 2016.
•

Microsoft reported the standardised word-error rate of professional
transcriptionists was 5.9 percent (Xiong et al, 2016).

•

Microsoft reported its speech recognition system had a word error rate of
5.9 percent (Xiong et al, 2016).

Chapter 4.5 Facebook responses results and discussion

179

•

Microsoft claimed its artificial intelligence program could now perform
making the same or fewer errors than professional transcriptionists (Linn,
2016).

•

The announcement was labelled an “historic achievement” (Simonite,
2018, para. 6).

Artificial intelligence speech recognition was as confirmed to be as good as
humans on August 20, 2017.
•

Shortly after Microsoft’s previous announcement, IBM reported the
accurate word-error rate of professional transcriptionists was actually 5.1
percent (Saon, 2017).

•

Microsoft acknowledged the criticism and reported its speech recognition
system had reached a word error rate of 5.1 percent (Xiong et al, 2017).

•

Microsoft’s artificial intelligence program was confirmed to now perform
making the same or fewer errors than professional transcriptionists
(Huang, 2017).

Artificial intelligence matched or outperformed humans at reading and
answering questions about text on January 15, 2018.
•

Microsoft announced it had produced software that matched or
outperformed humans on a standardised reading and comprehension test
conducted by Stanford University (Linn, 2018).

•

The artificial intelligence software was required to answer 10,000 simple
questions about excerpts from Wikipedia articles. Researchers built their
software by analysing 90,000 sample questions, with the answers attached
(Simonite, 2018).

•

Questions including, “where do water droplets collide with ice crystals to
form precipitation?” had to be answered by highlighting words in the
original text, in this case, “within a cloud” (Simonite, 2018).

•

In early January, Microsoft and Alibaba submitted models that respectively
got 82.65 and 82.44 percent of the highlighted segments exactly right. This
was the first artificially intelligent software that had outperformed the
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82.304 percent score Stanford researchers had termed “human
performance” (Linn, 2018).
•

However, Professor Percy Liang, one of the test’s creators, labelled the test
as a “fairly narrow” evaluation of reading comprehension, and critics
suggested that the test was not an accurate measure of English language
proficiency.

•

Engineers described the key to its success was the application of a “deep
learning” approach that trained algorithms with example data (Simonite,
2018, para. 9).

•

The artificial intelligence software combined Long Short-Term Memory
and WaveNet language models with three strong acoustic models (Saon,
2017).

•

The announcement was labelled a “major milestone” and media coverage
at the time suggested millions of jobs were at risk, however, content
moderators welcomed its potential to perform their current roles (Linn,
2018).

Emerging from the exploration of machine learning and artificial intelligence
using the grounded theory approach, two subcategories of image detection
algorithms and language detection algorithms were considered relevant to
Australian journalists who were trolled on Facebook as part of their work and
were selected for further inquiry.
Image detection algorithm background
The study explored the image detection algorithm next, using the 56 articles
retrieved as archival evidence in this chapter as a starting point, and
supplementary data from articles identified by using Google as a search tool for
the terms “image detection” + “algorithm” + “Facebook”.

Although image

detection algorithms are considered a successful function strategy by Facebook
and its critics, the study notes the algorithm does not remove all offensive
imagery. In particular, the distribution of non-consensual intimate imagery is still
prevalent on the platform, and a noted concern of the management team. Non-
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consensual intimate imagery is addressed later as part of the Facebook research
strategies (on p. 196).
The following statistics were retrieved from Facebook’s 2018 community
standards enforcement report to analyse and interpret the effectiveness of the
image detection algorithm. The study identified and calculated:
•

In one year, 107.6 million images were flagged to contain adult nudity
or sexual activity, and were subsequently removed from the platform,
between October 1, 2017, and September 30, 2018.

•

For the same time period, the image detection algorithm had an average
success rate 95.75 percent for identifying adult nudity or sexual activity
violations before being reported by users.

•

This meant the algorithm failed to detect 4.78 million images during
that year.

For comparison, the study further identified and calculated:
•

For the same time period, 8.7 million images were flagged to contain
child nudity or sexual exploitation and were subsequently removed
from the platform.

•

The image detection algorithm had an average success rate of 99.2%
for identifying child nudity or sexual exploitation violations before
being reported by users.

•

This meant the algorithm failed to detect only 69,600 images during
that year.

Due to the vast quantity of content published on Facebook, seven low rates of
failure result in disturbing volumes of undetected content.
Image detection algorithm thematic analysis
Image recognition is important for journalists as trolls often send pornography as
part of their attacks. Through thematic analysis of qualitative and quantitative
data results of image detection algorithms that help to protect Australian
journalists from being trolled, three themes emerged: time lag of removal;
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successful implementation; and determining consent. These themes are explored
and unpacked in the following sections.
Time lag of removal
The reliance on the reporting process was inefficient in addressing harm in a
timely fashion as described by Martin and Murrell (2020). Jakubowicz et al (2017)
stated, “the reporting process inherently involves a time lag within which the
abusive material may be further disseminated” (p. 57) and they are particularly
critical of the strategy’s effectiveness in response to cyber racism. The study notes
this key failing of the reporting process and calls for interactive providers to
improve responsiveness. Facebook (2019) also reported that the corporation had
acknowledged the time lag between a victim reporting a trolling incident to
Facebook, and a response from Facebook being received an issue flagged as a
priority in 2019. Facebook initially reported that in this time period, “victims were
filled with anxiety and helplessness” (para. 7). Victims required fast but
personalised responses that were not provided by Facebook, as the damage they
experienced increased the longer the trolling content remained online.
Successful implementation
Facebook claims that the image detection artificial intelligence program was a
successful tool in response to trolling. This endorsement suggests that it will
continue to be an important combative strategy for Facebook in the future.
Microsoft was the leader that paved the way and provided the tools social media
companies could choose to recognise and implement (He et al, 2015). Facebook
was first social media platform to actively embrace image detection technology
and, in 2014, led by Tanton Gibbs, transitioned to automated content moderation.
Academics such as Simonite (2018) first criticised Facebook for assigning the job
to Gibbs, an ad executive who had no expertise in online discourse at the time.
However, by embracing deep learning the technology became much more
versatile (McDermott, 2018). In comparison, Twitter was far slower to undertake
the required back-of-house changes, initially resisting the proposed benefits of
artificial intelligence advancements until following Facebook’s lead in 2019
(Leetaru, 2019).
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Facebook’s success was attributed to deep learning algorithms that have proven
to be effective when sorting images into categories with two alternative outcomes,
such as pornographic and not pornographic. The algorithm attributes a ‘yes’ or
‘no’ value to each image, from which further functions can be applied in a
systematic filtration system. However, its application is not perfect, and the
algorithm been criticised for misclassifying images of nursing mothers as
pornography (Bell, 2018). Identified flaws are frequently modified and refined in
the development process. Early stages of success have been used as talking points
for Facebook executives touting the potential of artificial intelligence to eliminate
trolling on the service (McDermott, 2018). Image detection algorithms provide the
first evidence that an algorithmic immune system could help shelter Facebook
users from harmful content, and subsequently shield the company from the
potentially harmful consequences of hosting it. Although artificial intelligence has
proved effective at minimizing nudity and pornography on the platform,
recognising and decoding language has proven to be a far more complex problem.
The vast majority of abusive trolling content is verbal and hate speech and
bullying have proven a far more difficult task to combat.
The study identified the interpretation of imagery and text is still a problematic
given the limitations of current technology (Mitchell, 2020). As forecast in 1986
by mathematician and philosopher Gian-Carlo Rota who questioned, “I wonder
whether or when artificial intelligence will ever crash the barrier of meaning”
(Rota, 1986, p. 1), algorithms are not yet proficient in the recognition of meaning,
and therefore cannot yet be universally applied against trolling. Professor Melanie
Mitchell from Portland State University outlined this limitation in her research
and described modern computing software as stuck behind “the barrier of
meaning” (Mitchell, 2020, p. 1). Computing engineers and research teams globally
are trying to figure out this critical problem; however, industry leaders, such as
Microsoft, suggest that with perseverance, artificial intelligence will evolve to
overcome this hurdle in the near future (Linn, 2018).
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Determining consent
Explicit images are commonly published on the platform with consent of all
parties. These include swimwear and lingerie promotional images, and impliednude artistic photos of professional models and private users. Commonly
permitted by Australian advertising standards (as outlined in section 2.4 of the
Australian Association of National Advertisers Code of Ethics), and largely
accepted by western society as inoffensive, these images are widely distributed on
the service, with younger generations emerging as their most frequent sharers.
Journalists have been trolled with such images including Siobhan Moyes in 2016
(Thompson, 2016) and Australian journalist Lily Mayers in 2020 (Gillespie, 2020).
Such images would not be removed by the image detection algorithm as they do
not breech Facebook’s Community Standards in regard to nudity or sexual
content. However, western social mores do not apply to all users and many
women, particularly of more conservative religious beliefs, may consider personal
photos being publicly posted as extremely offensive. User consent is the influential
factor when defining an image as offensive. The study identified the intention to
offend was the key factor when determining if an image was published as an act
of trolling or not. This study identified that the image detection algorithm is not
able to determine the consent of the subject of an image, or its subsequent intent
to offend, highlighting a flaw in the automation process that trolling content can
potentially bypass. The subjective nature of image detection, in particular in
relation to non-consensual intimate imagery, is highlighted as a significant issue
and is discussed in further detail in the Facebook research strategies (on p. 196).
The study suggests removal of the consent variable may contribute to
discrepancies between the rates of removal between images of nude adults and
children. The image detection algorithm had an average success rate 99.2 percent
for identifying child nudity or sexual exploitation violations before being reported
by users, in comparison to an average success rate 95.75 percent for identifying
adult nudity or sexual activity violations before being reported by users. Whether
or not a child consents for the image to be posted or not is irrelevant, as the act is
illegal, and the image would be immediately removed. The consent variable would
only apply to adult imagery and, due to its subjective nature, may be more difficult
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for an algorithm to recognise and this may contribute to different quantitative
recorded data.
Language detection algorithm background
The study then explored the language detection algorithm using the same
approach, examining the 56 articles retrieved as archival evidence in this chapter
as a starting point to which supplementary articles identified using Google as a
search tool for the terms “language detection” + “algorithm” + “Facebook” were
added. The data documented concerns the ability of language detection
algorithms to cope with vast amounts of harassment and hate speech on the
platform, which required artificial intelligence systems that could understand the
shifting nuances of more than 100 different languages (Simonite, 2018). Any
shortfalls were required to be identified by Facebook’s backup filtration staff of
15,000 human reviewers (Fick & Dave, 2019). Considering the amount of content
required to be reviewed at scale, the workload is unmanageable for these 15,000
employees as documented by in a report by Barrett (2020). Because of staff costs,
there are questions about the sustainability of this process, and it highlights that
the current management process may be under-resourced and is destined to put
a strain on the service, and pressure on its employees. Gaps in the enforcement
net can have harmful real-life implications for victims, as discussed in the 4.2
impact findings (on p. 64) of this study. Many severe trolling examples in the
Australian news media have been documented to inflict long-term damage, and
thus emphasise the need for social media organisations, including Facebook, to
resolve funding and business model issues to ensure the safety and protection of
its users. Although Microsoft and Alibaba claimed on January 15, 2018, that its
software could read like a human (He et al, 2015), software’s potential to deduce
content meaning is still a work-in-progress. The continuous language progression
of computers has enabled virtual assistants such as Alexa significant
advancements in the accuracy of automatic translations. However, critics still
argue artificial intelligence is still a long way from understanding even relatively
simple text in the way humans do (Simonite, 2018, para. 13). The following
statistics were retrieved from Facebook’s (2018) community standards
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enforcement report to analyse and interpret the effectiveness of the language
detection algorithm. This study identified and calculated:
•

In one year, 2.1 million posts were flagged to contain bullying and
harassment, and were subsequently removed from the platform,
between the October 1, 2017 and September 30, 2018.

•

For the same time-period, the language detection algorithm had an
average success rate 14.9 percent for identifying bullying and
harassment violations before being reported by users.

•

This meant the algorithm failed to detect 1.79 million bullying and
harassment violations during that year.

•

The study further identified the algorithm failed to identify any bullying
and harassment violations before being reported by users until July
2018.

For comparative illustration, the study further identified and calculated:
•

In one year, 8.6 million posts were flagged to contain hate speech and
were subsequently removed from the platform, between October 1,
2017, and September 30, 2018.

•

For the same time-period, the language detection algorithm had an
average success rate of 41.5 percent for identifying hate speech
violations before being reported by users.

•

This meant the algorithm failed to detect 5.03 million hate speech
violations during that year.

Language detection algorithm thematic analysis
Through thematic analysis of qualitative and quantitative data results of language
detection algorithms that help to protect Australian journalists from being trolled,
one central theme emerged: decoding problems. Limitations of the software are
revealed in the translation of language, particularly when using slang terminology.
Foer states that “algorithms can translate languages without understanding
words, simply by uncovering the patterns that undergird the construction of
sentences” (Foer, 2017, para. 25). However, the language detection algorithm is
far more complex, and is required to interpret language, rather than translate.
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Facebook’s Chief Global Security Officer Nick Lovrien (cited in Bell, 2018) explains
the shortfall of the system is the inability to interpret human interactions based of
idiomatic expressions and suggests regulating the intricacies of languages
requires human review. Native language of a metaphorical nature can be
misinterpreted through the translation process, if read in a literal context. Lovrien
(cited in Bell, 2018) further explains saying, “in English we say it’s ‘raining cats
and dogs’ ... but in Portuguese, it's ‘raining knives and daggers” (para. 10). A
Facebook algorithm can identify content that contains the word “knives” (para.
10) but, without context, does not have the ability to determine if the comment is
violent, or talking about the weather. The English language is particularly hard to
decode, as the underlying meanings of many expressions are not represented in
the literal text (Knight, 2016).
The impacts of trolling are subjective by nature, and victims are impacted
differently by certain content. Offense is not universal and, therefore, a universal
algorithm is destined to fail. As a notable limitation, language detection algorithms
are limited in their ability to understand context and, therefore, cannot always
determine the intent of a comment. Problems arise with comments such as “I’m
going to beat you,” which could be a threat or friendly competitive challenge.
Because of this complexity, there is no simple techno fix to the problem and people
need to be engaged with finding a solution. Previous research on social problems
has found that the people who need to be engaged are not just the victims and
perpetrators, but stakeholders on all levels of the systems model (Rittel, 1972,
Funnel, 2014; Beutler, 2021). In a 2021 study, Australian researchers Aim
Sinpeng, Fiona Martin, Katharine Gelber and Kirril Shields called on Facebook to
boost its consultation with minority groups and better train its in-house
moderators in response to online hate speech in the Asia Pacific region. The was
the first Facebook-funded regional study and found despite automated
moderation and improved content standards, the platform is still allowing
vilification and discrimination to proliferate on public pages, with inadequate
mechanisms to address it (Sinpeng et al, 2021).
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Trolling content depicted in image often contained nudity and violence that were
more universally recognised as offensive and Facebook algorithms were thus
more effective at identifying trolling delivered through a visual medium. However,
additional decoding flaws were revealed by which trolls could avoid language
detection algorithms, hiding abusive text within images and videos. To combat
this, Facebook announced a new program in 2018 called Rosetta that was
designed to read text and divert flagged content for moderation. Academic
discussions recognised decoding problems as “important”, yet progression as
“unsatisfying” (Huang, cited Simonite, 2018, para. 14) with Huang further
concluding that “current models are not that intelligent, that’s the problem.”
Srinivas Narayanan, who leads engineering in Facebook’s Applied Machine
Learning group, agreed with frustrations with the algorithms’ current limitation
of decoding language. Although progress in image detection enables the system to
scan for pornography and hate speech on a vast scale, Narayanan (2018)
suggested human-level accuracy and nuance remains a distant hope for language
detection. Although Narayanan (2018) believed with time artificial intelligence
could eventually achieve this desired level of interpretation, he stated “we just
don’t know how yet” (Narayanan, cited Simonite, 2018, para. 15). Facebook
continues to employ a large, multinational team to conduct long-term
fundamental research with aims, one day, to bridge the gap between autonomous
recognition and understanding.
Practical application of machine learning and artificial intelligence
functional strategy quantitative data results
It was important to at least consider the practical application of machine learning
and artificial intelligence models in reducing trolling on Facebook, although a
comprehensive analysis to determine their effectiveness fell beyond the scope of
this study. However, for a general discussion of their influence, the study explored
Facebook’s website https://transparency.fb.com and retrieved the Facebook
Community Standards Enforcement Data Snapshot (2018a) displayed in Figure 28
(on p. 191). As Facebook integrates both image detection and language detection
algorithms together, the retrieved data assessed their combined effect on
identifying abusive content. Thematic analysis applied to the aggregated data
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revealed bullying and harassment was the most challenging problem for the
artificial intelligence software to identify, followed by hate speech. Facebook
acknowledges this in its corporate communications. These two themes are
highlighted in red in Figure 28 for visual comparison.
The data indicates artificial intelligence algorithms do not work autonomously in
response more complex and subjective concepts, and subsequently fail as a
comprehensive proactive combative feature against trolls.
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A data snapshot of Facebook’s Community Standards Enforcement Report

Figure 28

Note: The image is produced by Facebook in 2018. Bullying and harassment and hate speech are identified as difficult areas for automatic detection.
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Qualitative thematic analysis
Through thematic analysis of the Facebook Community Standards Enforcement
Data Snapshot (Facebook, 2018a), six themes emerged: the vastness of the
content; impersonal automation; user uptake; lasting harm; censorship bias and
fake news. Each theme is discussed and critiqued in the following sections.
Vast content
With over 2.85 billion users at the first quarter of 2021 publishing over 2 billion
posts every day (Statista, 2021), Facebook’s vast content archive has burgeoned
to unmanageable levels that require technological intervention. Critics have
suggested that Facebook was reluctant to commence research and funding to
create artificial intelligence feature responses due to “ideological” hopes (Taibbi,
2017, para. 12) that the trolling problem would subside on its own over time.
However, trolling frequencies have not subsided and the dilemma of monitoring
content at scale remains. Critics, including Taibbi (2017), further suggested that
prior to 2016, Facebook had a logistical nightmare because “keeping porn and
beheading videos out of users’ news feeds was an extraordinarily involved
technical process” (para. 13). Examples of extreme violence initially took
precedence over the impact of trolling on victims, and resources were
disproportionately distributed towards image detection algorithms rather than
language detection models. In a multi-layered approach mirroring Ackoff’s (1974)
framework that this study adopts, Facebook used a combination of reports from
users to which artificial intelligence models were applied, to more quickly identify
content that violated their Community Standards. Flagged content was reviewed
by Facebook’s Community Operations team who worked on rosters operating
twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, in over 40 languages (Facebook,
2018c). In 2018, Facebook had more than 15,000 content reviewers, an increase
of over 40% from the previous year (Facebook, 2018c). This marked the most
responsive time period by Facebook in implementing techniques to combat
trolling on the platform. This coincided with the saturation period identified in
chapter 4.1 (on p. 62). While the improvement in moderation by Facebook is likely
to have reduced the risk that journalists would be exposed to trolling, given the
vastness of the platform, gaps likely remained.
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Impersonal automation
Journalist users have expressed frustration at automated responses and criticised
computing algorithms for their impersonal nature (Munn, 2020). The study
identified the importance of an easy-to-use reporting process to moderate the
described frustration levels and encourage trolled journalists to use the report
feature. Simply removing the offensive images without acknowledging the trauma
that targeted victims and moderators endured was highlighted as a concern that
Facebook’s research team was deliberating in 2019 (Facebook, 2019). This is
relevant to the thesis because the automated filters used by Facebook and its
reporting mechanisms are created to deal with vast content and are not able to be
person or content specific. This enables opportunities for cunningly worded
trolling of specific journalists.
User uptake
Facebook reported that some of its users who had been subjected to abuse were
not familiar with the online reporting process and were unsure how to navigate
the website to locate the feature tools. Facebook (2019) reported this lack of
knowledge as an identified area of concern that researchers were attempting to
resolve in 2019. This indicates the importance of educating journalists and
comment moderators in social media platform capabilities and reporting
processes.
Lasting harm
The study identified that victims whose images were shared, or who were
threatened online, felt violated, angry and embarrassed and were often “scared
and worried that their family, friends, and co-workers would see the images”
(Facebook, 2019, para. 4). The study revealed that harm continued for victims long
after the images were removed. Facebook (2019) reported mental health
consequences that included anxiety, depression, suicidal thoughts, and sometimes
post-traumatic stress disorder (para. 4) and that further highlighted the potential
economic and professional consequences for victims, including lost jobs, fewer
professional connections, and colleagues who tease or avoid them. Facebook
further reported difficulties for victims to find new employment and suggested, in
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many cases, the costs to victims are “serious” and “unquestionably long-lasting”
(para. 4), this impacts the career trajectories of trolled journalists.
Censorship bias
Facebook’s Community Standards project puts the company in the position of
deciding arbitrarily what speech is acceptable and what is not which is then
enforced by the algorithms. Tepper and Hearn (2019) outlined their perspective
stating “we may fool ourselves into thinking that Facebook and Google use fair,
impersonal algorithms to monitor speech. But algorithms are programmed by
people, and people are imperfect and have biases. The left may be happy that
conservative biases are censored today, but who will control these platforms in
five to 10 years” (p. 92). The effectiveness of algorithms to remove certain content
may not only benefit trolling victims including journalists but may be leveraged as
a means of societal control.
Fake news focus re-emerging
Through the thematic analysis of archival evidence about the technological
developments of Facebook’s artificial intelligence, this study identified an initial
shift in focus on what the company had prioritised as the most important factor to
address. Although the autonomous removal of abusive content directed at its
users on the service was prominent around 2010, the company’s main objectives
began to digress from harassment as a primary focus, prioritising attention
towards the regulation of fake news on the platform around 2016. A UNESCO
study in 2018 outlined many uses of term ‘fake news’ to describe “reporting with
which the claimant does not agree” (Ireton & Posetti, 2018, p. 45). The study
provided the following context to more accurately represent the meaning of ‘fake
news’ in reference to trolling and its implications for journalists:
Unfortunately, the phrase is inherently vulnerable to being
politicised and deployed as a weapon against the news
industry, as a way of undermining reporting that people in
power do not like… it covers satire and parody, click-bait
headlines, and the misleading use of captions, visuals or
statistics, as well as the genuine content that is shared out
of context, imposter content (when a journalist’s name or a
newsroom logo is used by people with no connections to
them), and manipulated and fabricated content.
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(Ireton & Posetti, 2018, p. 45)
Ireton and Posetti (2018) further suggested, “this crisis is much more complex
than the term ‘fake news’ suggests. If we want to think about solutions to these
types of information polluting our social media streams and stopping them from
flowing into traditional media outputs, we need to start thinking about the
problem much more carefully” (p. 45). This study suggests the attention shift at
the time was significantly impacted by the US Presidential election campaign of
Donald Trump that year. As discussed in chapter 4.1’s emergence findings (on p.
39), the presidential campaign is identified as a significant contributing factor that
fundamentally shaped the evolution of trolling in the Australian news media. The
election marked the commencement of the saturation period in chapter 4.1. At the
time, information surrounding trolling was so widespread that its meaning shifted
and flooded news media channels with misinformation leading to public confusion
and decreased trust in journalism. Although the election occurred overseas, the
impact still influenced the Australian news media, as it did around the world.
Facebook campaigns against inauthentic content took precedence, which was
detrimental for the progression towards any tangible support strategies for
trolled victims. Critics further suggestions that after Trump’s presidential win,
“everyone turned to Facebook and Google to fix fake news, but nobody had a
coherent definition of what constitutes it” (Taibbi, 2017, para. 18). Wardle (2017)
does, however, comprehensively explain that fake news is more than just news,
suggesting it is an entire information ecosystem of misinformation and
disinformation. Political smear tactics transformed the collective understanding
of trolling, and hindered attempts to remove it, and subsequently fuelled its
further escalation into 2017 when many Australian journalists were forced to
leave social media as a result (Ford, 2017; Noyes, 2017).
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4.5.4 Facebook research strategies results and discussion
Research strategies were identified by the study as the fourth type of Facebook
response to trolling that emerged from analysis of the 56 articles retrieved as
archival evidence in this chapter. This study noted a complete assessment of all
research initiated by the platform was not feasible. However, one in particular was
referenced in four of the 56 articles and was selected for further investigation:
Facebook’s non-consensual intimate imagery research. Using Google as a search
tool for the terms “Facebook” + “intimate imagery” + “research,” a further 11
relevant articles from credible newsrooms were retrieved that described or made
comment on Facebook’s non-consensual intimate imagery research, which are
summarised and presented to illuminate common themes for discussion and
critique. As the research developed, platform adjustments were progressively
implemented throughout 2019 that addressed concerns of gender-bias. The study
adopting the feminism paradigm as a framework for analysis is particularly
relevant to this section because it is about gender.
To ground the discussion in the context of Australian trolled journalists, the study
spotlights the malicious, targeted abuse of female journalists by reiterating
chapters’ 4.1 and 4.2 findings that women are disproportionately affected by
trolling. Not only are female journalists trolled more frequently, but they are
trolled more aggressively than males, with threats of physical violence and sexual
abuse a daily occurrence in newsrooms. The explicit content directed at females
is echoed in user sentiments on the platform that highlight a gender imbalance. By
failing to eliminate trolling, Facebook has continued the facilitation of pathways
used by abusers to exploit vulnerabilities, and further deepen the gender divide.
Non-consensual intimate imagery research background
The term non-consensual intimate imagery is defined as a form of sexual violence
that can be motivated by an intent to control, shame, humiliate, extort, and
terrorise through the act of exposing personal images of woman online (Facebook,
2019a). The term, abbreviated to NCII, is often referred to as revenge porn,
although revenge is not always the motivating factor. Consequences of sharing
intimate images include grave and lasting emotional and physical impacts for
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victims. Between 2018 and 2019, Facebook in partnership with several
international safety organisations, conducted research on the impacts of NCII, to
review and improve responses to trolling. In a comprehensive approach, research
findings were implemented across Facebook, Messenger and Instagram, the
applications owned by Facebook Inc, which also owns WhatsApp. Facebook said
it aimed to understand experiences through the lens of victims with the objective
to better identify barriers to the reporting process that made users feel unsafe on
the platform (Iyengar & Nain, 2019). Facebook conducted interviews with victims
and support advocates from Kenya, Denmark and the United Kingdom and
brought together over 20 academics and non-profit leaders from 10 countries in
a conference, to broaden collective understanding of best-practice (Davis, 2019).
The conference flagged technology, educational information, and psychosocial
support as the most influential factors for future effective proactive responses
(Davis, 2019). A combined approach of user precaution (to minimize behaviour
susceptible to attack) and refined platform responses (to monitor and restrict
communication avenues) were suggested by the study as the best responsive
approaches to NCII trolling.
Optional profile picture guard
Non-consensual intimate imagery research provided Facebook with a greater
understanding of global trends facing women and enabled practical features to be
implemented in response to trolling. Cultural discrepancies revealed some Indian
women chose not to share profile pictures of their face due to growing concerns
that photographs could be exploited by trolls to shame or dishonour victims and
their families (Soman, 2017). In response to these concerns, Facebook developed
an optional profile picture guard that gave women in particularly vulnerable
regions more control over who could download or share their pictures. This
feature may have been helpful for journalists such Maria Ressa, with a 2021 study
by the International Centre for Journalists finding that 40% of her trolling attacks
were personal assaults, with 14% classified as misogynistic, sexist and explicit
abuse (Posetti, Maynard, & Bontcheva, 2021). The feature is available in India,
Pakistan, Egypt, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, where women expressed similar
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concerns (Affi, 2018). However, in 2021 this feature is not available in Australia
and therefore provides no protection for Australian journalists.
Image hash strategy
Facebook introduced a controversial proactive strategy to combat nonconsensual intimate image trolling on November 9, 2017. In an attempt to help
users who feared that a private photo may be exposed, the platform trialled an
unprecedented provocative strategy in Australia (Statt, 2017). Although Facebook
developed the strategy “in partnership with international safety organisations,
survivors, and victim advocates” (Iyengar & Nain, 2019, para. 9), the public
expressed serious concerns with the suggestion that nude photos or videos be
directly uploaded to Facebook’s Community Operations team who personally
review each image and “hash” it. This process creates a digital footprint that
prompts algorithms to block the same image being uploaded elsewhere. Although
someone at Facebook is indeed looking at the nude photos, the company stressed
that these were “specially trained representatives” (Statt, 2017, para. 4) and
dismissed criticisms that the measure was unethical and “counterproductive”
(para. 2). Despite the feedback, Facebook claimed its research indicated, “this was
an option that victims generally wanted built into the reporting process” (Iyengar
and Nain, 2019, para. 10). However, the pilot program would only work if the
potential victim was aware that a particular image was at risk of being shared,
which is often not the case. The announcement by Head of Facebook Global
Security, Antigone Davis, provided the following explanation:
Australians can complete an online form on the eSafety
Commissioner’s official website. To establish which image
is of concern, people will be asked to send the image to
themselves on Messenger. The eSafety Commissioner’s
office notifies us of the submission (via their form).
However, they do not have access to the actual image. Once
we receive this notification, a specially trained
representative from our Community Operations team
reviews and hashes the image, which creates a humanunreadable, numerical fingerprint of it. We store the photo
hash—not the photo—to prevent someone from uploading
the photo in the future. If someone tries to upload the image
to our platform, like all photos on Facebook, it is run
through a database of these hashes and if it matches, we do
not allow it to be posted or shared. Once we hash the photo,
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we notify the person who submitted the report via the
secure email they provided to the eSafety Commissioner’s
office and ask them to delete the photo from the Messenger
thread on their device. Once they delete the image from the
thread, we will delete the image from our servers.
(Davis, 2017, para. 4)
Uptake of the strategy was relatively low in the first years of operation, which the
platform attributed to deficient awareness of the strategy; however, critics
suggested a lack of trust by the public in Facebook’s ability to safely store such
personal images (Martin, 2017a). Facebook did not concede that the provocative
design was more likely a contributing factor, with many victims understandably
concerned about sending private intimate images to strangers for external
mediated review. From a victim perspective, the strategy is counterintuitive. This
study suggests the controversial nature of the proactive strategy represents the
dominance of the patriarchal-perspective, and when scrutinised through an
alternate paradigm, it can be considered culturally insensitive and potentially
offensive in its very suggestions (Soman, 2017). Sexual imagery is forbidden by
some religious ideologies, and to request that victims send such photos to their
government or a similarly authoritative organisation is highly disrespectful and
fails to acknowledge the risks associated with doing so. Although this study
acknowledges the shortcoming of prior strategies and the need for new and
innovative resolution methods, the practical consideration of this strategy is
deemed to be questionable.
Qualitative thematic analysis
From thematic analysis of Facebook’s non-consensual intimate imagery research,
five themes emerged: deflection of responsibility; humiliation of women; cultural
differences; cultural insensitivity; and a holistic approach. All these themes are
discussed and critiqued in the following sections.
Deflection of responsibility
Facebook often seeks assistance from affiliates overseas. In Pakistan, Executive
Director of the Digital Rights Foundation, Nighat Dad, has worked with Facebook
as part of the management team reviewing harassment issues on the service, and
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in particular, the sharing of non-consensual intimate images. She stated, “online
gender-based violence is not a technology problem, it is a societal problem” (Dad,
cited in Facebook, 2019a, para. 21). Although the fundamental argument is
correct, because of the scale of social media platforms, trolling has emerged as a
technological problem as well. The Facebook management teams and associated
management affiliation are often quick to deflect blame, which is further discussed
in the next theme below. Although trolling is not perpetrated by the social media
platforms themselves, their creators have provided the forum from which trolls
exert their abuse. Public criticism asserts that partial responsibility for its
prevention falls on the facilitators (Leetaru, 2018; Morell, 2021). Prior to 2014,
identified as the social problem period in this study (and described on p. 55), when
the recognition of trolling as a standalone social problem was not universal,
Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg shunned this responsibility (Taibbi, 2017).
Indeed, Zuckerberg deflected accountability as late as June 2016, saying, “editing
content… that’s not us” (para. 11). Although Facebook does not make journalism,
it is hosting, distributing, and monetising content just like a media company, and
criticisms suggested a declaration of partial responsibility should have been made
(D’Onfro, 2016). Continued deflection of responsibility halted any progress
towards the solution of the trolling problem for several critical years. As trolling
evolved and permeated across the service, Facebook had no alternative than to
commence more in-depth counteractive strategies.
Humiliation of women
Facebook’s research responds to the trend of trolls attempting to humiliate
women as one of their primary tactics. Examples of revenge porn involving female
journalists include British journalist Anna Richardson in 2015 (Horswill, 2015),
Scottish journalist Vonny Moyes in 2016 (Ballard, 2016), and Australian journalist
Fiona Harper in 2019 (Wondracz, 2019). Abusers can also obtain or create via
Photoshop private images of women, often nude, posing in suggestive positions or
engaging in sexual actions, and share these images without consent on Facebook
to publicly embarrass and discredit the victim. Although Facebook claims to
remove such images under their standards on the sexual exploitation of adults,
with 1,400 cases of revenge porn abuse reported across Australia in 2019 (Taylor
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& Mitchell, 2019), examples continue to materialise and circulate undetected
suggesting Facebook’s removal procedures are flawed and inconsistent. This
particular tactic crosses legal boundaries discussed in further detail in the 4.7 legal
responses section of this study (on p. 265).
Cultural differences
The internet has both facilitated globalisation and fuelled cultural interactions
previously constrained by the cost of international travel. Through the
introduction of the internet, cultures were able to spread exponentially, with
different beliefs, practices, and ways of living able to be explored and experienced
by anyone with access to a computer. Online content was shaped by cultural
diversity (Burri, 2016) but was not immune from being exploited for targeted
abuse. Many Silicon Valley technologies were encoded with Western biases that
prevented users from learning more deeply about other people, cultures, and
places (Srinivasan, 2017). To support richer understandings of differences, social
media networks need to be redesigned to better represent diverse cultural and
political perspectives and reflect a more inclusive approach when determining
which content is offensive and to be removed. Different cultural backgrounds have
varying tolerances of certain behaviours and although it would be considered
shameful by the broader Australian community for a woman to have taken photos
while performing a sexual act, in more traditional communities, women may face
extreme repercussions and be harmed, shunned, or exiled from their communities
(Facebook, 2019a). While bikinis are commonly worn in Australia, a woman Saudi
Arabia a would be shamed if a troll revealed a photo of her ankle and put at risk of
physical harm if a troll published a photo of her walking with a man who was not
an immediate family member (Facebook, 2019a). Facebook highlights that many
women were forced to run away from home to avoid persecution after imagery
was published on the platform. When considered in its full cultural context, images
shared in this way are intentional attempts to humiliate women. In 2021, revenge
porn had become a political weapon in Myanmar with journalists such as Han
Nyein Oo profusely targeted (Thiha, 2021). Facebook recognises cultural
discrepancies and is required to monitor trolling content based on its individual
merits, to ensure examples such as this are specifically removed under Facebook’s
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bullying harassment standard (Facebook, 2019a, para. 10). This study illustrates
a lack of established support organisations or viable law enforcement solutions
for dealing with the complexity of the cultural diversity issues that emerge online.
Cultural insensitivity
The exponential rise of popularity, usership and the fundamental integration of
Facebook within contemporary culture can be considered a natural progression
of technological advancements. However, this rapid success was not a coincidence
but an intentional objective at the foundation of Facebook’s construction. As
spotlighted by Nussbaum (2010), Facebook purposively matched its technological
design with a deep Western cultural longing characterised by the adolescent
desire for connection. With this theoretical perspective ingrained, response
strategies were shaped by its cultural biases. In a 2018 study, researchers Hong
and Na (2018) concluded, “cultural backgrounds determine not only the features
of online networks, but also the patterns of online behaviours” (p. 441). Therefore,
because of complex cultural nuances, universal strategies deployed at global scale
were likely to fail, with non-western cultures often the first casualties. While, this
study recognises that distinctions between western countries also exist, and
current universal approaches to trolling may need to be adapted to each
geopolitical region. Facebook is used in different ways in independent and
interdependent cultures (Hong & Na, 2018). Individualism, the dominant western
perspective, governs much of cyber-hate literature (Jane, 2016), in a self-focused
approach. Collectivist perspectives favoured in interdependent cultures, including
China and Korea, focus on belonging and social obligation (Ren, Cang & Ryder,
2021). The study does not infer any conclusions about differences in trolling
frequency or severity between idiosyncratic cultural characteristics; however, it
does suggest that the current individualist, self-focused, western approach has not
eliminated the problem to date, that a more holistic multi-faceted social approach
to trolling responses, sensitive to a wider array of cultural principles, may work
better.
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Holistic approach
Describing Systems Theory, Ackoff (1974) wrote, “the properties or behaviour of
each element of the set [or system] has an effect on the properties or behaviour of
the set taken as a whole” (p. 13). He went on to explain that this
interconnectedness is why a system’s performance depends on how well the parts
fit and work together, not just how well each one performs individually. This
thinking seems to have permeated Facebook’s research strategy which
acknowledges the importance of a holistic approach to the complex social problem
of trolling stating, “we take a comprehensive approach to making our platform a
safer place for women, including writing clear policies and developing cuttingedge technology to help prevent abuse from happening in the first place”
(Facebook, 2019a, para. 5). Facebook reiterates the significance of a coordinated
and multifaceted approach to trolling on its platform stating, “to account for this
wide spectrum of harassment types, our rules need to be thoughtful and similarly
comprehensive” (para. 11) and “blocking and reporting are only part of the
solution, and their success relies on people knowing to seek them out and
understanding how to use them, plus feeling comfortable enough to use them”
(para. 14). Although Facebook repeatedly invokes the need for a comprehensive
approach, it fails to effectively outline the required processes for the successful
implementation of this strategy. Facebook does provide data in some cases,
however, on a global/Australian level it is lacking. The current toxic environment
highlighted by recent examples of Australian trolled journalists (Hoffman, 2020;
Smith, 2020; O’Callagham, 2021) illustrates its failed implementation at present.
4.5.5 Facebook corporate approach strategies
The notion of corporate social responsibility was not new when Ackoff formulated
his model in 1974. He wrote:
Mounting public pressure on corporations to behave in
more socially responsible ways has given rise to a major
debate in corporate circles. The debate focuses on the
question: Should or should not a corporation involve itself
in activities and programs that are intended to improve its
physical and social environment? This question arises only
when such involvement consumes corporate profits; when
it produces profit there is no issue. The answers to this
question reflect the four basic attitudes towards the present
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and future; inactivism, reactivism, preactivism, and
interactivism.
(p. 56).
He described inactivism, reactivism, and preactivism as profit-focussed, while
citing R.N. Anthony’s indictment in the Harvard Business Review of profit as
immoral and socially unacceptable. Although Ackoff conceded that profit was also
the most universally accepted corporate objective. He then deployed the
argument that survival is the central purpose of a company and while profit may
serve that purpose, social responsibility also plays a role. Making this point, Ansoff
(1965) had said firms should aim to balance the conflicting claims of various
stakeholders (managers, workers, stockholders, suppliers, vendors) and to
configure its objectives to give a measure of satisfaction to each. While this style
of management has evolved since the 1960s, the central tenant aligns with what
Facebook appears to be doing.
Corporate approaches were identified as the fifth type of Facebook response to
trolling.

Through

exploration

of

archives

on

Facebook’s

website

https://about.fb.com, and analysis of the 56 articles retrieved as archival evidence
in this chapter, this study identified multiple corporate responses by the platform.
However, in consideration of the scope of the study, the three strategies
considered most relevant to Australian trolled journalists were selected for
further inquiry and are listed below:
1. Transparency
2. Live-stream continuation
3. Moderator compensation

Background to transparency corporate approach strategy
Comparing the first management responses to trolling by Facebook and Twitter
(as identified in chapter 4.4), the study revealed a significant difference in levels
of concern. While Twitter grappled to admit trolling was a problem, Facebook led
by example adopting a transparent corporate approach. Twitter’s first response
came on September 14, 2012, in a statement that acknowledged trolling occurred
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on its platform and outlined an updated user policy (Twitter, 2012). The 16-word
addition to the previous user policy outlined abuse would not be tolerated,
without providing any function for users to report such behaviour at the time. In
stark comparison, Facebook had implemented a report feature as part of its initial
setup and, on June 20, 2012, released the Reporting Guide (Facebook, 2012) that
detailed the back-of-house reporting process in an effort to be transparent with
its users. Facebook accepted some responsibility for the negative behavioural
patterns that had emerged on its platform and adopted a more open and honest
approach with the public than Twitter. Facebook management continued to share
difficulties, discuss limitations and setbacks, reach out to researchers and
partnering companies for specialised support, and attempted to educate users
about procedural updates as they developed. The processes illustrated on
Facebook’s Reporting Guide in 2012 still reflect its current procedures and
provide useful information for Australian journalists who are trolled at work. The
infographic is displayed in Figure 29 (Angotti, 2012) on the following page and
provides both qualitative and quantitative data for thematic analysis and critique.
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Figure 29: An internal progression flow-chart of a Facebook report
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Transparency corporate approach strategy thematic analysis
Through thematic analysis of data presented in Facebook’s Reporting Guide from
2012, the three themes that emerged (nonlinearity, systems theory and hierarchy)
are unpacked and discussed in the following sections.
Nonlinearity
Social problems often arise from a series of cumulative events as supported by
chapter 4.1 findings that mapped the emergence of trolling in the Australian news
media. Behaviour dynamics can be analysed for patterns that provide an insight
into the underlying structure of a system, key to understanding what is happening
and, importantly, why. Social media companies often respond to individual events
rather than considering and addressing more complex underlying causes
(Gillespie, 2018; Napoli, 2019). Meadows (2008) explains that in approaching
complex problems, humans have linear minds in a nonlinear world and suggests
“we are often insufficiently skilled in understanding the nature of relationships”
(p. 91). At first glance at Facebook’s procedures in Figure 29 it is evident the
platform has taken a nonlinear approach, with the flow-chart provides a number
of different pathways to report abuse. Linear relationships have an important
modular feature that enable them to be dissected and rebuilt multiple times.
However, the unpredictability of nonlinear relationships creates “rich kinds of
behaviour” (p. 23) that generally do not have a resolute solution, a phenomenon
described in the seminal text Chaos: Making a New Science by James Gleick (1988).
Society observes the world in terms of constant proportions only provided by
linear models, where cause and effect are relative. However, nonlinear
relationships do not produce proportional effects and are therefore more difficult
to comprehend and forecast. Nonlinearities confound our expectations of
responsive action engendering behavioural change. Facebook’s diverse response
web is a constructive approach; however, its effectiveness is difficult to assess in
isolation.
Systems theory
Facebook is an example of a complex system, characterised by a large network
consisting of relatively simple components working in cohesion. One year after
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the launch of Facebook, Skyttner (2005) described six system characteristics
determined as applicable to the platform which included: a large number of
elements; many interactions among the elements; attributes of the elements not
being predetermined; interaction between elements being loosely organised; the
system being subject to behavioural influences; and the system being largely open
to the environment. The relationships between system components shape the
properties of the system more than the nature of individual components. The
Reporting Guide appears to implement this theoretical approach to address
trolling by focussing on the interconnected components of the reporting system.
Although the systems approach is often perceived as an approach for solving
technical problems, it has emerged as an adaptable concept that is applicable to
both material and nonmaterial phenomena. The application of systems theory
approach to the fast growing and complex field of social media was forecast by
Darena (2011) ten years ago as an important problem-solving approach to a
domain that operates as an interdisciplinary system with tendencies of
specialisation. However, the results that stem from its apparent applications by
social media platforms are varied. Recognised as an effective response to highly
specialised branches of science, the systems approach breaks down components
of complex problems enabling communication among specialisations to facilitate
combined problem-solving methods. The study suggests continued application of
this approach by all stakeholder groups is imperative to more effectively address
online trolling behaviours.
Lack of hierarchy
Influential systems theorist, Donella Meadows (2008) states systems work with
greater efficiency, accuracy, and positive structure when resilience, selforganisation and hierarchy are present. Resilience is defined as “a measure of a
system’s ability to survive and persist within a variable environment” (Meadows,
2008, p. 76). Self-organisation means “changing any aspect of a system lower on
this list by adding completely new physical structures, adding new balancing or
reinforcing loops, or new rules” (Meadows, 2008, p. 159). Hierarchy is defined as
“the ordered nature of a system where individuals, groups, or entities are
conceptually situated relative to one another based on power or rank” (Mangal,
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2013, p. 119) and, in a highly functional system, the welfare, freedoms and
responsibilities of each part of the system must be balanced (Meadows, 2008, p.
85). Although Facebook’s Reporting Guide exhibited resilience and selforganisation characteristics, a defined hierarchy was lacking. In support of this
finding, Mangal (2013) stated Facebook had “fairly present resilience, very
present self-organisation, but minutely present hierarchy” (p. 118). Yet despite
hierarchal discrepancies that are still present in 2021, the reporting feature
seemed to function well. Although minor hierarchies may exist within parts of
Facebook, including the elevated status of Groups and Pages, there is no built-in
hierarchy for the entire site and implementation at a user-level may disrupt an
interactive function if friends are ranked, a discriminative function of MySpace
that contributed to its demise. These junctions could play a part in regulating
behaviour on news-related pages if blocking, suspension, or demotion in ranking
was a negative consequence of bad behaviour such as trolling. The capacity to
report could help trolled journalists overcome the sense of powerlessness they
felt. However, the study observes alternate models have successfully contributed
to the improvement of behavioural standards through self-regulation: Uber, for
example, ranks its users by five stars (Scheiber, 2017), as does eBay and Facebook
Marketplace. Such a mechanism could be taken into consideration when adopting
preventative strategies to trolling. But while the risk of poor ratings could deter
trolls or trolls could use the power to demote people to harass victims, if not
implemented at the user-level, it could be more forcefully applied at the corporate
level to shift the power imbalance and more efficiently remove the authority of
abusers to use the platform. Although some ranking of comments (sorted into top
comments and most relevant) does occur, Facebook uses algorithms that are not
publicly disclosed to prioritise content. While Facebook has considered internal
levels, the platform is part of a larger system and is resistant to being legislated,
deflecting legal responsibilities to the publications to shoulder themselves.
Live stream continuation corporate approach strategy background
In the analysis of the 56 articles retrieved as archival evidence in this chapter,
Facebook’s live stream function was selected for inquiry and collective
descriptions were summarised to provide a brief background. Launched on
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August 5, 2015, the live stream feature on Facebook evolved from being
exclusively used by celebrities with verified accounts, to streaming violent
criminal acts. Although majority of viewers accrue after filming has ceased, Hern
(2017) suggested the difference from pre-recorded videos was evolutionary, not
revolutionary. The live or pre-recorded function of content is not the main
concern, but the ease with which unmonitored content can be posted. In 2019,
Facebook announced it would hire 3,000 people to “speed up the removal of
videos showing murder, suicide and other violent acts” (Tsukayana, 2017).
Despite criticisms (Crossley, 2017), exploration of Facebook’s website revealed
the feature remained active as of June 2021. Acts of hate-speech and terrorism
have and continue to present significant problems for investigative journalists
including Finnish journalist Jessikka Aro (Miller, 2016) and Indian journalist Rana
Ayyub (Fitzgerald, 2022).
Key event: New Zealand massacre
Despite investing in artificial intelligence to aid its 15,000 content moderators in
2019 (Newton, 2019), Facebook’s policing measures failed to flag a massacre in
New Zealand that was live streamed on its platform for at least 15 minutes
(O’Sullivan, 2019). A central intention of perpetrators publishing violent acts
online is to incite a reaction and considering the majority of users would respond
in disgust and that the trolls own extremist community may reward the poster for
this behaviour, the act can be classified as a form of social trolling, aimed to
provoke the broader community rather than to target an individual.
Live stream continuation corporate approach strategy thematic analysis
In thematic analysis, the two themes of cumulative scrutiny and anti-racism social
movement emerged. The descriptive commentary below provides context for a
comprehensive analysis of the implications for Australian journalists.
Cumulative scrutiny
In a comprehensive investigation led by The Guardian’s Samuel Gibbs (2017),
Facebook came under extensive public scrutiny in mainstream media. The
following descriptions of key events formed the basis of this criticism. On April 26,
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2017, a man live streamed the murder of his 11-month-old daughter in Thailand
(Gibbs, 2017). Relatives reportedly saw the distressing footage and alerted the
police who arrived too late to save the 11-month-old or the father, who had
committed suicide. The two posted videos were accessible to Facebook users for
approximately 24 hours before being taken down and had been viewed 112,000
and 258,000 times respectively. The videos were uploaded by other people to
YouTube but they were removed within 15 minutes of YouTube being notified.
This study identified the murder as a catalyst event that played a pivotal role in
shaping public perception of Facebook’s inaction against online extremism. It was
not an isolated example, and a cluster of extreme acts of violence broadcast on the
platform drew attention to Facebook’s inaction and widespread condemnation of
it at the time. Additional incidents include the torture of an 18-year-old disabled
man on January 6, 2017 that was live streamed and watched by more than 16,000
users (Levin, 2017) a video which is concerningly still accessible online as of July
2020; the sexual assault of a 15-year-old girl by six men on March 22, 2017 live
streamed to more than 40 users (Associated Press, 2017); the random shooting of
a 74-year-old retiree collecting aluminium cans on April 17, 2017; and although
not broadcast live, video of the murder was posted on the platform shortly
afterwards and remained visible for over three hours (The Guardian, 2017). The
ease with which the platform can be used as a podium for hatred and violence
incited public anger and outrage, yet Facebook still continued the feature despite
a storm of scrutiny (Gibbs, 2017).
Precursor for the Black Lives Matter movement
Intending to increase interactivity and connectivity amongst users through a live
streaming function, Facebook may not have predicted the cultural impact of the
feature. In essence, the function shifted the power balance in favour of users and
negated traditional gatekeeper roles by facilitating the dissemination of
unmonitored content in real-time, enabling users to harness the puissant tool and
act as citizen journalists, and citizen pornographers, and citizen executioners. Live
streaming provided unedited documentation of police hostilities that became
catalysts for countering activism. The first death live streamed on Facebook
occurred on July 6, 2016, when Diamond Reynolds recorded the immediate
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aftermath of a police officer shooting her boyfriend, Philando Castile. The video
shows that after being asked to show his license and registration, Castile advised
in a calm demeanour that he was legally carrying a gun before reaching for his
license and being shot seven times. Castile’s was the first of several deaths in
police custody live streamed on Facebook. Disparate discourses, once considered
anecdotal evidence, began to form a cumulative record that exposed the existence
and extent of the police racism and discrimination, and through this awareness,
public perceptions were shaped. The association between the live stream function
and police killings was the precursor for the Black Lives Matter movement. In
support of this idea, Hern (2017) suggests this association is about more than just
being the only camera available. The difficulty of removing online content has
emerged as a characteristic of importance when dealing with an untrusted
adversary with the legal power to confiscate devices and suppress footage. The
immediacy of live streaming can alert personal contacts and increase the number
of people who witness an event beyond those physically present and be further
leveraged through increased exposure as a call to arms for the fight for justice. In
a snowballing effect, Facebook algorithms aggressively push live streamed videos
to the top of newsfeeds in an effort to encourage the interaction; however, this
promotional feature also accelerates the adverse rapid exposure of offensive
content to large audiences. As acknowledged by Facebook (Rosen, 2019) and
journalists (Cox, 2019; Silva, 2021), when abuse happens in real-time, it is more
difficult for social media platforms to control as the standard reporting method
that requires external moderation is delayed.
Catalyst for the Black Lives Matter movement
This study identified the Facebook live streaming feature as the catalyst for the
Black Lives Matter movement, marked by its global peak on March 25, 2020,
broadcasting on Facebook the death of George Floyd in police custody. The
movement called for change worldwide. The need for change was evident in the
racist content reported by Australian journalists described chapter 4.3 (on p. 82).
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Absence of dump button
While traditional television broadcasters are subject to regulations, internet
streaming services do not face the same restrictions and are left by government
bodies to regulate and enforce their own terms of service. With a sole reliance on
reactive reporting methods, through a combination of people-powered and
automated means, the challenge for companies that host videos is to discern
objectionable content in real time, a process that none of the large social media
platforms seems capable of doing. Facebook’s lack of responsiveness on removing
shootings, beheadings, gang rape and child sex abuse from the platform raises
questions about the reasons for Facebook’s refusal to discontinue live streaming
from its service. Consideration of a delayed broadcast may provide a buffer for
automated algorithms to flag abusive content for removal (Kanter, 2019). The
success of radio’s seven-second dump button continues today and may be a
possible avenue for further research into live streaming. This function would still
allow the desired real-time interactivity between users who respond to comments
within their shared videos but may provide greater scope for identifying of violent
and offensive imagery. The apparent impunity with which the platform can be
used as a podium for hatred and violence also raises concerns about employee
welfare of those tasked to examine and filter the obscene content (Newton, 2019).
Moderator compensation corporate approach strategy background
In the 56 articles retrieved as archival evidence in this chapter, discussions, or
concerns about moderator compensation on Facebook were raised in six articles.
Although the scope of the study does not permit an in-depth exploration of
adequate moderator compensation, collective descriptions were summarised to
provide a brief background of key concepts for further discussion and critique.
Cumulative concerns for Facebook moderators
On May 25, 2017, The Guardian spotlighted growing psychological concerns in the
article, “Underpaid and overburdened: the life of a Facebook moderator”.
Testimonies from those working to keep beheadings, bestiality and child sexual
abuse images off Facebook indicated support procedures were commonly
insufficient, and in some instances non-existent. Interviews with staff reflected
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immense workplace distress. One stated, “there was literally nothing enjoyable
about the job, you would go into work at 9am every morning, turn on your
computer and watch someone have their head cut off. Every day, every minute,
that is what you would see, heads being cut off” (Solon, 2017, para. 1). The
respondent earned roughly $15 per hour removing terrorist content from the
social network after a two-week training course. In addition to training and
support reported as “insufficient” (para. 7), Facebook staff reported severe
impacts, illustrated in the comment: “people would have to visit psychologists
every day as they could not sleep or had nightmares” (para. 5).
In comparison, the study assessed the preventative workplace procedures of the
Internet Watch Foundation (IWF) in the United Kingdom (Solon, 2017). Before a
moderator is hired, the applicants are assessed for suitability by a psychologist,
who asks about their opinions on pornography in general, their support network,
childhood, and triggers. Once they pass this stage, candidates are interviewed
about their work skills before moving onto the final stage designed to see how the
potential employee copes and letting them decide whether they wish to continue
with the role. At this stage, alongside two trained IWF employees, candidates are
exposed to progressively more egregious child sexual abuse imagery that
concludes with the worst kinds of sexual violence against children. If the job is
accepted, moderators have an enhanced background check before they start six
months’ training, which involves understanding criminal law, learning about the
dark web and, crucially, building resilience to looking at traumatic content. This
six-month training period provided by the IWF far exceeds Facebook’s two-week
training course.
On September 21, 2018, Selena Scola, a former Facebook content moderator who
worked on contract for nine months, filed a lawsuit in the San Mateo County
Superior Court that claimed exposure to violent images caused her post-traumatic
stress disorder (Garcia, 2018). Scola argued the company failed to protect her and
other contractors as they viewed distressing videos and photographs of rapes,
suicides, beheadings, and other killings. The unprecedented case was the first to
hold Facebook accountable for failing to protect its employees from trolling in the
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workplace. The lawsuit stated 7,500 moderators around the world sift through 10
million potentially rule-breaking posts every week. Facebook relies on its two
billion users to report inappropriate content. The moderators then employ the
hundreds of rules Facebook has developed to determine if the content violates its
policies. Scola urged Facebook to establish a fund to create a testing and treatment
program through which current and former content moderators, including
moderators employed by a third party, can receive medical testing and monitoring
including psychiatric treatment (Garcia, 2018).
Pay rise for Facebook moderators
On February 15, 2019, The Verge journalist Casey Newton published The Trauma
Floor a scathing investigative report of the secret lives of Facebook moderators
and the horrendous content and workplace conditions they endure. The report
revealed Facebook contractors in Phoenix were suffering from long-term mental
health issues after working as content moderators, as their jobs required them to
view a steady stream of violent and disturbing content, resulting in many
struggling with PTSD-like symptoms (Newton, 2019a). In response to public
criticism, on May 13, 2019, Facebook announced a pay increase for its content
moderators, up $3 US per hour to $18 US per hour, (Newton, 2019a).
Mandatory counselling support for Facebook moderators
In further response to the growing negative discussions that preceded The Verge
report, Facebook stated it would now provide access to on-site counselling during
all hours of operation for its workers, rather than only during the day shift, and
would also begin surveying contractors about their mental health twice a year and
use these results to shape programs and practices (Newton, 2019, para. 4).
Moderators would also be able to blur graphic images before viewing them, to
reduce the risk of being caught unawares by disturbing content. However, as a
result of accumulating pressure, the implemented strategies were considered by
the judge too little too late (Newton, 2019), and Facebook was successfully sued
by moderators seeking damages.
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Facebook moderators compensated
On May 12, 2020, a landmark acknowledgment of the toll that content moderation
takes on employees was made in the case Scola, et al. v Facebook Inc 2020. In a
preliminary settlement Facebook paid $52 million US to both current and former
content moderators in compensation for mental health issues developed on the
job (Newton, 2020). Each moderator received a minimum of $1,000 US and would
be eligible for additional compensation of up to $50,000 US if diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder or related conditions. The settlement covered 11,250
moderators, and lawyers in the case believed more than half may be eligible for
additional compensation related to mental health issues associated with their
time working for Facebook, including depression and addiction. Plaintiff lawyer,
Steve Williams (cited in in Newton, 2020), said the unprecedented case signified
“the harm that can be suffered from this work is real and severe” (para. 3). This
study identified the announcement to compensate content moderator employees
as the most significant social media response. The response acknowledged the
impact trolling has on people, beyond the targeted victim.
Moderator compensation corporate approach strategy thematic analysis
From thematic analysis of collective descriptions from six articles that discussed
or raised concerns about moderator compensation on Facebook, four themes
emerged: accountability, international moderators excluded, resilience and legal
precedence. These are explored and unpacked in the following sections.
Accountability
Up until the settlement, Facebook had acknowledged the escalating presence of
trolling on its platform, and its associated problems in regulatory controls, but had
not yet chosen or been required to take responsibility for the repercussions of
moderation on its employees. This thesis argues the settlement was the most
significant social media response to trolling, in the acceptance of responsibility for
human suffering facilitated by the service. This paves the way for similar claims
by trolled journalists to seek compensation from their employers.

Chapter 4.5 Facebook responses results and discussion

216

International moderators excluded
The location of moderators determined their inclusion in the compensation
payment. The preliminary settlement only covered Facebook content moderators
working in California, Arizona, Texas, and Florida from 2015 until 2020. Due to
the extensive volume of content, Facebook contracted its moderation work to
other companies, with many of the contract companies hiring their workforces
from developing countries where labour is cheaper, including India and China. The
settlement payment excluded many content moderators who were performing the
same tasks and suffering the same mental health issues as those in the four
American states and does not cover people hired beyond Facebook to moderate
social media content. This illustrates weaknesses in Facebook’s content
moderation system that could mean trolled journalists are left exposed.
Resilience
In response to a further recommendation from the settlement, Facebook required
contractors to “screen applicants for emotional resiliency as part of the recruiting
and hiring process” (Newton, 2019a, para. 14). In this study’s in-depth interviews
with trolled journalists (in chapter 4.2 on p. 64), seven of the ten highlighted the
need to be “resilient” as a journalist Additionally, all ten participants labelled
trolling a “significant” workplace problem, described the suggestion to ignore
trolls as an “inadequate” coping strategy, and suggested that relying on resilience
is harmful to the journalist (as reported on p. 72 and discussed on p. 79).
Facebook’s continued reliance on emotional resilience as a coping strategy for
content moderators as still suggested as questionable. The same applies to
newsrooms requiring journalistic resilience in place of effective strategies to
reduce trolling.
Legal precedence
In the unprecedented compensation case, plaintiff lawyer Steve Williams (cited in
Newton, 2020) said it signified that “the harm that can be suffered from this work
is real and severe” (para 3). Although the class-action lawsuit was filed in a
Californian state court in September 2018, the case opens up the possibility for

Chapter 4.5 Facebook responses results and discussion

217

further legal actions to be filed in other countries, including Australia. Legal
responses are discussed and critiqued later in this study (in chapter 4.7 on p. 265).
This chapter describes Facebook’s responses to trolling in five categories: support
strategies, feature strategies, functional strategies, research strategies and
corporate approach strategies providing clarity about an important stakeholder
in the trolling paradigm. The next chapter will investigate responses by Australian
newsrooms. While social media platforms sit at the junction of governance and
support levels in the systems model, newsrooms that once sat at the support level
because they have limited control over the behaviour of people on social media
platforms, are beginning to sit at the junction of governance and support level.
Newsrooms have begun to institute governance procedures such as social media
and workplace health and safety policies, in addition to training and support, that
contribute to the online safety of working journalists.
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Chapter 4.6
Newsroom Responses
Results and Discussion
A timeline of Australian newsroom responses
Question E - What strategies were implemented by Australian news
organisations in responses to trolling?
Trolling has cemented itself as a fundamental part of the current Australian news
media landscape. Interactivity provided by social media is a significant
contributor to online news’ popularity. However, this interactive function of Web
2.0 has also facilitated trolls’ access to their victims. Comment sections on
reputable news sites routinely burst with insults, presenting a significant
workplace problem for Australian journalists (Barnes, 2018; Citron, 2016; Jane,
2015; Phillips, 2015). An online culture has emerged where vicious and frequent
trolling has become commonplace, and where rape threats have become a
predictable default response to journalistic practice (Bartlett, 2015; Greig, 2016;
Hunt, 2016; West, 2015; Ford, 2016). Although trolling is evident on a global scale,
the academic literature on this phenomenon is still developing in 2021.
Although comprehensive analysis of international news organisations fell beyond
the scope of this study, which specifically focused on the trolling of journalists in
the Australian news media, notable global newsroom responses were included in
the data set and relevant discussion sections where appropriate for contextual
analysis. The study selectively analysed three popular Australian newsrooms of
differing ownership: The Sydney Morning Herald, News.com.au and ABC.
The research design strategy that addresses Question F: What strategies were
implemented by Australian news organisations in responses to trolling? applies
mixed methods applied to archival evidence, thematic critical analysis and
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interviews. As a starting point, the chapter used the 528 articles in the thematic
content analysis from chapter 4.1 (on p. 39). Twenty-four of these articles
mentioned newsroom responses to trolling and were deemed relevant for
inclusion. Google was then used as a search tool with the search inquiry: “troll” +
“newsroom” + “response” + “Australia” retrieving 8,540,000 results. On closer
analysis of the first ten pages totalling 100 articles, 17 additional articles were
deemed relevant for inclusion. From thematic analysis of the 41 articles retrieved
as archival evidence, newsroom responses that documented changes to news
organisations websites, social media pages and comment streams, in addition to
support and training programs are listed in chronological order. To provide
further primary data, media academic Dr Jennifer Beckett whose research
explored the safety of online moderators was also selected for the interviews
conducted in 2020. In addition, journalist and academic, who in 2019 completed
her PhD Destroying the joint: A case study of feminist digital activism in Australia
and its account of fatal violence against women, that presented a history and
assessment of the online feminist movement, Dr Jenna Price, was selected to
interview. Both interviewees are Australian. Respondents were reached through
academic and industry contacts. The semi-structured interviews went for
approximately one hour and provided both quantitative and qualitative data.
Through predominantly open-ended questions, robust qualitative data was
acquired. The study identified emerging patterns regarding the use and
effectiveness of newsroom support systems, which were drawn upon for
comparison, discussion and critique. Newsrooms ABC, 9 News Perth, Seven West
Media, and Network Ten in Subiaco were contacted and asked about their policies
in response to trolling. ABC policies were found on their website. Seven West Media
and Network Ten dealt with matter internally on a case-by-case basis, and 9 Perth
(formerly Fairfax Media) refused twice to provide a copy of their handbook for
online safety produced by Julie Posetti. While interviews with newsroom
executives may have yielded more first-hand information, it was beyond the scope
of this thesis.
Brief definition of key terms
In newsroom contexts, trolling is part of the broader issue of management of user

Chapter 4.6 Newsroom responses results and discussion

220

generated content, including screening for inappropriate content. However, the
definition of inappropriate content is not universally recognised and can differ
between various news organisations. Individual newsrooms commonly have
guidelines on their websites and social media pages that users must adhere to
when engaging online and that moderators can reference and implement when
assessing content. The boundary between appropriate and inappropriate content
is often left up to individual interpretation. While racist comments are usually
flagged for removal as they are unlawful under section 18C of the Racial
Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) and Racial Hatred Act 1995 (Cth), tolerance of a
wider spectrum of content including profanity, threats, and insults vary
depending on the individual publication (Chadwick, 2019).
Brief background
While newsroom interactivity in the form of letters to the editor have long been a
feature of newspapers, there are competing claims about the first news website to
offer opportunities for dialogic interactivity between news content creators and
their audiences. In 1997, ABC launched its first online discussion forum on The
Frontier website (ABC, 2021). Another early pioneer was Bruce Ableson who in
October 1998 introduced reader comments to his blogging platform Open Diary
that allowed users to respond to each other. In the same month, software
developer Dave Winer created a discussion board and published its first comment
on October 5, 1998: “too bad coders can’t be like rock stars and get their money
for nothing and their chicks for free” (Erard, 2013, para. 6). Integration on news
websites began later the same year, with American publication The Rocky
Mountain News credited as one of the first newspapers to add the feature (Masullo
Chen & Pain, 2017). Australia’s ABC was years ahead of most Australian media in
its adoption of dialogic interactivity and had a rich history of user commenting
from 1997 onwards (ABC, 2021). Although the ABC opened a limited selection of
opinion and analysis stories for comment in their ’The Drum’ section, Martin
(2015) described how the ABC were under political and regulatory pressure to
maintain news impartiality and had prioritised public sector expenditure on
reporting rather than moderation costs. However, Martin (2015) added that the
ABC sought user news interaction through other strategies including local station
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and current affairs websites, and innovative social broadcast hybrids such as their
‘Q&A’ program which incorporated live moderated Twitter feeds. Globally,
newsrooms began to embrace the two-way communication model in a gradual
progression until a swift spike in uptake that included a renewed focus on it by
the ABC in November 2005 (ABC, 2005), followed by The Washington Post in June
2006 and The New York Times in November 2007. Between 2007 and 2008 there
was a 42 percent growth in the number of top circulating news sites with
comments sections in the United States (Santana, 2011). By 2008, 75 percent of
the top 100 most circulated newspapers in the US had comments sections
(Santana, 2011) which trolls used to abuse journalists. In a 2012 report for the
Press Council, Martin and Dwyer (2012) described the emerging need for
comment moderation:
As online contributors are not necessarily aware of the
codes of practice and standards that govern, however
imperfectly, professional media work, content moderation
is an essential part of ensuring content accuracy,
authenticity and ensuring civility in comments and
discussion spaces.
(p. 22)
Although they suggested the primary motivation of moderation was to “protect
corporate reputation” (p. 22), they also suggested its design could ensure user
trust in industry standards by removing inaccuracies and constraining ethically
problematic behaviour such trolling.
4.6.1 Qualitative data results of newsroom responses
From thematic analysis of the 41 articles retrieved as archival evidence in this
chapter, emerging key themes were grouped to provide ten newsroom responses
to trolling in the Australian news media. Changes to the interface and functional
features of gated news websites, industry-led campaigns, counselling resources,
and training procedures were included. The ten newsroom responses were
grouped into four stages, based on their key objectives. The newsrooms’
responses progressed from basic website feature upgrades to workplace
procedural changes that considered the emotional and behavioural impacts of
trolling. These ten newsroom responses are listed in chronological order below.
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Stage One: Comment stream regulation
1. Newsrooms employed comment stream moderators (2005)
2. Newsrooms began to shut down comments in forums (2002) and
comment streams under news articles (2012)
3. Newsrooms removed comments on selected articles (circa 2012)
Stage Two: Activism
4. #StopTheTrolls campaign was launched by The Daily Telegraph
(2012)
Stage Three: Tightened security protocols through gated websites
5. Newsrooms authenticated users before commentary (2013)
6. Newsrooms introduced ‘hide comments’ feature for journalists
(2013)
7. Newsrooms may have deliberately redacted the names of
journalists from selected articles (circa 2014)
8. Newsrooms introduced technology assisted moderation (2015)
Stage Four: Training and support
9. Newsrooms acknowledged psychological impacts and provided
counselling
10. Newsrooms introduced trolling specific training resources
Each of the ten newsroom responses were further investigated using the Google
search engine to provide 21 supplementary articles that were not part of the initial
data set. This collection of 62 documents was used as a base for the research and
was drawn upon to provide the qualitative descriptions of each individual
newsroom response.
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4.6.2 Thematic critical analysis
The next step was a thematic critical analysis (Weerakkody, 2015). The responses
are individually described and then discussed in chronological order. In a
collective narrative, each newsroom response is individually critiqued. Through
the grounded theory method, additional themes materialise and are discussed
within the textual timeline of the progressive commentary. Emerging themes
within this timeline are integrated for discussion to provide a robust commentary
for contextual analysis for a systematic and vigorous evaluation. The thematic and
critical analysis is predominantly qualitative; however, quantitative evaluation of
time periods are also incorporated.
Stage One: Comment Stream Regulation
The first three newsroom responses were grouped in Stage One, addressing the
need to monitor, regulate, restrict or remove the comments section below
published articles on news websites. The study coded these strategies as reactions
to the increased frequency of trolling in the Australian news media.
First newsroom response:
Newsrooms employed comment stream moderators (2005)
Identified as the first response, journalists, who were often first-year graduates,
were employed by newsrooms to moderate user content within comment streams
below published articles on news websites. ABC first policy that mentioned the
commentary moderation in its 2005 House Rules.
•

2005, November 2
We reserve the right to remove any comment or user from our
blogs, although we have no duty to do so. When comments are
deleted, it’s usually because they violate one or more of our house
rules. Repeated violation of these rules may result in the suspension
of your commenting privileges.
(ABC, 2005, para. 1)

Seven years later, Fairfax Media employed Rob Ashton as its first full-time
comment moderator in 2012. Inundated with comments and responding to
increased public pressure in 2016, Fairfax Media employed additional staff to the
equivalent of 3.5 full-time comment moderators to monitor its five metropolitan
news websites, including both smh.com.au and theage.com.au in 2016 (Ashton,
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2016). Discussion of this newly formed role follows.
The comment stream section of online news providers enabled millions of readers
to share and discuss their opinions on news topics of interest. This increased
engagement amplified readership. Moderators aimed to facilitate respectful and
informative discussions by deleting insults, defamation, and hate speech, in
addition to unverifiable facts (ABC, 2005). In some parts of the ABC and Fairfax
Media organisations journalists moderated their own comments. Some comment
moderation was done before comments were published, and some after. In order
to keep the community engaged, the moderation process is required to be
transparent and comprehensive; however, news providers must not give the
impression of censorship or dissemination of fake news. As manual moderation is
expensive, the process becomes increasingly unfeasible with cumulative
discourse. It is from this two-way, interactive function of comment streams that
trolling emerged. Its impacts on journalists employed as comment stream
moderators have been documented in chapter 4.5 (on p. 127). Risch and Krestel
(2018) suggested comment moderators were “the only known way to prevent
trolling attacks, to watch the compliance of users “netiquette” and to keep up good
discussions” (p. 166). While the other solution is removal of the comment streams,
this would limit the platform’s capacity to host “good discussions.” To further
unpack emerging difficulties with the moderation and governance of social media
in response to trolling, an interview was conducted with Dr Jennifer Beckett, a
lecturer and media academic, whose research focused on online community
management. Excerpts from this primary data are presented in section 4.3.1 (on
p. 70).
The heavy reliance on comment moderators created issues over time, and human
moderation methods proved a lengthy process. Time delays between a reader
posting a comment and it appearing on the news website became apparent. At the
conclusion of 2017, The Sydney Morning Herald expressed concerns with the
quantity of comments to be moderated preceding a year of active debate
surrounding same-sex marriage, Donald Trump’s first year of presidency, and the
conviction for rape of international film producer Harvey Weinstein and
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accusations of sexual assault against Australian television presenter Don Burke.
Ashton (cited in The Sydney Morning Herald, 2019) stated, “some of you have
understandably complained about delays in moderating your comments. We will
continue to do our best to moderate them promptly. But sometimes we may not
have time to moderate at all. I cannot guarantee that we will be able to keep up”
(para. 5). The Sydney Morning Herald revealed that comments unable to be
reviewed by moderation staff were discarded (Ashton, 2019).
Second newsroom response:
Newsrooms began to shut down comments in forums (2002) and comment
streams under news articles (2012)
Academic debate ensued concerning decisions to keep or remove comment
streams on Australian news platforms, emerging in July 2000 when Margo
Kingston founded Webdiary for The Sydney Morning Herald (Webdiary, 2020).
“What was once 'an open conversation' between Margo and her readers became
an open conversation between the readers” (para 2). Prior to this, letters to the
editor had been a key part of Australian newspapers that aired public debate on
major political and social issues, and were they the main channel for readers to
respond to the content they consumed (Smith, 2017). Two key articles by Green
(2018) and Syfret (2019) described why more news websites were dumping
comment streams and these articles form the basis of this discussion section.
From the early 2000s, media outlets began publishing more of their content on
online, and many editors and reporters were cautiously optimistic that providing
a space for online commentary would elicit more diverse audience engagement
and create stronger connections between content creators and consumers (Green,
2018). Two significant factors that differentiate between letters to the editor and
online commenting are moderation and selectivity. Providing adequate oversight
of user commentary was costly and yet defamation risks meant it was required.
Many news outlets found the commentary fell far short of the initial goal of
encouraging debate and civil discourse among a representative selection of users
(Syfret, 2019).
After experimentation and discussion, many news organisations concluded
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comment sections did not provide a useful experience for the vast majority of
users and became overwhelmed by anonymous contributors who too often
hijacked comment threads with offensive and inappropriate submissions (Green,
2018). Jensen (as cited in Green, 2018), who suggested public engagement is a key
part of media organisations and must continue to be to keep the business model
afloat, considered the decision to shut down comment streams as a hard-line
proactive response to trolling by newsrooms. Critics in further literature including
Risch and Krestel (2018) suggested a semi-automatic, holistic approach is the
optimal strategy, with news providers including comment features but also
providing context, which includes transparent information about commentators.
Of the three Australian news websites analysed in content analysis of this chapter,
only the ABC had removed its commenting function. The remaining two had active
comment streams at the conclusion of 2020, which were The Sydney Morning
Herald and News.com.au. The ABC emerged as the leader in Australia in its hardline response to trolling, identified as the first newsroom globally to remove
comments from forums in 2002 (Martin, 2012) and from comment streams under
news articles in 2012. In doing this, it followed the BBC which cut access earlier
from news due to budget cuts in 2011 (Plunkett, 2011). Although the scope of this
study considers the Australian news media, notable international newsrooms that
were mentioned in the 62 articles analysed in this section were included to
provide context for comparison and discussion. This chapter identified 22
newsrooms that had removed comment sections from their news websites in
response to trolling, of which two were Australian: ABC and Mumbrella, and 16
were American. However, after this chapter’s research period had concluded,
Mumbrella reopened its comments section for a six-month trial in November 2021
(Mumbrella, 2021). Multiple responses from each Australian newsroom are listed
to show the evolution of responses, in which trial periods were adopted. Each
newsroom response is listed in chronological order below.
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•

2002 – ABC’s first response

(Australian Broadcasting Corporation)
o ABC first began to shut down commenting on forums (Martin,
2012).
•

2012 March 16 – ABC second response

(Australian Broadcasting Corporation)
o ABC directed viewers of private and commercially owned social
media platforms to make comments on its shows and news articles
on their social media accounts instead of on its website, closing the
ABC-moderated message board (Knox, 2012).
•

2013, September 24 – Popular Science

(American quarterly magazine)
o Popular Science’s Director of online content, Suzann LaBarre,
announced the decision to remove the comments section saying,
uncivil comments not only polarized readers, but they often
changed a participant's interpretation of the news story itself
stating, “we’re shutting off comments” (LaBarre, 2013, para. 5).
•

2013, December – USA Today’s

(American daily newspaper)
o USA Today’s Director of content development, Jamie Mottram,
(2014) stated the decision had not reduced their audience reach:
“when comments were removed in December 2013, it had 8 million
monthly unique users, (11 months later) in November 2014, it had
17 million monthly unique users, and the time spent per visit had
not dropped” (Mottram, 2014, para. 1).
•

2014, April 6 – Vox Media
(American news website)
o Vox.com launched in 2014 without a comment function, stating that
“flame wars turn readers off” (AFP, 2015, para. 6).
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•

2014, April 12 – The Chicago Sun-Times

(American daily newspaper)
o Managing editor Craig Newman announced The Chicago Sun-Times
would temporarily shut down comments as “these forums too often
turn into a morass of negativity, racism, hate speech and general
trollish behaviours that detract from the content” (Graef, 2014,
para. 4). He promised a “new commenting system” (para. 1).
•

2014, August – CNN

(American news-based pay television channel)
o CNN “quietly disable[d] comments on most articles [published on
cnn.com] during the protests in Ferguson, Missouri” (Finley, 2015,
para. 7). However, some comment sections are selectively activated
on stories that editors feel have the potential for high-quality
debate, and when writers and editors can actively participate in and
moderate those conversations (Gross, 2014).
•

2014, November 7 – Reuters
(International news organization established in London)
o Reuters’s executive editor Dan Colarusso (2014) announced,
“Reuters.com is ending user comments on news stories” (para. 2).
Colarusso suggested social media platforms were the successors of
the commentary space.

•

2014, December 17 - Mic

(American media company)
o Mic’s editor Christopher Altchek (2014) announced the removal of
comments from mic.com with the explanation, “rather than
assigning team members to manage the comments on our site, we
are investing our engineering and editorial resources in new
products and storytelling formats that benefit our audience” (para.
3).
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•

2014, December – Recode

(American technology news website)
o Recode’s executive editor Kara Swisher announced that comment
streams would be removed from recode.net and encouraged a
migration of discussions to social media platforms (Swisher &
Mossberg, 2014).
•

2014, December 15 – The Week

(British and American weekly news magazine)
o The Week’s editor Ben Fruman (2014) announced the removal of
comments, explaining “too often, the comments sections of news
sites are hijacked by a small group of pseudonymous commenters
who replace smart, thoughtful dialogue with vitriolic personal
insults and rote exchanges of partisan acrimony” (para. 2).
•

2015, January 27 – Bloomberg Businessweek

(American weekly business magazine)
o Bloomberg.com website was relaunched with no comments. Digital
editor Josh Topolsky explained, “I have looked at the analytics on
the commenting community versus overall audience. You are really
talking about less than one percent of the overall audience that’s
engaged in commenting… in the grand scheme of the audience, it
does not represent the readership” (cited in O’Donovan, 2015, para.
9).
•

2015, July 6 – The Verge

(American technology news website)
o Vox Media’s online news website, The Verge said it was “turning off
comments for a bit” (Patel, 2015, para. 1) as the tone of dialogue was
“getting a little too aggressive and negative” (para. 2).
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•

2015, July 27 – The Daily Dot

(American news website)
o In a joint announcement, The Daily Dot’s founder and editor-in-chief
Nicholas White and former managing editor Austin Powell
announced the removal of comments on dailydot.com stating, “the
system has been difficult to manage” (Powell & White, 2015 para.
3), and further adding, “we suspect that many publishers will soon
find that their existing commenting systems do not serve their
readers as the conversation continues to move off websites to social
media, where most of our content is discovered and consumed”
(para. 3).
•

2015, September 8 – 24.com

(South African largest English language online news publication)
o Following moderation challenges, 24.com removed its commenting
function. Editor-in-chief Andrew Trench (cited in News24, 2015)
said, “While News24 is an active proponent of freedom of speech, we
believe the comments sections on our news sites are not adding
significant value to our content offering and the user experience”
(para. 4).
•

2015, October 5 – Vice Motherboard

(Canadian and American news website)
o Vice Media’s website motherboard.vice.com decided to permanently
remove commenting, concluding “the scorched earth nature of
comments sections just stifles real conversation” (AFP, 2015, para.
3.). It announced that recommenced letters-to-the-editor would be
filtered by moderator staff.
•

2015, October 6 – Reddit

(American social news aggregation)
o Reddit launched its news site Upvoted, which has no commenting
feature (Finley, 2015).
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•

2016, August 23 – National Public Radio (NPR)

(American privately and publicly funded non-profit media organization)
o On September 28, 2008, NPR introduced its reader commenting
system, an option it embedded through a third-party system at the
end of most articles on the site. The then-editor Dick Meyer stated,
“NPR was late to this game” (2008, para. 5) and that he hoped the
dialogue exchange would be “smart and generous of spirit” (para.
2). However, the toxic culture grew over time and, in 2016, the
former managing editor Scott Montgomery stated it no longer
“provided a useful experience for the vast majority of users” (para.
1).
o Eight years after launching, the comment section was removed.
o The removal did not significantly impact its readership and NPR
found only a small proportion of its visitors were commenting on
articles (Guaglione, 2017). After being comment free for one year,
NPR’s interim managing editor Sara Kehualani Goo stated, “the
number of users for the May-to-July period grew 18 percent in 2017
compared to the same period a year earlier” (cited in Guaglione,
2017, para. 11). However, Facebook comments for NPR posts were
continuing to steadily increase, reaching a high of 700,000 in
January 2017. This may suggest readers who previously shared
opinions on NPR’s website had migrated their commentary to
Facebook, and therefore the newsroom response had not decreased
the trolling frequency, it had simply redirected the location of
trolling content to Facebook.
•

2017, April 14 – The Daily Beast

(American news publication)
o The Daily Beast temporarily removed commenting from the
thedailybeast.com; however, 7 days later, on April 21, 2017, it
launched a new comments platform. The software produced by
LiveFyre aimed to ensure a higher level of discourse and less vitriol
through the integration of “better moderation tools and a low
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system tolerance for spam” (The Daily Beast, 2017).
•

2017, July – MSN News

(American news aggregator)
o MSN.com temporarily removed commenting on its sites (Guaglione,
2017).
•

2017, August 30 – Al Jazerra English

(Qatari state-owned news channel)
o Al Jazerra English disabled commenting, stating, “the comments
section was hijacked by users hiding behind vitriol, bigotry, racism
and sectarianism. The possibility of having any form of debate was
virtually nonexistent” (Guaglione, 2017, para. 3).
•

2017 September 7 – ABC’s third response
ABC relaunched commenting in a three-month trial of Livefyre comments
on abc.net.au, which aimed to:
o Offer comments on a wide selection of content, but with a focus on
the stories that were generating the most interest on the ABC News
site.
o Build a community of commenters interested in sharing their
perspectives on the news of the day in a civil way.
o Highlight the best of this content and surface it for all ABC News
readers, even if they are not commenters.
o Determine whether comments on our site are still valued, despite
the rise of Facebook (Kemble, 2017, para. 17).

•

2017, October 9 – Independent

(Irish news website)
o Independent News and Media (INM) removed the comments section
from its main news website Independent.ie to “minimise the legal
risk” (Hamilton, 2017, para. 1) to its business, citing Ireland’s
“draconian libel awards system” (para. 2) as the primary driver
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behind the decision.
•

2018, February 15 – ABC’s fourth response
After five months, ABC again ceased the comments section on abc.net.au
concluding that “despite technological advances, moderating comments is
still (too) labour intensive” (Kemble, 2018, para. 32). ABC acknowledged
that comments are a valuable way for readers to share their experiences
and still play an important role in the social media world; however, the
toxic influx of discourse, particularly regarding politics, distracted from the
interactions. ABC disclosed the most provocative articles account for the
bulk of the comments and revealed the top five:
1. Same-sex marriage bill: We need amendments and it's not just
about bakers and florists with 3,946 comments.
2. Donald Trump hits out at 'shithole' countries amid talks on
protections for immigrants with 3,071 comments.
3. Donald Trump's obsession with Hillary Clinton is a sign of a deeper
problem with 2734 comments.
4. Steve Bannon's apology masks the chatter about Donald Trump and
the 25th Amendment with 2,667 comments.
5. Sam Dastyari warns white nationalism on the rise after pub ambush
by far-right group with 2,487 comments.
(Kemble, 2018, para. 21).

•

2020 January 29 – Mumbrella first response

(Australian marketing and media industry news website)
o In a partial ban, Mumbrella’s head of content Tim Burrowes (2020)
said, “under our new moderation policy, we will only be publishing
comments that we believe are worth our audience seeing” (para.
3).
•

2020 September 18 – Mumbrella second response
o Seven months after their first announcement, Mumbrella’s head of
content Damian Francis (2020) announced the website would “no
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longer publish reader comments. This policy will be for all of the
content we publish, regardless of what it is” (para. 1).
The ABC emerged a leading player in a hard-line response to trolling and was
identified as one of the first newsrooms globally to start removing comments from
their forums in 2002 (Martin, 2012) and further announce the removal comment
streams on March 16, 2012, within the social problem period (described in section
4.1.3 on p. 45). However, on September 7, 2017, ABC launched a trial of Livefyre
comments on abc.net.au, following The Daily Beast’s introduction of the
technology five months earlier on April 21. Livefyre (now owned by Adobe) is a
commenting platform founded in 2009 that incorporates marketing tools to
increase engagement of user-generated content for companies including CNN, The
Coca-Cola Company and Major League Baseball (Lardinois, 2016). However, after
a trial period that lasted five months, ABC again ceased all commentary concluding
“despite technological advances, moderating comments is still (too) labour
intensive” (Kemble, 2018, para. 32). The trial displayed a willingness and
openness to adapt to the contemporary two-way communication environment,
and demonstrated the ABC valued some components of the commentary format
enough to attempt its reintroduction. However, the influx of toxic discourse
proved overwhelming for the technology, and commentary was removed
indefinitely. Both time pressure and financial restraints were cited as
compounding tensions that burdened moderators beyond the already recognised
psychological impacts. In support of the ABC’s claims, an additional six newsrooms
attributed a lack of resources to deal with the unmanageable quantity of content
as the main contributing factor towards the removal of commentary (Mic, 2014;
The Verge, 2015; The Daily Dot, 2015; 24.com, 2015; NPR, 2016; Mumbrella, 2020).
Newsrooms’ resources were concluded to be better spent producing editorial
content rather than monitoring reader dialogue.
Although comment sections can provide a place for readers to share opinions,
engage with others, and contribute to topics that affect their communities, these
sections can also provide a platform for toxic discourse marked by disrespect,
profanity, and yelling in all caps. Houston, Hansen and Nisbett first documented

Chapter 4.6 Newsroom responses results and discussion

235

this evidence in a 2011 study Influence of user comments on perceptions of media
bias and third-person effect in online news. Thematic analysis of the 41 articles
retrieved as archival evidence in this chapter revealed that the five newsrooms
that removed the feature asserted that trolling comments on their news website
adversely affected the credibility of the news organisation and uncivil comments
not only polarised readers, but often changed a participant’s interpretation of the
news story itself (Popular Science, 2013; The Chicago Sun-Times, 2014; CNN, 2014;
The Daily Dot, 2015; Al Jazeera English, 2017). In support of the identified claims,
researchers from the University of Texas (cited in Masullo Chen & Lu, 2019)
concluded, “people who viewed news stories with only uncivil comments had less
positive attitudes toward the site, and saw it as less valuable compared to those
who saw stories with only civil comments” (p. 2).
The most frequent clarification, explanation or excuse for the removal of comment
streams was the progression to social media platforms. In conjunction with
reported strains on internal staffing, 11 newsrooms publicly passed the
responsibility to Facebook and Twitter to regulate conversations away from their
own news websites (ABC, 2012; ABC, 2017; Popular Science, 2013; CNN. 2014;
Reuters, 2014; Mic, 2014; Recode, 2014; The Week, 2014; The Verge, 2015; The
Daily Dot, 2015; NPR, 2016; Al Jazeera English, 2017). This finding revealed 50
percent of all newsrooms examined via the documents gathered for this section
that removed comments publicly declared that trolling had escalated beyond their
ability to control it and handballed the problem to the social media companies to
deal with and bear legal responsibility for or to choose not to deal with,
independently. The Week’s editor Ben Fruman (2014) stated, “it is no longer a core
service of news sites to provide forums for these discussions” (para. 3). His
sentiments were echoed throughout all eleven newsrooms listed in this section.
In contrast, ABC’s John Kemble (2017) stated, “decisions to ditch comments are
often blamed on the rise of social media, Facebook in particular, as the go-to place
for audience interaction” (para. 6). However, he further criticised the wave of
deflection suggesting, “dig below the surface and it is often a case of resourcing.
Building a community is difficult and building the sort of community you want is
even harder” (para. 7). Kemble’s suggestion that deflecting the responsibility to
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social media emerged as a convenient cover and distraction from the true depth
of the trolling problem is valid. More accurately and more likely, the underlying
problem with trolling in newsrooms emerged from an accumulation of resource
concerns, including strained staffing, insufficient finances, and inadequate
technical aptitude (Green, 2018). In unison, these deficiencies meant that
newsrooms could no longer cope with trolling. Publicly deflecting responsibility
to social media organisations did not reflect underlying motives or acknowledge
the true scale of the trolling problem. Despite suggestions from the eleven
newsrooms that social media was better suited to comment regulation, Facebook
and Twitter were not exemplary regulators at the time. Newsrooms simply could
not cope with the onslaught of vexing commenters through internal means.
The presence of comment streams on some news websites illustrates the
difference of opinions in the current media industry. Debate still ensues about
whether the positives of free speech and reader engagement outweigh the cost of
relentless vitriol. Some publishers including The New York Times have been able
to effectively maintain commentary through robust moderation and technology.
Vox Media journalist who oversaw The Coral Project, Andrew Losowsky (2018)
suggested:
There are compelling reasons why it is worth investing in
comments on news sites. While they are usually a small
percentage of the total audience, commenters are often the
most loyal and most valuable readers. They spend longer on
the site, they come back more often, they share more links
to the site, and they are more likely to pay for subscriptions.
(para. 6)
However, positive romanticisms have become far less common, replaced with
critical inquiry. Although it resisted shutting down its comments, Australian
digital news service Crikey began to openly question the sustainability of constant
moderation under financial strain by publishing the article Is it time to kill the
comments section? (Syfret, 2019). Although trends were beginning to suggest that
more newsrooms are choosing to opt out of comment sections, active professional
and academic debate continued. The Daily Dot (cited in Powell, 2015) eloquently
concluded in favour of comment streams, “of course we would like to see a more
civil, compassionate Web, but we want to be careful that in the name of fostering
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civility, we do not inadvertently kill all dissention” (para. 4). An additional
argument for comment streams may stem from news companies’ desire to boost
metrics about time users spend on their sites as these metrics are used to
encourage advertisers to buy space.
Third newsroom response:
Newsrooms removed comments on selected articles (circa 2012)
In interview with The Sydney Morning Herald (Raggatt, 2013) on August 15, 2013,
the Press Council chair, Professor Julian Disney, confirmed that some newsrooms
had begun selectively removing the commenting section of potentially
problematic articles, stating:
•

“Cautious publishers were increasingly limiting the number of articles they
opened for reader comments because of abusive posts” (para. 2).

•

“There had been a notable decline in the number of 'open' articles
compared to two years ago” (para. 3).

•

"The quality of comments that are being received on a lot of streams have
led newspapers to just not open them on many articles" (para. 4).

These comments were the first identified data that documented Australian
responses to trolling. Disney suggested this decline had occurred over two years.
Therefore, the study has allocated this response to have emerged between 2012
and 2013.
As comment moderation became a round-the-clock and resource intensive
process, even large teams found it difficult to police at scale. Some newsrooms
attempted to navigate the problem by only opening commentary for a limited
number of articles. In 2016, The New York Times removed reader comments from
90 percent of articles that the publication considered a higher risk for inviting
vitriolic dialogue (Etim, 2016, September). In supporting evidence, on February 1,
2016, The Guardian announced the same strategy. Executive editor Mary Hamilton
(2016) stated:
•

“The Guardian took the decision to cut down the number of articles with
open comments on stories relating to a few contentious subjects,
particularly migration and race” (para. 2).
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•

“Improving comments does not mean censorship or eliminating criticism”
(para. 1).

•

“The aim is not to stop comment appearing, but rather to enable us to
management them more effectively… and make sure the discussion is
constructive and not abusive” (para. 2).

The Guardian stressed the importance of being responsible hosts who govern
constructive debate. The prevailing tone of proceeding commentary is set by the
article topic; therefore, proactive measures can be identified and implemented
before trolls target flagged stories.
In Raggatt’s (2013) article that provided the first documented data of comment
removal on contentious articles, opposition was also noted. Rob Ashton (2013), a
comment moderator at Fairfax Media's five Australian news websites, was cited
as saying, “there was no move to open fewer articles to reader comments” (as cited
in Raggatt, para. 12), and further suggested although “articles on controversial
topics such as Muslim immigration, same–sex marriage and asylum seekers may
have a higher rejection rate, that does not mean we should not open them” (para.
15). At the time, Fairfax Media advocated a strong stance against the removal of
commentary, reflected in continued commenting across their ownership web,
including the Canberra Times, whose chief online producer Lucy Rickard actively
invited reader engagement and encouraged comments to generate conversation
(Raggatt, 2013).
Stage Two: Activism
The fifth newsroom response was coded as the first attempt to proactively address
the rising frequency of online abuse journalists were subjected to as part of their
work.
Fourth newsroom response:
#StopTheTrolls campaign is launched (2012)
Murdoch-owned, Sydney tabloid The Daily Telegraph launched the #StopTheTrolls
anti-trolling campaign on its front page on September 11, 2012. The campaigned
pressured Australian politicians and law enforcement to increase regulation and
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policing of Twitter in order to identity and prosecute perpetrators of online abuse.
The newspaper front-page feature is shown in Figure 30 below.
Figure 30
The Daily Telegraph take a stand against trolls.

Figure 30 is not available in this version of the thesis.
The figure is available at the below link.

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-09-13/greenstaggering-hypocrisy-of-the-supertrollers/4257706

In a multi-platform campaign, readers were encouraged to digitally sign two
petitions and share their support by posting ‘#StopTheTrolls’ on Twitter. The
hashtag began to trend across Australia and in 24 hours had been retweeted over
400 times (Lince, 2012). Although the ‘Twitition’ petition is no longer accessible,
the Change.org version of the petition received 1,000 signatures in a few weeks.
Although some journalists criticised the gradual uptake of signatures as a failure
(Posetti, 2012; Ross, 2012), the extensive public awareness generated from the
campaign is indisputably a measure of partial success. The swift inclusion of
trolling within active public debates spotlighted the gravity of an underlying
trolling epidemic that had simmered without generating widespread public
concern until this point. The original text of the 138-word campaign published on
the change.org website stated:
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This is the Daily Telegraph (Sydney) and www.TheTelegraph.com.au
petition to stop the vile and abusive trolls on Twitter that facelessly
and mercilessly attack not just celebrities and sports stars but other
everyday users simply for the thrill. Our goal is to push for Twitter to
be obligated to work with authorities when these cowards have broken
the law, bullied and abused others simply because they can, hidden by
their anonymity. It’s no secret bullying – and cyber bullying – can lead
to self-harm and we are determined to make a difference in the lives of
people that feel helpless to stop it. People should not be forced off
Twitter by trolls - that's ignoring the problem. We must stop treating
the symptoms and tackle the real issue. Sign our petition and help
make Twitter a better place for all users.
(Change.org, 2012, para. 1)
In a publicly storm, The Daily Telegraph published five related articles on their
news website over four days: three articles on September 11 (Jones & Byrnes,
2012, The Daily Telegraph, 2012; The Daily Telegraph, 2012a), one on September
13 (Jones, Lulham & Frost, 2012) and one on September 15 (Hildebrand &
Matheson, 2012). Textual analysis of the five articles yielded examples of highly
emotive language that differed from the newspaper’s traditional reporting style,
which customarily focussed on facts rather than editorial opinions. Examples of
these expressions included “anonymously taunt”, “faceless bullies”, “unmask
them” (Jones, Lulham & Frost, 2012, para. 1), “these cowards”, “vile and abusive”,
“mercilessly attacking”, “hiding behind keyboards” (The Daily Telegraph, 2012,
para. 1), “helpless victims” (para. 6), “lawless free-for-all” (The Daily Telegraph,
2012a, para. 3), “anonymous cowards”, “misery and distress” (para. 5),
“mindlessly torment”, “grieving, vulnerable or suicidal” (para. 7), “vile and
unanswerable” (para. 9) and “condemned the cowards” (Jones, Lulham & Frost,
2012, para. 2). Minimal emotive wording was identified in the fifth article, with
formal descriptive language readopted. The initial tonal shift provoked reader
interest and sparked discussions about an underlying social problem many had
experienced or witnessed in isolation, behind a computer screen. Once private
struggles were broadcast across NSW news media and other News Corp
publications, they became part of public discourse and awareness.
A deliberate publicity tactic that leveraged celebrity endorsements to fuel the
movement is revealed in the thematic analysis of these five articles. The marketing
strategy received extensive support from nineteen prominent public figures, who
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openly commented on and promoted the campaign. Although celebrity
endorsements often require payment, nineteen public figures appeared in the five
Daily Telegraph articles analysed. Seven were athletes, two were television
presenters, and ten were politicians. The list included NRL players Ben Barba, Josh
Dugan, Israel Folau and Robbie Farah, Australian cricket captain Michael Clarke,
Ironwoman Candice Falzon, surfer Laura Enever, media personalities Charlotte
Dawson and Nathan Jolliffe, then-Prime Minister Julia Gillard, then-acting Prime
Minister Wayne Swan, former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, Opposition Leader
Tony Abbott, opposition communications spokesperson and future Prime
Minister Malcolm Turnbull, NSW Premier Barry O’Farrell, Attorney-General
Nicola Roxon, Communications Minister Stephen Conroy, School Education
Minister Peter Garrett, and NSW Police Minister Mike Gallacher. In particular,
criticism of political involvement, Ross (2012) doubted the true motives of
Stephen Conroy and Nicola Roxon, who were gathering support for a data
retention inquiry and had a history of lobbying for legislation that restricted
freedom of expression.
Although the significance of celebrity theory has been discussed in depth (in
chapter 4.1 on p. 30), further criticisms of these dynamics are explored. Voicing
one of these critiques two days after the campaign bunch, political editor, Simon
Copland, published the article, Do we only care about trolling when celebrities are
victims? (2012), and suggested that trolling targeted all members of society. The
media, reacting at scale only when those in the public eye were affected,
diminished the importance of targeted minority groups by comparison. Copland
stated, “we have not seen any similar campaigns to stop homophobia, stop racism,
to stamp out sexism” (para. 7), which represented the demographics most
subjected to prolific abuse both online and offline (Wagner, 2022). However, by
virtue of social status, people in the public eye generate interest, and this piqued
interested can be leveraged more easily to spark greater interest. The
philosophical concept of the episteme used by Foucault (1971) in The Order of
Things can be used to contextualise and explain the explosive nature of the
campaign. Foucault wrote: “in any given culture and at any given moment, there
is always only one episteme that defines the conditions of possibility of all
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knowledge, whether expressed in a theory or silently invested in a practise” (p.
183). Therefore, if an issue is raised at a time when the configuration of the
episteme prevents its processing it will flounder. But if presented again later when
the episteme has lifted it can gain traction. The root problem was not the fact a
celebrity or the Prime Minister was trolled; however, the incident emerged from
a ‘perfect storm’ that triggered an underlying widespread social issue into the
public spotlight.
Australian news media were unanimous on their stance against trolling although
opinions about the campaign’s true impact varied between newsrooms of
differing ownerships. Although some critical commentary echoed suggestions that
media coverage was exaggerated and the campaign was a failure (Posetti, 2012;
Ross, 2012), continued media coverage from multiple news outlets including the
ABC (Mark, 2012), News.com.au (AAP, 2012) and The Sydney Morning Herald
(Yeates, 2012) applied unrelenting pressure on the platform to respond,
prompting discussions between the Australian government and the Twitter
management team. Nine days after the campaign was launched, changes to the
relationship were announced. “Twitter has agreed to hand to Australian
authorities the account names and IP addresses of users suspected of bullying or
other harmful tweets” (Hutchinson, 2012, para. 1). Twitter’s previous policy had
required a U.S. court order before an abusive user account could be identified, an
impenetrable obstacle for Australian authorities. However, the agreement did not
address or provide any solutions for accounts that are intentionally set up
anonymously. These users cannot be identified by Twitter and remain a significant
contributing factor to the presence and malice of trolling online.
As discussed in the literature review, raising awareness is a key strategy in
addressing wicked problems such as trolling, which are complex, dynamic, and
difficult to navigate. Australian Public Service Commission (2007) defined wicked
problems as problems that go beyond the capacity of any one organisation to
understand and respond to and working across agency boundaries is increasingly
important in tackling them. They added that changing the behaviour of large
groups of people requires a collaborative approach by multiple stakeholder

Chapter 4.6 Newsroom responses results and discussion

243

groups and poses challenges for traditional approaches, given the fluctuating
dynamics of the online environment. The range of traditional levers used to
influence behaviour, including legislation, fines, taxes, other sanctions are often
part of the solution, but these alone may not be sufficient. More innovative,
personalised approaches are likely to be necessary to motivate individuals to
actively cooperate in achieving sustained behavioural change.
Thematic analysis of the #StopTheTrolls that ran concurrently with Facebook’s
Australian Be Bold Stop Bullying campaign in 2012, revealed bystanders to be an
emerging stakeholder group in the trolling paradigm. The widespread public
sympathy engendered by the awareness campaign revealed a portion of the
population including students, parents and educators that may have witnessed
trolling abuse but until this point had taken no personal responsive action
(Marszalek, 2012). The campaign galvanised this passive group to respond in
collaboration with other stakeholder groups and create a cohesive public stance
against trolling. Further scrutiny of trolling came from the non-for-profit sector.
The chief executive of mental health advocacy group Headspace, Chris Tanti said,
“the campaign is about the bystander, and for the bystander to stop being a
bystander and get involved” (as cited in Marszalek, 2012, para. 15). These
onlookers or observers emerged as the largest stakeholder group, and by
motivating this portion of the public to take interest at scale, sporadic discussions
lead to extensive discourse, and widespread media traction was gained.
In summary, the campaign received widespread public praise, international media
traction and global recognition, evoking action from a previously passive
stakeholder group: bystanders. The campaign was the catalyst for a detectable
shift in public perception from anecdotal evidence to a recognised social epidemic
that called for urgent and extensive responses from multiple stakeholder groups.
Stage Three: Tightened security protocols through gated websites
The next four newsroom responses were grouped in Stage Three, with each
response introducing a feature that provided a barrier to comment sections,
creating safer gated websites. The study coded the strategies as either reactive
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and proactive. Newsrooms globally began to recognise that trolling abuse was not
exclusive to the online domain, and sometimes represented a real-life threat to the
physical safety of their employees (Barton & Storm, 2014). From thematic analysis
of the 62 articles retrieved as archival evidence in this chapter, the 2017 article:
Fighting back against prolific online harassment: Maria Ressa by Julie Posetti, an
academic and former Fairfax Media employee who composed a handbook of
recommended newsroom responses to trolling (Ireton & Posetti, 2018) was
analysed during this study. The article was focussed on a journalist of 30 years,
former CNN war correspondent and the founding CEO and Executive Editor of the
social media powered news organisation Rappler, Maria Ressa. Posetti (2017)
quotes Ressa calling for tighter security protocols. Posetti describes Ressa as an
industry leader who directed a synthesised response to protect female employees
who were disproportionately targeted in her newsroom. Ressa was one of the first
Executive Editors to openly acknowledge that the harm caused by trolling “must
be taken seriously” (para. 17), and had the potential to materialise as an imminent
danger in the real world. Ressa asserted that the strategies of blocking, muting,
reporting, deleting, and ignoring were no longer adequate, and declared
newsrooms must take responsibility for the health and wellbeing of their
employees. In support of her claims, two years later, research by Gender Equity
Victoria and the Media Entertainment and Arts Alliance (2019) stated “online
abuse can move offline when technology is used to access private information that
is then mobilised to physically stalk or harm women” (p. 1). The following three
newsrooms’ responses were implemented to tighten security protocols by
introducing gated features to news websites.
Fifth newsroom response:
Newsrooms authenticated readers before commentary (2013)
In an additional response, readers were required to authenticate their accounts
before any commentary could be published online with The Sydney Morning
Herald leading by example in 2013. In an attempt to combat the influx of daily
abuse, reinstate the gatekeeper function, and reduce the risk of defamation,
newsrooms progressively began to implement this strategy, providing publishers
with greater control, as displayed in the chronological list below.
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•

2013, February 24 – The Sydney Morning Herald

(Australian newspaper)
o The Sydney Morning Herald launched its ‘Comment Page’ on which
community editor, Kathyrn Wicks, announced users would be
required to log in, using an authenticated account, before
contributing to discussions (Wicks, 2013).
Some newsrooms progressively applied the authentication feature both in
Australia, and globally.
•

2013, August 22 – Huffington Post

(American news aggregator and blog)
o Huffington Post’s managing editor, Jimmy Soni, announced users
would no longer be able to create anonymous accounts, with users’
identification required internally. In further explanation Soni
(2013) stated:
Huffington Post recognises that many people are not in a
professional or personal situation where attaching their name to a
comment is feasible. This change would not require users to identify
themselves in connection with each comment. Rather users are
asked to verify their identity when creating an account to reduce the
number of drive-by1 or automated trolls2.
(para. 1)
However, the decision to end anonymous comments provoked mixed
commentary, reportedly “spark[ing] anger” amongst some users (AFP, 2015, para.
19) yet receiving praise from others. Media expert and sociology professor at Tufts
University, Sarah Sobieraj, welcomed the decision in preference to banning all
comments stating:
the ability to speak anonymously online is not just for trolls.
Many people turn to the anonymity of the Internet for
meaningful dialogue about sensitive topics, such as politics
or impropriety in the workplace, that prove difficult to
discuss face to face.
A user who posts abusive content and immediately leaves the conversation in the digital
equivalent of a drive-by shooting.
2 An automated social media account (also known as a ‘bot’) run by an algorithm, rather than a real
person, designed to make posts without human intervention (Barojan, 2018).
1
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(Sobieraj, cited in Landers, 2013, para. 17).
American privately and publicly funded non-profit media organisation National
Public Radio (NPR) also implemented the strategy, and a visual example of the
authentication feature is shown in Figure 31 below.
Figure 31
Unauthenticated readers are blocked from commenting by newsrooms.

(Hugo Rojo/NPR)
An extension of the authentication feature was also identified and described
below.
•

2018, October 16 – The Australian

(Australian newspaper)
o The Australian digital editor, Daniel Sankey, (2018) announced a
series of upgrades to the news websites’ commenting functions,
stating “when making comments, users will now see a new My
Profile tab… users are able to see their comment history, whether a
comment is pending moderation, or once moderated, whether it’s
been approved or rejected” (para. 2) providing a clear and
transparent commentary process.
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Accountability has emerged as a key factor to reduce the frequency of trolling,
particularly by spam3 accounts. University of Kent researcher Ian Rowe (2013)
attributed authentication to a reduction in the frequency of unfavourable
behaviours online. Referencing the Facebook user verification system, the 2013
study found that by introducing accountability, users were “less likely to engage
in uncivil discussion” (cited in AFP, 2015, para. 21). This theoretical deterrent did
not always succeed in practice. Many newsrooms have not independently adopted
this strategy but have linked up with Facebook whose plug-in verifies the identity
of users by asking people to use their real names, meaning users are authenticated
via the third-party (Yu, 2020). Studies such as the one previously mentioned
indicate the Facebook platform authentication process could help set the tone of
comments by removing anonymity and providing sufficient information to hold
users accountable for unlawful dialogue. However, the authentication process is
not fool-proof, and fake accounts are still able to be created and exploited by trolls,
with minimal technical aptitude, as was illustrated by Facebook removing 3.3
billion fake accounts in 2018, 6.5 billion in 2019 and 5.8 billion in 2020 (Statista,
2021a).
Sixth newsroom response:
Newsrooms introduced ‘hide comments’ feature for journalists.
In an attempt to provide journalists with greater control over abusive
commentary, some publications followed Facebook’s lead and implemented the
hide-comment feature on their websites (Medium, 2015). This optional function
allowed journalists to select their preference to conceal all commentary on
published articles. This did not remove the comments from being viewed by
others but shielded journalists from notifications in a more personalised
approach. On November 6, 2015, American blogging platform Medium allowed
users to adopt this function, announcing:
We value discussion, discourse, and conversation. We
encourage users with similar and divergent viewpoints to
engage over the ideas and stories that matter to them. But
3A

secondary account for sign-up pages when people do not want to give their primary email
address that is often used for posting frequent, miscellaneous, random and excessive content
(Sommer, 2018).
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we live in the real world and recognise that sometimes you
may not want to get in a discussion. Sometimes, you just
need to come and post. We welcome that use of Medium as
well and want to help you feel safe and comfortable doing
so.
(Medium, 2015, para. 1)
Although the retention of comment streams continued to enable trolling, it was
reported as a step in the right direction by newsrooms to protect journalists yet
still permit open discourse (Reader, 2015). However, the extreme examples of
trolling that emerged at the same time (West, 2015), suggest the response was
inadequate. Shielding journalists from the growing trolling problem whilst
allowing the abuse in comment streams did not contribute to solution. The
absence of hard-line action may have contributed to part of the problem.
Seventh newsroom response:
Newsrooms may have deliberately redacted the names of journalists from
selected articles (prior to 2017)
The thematic content analysis in chapter 4.2 identified that, of the 528 news
articles, 118 were by journalists whose identities were not included in published
articles on smh.com.au, theage.com.au and abc.net.au which may have been in
response to trolling, meaning that their names did not appear on their stories.
Through quantitative analysis, including Mann-Whitney nonparametric tests,
binary logistic regression, and Pearson’s correlation coefficient (in chapter 4.1 on
p. 30), this study found the 22 percent articles without journalist by-lines received
rape threats, in addition to death threats, sexist comments, feminist comments,
body shaming or homophobic comments. The inference we can draw from this by
looking at the types of trolling received by male and female victims is that a
significant portion of the 118 victims with redacted genders were likely to be
female. While there may be other reasons behind not publishing by-lines, if female
journalists have fewer published by-lines as a trolling-related strategy, then
trolling can be seen to be influencing their style of professional engagement. In
acknowledgement of this gender skew, Australian trolled journalist, Ginger
Gorman, voiced concerns about the professional and economic harms of trolling
to women, stating “gendered cyberhate silences women and constrains their
ability to find jobs, market themselves, network, socialise, engage politically and
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partake freely in self-expression and self-representation” (Gorman, 2019, p. 71).
The redaction strategy did not directly address the gender imbalance that would
have been evident when journalists’ names were omitted from the news articles.
Although it is unknown when the redaction process began, it was identified during
the data gathering process of the content analysis concluding in December 2017,
and therefore began prior to this date. Although no formal announcement has
been made public about the strategy, the move would have protected staff from
abuse by reducing access to journalists by trolls.
In further evidence supporting the strategic nature of by-line omission, on July 30,
2020, Australian popular culture news website Junkee announced “[we] will no
longer publish journalists’ by-lines on some stories to protect them from
harassment campaigns (Rigby, 2020, para. 1). This was the first documented
evidence of the strategy, although it had secretly been adopted by newsrooms at
least three years prior when recognised by this study, if not longer.
Eighth newsroom response:
Newsrooms introduced technology-assisted moderation 2015)
As the trolling problem intensified, large news organisations employed large
teams of moderators to weed out inappropriate dialogue, but the quantity of
comments often required additional help from external contractors. However, this
outsourcing tactic was not viable for budget-stretched newsrooms that could not
afford to integrate private vendor software available at the time. They were left to
battle trolls internally, further burdening staff who were already time-poor and
emotionally strained. Competing newsrooms soon realised they faced a common
enemy and combined resources in a collective response. In 2015, The Washington
Post and The New York Times joined forces with technology developer Mozilla to
form ‘The Coral Project,’ funded by a US $3.89 million grant from the philanthropic
organisation Knight Foundation (Tjaardstra, 2016). The project aimed to create
open-source software adapted for news websites to better handle online
discussions. After two years, the ‘Talk’ software was launched. The multifaceted
approach allowed information to be shared between newsrooms, which fast-
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tracked the technological advancements required to combat the dynamics of
trolling online. The Coral Project was bought in early 2019 by Vox Media (Rieder
& Skop, 2021) and, according to the company, “powered the communities of
nearly 50 publishers in 12 countries” (p. 10), improved commenting practices, and
made the use of machine learning more transparent.
By 2016, The New York Times had a moderation team of 10 who collectively
reviewed over 11,000 comments per day (Etim, 2016, September) although only
10 percent of selected articles were open for commentary at the time. Reaching
critical mass, The New York Times implemented technology-assisted moderation
software called ‘Perspective’ in partnership with Google Jigsaw, which had not
been “economically feasible until now” (para. 3). A description of the tool was
provided by product manager CJ Adams (2018):
Perspective uses machine learning to make it easier to host
good conversations online. Perspective finds patterns in
data to spot abusive language or online harassment, and it
scores comments based on the perceived impact they might
have on a conversation. Publishers can use that information
to give real-time feedback to commenters and help human
moderators sort comments more quickly. That means news
organizations and content publishers can grow their
comment sections instead of turning them off, and can
provide their readers with a better, more engaging
community forum.
(para. 4)
Using this software to host healthier conversations, The New York Times was able
to triple the number of articles with open commentary from 10 percent to 30
percent (para. 5). Newsrooms researched and adopted new technologies to filter
out trolling and highlight constructive conversations from readers.
As commentary remained open on most stories, by 2015, The Washington Post
received over 22,000 comments per day and struggled to retain a positive tone
(AFP, 2015). In response to the overwhelming quantity of comments, the
publication

also

implemented

technology-assisted

moderation

software

described in a May 5, 2017, announcement:
The Washington Post has launched ModBot, a software
application that utilizes artificial intelligence to moderate
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comments. The proprietary technology uses machine
learning to automatically filter comments that require
human moderating, flag stories that require real-time
monitoring, and approve or delete comments based on The
Post’s discussion policy. The technology evaluates
comments using an algorithm that has been trained by The
Post’s years-long history of human-moderated comments.
(The Washington Post, 2017, para. 1)
Working in unison with human moderators, this software recognised stories with
high rates of deleted content and flagged the articles for further consideration and
potential commentary removal by editors. The Washington Post was the first news
organisation to integrate The Coral Project’s Talk software with its own Modbot
technology on September 6, 2017.
Australian newsrooms took longer to integrate artificial intelligence software into
their moderation models.
•

The study noted ABC’s removal of comments in 2012 eliminated the need
for any moderation, human or technological.

•

Although reporting on the technology used by American newsrooms in
2016 (Sullivan, 2016), Fairfax Media did not integrate any methods and
continued to rely on the equivalent of 3.5 full-time content moderators led
by Rob Ashton (2016).

•

It was not until four years after the American Coral Project commenced,
that News.com.au introduced technology-assisted moderation on February
7, 2019. In an unconventional announcement, possibly intended to be
humorous, the software was described as: “Trish is the name of the fancy
new commenting system here at the website… Trish is not a person –
though we do wish she was a semi-retired chain-smoking lady with a blue
hair rinse who tolerates no horseplay” (News Corp Australia, 2019, para.
2). Furthermore, the publication did not discuss the significance of trollingrelated impacts, with the text of the article insulting another journalist
saying, “Trish is a moderator – the queen governing the comments section,
like Tony Jones on Q&A but with better hair” (para. 4) and was a poor
illustration that underplayed the significance of the social problem.

Chapter 4.6 Newsroom responses results and discussion

252

Although on January 15, 2018, both Microsoft and Ali Baba claimed that their
software could read like a human, the potential to deduce content meaning was
critiqued as a work-in-progress at the time (as described in section 4.5 on p. 126).
But in proof of success in practical application, Microsoft News cut dozens of
editorial workers on May 29, 2020, as it shifted to an artificial intelligence driven
system of picking news stories. Critics questioned the algorithm’s ability to
completely

replace

human

judgement

(Moses,

2020);

however,

its

implementation proved cost-effective, and the same technology could be used by
the news organisation for user-generated content moderation in the near future.
Stage Four: Training and support
The final two newsroom responses involved acknowledgement by employers that
trolling was a serious issue that required specific workplace training and support.
They were coded as both reactive and proactive responses to trolling.
Nineth newsroom response:
Newsrooms acknowledged psychological impacts and provided counselling
(circa 2018)
The psychological impacts of workplace trolling were discussed by Ginger
Gorman, Van Badham, Liza-Jane Loch, and Jenna Price in the 2018 Senate Inquiry
on the adequacy of existing cyber-bullying laws. Although the inquiry
acknowledged online abuse resulted in “serious harms” for journalists
(Parliament of Australia, 2018, p. vii), counselling support varied between
newsrooms, and there was not yet a universal approach. Findings from research
by Gender Equity Victoria and the Media Entertainment and Arts Alliance (2019)
stated “a lack of support from employers in these situations (of trolling
incidences) led to poor mental health, lack of desire to engage, and low selfesteem” (p. 8), and further claimed “there is no real help in coping with the
emotional and professional fall out” (p. 8). The findings reflected Posetti’s (2017)
criticisms that “[trolling] damage includes well-documented impacts on
emotional and psychological well-being” (para. 26). However, inadequate
counselling within newsrooms did not address freelance media workers who are
exposed to additional risk. Freelance journalists do not always have access to
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institutional resources or support afforded to employees working within
structured news organisations. Although in 2015, the Dart Centre for Journalism
and Trauma reported that “a coalition of major news companies and journalism
organisations endorsed worldwide freelance protection standards” (para. 1), the
safety principles did not address online harassment, and left some freelance
journalists with limited avenues to seek professional advice. Of particular concern,
recently graduated younger journalists were sometimes unable to prioritise the
training and equipment that may help keep them safe in their personal budget.
To further examine the adequacy of the counselling and psychological support
offered to journalists trolled in the workplace, an interview was conducted with
Jenna Price that also addressed the tenth newsroom’s response in the section that
follows. These results are displayed in section 4.6.2 (on p. 207).
Tenth newsroom response:
Newsrooms introduced trolling specific training resources (circa 2018)
The research that prompted newsrooms to implement trolling-specific training
resources arose in 2016. The Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance published
research findings from a survey of over 1000 journalists, most of them women
(Media Entertainment Arts Alliance, 2016). The Mates Over Merit report
highlighted that a significant proportion of female journalists had experienced
online harassment, trolling, and stalking during the course of their work, but only
16 per cent of those surveyed were aware of their workplace having existing
policies to address online abuse, with another 32 per cent stating that their
employer had no such policies (Media Entertainment Arts Alliance, 2016).
While Julie Posetti was unavailable for interview for the duration of this study, a
booklet funded by United Nations Educations Scientific and Cultural
Organisation’s (UNESCO) and written by Ireton and Posetti (2018) called,
Journalism, 'fake news' and disinformation: A handbook for journalism education
and training was obtained for analysis. The booklet consisted of seven modules
designed to provide journalists, their employers, and journalism educators
framework and guidance to navigate emerging issues in contemporary journalism
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practice. The seventh module, Combatting online abuse: When journalists and their
sources are targeted, is relevant to trolling and was written after Posetti wrote
advisor guidelines for Fairfax Media on best-practice for newsrooms when trolling
occurs in the workplace. The module includes literature that introduces
disinformation, defines astroturfing, outlines 13 case examples, lists 12 digital
security threats, and provides five basic learning objectives. Strategies were about
how to look after their own mental and physical safety. There were no suggestions
about lobbying other levels of the system framework to bring about more
sustainable change. The handbook has been translated into 23 languages;
however, it is not known how much uptake there has been of this module in
Australian newsrooms. It is unknown if the Fairfax Media training guide may have
been a more useful tool as refused to make it available for analysis.
In another UNESCO research project, disturbing recommendations for female
journalists were identified. A 2014 report, Violence and harassment against
women in the news media: A global picture, by Barton and Storm, was obtained for
analysis. The report was commissioned by the American-based International
Women’s Media Foundation and the English-based International News Safety
Institute, part of a broader program of work initiated by UNESCO. The report
included concerning advice in response to the harassment of women online.
Within the six-page recommendation list, the research suggested:
Journalists should consider carrying a whistle or a rape alarm in their
hand or in an accessible part of their bag, but if flying, they should
check beforehand if it can be carried on the airline. Journalists should
be aware that some everyday items, such as hairspray and spray
deodorant, may be used as weapons and can deter an attacker.
(Barton & Storm, 2014, p. 35)
The suggestion by an internationally recognised organisation that journalists
carry a rape whistle is of great concern if it is made in isolation and implies that
victims are solely responsible for ensuring they are not attacked. However, in this
case it is part of a systemic approach to deal with violence against journalists.
UNESCO is international and the study recognised that threats of violence against
journalists in other countries can be a greater concern, with death and
disappearance reports more common in countries such as Russia (Roth, 2018)
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Nigeria (Cobus, 2020) and Mexico, which was named in 2020 as the “world’s
deadliest country for journalists” (Lakhani, 2020).
4.6.2 Interview qualitative data results
Interview with Jennifer Beckett
In September 2020, an interview was conducted with Dr Jennifer Beckett, a
lecturer and academic in media and communications, whose research focused on
online community management. Emerging from the second and third Australian
newsrooms responses identified by this study, the interview provided key insights
into the problems faced by social media moderators. Responses were grouped
into key themes that are described and summarised below.
Questioned about the prevalence of trolling in the current Australian news media
landscape, Beckett acknowledged the complex problem has become an
inescapable and embedded part of modern newsrooms, in which moderators play
an essential gatekeeping role:
•

Although I would like to think we have reached saturation point, I do not
think we have yet.

•

Trolling predominantly affects women and people of colour, and as more
of these targeted groups end up in online spaces, it becomes more visible.

•

If a journalist indicates they are a feminist writer in their by-line, they can
expect to be trolled.

Confirming the difficultly of policing comments at scale, Beckett labelled the
inability to identify abusers as a serious concern for moderators:
•

It is hard to figure out who these people are as they often use a Virtual
Private Network4 (VPN) and scramble their location, making it impossible
to track them down.

•

Even if a trolling account is deactivated, they can just start a new account
with a brand-new name.

4 An arrangement whereby a secure, apparently private network is achieved using encryption over

a public network, typically the internet (Oxford English Dictionary, 2021).
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•

There is not exactly a barrier to entry and when that happens, it would
make things a lot easier.

Reflecting on the use of comment streams as a streamlined and unfiltered
replacement of the former ‘letter to the editor’ process, Beckett suggested political
divides further fuel abusive commentary:
•

We have become more polarized as a society, and social media provides an
unmonitored outlet to say inflammatory things people would not have said
in the past.

•

The Internet has really thrown out the ends of the spectrum of both left and
the right. It is the sexy stuff that gets coverage; the middle does not as much.
We are in danger of falling under the thrall of the trolls on both ends of the
spectrum.

•

It seems to me it is less of a hard-news journalist issue and much more of
an opinion or columnist journalist issue.

When questioned about the notion of resilience as a coping strategy for
moderators, Beckett described this strategy as an out-dated band-aid solution:
•

Resilience is only going to take you so far, and after a while you run out, it
is not a bottomless well.

•

Employers are basically failing in their duty of care by saying you ought to
be more resilient and toughen up.

The commonly advocated technique of ‘don’t feed the trolls’ was discussed openly
without being directly questioned:
•

The old “don't feed the trolls” does not mean that they go away, it just gives
them less oxygen and they eventually burn out.

Spotlighting content moderators as a crucial yet often overlooked stakeholder in
the trolling paradigm, Beckett explained:
•

It is also really important to understand that there are a lot of people who
work behind the scenes who are not the talent, who are not as visible, and
whose job it is to mediate all of this commentary.
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Beckett’s own research is being conducted in this space and she suggests further
research is required to safeguard social media moderation.
Providing further insights, Beckett explained:
•

Trolling is concerning due to the presence of poor general behaviours, and
its addictive nature as well.

•

Focus needs to be directed towards changing people's behaviour, and, to
achieve that, we need a little bit of cognitive behavioural therapy.

•

Popping up cues that make users second guess their actions is going to pick
up the majority of people in the middle.

•

We focus too much on their behaviour and not enough on modelling good
behaviour. That is effectively what community guidelines are there for.

Raising concerns about the heavy reliance on artificial intelligence to resolve
content moderation problems Beckett called for more clarity about the difference
between artificial intelligence and machine learning. Artificial intelligence refers
to programs that can simulate human thought, whereas machine learning is a
subset of artificial intelligence that allows applications to learn from data without
being programmed explicitly. Beckett said:
•

Artificial intelligence is too far off at the moment.

•

Current online moderation is not artificial intelligence, it is machine
learning, and machine learning lacks the ability to consider context.

When questioned about the emerging bystander theme, Beckett suggested
support between users within online communities was a key strategy to reinforce
communal standards and weed out trolls:
•

If we want people to be good bystanders, we have to tell them how to be
good bystanders.

•

Part of moderation is called ‘leaving a trace,’ where users are told why a
comment has been removed, by referring to the community guideline it has
breached. Both the explanation and reiteration of community values forms
a sense of ownership over the space.
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In summary and discussion, Beckett described the crucial role content moderators
play in the function of newsrooms. The frequency of commentary for assessment
grew exponentially as global trends opted for online news sources in preference
to traditional mediums. Without sufficient alternative means to reduce the
quantity of content, the psychological effects on content moderators were
outlined, and the requirement for newsrooms to introduce technological
assistance to help cope with the workload was inevitable. However, a complete
removal of humans from the moderation process was not considered a viable
option, and a blended approach involving algorithms and humans was offered as
a more practical means of moderation in the current media landscape. Etim (2016,
March) advocated the positives of dialogic interactions that introduce readers to
other like-minded readers, who may continue to recommend other articles from
the publisher to each other:
The news industry has done a reasonable job of displaying
readers’ voices in recent years, at least at the bottom of
some articles. But not enough thought has been given to
elevating them, creating an understanding among readers
that their responses can be part of the news.
(para. 4)
Etim (2016, March) explored different ways to reward and engage with good
commenters to “create a vibrant online society and protect it” (para. 21). As
dialogic journalism is framed as an integral part of the future of journalism
practice (Martin & Murrell, 2021), moderators are an important stakeholder in
The Trolling Paradigm.
Interview with Dr Jenna Price
In September 2020 an interview was conducted with trolled journalist, columnist
with the Canberra Times and journalism academic Dr Jenna Price. Her work
included a collaboration project with Julie Posetti and Fiona Martin about trolling.
Emerging from the ninth and tenth newsroom responses of this section, the
interview further evaluated the counselling and psychological support offered to
trolled journalists in the workplace. Questions were also raised regarding the
Senate Inquiry on the adequacy of existing cyber-bullying laws, to which she made
submissions that stressed the need for adequate law reform. This aspect is
addressed in the next chapter (in section 4.7 on p. 249). Responses were grouped
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into key themes that are described and summarised below.
When questioned about the prevalence of trolling in the current Australian news
media landscape, Price acknowledged public sympathy had been shaped by
continued media exposure to trolling victims:
•

Trolling is not going away, but the public understands the dangers more
because there has been much publicity about it. This is partly because there
has been more research around trolling, and partly because there have
been more stories about trolling.

Reflecting on the #StopTheTrolls campaign, Price linked external pressures from
cumulative exposure to the combative action initiated by media organisations in
Australia:
•

I would have never imagined in a million years that a tabloid [The Daily
Telegraph] would be conducting a campaign that said, let's stop trolling,
let's stop online abuse of women. The public perception is very different
than it was eight years ago.

In confirmation of trolling support strategies at Nine (formerly Fairfax Media) that
owns the Canberra Times, that she writes a column for, Price stated:
•

I was provided lots of information by my employer.

Describing the support provided by the newsroom, Price said colleagues were the
most impactful resource:
•

The most crucial support is none of the printed information, it is having a
support person within the organisation who will help and support you if
you are feeling down. I have found it extremely useful to have that person.
The person who deals with my copy is also a fantastic support when the
going gets tough. Every single person who writes about these things has a
contact person, their supervisor.

When further questioned about the timeline of trolling support being introduced,
Price explained that at Nine (formerly Fairfax Media), training strategies evolved
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over time; however, work relationships that offered support were always present:
•

I have always been able to speak to my editors about what is happening to
me. Everyone has a direct chain where you can discuss these things with
other people.

The importance of connections with family and friends was also raised. Price
reiterated her colleagues outside of Nine (formerly Fairfax Media) were not only
an alternative safety net, but a preferred one:
•

Importantly, I also have a network of other women columnists where we
talk about the things that are happening to us in a group chat.

When asked if newsrooms had edited the content of stories or removed her bylines to reduce personal trolling attacks on their employees, Price said:
•

The answer is no. I am able to continue writing what I need to write and do
not stop writing what I want to write, but I really take good care of my
mental health.

When asked if personal resilience had grown over time, or was considered a
fundamental and expected characteristic of journalism work, Price said:
•

I have always been a pretty resilient person, which is why I have been able
to continue as a journalist for a very long time.

•

But I see young women who are less resilient and people who get off
Twitter because they cannot stand the abuse.

•

We need to all support each other.

•

My own research discovered that the community of women who were the
administrators and moderators really supported each other, and that made
it possible for us to be resilient. It was fantastic.

Price raised the commonly advocated strategy of ‘don’t feed the trolls’ without
criticism:
•

In the early days, I'd be having discussions, trying to persuade them,
sending them research but none of that works. But I don't engage with
those people anymore. I mute, I block or I delete.
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•

When trolling first started to happen to me I had no idea what was going
on as the use of social media was new. Initially, you imagine you would be
able to fix people, but it is absolutely not possible.

In summary and discussion, Price described how continuous media exposure
engendered public awareness of the impacts of trolling, and subsequently framed
public sympathy. An anti-trolling discourse put external pressure on newsrooms
to respond in ways Price had never thought probable, including The Daily
Telegraph’s

#StopTheTrolls

campaign.

Continued

pressure

encouraged

newsrooms to recognise trolling as a widespread workplace problem and
acknowledge the potential for adverse psychological impacts on employees. This
prompted the evolution of internal procedures for trolling-specific counselling
and training resources, including the provision of support staff. Although Fairfax
Media provided Price with ample information, colleagues were clearly identified
as her preferred and most impactful resource, with the support of female
colleagues both inside and outside the organisation being of particular help. This
stands in contrast to comments by all 10 participants in chapter 4.2’s interviews
who expressed they required more training and workplace support strategies
than offered by their newsrooms.
Both Beckett and Price noted that the idea of reliance on resilience as a key coping
strategy was outdated, and newsrooms needed to provide further support for
employees in contemporary journalism where dealing with trolling has become a
prominent part of the workplace. These views reflected the sentiments identified
in the 2015 interviews with ten trolled journalists (in section 4.1 on p. 28).
Participants highlighted that not only were there no universal workplace
procedures in regard to trolling at the time of the interviews in 2015, but all felt
this was inadequate. Their sense of a need for hyper-resilience may be an
indication of a broken system, with the prolonged reliance on tolerance as coping
strategy recognised as a band-aid solution to a widespread problem not
comprehensively understood. Attitudes in both the 2015 victims interviews and
2020 academic interviews suggest further research to develop an understanding
of best-practice is essential, to prepare journalists for a world in which vitriolic
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discourse is increasingly prevalent.
Summary
The ABC was a global leader in the hard-line response to trolling. The removal of
comment streams meant that no form of moderation was required. Other
Australian newsrooms were much slower to respond, opting for user-generated
content moderation methods for several years until the sporadic introduction of
machine-learning software. Gradually, external pressure grew until consensus
across all Australian newsrooms emerged in 2015, acknowledging trolling as a
widespread problem in contemporary journalism. Two key events that prompted
the most notable response from Australian newsrooms included:
•

#StopTheTrolls campaign in 2012

•

The Senate inquiry to access the Adequacy of existing offences in the
Commonwealth Criminal Code and of state and territory criminal laws to
capture cyberbullying in 2018.

Although multiple strategies have been adopted to varying degrees, the continued
presence and virulence of trolling in the current media landscape suggests these
approaches have not yet been successful in reducing abuse to a manageable level.
The cost of cyberhate is not simply hurt feelings: it can result in job loss as well as
poor mental health. In a world where journalists are required to have an online
presence, trolling can be considered a form of economic vandalism. With no
universal guidelines for journalists and newsrooms, further research is required
to provide best-practices that also embrace freelance journalists. Gorman (2019)
summed up current sentiments stating “while we have clear laws about the duty
to maintain a safe workplace that are imposed on our employers, who is
responsible for maintaining a safe social media space? That’s probably not just
employers” (p. 71). As Ackoff’s (1974) System Theory suggests, an approach from
multiple stakeholder groups is required if the social problem is to be adequately
addressed. Although a fundamental portion, newsrooms are only a part of the
complex and intricate.
This chapter has outlined ten responses to trolling by Australian newsrooms,
providing clarity about an important stakeholder in the trolling paradigm. The
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analysis of the relative success various newsroom initiatives highlights the
importance of the support level of the systems model, a finding that resonates with
comments by the ten trolled Australian journalists interviewed in chapter 4.2.
However, without reinforcement from other levels, its impact is limited. The next
chapter will investigate Australian legislative responses.
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Chapter 4.7
Legal Responses
Results and Discussion
Criminal and civil law flowcharts for prosecuting a troll
Question G – What Australian laws can be used by journalists to prosecute a troll?
Current legislation is not effective for Australian journalists, who receive frequent
abuse as a commonly accepted part of their job. As a legal grey area few trolls
prosecuted and convicted in Australia. Trolling is a very broad church, ranging
from amateur philosophers to bullies, from the mildly offensive to the illegal
(Bartlett, 2013, p. 45), and the line between argument, criminality, threats,
offensiveness, and satire is a very fine one (p 42). At present, there is no Australian
law, statute or common, specific to trolling; however, criminal laws of sedition,
libel and hate speech, and civil laws of harassment, stalking, defamation,
discrimination, vilification, blasphemy, and obscenity can be drawn upon for
prosecution (Pearson, 2019). However, legal addenda will take time, and victims
during this time lag must deal with the life-changing consequences without
compensation, and sometimes without adequate workplace support systems in
place (Citron, 2014, p 226). Hateful and aggressive online communication is now
commonly considered to be a social problem requiring legal interventions
(Windisch, Wiedlitzka & Olaghere, 2021; Blaya, 2019). At the same time, online
aggression remains a challenging phenomenon for authorities and public policy
makers to manage (Kaakinen et al., 2018, p. 31). This chapter unpacks current
laws and draws upon documented case studies in Australia to critique the
legislative response, described by many victims as slow, unclear and ineffective.
The research design strategy that addresses Question G: What Australian laws can
be used by journalists to prosecute a troll? applies mixed methods of archival
evidence, thematic critical analysis and interviews. Although framing cyberChapter 4.7 Legal responses results and discussion
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bullying as a significant issue of the digital media space, the Australian
government does not have a standalone trolling law. This chapter outlines
although abuse can be covered by existing laws, the extent of harms and continued
impacts on victims may indicate more direct laws are required to protect
Australian journalists. In the media law textbook, The journalist’s guide to media
law: A handbook for communicators in a digital world, Pearson and Polden (2019)
described relevant Australian laws to prosecuting trolling. To provide primary
data, the co-authors of this textbook Mark Pearson, an academic, media legal
expert and former section editor of The Australian, and Mark Polden, an academic
and media lawyer, were interviewed to extend on the content on their book. Both
are Australian and were reached through academic and industry contacts. The
semi-structured interview went for approximately one hour and provided both
quantitative and qualitative data. Through predominantly open-ended questions,
robust qualitative data was acquired. Developing patterns regarding the use and
effectiveness of Australian laws in relation to trolling were drawn upon for
comparison, discussion and critique. Through brainstorm discussions in two
separate interviews with Pearson and Polden, a new list of general umbrella laws
that may cover trolling was compiled. Each key area was then investigated, using
the legal search engine www.austlii.edu.au. Thematic analysis was applied to
categorise legal pathways as criminal or civil, and federal or state. The following
websites were then searched to retrieve laws that could be used for prosecution,
based on the victim’s jurisdiction:
•

Federal laws – www.legislation.gov.au

•

Australian Capital Territory laws – www.legislation.act.gov.au

•

News South Wales laws – www.legislation.nsw.gov.au

•

Northern Territory laws - www.legislation.nt.gov.au

•

Queensland laws – www.legislation.qld.gov.au

•

South Australian laws – www.legislation.sa.gov.au

•

Victorian laws – www.legislation.vic.gov.au

•

Tasmanian laws - www.legislation.tas.gov.au

•

Western Australian laws - www.legislation.wa.gov.au

This complex process was difficult and time-consuming. For a trolled journalist
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dealing with the emotional strain of the abuse, identifying the appropriate laws to
apply would be a problematic and potentially unachievable task. In most cases this
would lead to the trolled journalist having to engage a lawyer at their own expense
(Whitbourn, 2022), further stressing their mental and financial well-being.
Complicated legal pathways can also present issues for newsroom governance.
This study extends on Pearson and Polden’s published work, updating and
presenting the specific Australian laws journalists are able to use against a troll in
a useful format. This qualitative data is displayed in descriptive passages within
themed tables to provide a comprehensive list for real-world implementation by
trolled journalists. The descriptive passages of each law are notably long;
however, each is directly quoted from their respective federal or state Criminal
Codes and they are important for inclusion, to allow comparisons and critical
analysis. Furthermore, this data can be used by future studies to assess the
effectiveness of current trolling laws. From this data, two flowcharts, one criminal
and one civil, were constructed to distil the complex dataset into a practical guide
that trolled journalists can refer to when seeking to prosecute their abusers. The
flowcharts are displayed first, to provide an overall context, followed by the data
results for each theme and discussion. Criminal laws are described first, followed
by civil laws.
Brief background of legal jurisdictions in Australia
Australia is a federation of states with a Westminster style legal and parliamentary
system. Australia combines nine major jurisdictions including six states: New
South Wales; Queensland; South Australia; Tasmania; Victoria; and Western
Australia; and two territories: the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital
Territory. The final jurisdiction is the Australian Commonwealth Government. As
per the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution 1900 (Cth), each state may
compose laws on any subject matter, while the Commonwealth government can
only make laws on areas that fall within the powers granted under the
constitution. Where there is overlap, the states may still make laws, but those laws
cannot contradict laws passed by the Commonwealth government. Criminal law
is a breach of criminal codes prosecuted by the Commonwealth or State. Civil law
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exists between private litigants where the issue is financial compensation.
Brief background of trolling convictions in Australia
On March 25, 2011, the first convicted Australian internet troll, Bradley Paul
Hampson, was jailed for posting offensive pornographic material on Facebook
tribute sites dedicated to slain Queensland children, 12-year-old Elliott Fletcher
and 8-year-old Trinity Bates (Rawlins, 2011). Hampson was sentenced to three
years jail, to serve 12 months of that sentence, after he pleaded guilty to one count
each of distributing child exploitation material and possessing child exploitation
material, and two counts of using a carriage service to menace, harass or cause
offence (AAP, 2011). However, the Court of Appeal cut the actual time served from
12 months to six months after Hampson had served only 220 days, referencing
Hampson’s limited criminal history and his autism, which may have hindered his
insight into the impact of his offending (Rawlins, 2011). The case received
widespread publicity in the Australian news media and set the precedent for
future trolling prosecutions. Despite this case, the Australian government was
criticised for minimal convictions resulting in jail time (Dwyer, 2016), including
the widely publicised case of troll Zane Alchin who received a twelve-month good
behaviour bond after posting sexually explicit and threatening comments on
Facebook to Olivia Melville in 2015 about her Tinder profile.
Scope of the chapter
While there are no laws specifically about trolling journalists, certain Australian
laws could be used to prosecute a troll, including intimate images and child
pornography laws. This type of trolling was not raised in the 10 in-depth
interviews with the trolled journalists in chapter 4.1 (on p. 30) and is considered
to be of lower risk of occurring to practising journalists. These laws were therefore
determined to fall beyond the scope of this study and were not included in the
following descriptive analysis.
This study notes Australia administers a range of small non-mainland territories
that include, but are not limited to, Ashmore and Cartier Islands, Australian
Antarctic Territory, Christmas Island, Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Heard Island,
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McDonald Islands and Norfolk Island. The study acknowledges these territories
have their own respective laws, which were determined to exceed the scope of
this study and were excluded from the data set.
4.7.1 Qualitative data results of interviews
Qualitative data was retrieved from in-depth interviews one hour in length via
telephone, with academic and media law expert Professor Mark Pearson and
academic and lawyer Mark Polden, who co-wrote The journalist’s guide to media
law (2019), now in its 6th addition, and used as the textbook for journalism studies
by several tertiary educators. Through thematic analysis of brainstormed
discussions, a list of general umbrella laws that may cover trolling was compiled
and presented in the table below.
Figure 32
Australian umbrella laws for trolling.

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Criminal Laws
Harassment
Threats
Inciting suicide
Vilification
Stalking
Criminal Defamation
Obscenity

•
•
•

Civil Laws
Defamation
Personal injury
Worker compensation

This list formed the starting point for the research from which the investigative
process extended. The in-depth interview also provided qualitative data from
discussion about the effectiveness of current Australian legislation in the
contemporary journalism landscape, in which online interactivity with audiences
plays a major role and has become a standard workplace practice.
Interview with Professor Mark Pearson
In November 2020, an interview was conducted with Professor Mark Pearson,
which provided key insights on emerging problems with the practical application
of Australian laws by journalists in response to frequent and malicious online
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abuse. Responses were grouped into key themes that are described and
summarised below.
Asked if it was possible to ascertain how many times the law “using a carriage
service to menace, harass or offend” had been used successfully to prosecute a
troll, Pearson said collecting and analysing such data would fall well beyond the
scope of this thesis:
•

This would be a huge task, a minefield.

•

It would take a criminologist to be able to work out where records of
particular prosecutions are kept.

•

It would require access to police records in order to find the complaints,
and then lower court records would need to be accessed to find out how
many times people have been charged with these particular offenses.

The extensive criminology work required to retrieve relevant data with which to
draw a quantitative conclusion was therefore not included as part of this study;
however, specific laws were identified, and qualitative data was analysed,
discussed and critiqued.
Reflecting on the use of criminal laws in practical application, Pearson highlighted
that many laws are used in unison and, therefore, the true extent of trolling may
not even be evident in a large-scale criminology study:
•

Online abuse may often fall under a suite of charges.

•

Many instances may be hidden under other laws that would include
domestic violence orders.

Confirming the importance of this chapter that addresses the legal stakeholder
group of the trolling paradigm, Pearson said:
•

This is why it is so important to define prosecution routes.

•

You will be exposing the fact that such information is so difficult to access,
how it is not pulled together and how difficult it can be to do that without
a legal background.

Spotlighting the need for enforcement officers to understand how to enforce
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current legislation, Pearson said:
•

Policing systems have a scale of importance for different crimes.

•

Physical crimes are ones that historically the police and the prosecutors
and the courts have been used to dealing with.

•

Similarly, authorities need to find a way to collaborate and share
information to prosecute criminals when they commit very serious crimes
online.

Pearson described the difficulties that arise when prosecuting a troll across
different jurisdictions, and identified the abuser’s location as a hindering factor
that determined which legal avenues could be pursued:
•

Online communications are ethereal and by definition cross-jurisdictional
and are therefore more complicated than communication in the real world.

•

An extradition order is required to bring the accused into the court of a
neighbouring state.

Reflecting on his own experience of being trolled, Pearson criticised the practical
application of current Australian laws in response to spiteful abuse online.
•

I know from my own experience the process is difficult.

•

I was called a rapist.

•

I was going to make a complaint to the police, but they are very quick to
refer it another state or territory.

Asked about the adequacy of social media companies removing reported trolling,
Pearson described their response as underwhelming, but explained possible
defences:
•

Reasonableness is always an issue.

•

Many platforms receive millions and millions of complaints.

•

Removal of comments within two weeks may be an acceptable excuse for
a smaller company; however, big platforms should be better staffed and
ought to be able to remove offensive comments within 24 hours.

Asked if social media companies such as Facebook and Twitter should be
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considered publishers and subsequently be held liable for the abusive
commentary they host, Pearson said:
•

Once they start to play a role in the publishing with the introduction of
algorithms, they no longer remain secondary publisher.

•

Innocent dissemination is the defence against defamation traditionally
used by newsagents that sell newspapers. However, it is not applicable in
this context.

In summary, Pearson described multiple problems with the application of current
legislation and highlighted the need for further education and training about how
police can implement these laws when digital abuse crims are drawn to their
attention. Current legislation is not effective for Australian journalists, who
receive frequent abuse as a commonly accepted part of their job. The legal
stakeholder group that this chapter begins to address is a crucial part of a multilayered approach needed to adequately respond to the social issue.
Interview with barrister Mark Polden
In October 2020, an interview was conducted with Mark Polden, which provided
key insights into the inadequacy of current Australian laws that often fail to
protect journalists from frequent and malicious online abuse and do not
adequately reprimand trolls or the companies that host them. Responses were
grouped into key themes that are described and summarised below.
Asked about how to approach social media platforms about removing abusive
commentary, Polden said:
•

For media purposes, in practical terms, what one would contact the
platform and say this user is in breach of the terms of services. This user is
breaching the contract with you, and it is affecting me. It ought to be taken
out because it is breaching your terms of service.

When questioned about how to approach social media platforms to unmask a troll,
Polden described the key steps but recognised further fundamental problems that
can hinder the ability to reveal their true identity:
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•

First you would ask for the platform to identify the name of the user.

•

If they refuse, you've taken reasonable steps to obtain that information.

•

Then you would need to get an order for preliminary discovery to make
them disclose the name or the URL or the identifying features of the person
who posted.

•

However, the person can hide their identity pretty well.

•

If they are hiding behind some proxy server, their location can be bounced
around the world.

•

You can issue a subpoena to the American company under The Hague
Convention. While it can be done, the federal court will often not issue the
subpoena as a matter of discretion, because it is unenforceable. There is no
power to enforce the laws in the US.

•

With a lot of these entities, you run into the consistent problem that they
stonewall courts in Australia because they are domiciled overseas.

Reflecting on whether social media platforms should be considered publishers
after the Voller v Fairfax Media, Nationwide News and Sky News case in 2019,
Polden said:
•

Social media companies are responsible for the material; however, the
Broadcasting Services Act provides immunity to Internet service providers
in certain circumstances.

•

However, if you are made aware of defamation or abuse on your site, then
that immunity goes away.

•

You would need to look at the terms of service of the platforms, which will
be available, but I am reasonably confident that they would have provision
there that would cover it.

On review of the terms and conditions of Facebook, the study identified this was
addressed in section “3. Limits on liability” that stated:
We do not control or direct what people and others do or
say, and we are not responsible for their actions or conduct
(whether online or offline) or any content they share
(including offensive, inappropriate, obscene, unlawful, and
other objectionable content).
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(Facebook, 2021, para. 36)
Twitter’s terms and conditions also addressed liability, in section “3. Content on
the services,” which stated:
Any use or reliance on any content or materials posted via
the services or obtained by you through the services is at
your own risk. We do not endorse, support, represent or
guarantee the completeness, truthfulness, accuracy, or
reliability of any content or communications posted via the
services or endorse any opinions expressed via the services.
You understand that by using the services, you may be
exposed to content that might be offensive, harmful,
inaccurate or otherwise inappropriate, or in some cases,
postings that have been mislabelled or are otherwise
deceptive. All content is the sole responsibility of the
person who originated such content. We may not monitor
or control the content posted via the services and, we
cannot take responsibility for such content.
(Twitter, 2021, para. 5)
Polden concluded:
•

If the content is defamatory, then the social media platform is going to be
liable for it.

•

If social media companies dismiss liability, then pressure needs to be
applied to parliamentarians to take them on.

Confirming the need for new laws against doxing, swatting, impersonation or
cheap fakes that more adequately address online abuse in Australian newsrooms,
Polden suggests continued political pressure from multiple stakeholder groups
would be the most effective way to incite legislative change:
•

[His] perception is that very little happens unless there is either a vested
interest attached to it, or to seek political advantage.

•

In order to get attention, it would need a concerted campaign.

•

It would need schoolteachers worried about the effects on children

•

It would need the clinical psychologists and Australian Psychological
Association, the peak body for registered clinical psychologists.

•

It would need long and concerted pressure, if things don't happen
automatically.

•

It puts it puts pressure on members of state, the Attorney-General, on the
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premier, or if it’s federal, it puts pressure on the relevant minister.
Polden argued current Australian laws often fail to protect journalists from
frequent and malicious online abuse that can impact the emotional and mental
wellbeing of victims. Continued political pressure from multiple stakeholder
groups is required to incite the government to consider specific law reform that
holds trolls individually accountable, along with the platforms that fail to monitor
and efficiently remove their abuse. This study acknowledges that this process is a
lengthy one; however, the proposed new laws presented to parliament in 2021
(discussed later in this chapter), are acknowledged as a critical first step enforcing
criminal penalties that reflect the severity of victim impacts.
4.7.2 Qualitative data results of flowcharts
Flowchart of Australian criminal laws
Through thematic analysis of qualitative data results, two critical requirements
that must be met were determined. The first key consideration was giving victims
the ability to discover the identity of the troll. Without knowing the true identity
of the abuser, no legal pathway against the troll could proceed. Anonymity
provided by the internet emerged as a significant problematic factor in
prosecuting a troll. The study identified a potential civil case against the social
media platform on which the trolling arose; however, existing cases were sporadic
and had had limited success. Although platforms continue to deflect responsibility
for hosting trolls in 2021, the subject is an area of widespread active debate and
will be discussed in further detail later in this chapter.
The second key consideration was the location of the troll. If the troll is not located
in Australia, limited avenues for prosecution exist. Difficulties also arise when the
victim and abuser live in different states within Australia, as governing laws
sometimes differ between jurisdictions, further compounding the complexity, and
restricting the ability to provide universal legal pathways. Globalisation of the
internet emerged as yet another problematic factor, due to the trans-national
nature of social media companies that permit instantaneous potential abuse on a
global scale.
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These two key considerations were included in the original flowchart of
Australian criminal laws displayed in Figure 33 over the three pages that follow.
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Figure 33 Flowchart of criminal laws that trolled journalists could use derived from chapter 4.7 data.
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Descriptive tables of Australian criminal laws
Through thematic analysis interviews with Professor Mark Pearson and Mark
Polden, the study identified seven criminal law themes including harassment,
threats, inciting suicide, vilification, stalking, criminal defamation and obscenity.
In addition, three civil law themes were identified and will be discussed later in
this chapter. Each criminal law theme was investigated on federal and state
legislative websites, to determine which specific Australian laws could be used for
prosecution under each individual category. The findings are presented in
descriptive tables and are categorised by theme, then by jurisdiction. The study
provides one trolling example for each criminal law theme. Each table is followed
by a brief discussion to provide context for critical analysis.
Determining seriousness of crime
The average State maximum penalties, excluding Tasmania as an outlier, were
calculated and coded to determine their graded level of seriousness. The study
considered imprisonment to be far worse than a financial reprimand. With the
abolition of capital punishment in Australian in 1985 (Australian Institute of
Criminology, 1987) and the Crimes Legislation Amendment (Torture Prohibition
and Death Penalty Abolition) Act 2010 blocking any state or territory from
reintroducing it (National Library of Australia, 2017), life imprisonment has
become the most severe sanction under the criminal law. To provide a solid base
from which to access the ‘seriousness’ of an act, the study looked at the maximum
penalties of other crimes under the Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA)
that are displayed in the following table.
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Figure 34
Graded level of seriousness for crimes in Western Australia derived from chapter 4.7
data
Crime

Criminal Code Act
Compilation Act 1913
(WA)

Maximum penalty

Murder

Section 279

Life imprisonment

Attempted murder

Section 283

Life imprisonment

Manslaughter

Section 280

Life imprisonment

Aggravated burglary

Section 401

20 years

Aggravated sexual
penetration without
consent
Sexual offences against
a child under 13
Sexual penetration
without consent
Grievous bodily harm

Section 326

20 years

Section 320

20 years

Section 325

14 years

Section 297

10 years

Serious assault

Section 318

10 years

Assault causing bodily
harm
Indecent assault

Section 317

7 years

Section 323

5 years

Common assault

Section 313

3 years

Trespass

Section 70A

12 months and a fine
of $12,000

Coded level of
seriousness

‘Most serious’
(Life imprisonment)

‘Very serious’
(15 + years
imprisonment)

‘Serious’
(10-15 years
imprisonment)
‘Less serious’
(5-10 years
imprisonment)
‘Moderate’
(Less than 5 years)

The study used this method as a general guide for comparison and acknowledges
it does not represent the exact level of seriousness attributed by Australian law.
Standalone findings
The study identified the relevant Australian Human Rights Commissioner for each
theme that a trolled journalist could contact to lodge a complaint to examine a
discrimination 5 claim thorough an independent enquiry. The AHRC complaint

5

Discrimination happens when a person, or a group of people, is treated less
favourably than another person or group because of their background or certain
personal characteristics (Australian Human Rights Commission, 2021).
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form can be downloaded on the https://humanrights.gov.au website and
submitted by post to the Australian Human Rights Commission GPO Box 5218
Sydney 5218, by email to complaints@humanrights.gov.au or by fax to 02 9284
9611.
The study also found Tasmanian legislation, unlike the approach in other
Australian jurisdictions, does not contain graduated penalties that would allow for
a determination of the relative seriousness of each individual law. Obscenity
legislation described in the Police Offences Act 1935 (Tas) did provide individual
penalties which were recorded, but for all other criminal laws governed by the
Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas), section 389 provided a general clause stating, “the
punishment for any crime shall be by imprisonment for 21 years, or by fine, or by
both such punishments, and shall be such as the judge of the court of trial shall
think fit in the circumstances of each particular case”. The generalised 21-year
maximum penalty is therefore applied to all Tasmania laws in the Criminal Code
Act 1924 (Tas); however, this does not mean that offenders who are sentenced for
any offence under the Code will get the maximum penalty (Tasmania Sentencing
Advisory Council, 2020). Courts, rather than the legislature, exercise discretion in
prosecution, and sentences are rarely as long as 21 years for crimes other than
murder and treason. The study notes the 21-year maximum penalty included in
findings may not reflect the actual time period determined by the court when a
troll is prosecuted and acknowledges its inclusion will skew the data set. Although
presented in the descriptive tables, for quantitative comparison and discussion,
the study selectively removed the Tasmanian 21-year maximum penalty as an
outlier where appropriate.
The study found most jurisdictions have their own penalty unit value, which
increased each year. This enables fines to be increased without the need for
legislative amendments. The monetary value of each fine was calculated using the
penalty units as of June 2021; these were as follows: Australian Capital Territory
$160, New South Wales $110, Northern Territory $158, Queensland $133.45,
Tasmania $172, Victoria $165.22, Western Australia $110. South Australia did not
use a penalty points system and quoted the exact fine amount within the Criminal
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Code. Determining the exact amount of these fines allowed for cross-referencing
to access the severity of laws to between jurisdictions that did not include
imprisonment time.
Criminal laws for harassment
Figure 35 describes the Australian federal criminal law “using a carrier service to
menace, harass or cause offence” that governs the theme of harassment. This
federal law can be used in all eight respective states or territories for prosecution
and is the most referenced law in response to trolling. An example of trolling in
breach of harassment, which included ongoing harassment as well as menacing
and offensive online behaviour, under this law is also provided.
Figure 35
Australian criminal laws for harassment that trolled journalists could use derived
from chapter 4.7 data
Criminal Laws for Harassment
Trolling Example: “No one would want to rape that fat, disgusting mess” (West, 2015, para. 6)
Jurisdiction Law
Section
Description
Maximum
Penalty
Federal
Using a Section
A person is guilty of an offence if:
Imprisonment
carrier
474.17 of
(a) the person uses a carriage service; and
for 3 years.
service
the
(b) the person does so in a way (whether by
to
Criminal
the method of use or the content of a
menace, Code Act
communication, or both) that reasonable
harass
1995 (Cth) persons would regard as being, in all the
or
circumstances, menacing, harassing or
cause
offensive.
offence
Section 46P of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth) allows journalists
to make a complaint to the Human Rights Commissioner, a position held in 2021 by Edward Santow.

With a maximum penalty of 3 years imprisonment, the offense can attract a
substantial punishment term, indicating that Australian law considers this type of
harassment as a ‘moderate’ crime.
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Discussion
Since the inclusion of the provision in 1995, academic discussions continue to
debate the effectiveness of harassment prosecution in practical application. The
law was designed to address frequent insulting phone calls rather than abuse
delivered by forms of online communication when the law was first introduced. In
more recent discussions about the adequacy of this particular law, in 2014, the
Australian Law Reform Commission reported the Australian Federal Police saying
the law was “more than adequate to facilitate prosecution” (Australian Law
Reform Commission, 2014, para, 11). However, the onslaught of abusive content
online in 2014, and its further escalated presence in 2021, may suggest otherwise.
Although raising concerns about intensifying abuse, Google proposed the
problem, “was not that laws do not exist, but rather that there was a general lack
of awareness of the existing criminal and civil laws available” (para. 12). Anecdotal
evidence, such as Australian journalist Osman Faruqi (2019), suggests knowledge
about the applicability of trolling laws may be lacking, and legal pathways may
need to be both more universally understood and actively pursued by journalists.
This chapter begins to address the information gap; however, further education
campaign extensions are necessary to reach the broader media community. While
lengthy deliberations continue about the necessity of law reform, the flaws in the
current legal system remain. Whether by means of new or amended legislation,
the time lag until effective trolling laws are implemented continues to impact upon
the mental wellbeing of victims.
Criminal laws for threats
The study identified four sub-categories encompassed by the criminal law theme
of threats; these include threats to kill, threats to cause harm, hoax threat and
threat to destroy property and are described in the four tables below. Quantitative
analysis of the data is presented under each table, and a qualitative discussion
follows. An example of trolling in violation of each respective law is also provided.
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Figure 36
Australian criminal laws for threats to kill that trolled journalists could use derived
from chapter 4.7 data
Criminal Laws for Threat to kill
Trolling Example: “I will choke you to death” (Ryan, 2014, p. 2)
Jurisdiction

Law

Section

Description

Federal

Using a
carriage
service to
make a
threat to
kill

Section
474.17 of the
Criminal
Code Act
1995 (Cth)

ACT

Threats to
kill

Section 30 of
the Crimes
Act 1900
(ACT)

NSW

Documents
containing
threats

Section 31 of
the Crimes
Act 1900
(NSW)

NT

Threats to
kill

Section 166
of the
Criminal
Code Act
1983 (NT)

QLD

Threats to
murder

SA

Threats to
kill

Section 308
of the
Criminal
Code Act
1899 (Qld)
Section 19.1
of the
Criminal Law
Consolidation
Act 1935
(SA)

TAS

Threats to
kill

A person (the first person) is guilty of an
offence if:
(a) the first person uses a carriage service
to make to another person (the second
person) a threat to kill the second person
or a third person; and
(b) the first person intends the second
person to fear that the threat will be
carried out
A person makes a threat to another person
to kill that other person or any third person
(a) intending that other person to fear that
the threat would be carried out; or
(b) being reckless whether or not that
other person would fear that the threat
would be carried out; and
The threat is made
(c) without lawful excuse; and
(d) in circumstances in which a reasonable
person would fear that the threat would be
carried out.
A person who intentionally or recklessly,
and knowing its contents, sends or delivers,
or directly or indirectly causes to be
received, any document threatening to kill
or inflict bodily harm on any person.
Any person who, with intent to cause fear,
makes, or causes any person to receive, a
threat to kill any person which threat is of
such a nature as to cause fear to any person
of reasonable firmness and courage, is
guilty of an offence.
Any person who, knowing the contents
thereof, directly, or indirectly causes any
person to receive any document
threatening to kill any person, is guilty of a
crime.
A person is guilty of an offence who:
(a) threatens, without lawful excuse, to kill
or endanger the life of another; and
(b) intends to arouse a fear that the threat
will be, or is likely to be, carried out, or is
recklessly indifferent as to whether such a
fear is aroused.
Any person who, knowing the contents
thereof, wilfully, and with intent thereby to

Section 162
of the
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Penalty
Imprisonment
for 10 years.

Imprisonment
for 10 years.

Imprisonment
for 10 years.

Imprisonment
for 7 years.

Imprisonment
for 7 years.

Imprisonment
for 10 years
for a basic
offence, or 12
years for an
aggravated
offence.
Imprisonment
for 21 years.
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Criminal
Code Act
1924 (Tas)
VIC

Threats to
kill

Section 20 of
the Crimes
Act 1958
(Vic)

WA

Threats to
kill

Section 388B
of the
Criminal
Code Act
Compilation
Act 1913
(WA)

intimidate or influence any person, causes
such person to receive any writing
threatening to kill him or any other person,
is guilty of a crime.
A person who, without lawful excuse,
makes to another person a threat to kill
that other person or any other person:
(a) intending that that other person would
fear the threat would be carried out; or
(b) being reckless as to whether or not that
other person would fear the threat would
be carried out
is guilty of an indictable offence.
Any person who makes a threat with intent
to:
(a) gain a benefit, pecuniary or otherwise,
for any person; or
(b) cause a detriment, pecuniary or
otherwise, to any person; or
(c) prevent or hinder the doing of an act by
a person who is lawfully entitled to do that
act; or
(d) compel the doing of an act by a person
who is lawfully entitled to abstain from
doing that act,
is guilty of a crime.

Imprisonment
for 21 years.

Imprisonment
for 10 years,
or 14 years
imprisonment
if the offence
is committed
in
circumstances
of racial
aggravation.

Tasmania recorded the highest maximum penalty of 21 years imprisonment for
all criminal laws. However, the study again recognises this generalised law is
applied to all legislation and does not reflect a true representation of the actual
penalty imposed by court when prosecuted for any particular law. The Tasmanian
maximum penalty of 21 years is therefore excluded from the quantitative data
analysis to ensure the findings are not inflated and positively skewed.
The highest maximum penalties of the other eight jurisdictions that specify
graduated penalties for each law can be more fairly analysed as comparative data
to determine the relative seriousness of each individual law. With Tasmania
removed as an outlier, Western Australia had the highest maximum penalty of 14
years imprisonment for the offence if it was committed in circumstances of racial
aggravation. For a standard offence, six jurisdictions had 10 years imprisonment,
and two had 7 years imprisonment. With an average maximum penalty of 9.14
years imprisonment, the data suggests the offense can attract a significant
punishment term and may indicate that Australian law considers threats to kill as
a ‘less serious’ crime.
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Figure 37
Australian criminal laws for threats to cause harm that trolled journalists could use
derived from chapter 4.7 data
Criminal Laws for a Threat to Cause Harm
Trolling Example: “May your bloodied head rest on the edge of an Isis blade” (West, 2015, para. 15)
Jurisdiction Law
Section
Description
Maximum
Penalty
Federal
Using a
Section
A person (the first person) is guilty of an
Imprisonment
carriage
474.17 of the offence if:
for 7 years.
service to
Criminal Code (a) the first person uses a carriage service to
make a
Act 1995
make to another person (the second person)
threat to
(Cth)
a threat to cause serious harm to the second
cause harm
person or a third person; and
(b) the first person intends the second
person to fear that the threat will be carried
out.
ACT
Threats to
Section 31 of A person makes a threat to another person
Imprisonment
inflict
the Crimes
to inflict grievous bodily harm on that other
for 5 years.
grievous
Act 1900
person or any third person
bodily harm (ACT)
(a) intending that other person to fear that
the threat would be carried out; or
(b) being reckless whether or not that other
person would fear that the threat would be
carried out; and
The threat is made
(a) without lawful excuse; and
(b) in circumstances in which a reasonable
person would fear that the threat would be
carried out.
NSW
Documents Section 31 of A person who intentionally or recklessly, and Imprisonment
containing
the Crimes
knowing its contents, sends or delivers, or
for 10 years.
threats
Act 1900
directly or indirectly causes to be received,
(NSW)
any document threatening to kill or inflict
bodily harm on any person.
NT
Threats to
Section 200
Any person who threatens to do any injury,
Imprisonment
cause harm of the
or cause any detriment, of any kind to
for 2 years.
Criminal Code another with intent to prevent or hinder that
Act 1983 (NT) other person from doing any act that he is
lawfully entitled to do, or with intent to
compel him to do any act that he is lawfully
entitled to abstain from doing, is guilty of an
offence.
QLD
Threatening Section 75 of Any person who:
Imprisonment
violence
the Criminal
(a) with intent to intimidate or annoy any
for 2 years.
Code Act
person, by words or conduct threatens to
1899 (Qld)
enter or damage a dwelling or other
premise; or
(b) with intent to alarm any person,
discharges loaded firearms or does any other
act that is likely to cause any person in the
vicinity to fear bodily harm to any person or
damage to property.
commits a crime.
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SA

Threats to
cause harm

Section 19.2
of the
Criminal Law
Consolidation
Act 1935
(SA)

TAS

Causing a
person to
receive a
letter
threatening
injury to
property
Threats to
inflict
serious
injury

Section 276
of the
Criminal
Code Act
1924 (Tas)

Threats to
cause harm

Section 388A
of the
Criminal Code
Act
Compilation
Act 1913
(WA)

VIC

WA

Section 21 of
the Crimes
Act 1958
(Vic)

A person who:
(a) threatens, without lawful excuse, to cause
harm to another; and
(b) intends to arouse a fear that the threat
will be, or is likely to be, carried out, or is
recklessly indifferent as to whether such a
fear is aroused,
is guilty of an offence.
Any person who, knowing the contents
thereof, directly or indirectly causes any
person to receive any writing threatening
that any property shall be unlawfully burnt,
destroyed, or injured, is guilty of a crime.

Imprisonment
for 5 years for
a basic
offence, or 7
years for an
aggravated
offence.

A person who, without lawful excuse, makes
to another person a threat to inflict serious
injury on that other person or any other
person:
(a) intending that that other person would
fear the threat would be carried out; or
(b) being reckless as to whether or not that
other person would fear the threat would be
carried out
is guilty of an indictable offence.
Any person who makes a threat with intent
to:
(a) gain a benefit, pecuniary or otherwise, for
any person; or
(b) cause a detriment, pecuniary or
otherwise, to any person; or
(c) prevent or hinder the doing of an act by a
person who is lawfully entitled to do that act;
or
(d) compel the doing of an act by a person
who is lawfully entitled to abstain from
doing that act is guilty of a crime.

Imprisonment
for 5 years.

Imprisonment
for 21 years.

Imprisonment
for 7 years.

With the Tasmanian 21-year maximum penalty removed as an outlier, New South
Wales had the highest maximum penalty for a threat to cause harm of 10 years
imprisonment, two jurisdictions had 7 years, three had 5 years, and a further two
had 2 years imprisonment respectively. With an average maximum penalty of 5.38
years imprisonment, the data suggests the offense can attract a substantial
punishment term and may indicate that Australian law considers threats to kill as
a ‘less serious’ crime.
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Figure 38
Australian criminal laws for hoax threats that trolled journalists could use derived
from chapter 4.7 data
Criminal Laws for a Hoax Threat
Trolling Example: “A bomb has been placed outside your home. It will go off at exactly 10:47pm on a timer
and trigger destroying everything” (Paramaguru, 2013, para. 3) received by TIME’s Europe editor Catherine
Mayer, The Guardian’s columnist Hadley Freeman, and The Independent’s journalist Grace Dent on Twitter.
Jurisdiction Law
Section
Description
Maximum
Penalty
Federal
Using a
Section
A person is guilty of an offence if:
Imprisonment
carriage service 474.16 of the (a) the person uses a carriage service to
for 10 years.
for a hoax
Criminal
send a communication; and
threat
Code Act
(b) the person does so with the intention of
1995 (Cth)
inducing a false belief that an explosive, or a
dangerous or harmful substance or thing,
has been or will be left in any place.
ACT
Untrue
Section 122
A person who knowingly makes in any
Imprisonment
representations of the Crimes manner an untrue representation to any
for 5 years,
Act 1900
other person, being a representation that
100 penalty
(ACT)
tends to give rise to apprehension for the
units, or both.
safety of any person (including the person
making the representation and the person
to whom it is made) or property, or both,
commits an offence.
ACT
Making false
Section 139
A person must not make a statement that
Imprisonment
statements
of the Crimes the person believes to be false with the
for 10 years,
about
Act 1900
intention of:
200 penalty
contamination
(ACT)
(a) inducing the person to whom the
units, or both.
of goods with
statement is made or others to believe that
intent to cause
goods have been contaminated; and
public alarm or
(b) in that way, either:
economic loss
(i) causing public alarm or anxiety; or
(ii) causing economic loss through public
awareness of the contamination, or the
possibility of contamination.
NSW
Conveying false Section 93Q
A person who conveys information:
Imprisonment
information
of the Crimes (a) that the person knows to be false or
for 5 years.
that a person or Act 1900
misleading, and
property is in
(NSW)
(b) that is likely to make the person to
danger
whom the information is conveyed fear for
the safety of a person or of property, or
both,
is guilty of an offence.
NSW
Making false
Section 93M
A person who makes a statement that the
Imprisonment
statements
of the Crimes person believes to be false:
for 10 years.
concerning
Act 1900
(a) with the intention of inducing the
contamination
(NSW)
person to whom the statement is made or
of goods with
others to believe that goods have been
intent to cause
contaminated, and
public alarm or
(b) with the intention of thereby:
economic loss
(i) causing public alarm or anxiety, or
(ii) causing economic loss through public
awareness of the contamination,
is guilty of a crime.
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NT

Making false
statements
concerning
contamination
of goods with
intent to cause
public alarm or
economic loss

Section 148D
of the
Criminal
Code Act
1983 (NT)

QLD

Hoax
contamination
of goods

Section 239
of the
Criminal
Code Act
1899 (Qld)

SA

Goods
contamination
unrelated to
issues of public
health and
safety

Section 261
of the
Criminal Law
Consolidation
Act 1935
(SA)

TAS

False threats of
danger

Section
276AA of the
Criminal
Code Act
1924 (Tas)

TAS

Threatening to
contaminate
goods with

Section 287E
of the
Criminal

A person who makes a statement that the
person believes to be false:
(a) with the intention of inducing the
person to whom the statement is made or
others to believe that goods have been
contaminated; and
(b) with the intention of thereby:
(i) causing public alarm or anxiety; or
(ii) causing economic loss through public
awareness of the contamination,
is guilty of an offence.
A person who makes a statement or
conveys information to another person that
he or she knows or believes to be false with
the intention of inducing in that person or
another person a belief that goods have
been contaminated or interfered with and
causes:
(a) public alarm or anxiety; or
(b) that person or that other person to
refrain from purchasing those goods or
goods of that or any similar class; or
(c) any person to suffer economic loss
through taking steps to avoid public alarm
or anxiety; or
(d) members of the public to refrain from
purchasing those goods or goods of that or
any similar class;
commits a crime.
A person is guilty of an offence if the
person:
(a) contaminates goods; or
(b) makes it appear that goods have been,
or are about to be contaminated; or
(c) threatens to contaminate goods; or
(d) falsely claims that goods have been or
are about to be contaminated,
intending
(e) to influence the public against
purchasing the goods or goods of the
relevant class or to create an apprehension
that the public will be so influenced; and
(f) by doing so:
(i) to gain a benefit for himself, herself, or
another; or
(ii) to cause loss or harm to another.
A person who makes a statement or
conveys information, being a statement or
information that he knows to be false, to the
effect that, or from which it could be
reasonably inferred that, some act has been,
will be, or is likely to be, done at any place
that is of such a nature as to give rise, or be
likely to give rise, to serious risk of danger
to persons or property at or near that place,
is guilty of a crime.
A person who makes a threat that goods
will be contaminated with the intention of:
(a) causing public alarm or anxiety; or
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Imprisonment
for 10 years.

Imprisonment
for 7 years.

Imprisonment
for 5 years.

Imprisonment
for 21 years.

Imprisonment
for 21 years.
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VIC

WA

intent to cause
public alarm or
economic loss
Making false
statements
concerning
contamination
of goods with
intent to cause,
or being
reckless as to
whether it
would cause,
public alarm or
economic loss
Statement or
act creating
false
apprehension
as to existence
of threat or
danger

Code Act
1924 (Tas)
Section 251
of the Crimes
Act 1958
(Vic)

Section 388C
of the
Criminal
Code Act
Compilation
Act 1913
(WA)

(b) causing economic loss through public
awareness of the contamination
is guilty of a crime.
A person who, without lawful excuse,
makes to another person a threat to inflict
serious injury on that other person or any
other person:
(a) intending that that other person would
fear the threat would be carried out; or
(b) being reckless as to whether or not that
other person would fear the threat would
be carried out
is guilty of an indictable offence.
Any person who makes a statement or
conveys information which that person
knows to be false, and which expressly
indicates, or may reasonably be construed
as indicating
(a) that an unlawful threat has been made;
or
(b) that there has been, is, or is to be an
intention, proposal, plan, or conspiracy to
unlawfully
(i) kill, injure, endanger, or harm any
person, whether a particular person or not.
(ii) destroy, damage, endanger or harm any
property, whether particular property or
not; or
(iii) take or exercise control of a building,
structure or conveyance by force or
violence; or
is guilty of a crime.

Imprisonment
for 10 years,
1200 penalty
units,
or both.

Imprisonment
for 10 years.

The Australian Capital Territory and New South Wales have two criminal laws in
relation to a hoax threat. For this analysis, the study assumes the troll published
the abusive comments with the intent to cause alarm, and therefore the longer
maximum penalties are included for comparison. With the Tasmanian 21-year
maximum penalty removed as an outlier, six jurisdictions had the highest
maximum penalty for a hoax threat of 10 years imprisonment, one had 7 years and
one had 5 years. With an average maximum penalty of 9 years imprisonment, the
data suggests the offense can attract a substantial punishment term and may
indicate that Australian law considers hoax threats a ‘less serious’ crime.
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Figure 39
Australian criminal laws for threats to destroy property that trolled journalists
could use derived from chapter 4.7 data
Criminal Laws for a Threat to Destroy Property
Trolling Example: “I’ll burn your fucking house down to the ground” (West, 2015a, p. 77)
Jurisdiction Law
Section
Description
Maximum
Penalty
ACT
Threat to
Section 407
A person commits an offence if the person:
Imprisonment
cause
in the
(a) intentionally makes to someone else a
for 2 years,
property
Criminal
threat to damage property belonging to that
200 penalty
damage
Code 2002
person or another person; and
units
(ACT)
(b) intends that person to fear that the threat
(equivalent to
will be carried out.
$32,000 as of
June 2021) or
both.
NSW
Threatening Section 199
A person who, without lawful excuse, makes a
Imprisonment
to destroy
of the Crimes threat to another, with the intention of causing for 5 years.
or damage
Act 1900
that other to fear that the threat would be
property
(NSW)
carried out-(a) to destroy or damage property belonging to
that other or to a third person, or
(b) to destroy or damage the first-mentioned
person's own property in a way which that
person knows will or is likely to endanger the
life of, or to cause bodily injury to, that other or
a third person.
NT
Threat to
Section 241
A person is guilty of an offence if the person
Imprisonment
damage
of the
makes a threat to another person to cause
for 2 years, or
property
Criminal
damage to property belonging to that other
7 years
Code Act
person or someone else.
imprisonment
1983 (NT)
if carrying out
the threat will
cause death
or serious
harm to
someone.
QLD
Sending
Section 478
Any person who, knowing the contents of the
Imprisonment
letters
of the
document, causes any person to receive any
for 7 years.
threatening Criminal
document threatening that any building or
to burn or
Code Act
vessel, whether complete or not, or any stack of
destroy
1899 (Qld)
cultivated vegetable produce, or any such
produce that is in or under a building, shall be
burnt or destroyed, is guilty of a crime.
SA
Threats to
Section 85 of A person who, without lawful excuse, threatens Imprisonment
damage
the Criminal
to damage another's property
for 5 years for
property
Law
(a) intending to arouse a fear that the threat
a basic
Consolidation will be, or is likely to be, carried out; or
offence, 7
Act 1935
(b) being recklessly indifferent as to whether
years for an
(SA)
such a fear is aroused,
aggravated
is guilty of an offence.
offence, or 15
years
imprisonment
for an
aggravated
offence by
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TAS

Sending
letters
threatening
to burn or
destroy
False
threats of
danger

Section 276
of the
Criminal
Code Act
1924 (Tas)
Section
276AA of the
Criminal
Code Act
1924 (Tas)

VIC

Threats to
destroy or
damage
property

Section 198
of the Crimes
Act 1958
(Vic)

WA

Threat
toward
dwelling

Section 74 of
the Criminal
Code Act
Compilation
Act 1913
(WA)

TAS

Any person who, knowing the contents thereof,
directly, or indirectly causes any person to
receive any writing threatening that any
property shall be unlawfully burnt, destroyed,
or injured, is guilty of a crime.
A person who makes a statement or conveys
information, being a statement or information
that he knows to be false, to the effect that, or
from which it could be reasonably inferred
that, some act has been, will be, or is likely to
be, done at any place that is of such a nature as
to give rise, or be likely to give rise, to serious
risk of danger to persons or property at or near
that place, is guilty of a crime.
A person who without lawful excuse makes to
another a threat:
(a) to destroy or damage any property
belonging to that other or a third person or to
himself and that other or a third person; or
(b) to destroy or damage his own property in a
way which he knows or believes is more likely
than not to endanger the life of that other or a
third person
If he made the threat with the purpose of
causing the other to fear that it would be
carried out, shall be guilty of an indictable
offence.
Any person:
(a) with intent to intimidate or annoy any
person, threatens to enter, or damage a
dwelling; or
(b) with intent to alarm any person in a
dwelling, discharges loaded firearms or
commits any other breach of the peace;
is guilty of a crime.

threat to
commit arson.
Imprisonment
for 21 years.

Imprisonment
for 21 years.

Imprisonment
for 5 years.

Imprisonment
for 3 years.
For a
summary
conviction
imprisonment
for 1 year and
a $12,000
fine.

There are no specific federal laws for a threat to destroy property.

With the Tasmanian 21-year maximum penalty removed as an outlier, Queensland
had the highest maximum penalty for a basic offence for a threat destroy property
of 7 years imprisonment, three jurisdictions had 5 years, one had 3 years, and a
further two had 2 years imprisonment respectively. With an average penalty of
4.14 years imprisonment, the data suggests the offense can attract a substantial
punishment term and may indicate that Australian law considers threats to kill a
‘moderate’ crime.
Fuelled by anonymity, online trolls have emerged as one of the unfortunate byproducts of the liberating impact of social media. An online culture has emerged
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where vicious and frequent trolling has become commonplace and “I’m going to
rape you” has become a predictable default response to journalism practice
(Bartlett, 2013; Greig, 2016; Phillips, 2015; Citron, 2014; West, 2015; Williams,
2016; Tuohy, 2019; Hyland, 2021). Trolling terminology consists of offensive
threats of rape and death, with explicit comments suggesting victims deserved to
be urinated on and sexually abused (O’Connor, 2015). Although initial perceptions
about the impacts of trolling were downplayed suggesting that, “unlike real rape,
words and images on a screen cannot really hurt anyone” (Citron, 2014, p. 73).
Numerous documented case studies are now published in academic data and
provide countering evidence of tangible emotional and mental distress (Binns,
2017; Bossio & Holton, 2021; Gardiner, 2018; Lewis, Zamith & Coddington, 2020;
Martin & Murrell, 2020; Martin & Murrell, 2021). These verified impacts are
amplified by difficulty of navigating legislation.
One example that highlighted the additional trauma inflicted by the challenging
and prolonged legislative process involved Australian journalist, Van Badham,
who was trolled by far-right extremist, and former journalist Nathan Sykes.
Although the magistrate court ruled in favour, reflecting on the targeted
harassment campaign, Badham (as cited in Gorman, 2019) expressed serious
concerns about the process saying:
It was a year of my life. There were six or seven court
appearances, and I was strung out, exhausted, stressed out
of my mind. I’m not a suspicious person by nature, but the
ongoing cyberhate has changed my personality. I mourn the
persona I used to be.
(p. 72)
The grave impact on her mental wellbeing was evident. Similar concerns voiced in
the seminal case study Gamergate suggest a lack of legislative support can
compromise the emotional and psychological welfare of victims and should be
held partially responsible. In this prominent example, video game developer
Brianna Wu has spoken out multiple times about how traumatic and exhausting
the harassment of her family has been (Herzog, 2015). Yet despite widespread
publicly, US-based Wu was unable to prosecute her abusers as the Federal Bureau
of Investigation in the United States failed to identify the online trolls despite
Google and Microsoft tracking and providing their IP addresses to assist the
investigation (Dring, 2017). Providing insights about further problems with the
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policing of harassment laws, former FBI special agent for cybercrimes Tim Ryan
explained that cyber-abuse cases are a low priority for authorities as other crimes
they are tasked to enforce attract higher penalties (Ryan, as cited in Hess, 2014).
Similarly in Australia, the lack of continuity between applicable legislation, and
the law enforcement agencies that are required to apply that legislation, has
emerged as a significant obstruction to justice for trolling victims. While some
journalists continue to receive daily harassment, continued problems with the
judicial cycle permit trolls to sustain these activities with minimal risk of
punishment.
Criminal laws for inciting suicide
Figure 40 below displays the Australian criminal laws for inciting suicide that
could potentially be applied to Australian journalists such as Van Badham (Larsen,
2014), Ford (2016) and Dawson (Connelly & Keene, 2012) who received “go kill
yourself” comments. There are no specific federal laws. If the victim attempted
suicide as a result of trolling, prosecution is viable in all seven states. Tasmania is
the only state in which the act of attempting suicide is not a requirement for
prosecution. An example of comments that encourage suicide is also provided.
Figure 40
Australian criminal laws for inciting suicide that trolled journalists could use derived
from chapter 4.7 data

Jurisdiction

Law

Criminal Laws for Inciting Suicide
Trolling Example: “Bitch go kill yourself” (Ford, 2016, p. 177)
Section
Description

ACT

Suicide
aiding

Section 17 of
the Crimes
Act 1900
(ACT)

NSW

Suicide
aiding

Section 31C
of the Crimes
Act 1900
(NSW)

A person is guilty of an offence if the person:
(a) incites or counsels another person to commit
suicide; and
(b) the other person commits, or attempts to
commit, suicide as a consequence of that
incitement or counselling.
A person is guilty of an offence if the person:
(a) a person incites or counsels another person to
commit suicide, and
(b) that other person commits, or attempts to
commit, suicide as a consequence of that
incitement or counsel.
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Penalty
Imprisonment
for 10 years.

Imprisonment
for 5 years.
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NT

Encouraging
suicide

Section 162
of the
Criminal
Code Act
1983 (NT)

QLD

Aiding
suicide

SA

Inciting
suicide

Section 311
of the
Criminal
Code Act
1899 (Qld)
Section 13A
of the
Criminal Law
Consolidation
Act 1935
(SA)

TAS

Incitement
suicide

A person is guilty of an offence if the person:
(a) assists another person to kill or attempt to kill
himself or herself
(b) encourages another person to kill or attempt
to kill himself or herself.
For a person to be guilty of an offence:
(a) the person must have intended his or her
conduct would encourage the other person to
commit suicide; and
(b) the other person commits or attempts to
commit suicide and was encouraged to do so by
that conduct.
Any person who:
(a) procures another to kill himself or herself; or
(b) counsels another to kill himself or herself and
thereby induces the other person to do so is guilty
of a crime.
A person who aids, abets or counsels the suicide
of another, or an attempt by another to commit
suicide, shall be guilty of an indictable offence.

Section 163
Any person who instigates or aids another to kill
of the
himself is guilty of a crime.
Criminal
Code Act
1924 (Tas)
VIC
Inciting
Section 6B of Any person who incites any other person to
suicide
the Crimes
commit suicide and that other person commits or
Act 1924
attempts to commit suicide in consequence
(Vic)
thereof.
WA
Procuring
Section 288
Any person who:
suicide
of the
(a) procures another to kill himself; or
Criminal
(b) counsels another to kill himself and thereby
Code Act
induces him to do so is guilty of a crime.
Compilation
Act 1913
(WA)
There are no specific federal laws for inciting suicide.

Imprisonment
for life.

Imprisonment
for life.

Imprisonment
for 8 years for
attempted
suicide.
Imprisonment
for 14 years
for suicide.
Imprisonment
for 21 years.

Imprisonment
for 5 years.
Imprisonment
for life.

With the longest maximum penalty of all criminal laws, incitement of suicide
carries a life imprisonment sentence in the three jurisdictions of the Northern
Territory, Queensland, and Western Australia. With the possibility of life
imprisonment, the data may suggest incitement of suicide is considered the ‘most
serious’ form of trolling by Australian law; however, the broad range of maximum
penalties between five years and life may imply a national indecisiveness about
the seriousness of the behaviour. In most jurisdictions, only living victims can sue;
however, the death of a victim does not impact upon the ability for the deceased
person’s estate to sue. Tasmania is the only state in which trolls can be held liable
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for inciting suicide for behaviours that do not lead to the self-harm or fatality of
the victim.
Unlike discrepancies about the severity of inciting suicide laws, there appears to
be a more general consensus about the seriousness of manslaughter. Deakin
criminal law researchers advocate offenders should be charged with
manslaughter if they exploit another person’s vulnerable mental state and cause
them to commit suicide (McMahon & McGorrery, 2018). The suggested change
would mean offenders could face longer jail time without parole and prosecutors
may more easily be able to prove guilt. However, the complexity of this law must
consider issues of free will, causation and shared responsibility. Dr McMahon
(2017) explained:
a fundamental assumption of common law-based legal
systems is that individuals have free will and are
responsible for their own actions, which is why they are
held liable for their behaviour when it constitutes a criminal
offence. However, there are certain circumstances where
the legal system will accept on person’s free will has been
so overborne that responsibility is transposed onto another
person.
(para. 10)
The broad range of maximum penalties highlight a national indecisiveness about
the seriousness of this particular type of trolling. Academic debate is exploring
the contributing role that online abuse plays in the complex interconnected web
of suicide causation. Gorman (2019a) suggested cyber hate alone is unlikely to
cause suicide; however, predator trolling can be a significant stressor in a person’s
life (para. 2), particularly for journalists who are often required to frequently
engage online as part of their work. The true danger lies in the impacts of trolling
combined with other difficulties an individual may be experiencing at any given
time. Badham (as cited in Gorman, 2019) further highlights the compounding
struggles of those who are already grappling with depression, stating, “trolling
fuels the worst instincts of your illness” (p. 68). The impact of underlying mental
health issues may leave journalists vulnerable to trolling potentially emerging as
a catalyst for suicide. While the sole blame cannot be attributed to the troll, this is
not considered an acceptable defence for a reduced sentence and the act receives
the highest maximum penalty of life imprisonment in three jurisdictions. The
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study notes that the intense impact of suicide is far reaching, and it affects multiple
stakeholders beyond the deceased person including partners, family, close
friends, colleagues, and extended acquaintances. This widespread personal
impact is a key determining factor in the study’s suggestion to assign more serious
penalties to this law. There is therefore a ground for the remaining six
jurisdictions (the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South
Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, and the Commonwealth) to consider adopting a life
imprisonment sentence for inciting suicide through online abuse. A stronger and
united stance may act as a more robust deterrence strategy.
Discussions about legal reform to adequately address the escalation of cyber
abuse have circulated since news began the transition online (Windisch,
Wiedlitzka & Olaghere, 2021; Blaya, 2019). However, these concerns did not
attract state or Federal parliamentary debate until the catalyst event on January
3, 2018, in which 14-year-old Amy “Dolly” Everett took her own life after
sustained cyberbullying. As the Australian ambassador for the outback hat
company Akruna Everett suffered a targeted hate campaign, and reports of her
suicide made international headlines (Arena, 2018). Dolly became the recognised
face of trolling’s greatest potential impact, the death of a child, and forced the
government to prioritise a response. Funded research led to the implementation
of “Dolly’s Law” by the NSW Parliament, increasing the maximum penalty from 3
years to 5 years imprisonment. Continued public outrage about the exploitation
of children online has resulted in repeated Federal legislation revision; however,
the study questions the adequacy of such a slow legislative response, and
highlights that minimal action was undertaken to proactively address trolling
until Dolly’s death.
Criminal laws for criminal defamation
Defamation is part of tort law and allows a journalist to file a lawsuit over a civil
wrong that has been done to them, such as trolling. Internationally, this area of
law is often referred to as libel when defamation material is published or slander
when words are spoken; however, uniform national defamation laws in Australian
introduced in 2005 encompass both terms under the one law of defamation.
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Although criminal defamation still exists in many liberal democracies, including
Australia, prosecutions are rare and often unsuccessful (Pearson & Polden, 2019).
These rare cases involve severe incidents by a perpetrator who lacks the money
to pay for the associated damages that maliciously attack a journalist’s character.
Despite its lower prosecution rate, the law can still be considered as a potential
prosecution strategy for trolled journalists and was therefore determined as
relevant for inclusion. Successful prosecutions award the victim with a sum of
damages and may also impose a permanent injunction that prevents any further
publication, or a take-down order that requires offensive comments to be
removed. Although none are specified at federal level, criminal defamation laws
are defined in the following table and an example of trolling is also provided.
Figure 41
Australian criminal laws for criminal defamation that trolled journalists could use
derived from chapter 4.7 data
Criminal Laws for Criminal Defamation
Trolling Example: Queensland police charged a man with criminal defamation in June 2019 after handing out
flyers throughout Tewantin that falsely claimed a former sporting associate was a paedophile (Pearson, 2019)
Jurisdiction Law
Section
Description
Maximum
Penalty
ACT
Malicious
Section 29 of A person must not maliciously publish a defamatory Imprisonment
publication the
libel (whether or not the person knows it is false).
for 10 years.
of
Defamation
defamatory Act 2001
libel
(ACT)
NSW
Criminal
Section
A person who, without lawful excuse, publishes
Imprisonment
defamation 529(3) of the matter defamatory of another living person (the
for 5 years.
Crimes Act
victim):
1900 (NSW) (a) knowing the matter to be false, and
(b) with intent to cause serious harm to the victim or
any other person or being reckless as to whether
such harm is caused, is guilty of an offence.
NT
Criminal
Section 204
Any person who unlawfully publishes any
Imprisonment
defamation of the
defamatory matter:
for 3 years.
Criminal
(a) with intent to cause or that causes or is likely to
Code Act
cause a breach of the peace
1983 (NT)
(b) with intent to cause loss.
(c) with intent to interfere with the free and
informed exercise of a political right.
(d) with intent to prevent or deter a person from
performing any duty imposed on him by law.
(e) with intent to prevent or deter any person from
doing any act that he is lawfully entitled to do or to
compel him to do any act that he is lawfully entitled
to abstain from doing.
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(f) with intent to prevent any lawful investigation or
inquiry or
(g) with intent to interfere with or to influence any
judicial proceedings.
QLD
Criminal
Section 365
Any person who, without lawful excuse, publishes
defamation of the
matter defamatory of another living person (the
Defamation
"relevant person")
Act 2005
(a) knowing the matter to be false or without having
(Qld)
regard to whether the matter is true or false; and
(b) intending to cause serious harm to the relevant
person or any other person or without having regard
to whether serious harm to the relevant person or
any other person is caused commits a
misdemeanour.
SA
Criminal
Section 257
A person who, without lawful excuse, publishes
defamation of the
defamatory matter concerning another living
Criminal Law person:
Consolidation (a) knowing the matter to be false or being
Act 1935
recklessly indifferent as to whether the matter is
(SA)
true or false; and
(b) intending to cause serious harm or being
recklessly indifferent as to whether the publication
of the defamatory matter will cause serious harm, to
a person (whether the person defamed or not), is
guilty of an offence.
TAS
Criminal
Section 196
A person who, without lawful excuse, publishes
defamation of the
matter defamatory of another living person (the
Criminal
victim):
Code Act
(a) knowing the matter to be false or without having
1924 (Tas)
regard to whether the matter is true or false; and
(b) intending to cause serious harm to the victim or
any other person or without having regard to
whether such harm is caused is guilty of a crime.
VIC
Criminal
Section 10 of Every person who maliciously publishes any
defamation the Wrongs
defamatory libel knowing the same to be false shall
Act 1958
be liable to imprisonment for a term of not more
(Vic)
than two years and to pay such fine as the court
awards.
WA
Criminal
Section 365
A person who, without lawful excuse, publishes
defamation of the
matter defamatory of another living person (the
Defamation
victim):
Act 2005
(a) knowing the matter to be false or without having
(WA)
regard to whether the matter is true or false; and
(b) intending to cause serious harm to the victim or
any other person or without having regard to
whether such harm is caused is guilty of a crime
There are no specific federal laws for criminal defamation.

Imprisonment
for 3 years.

Imprisonment
for 3 years.

Imprisonment
for 21 years.

Imprisonment
for 2 years
and a fine
determined
by the court.
Imprisonment
for 3 years.

With the Tasmanian 21-year maximum penalty removed as an outlier, the
Australian Capital Territory had the highest maximum penalty of 7 years
imprisonment for criminal defamation. One jurisdiction had 5 years, four had 3
years and one had 2 years imprisonment respectively. With an average maximum
penalty of 4.14 years imprisonment, the data suggests the offense can attract a
substantial punishment term and may indicate that Australian law considers
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criminal defamation a ‘moderate’ crime. Successful prosecutions award the victim
with a sum of damages and judges may also impose a permanent injunction that
prevents any further publication or a take-down order that requires offensive
comments to be removed.
Criminal defamation is based on the notion that for serious incidents there should
be some means under the criminal law by which punishment of the offender can
be secured. For these severe offenses, a troll can be prosecuted by the state itself
and sentenced to jail in addition to financial reprimands (Pearson & Polden, 2019).
While prosecutions are rare, it is important for journalists to know of its existence;
hence its inclusion in the Pearson and Polden (2019) textbook. However, criminal
defamation, along with seditious libel, the term used for defamation of the state,
can be leveraged as censorship tools against the media by corporations, corrupt
politicians, and government officials to silence dissidents.
Journalists have been generally opposed to defamation laws as they are often used
against news organisations; but faced with spiteful threats of violence and
repeated attempts to undermine professional credibility, some have begun to use
this legislation to protect themselves against online harassment. South African
journalist Anton Harber (as cited in Schiggrin, 2020) eloquently expressed these
sentiments in the following statement:
As a journalist I have deep aversion to defamation litigation.
We want the freedom to say strong things, even push the
bounds of acceptable speech, and not have defamation law
used to silence us (however) we only embarked on this civil
action because we could see no other way to stop things
being said that were hurtful and harmful, even dangerous.
(para. 8)
The study acknowledges that free expression is a critical requirement of robust
journalism practise; however, without criminal code provisions many countries
lack adequate protections for journalists facing online harassment and require
journalists to use defamation legislation as a defensive measure. An advocate for
this approach, Peruvian investigative journalist Gustavo Gorriti explained that
commencing legal action was often enough for defamers to issue retractions. He
encouraged journalists to take a more determined approach that utilised current
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legislation as a protective strategy (Gorriti, as cited in Schiffrin, 2020). The
deterrent effect of the law may teach or remind trolls about penalties. Although
remedies include compensation for victims, compensation is often linked to lost
income and suffering can be hard to quantify. The presence of hate on social media
and the seeming inability to regulate the trend suggests criminal defamation may
still have a valuable role to play.
Criminal laws for stalking
Stalking may be applied to online behaviour and is an illegal offence in seven
states. Queensland is excluded from this group labelling the act unlawful, meaning
the conduct is prohibited by the law but holds no criminal penalty. In an important
note on the fundamental difference, Professor Simon Rice, former director of law
reform and social justice at the Australian National University, stated:
Unlawful acts are pursued by the person or entity who is
aggrieved, and illegal acts are pursued by the police in order
to punish the perpetrator. For unlawful conduct the harmed
person seeks a personal remedy such as compensation; for
illegal conduct the perpetrator is punished (with
imprisonment)
(Rice, as cited in ABC, 2014, para. 18).
Western Australia has two separate offences for stalking; however, there are none
specified at federal level. An example of trolling in breach of the stalking law is
also provided.
Figure 42
Australian criminal laws for stalking that trolled journalists could use derived from
chapter 4.7 data
Criminal Laws for Stalking
Trolling Example: An online hate group started by Zoe Quinn’s ex-boyfriend Eron Gjoni published her private
details online. “My personal information including my home address, phone number, emails, passwords, and those
of my family has been widely distributed, alongside nude photos of me, and several of my professional accounts
and those of my colleagues have been hacked” (Quinn, as cited in Grow, para. 3).
Jurisdiction Law
Section
Description
Maximum
Penalty
ACT
Stalking Section 35 of A person must not stalk someone with intent:
Imprisonment
the Crimes
(a) to cause apprehension, or fear of harm, in the
for 2 years.
Act 1900
person stalked or someone else; or
(ACT)
(b) to cause harm to the person stalked or someone
else; or
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NSW

Stalking

Section 13 of
the Crimes
(Domestic
and Personal
Violence Act)
2007 (NSW)

NT

Stalking

Section 189
of the
Criminal
Code Act
1983 (NT)

SA

Stalking

Section
196AA of the
Criminal Law
Consolidation
Act 1935
(SA)

TAS

Stalking
and
bullying

Section 192
of the
Criminal
Code Act
1924 (Tas)

(c) to harass the person stalked.
For this section, a person stalks someone else (the
stalked person) if, on at least 2 occasions, the person
does 1 or more of the following:
(e) gives or sends offensive material to the stalked
person or leaves offensive material where it is likely
to be found by, given to, or brought to the attention of,
the stalked person
(f) telephones, sends electronic messages to, or
otherwise contacts the stalked person
(g) sends electronic messages about the stalked
person to anybody else
(h) makes electronic messages about the stalked
person available to anybody else
(j) engages in conduct amounting to intimidation,
harassment, or molestation of the stalked person.
For the purposes of this Act, ‘intimidation’ of a person
means conduct (including cyberbullying) amounting
to harassment of the person.
In this Act, ‘stalking’ includes contacting or otherwise
approaching a person using the internet or any other
technologically assisted means.
A person who stalks or intimidates another person
with the intention of causing the other person to fear
physical or mental harm is guilty of an offence.
A person (the offender) stalks another person (the
victim) if the offender engages in conduct that
includes repeated instances of or a combination of any
of the following:
(a) telephoning, sending electronic messages to, or
otherwise contacting, the victim or another person.
(b) giving offensive material to the victim or another
person or leaving it where it will be found by, given to
or brought to the attention of, the victim or the other
person.
(c) acting in any other way that could reasonably be
expected to arouse apprehension or fear in the victim
for his or her own safety or that of another person.
A person stalks another if on at least two separate
occasions, the person:
(a) gives or sends offensive material to the other
person or leaves offensive material where it will be
found by, given to, or brought to the attention of the
other person which can be transmitted by means of
the internet, mail, telephone, facsimile or some other
form of electronic communication.
(b) acts in any other way that could reasonably be
expected to arouse the other person's apprehension
or fear; and
And the person:
(a) intends to cause serious physical or mental harm
to the other person or a third person; or
(b) intends to cause serious apprehension or fear.
A person who, with intent to cause another person
physical or mental harm, including self-harm, or
extreme humiliation or to be apprehensive or fearful,
pursues a course of conduct made up of one or more
of the following actions:
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Imprisonment
for 5 years, 50
penalty units
(equivalent to
$5,500 as of
June 2021) or
both.
Imprisonment
for 2 years.

Imprisonment
for 3 years for
a basic
offence or
imprisonment
for 5 years for
an aggravated
offence.

Imprisonment
for 21 years.
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VIC

Stalking

Section 21A
of the Crimes
Act 1958
(Vic)

WA

Stalking

Section 338E
of the
Criminal
Code Act

(a) making threats to the other person or a third
person
(b) directing abusive or offensive acts towards the
other person or a third person
(c) sending offensive material to the other person or a
third person or leaving offensive material where it is
likely to be found by, given to, or brought to the
attention of the other person or a third person
(d) publishing or transmitting offensive material by
electronic or any other means in such a way that the
offensive material is likely to be found by, or brought
to the attention of, the other person or a third person
(e) using the internet or any other form of electronic
communication in a way that could reasonably be
expected to cause the other person to be apprehensive
or fearful
(f) contacting the other person or a third person by
postal, telephonic, electronic or any other means of
communication
(g) acting in another way that could reasonably be
expected to cause the other person physical or mental
harm, including self-harm, or extreme humiliation or
to be apprehensive or fearful is guilty of a crime.
A person must not stalk another person. A person (the
offender) stalks another person (the victim) if the
offender engages in a course of conduct which
includes any of the following:
(a) contacting the victim or any other person by post,
telephone, fax, text message, e-mail, or other
electronic communication or by any other means
whatsoever.
(b) publishing on the Internet or by an e-mail or other
electronic communication to any person a statement
or other material
(ii) relating to the victim or any other person; or
(iii) purporting to relate to, or to originate from, the
victim or any other person.
(c) tracing the victim's or any other person's use of
the Internet or of e-mail or other electronic
communications.
(d) making threats to the victim.
(e) using abusive or offensive words to or in the
presence of the victim.
(f) using abusive or offensive words to or in the
presence of the victim.
(g) giving offensive material to the victim or any other
person or leaving it where it will be found by, given to
or brought to the attention of, the victim or the other
person.
(h) acting in any other way that could reasonably be
expected
(i) to cause physical or mental harm to the victim,
including self-harm; or
(ii) to arouse apprehension or fear in the victim for his
or her own safety or that of any other person.
There are two separate offences for stalking, with the
first being:
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Imprisonment
for 10 years.

Imprisonment
for 1 year and
a fine of
$12,000.
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WA

Stalking

Compilation
Act 1913
(WA)
Section 338E
of the
Criminal
Code Act
Compilation
Act 1913
(WA)

A person who pursues another person with intent to
intimidate that person, or a third person, is guilty of a
crime.
A person who pursues another person in a manner
that could reasonably be expected to intimidate, and
that does in fact intimidate that person or a third
party, is guilty of a simple offence.

Unlawful Laws for Stalking
Unlawful stalking is conduct:
(a) intentionally directed at a person (the "stalked
person"); and
(b) engaged in on any 1 occasion if the conduct is
protracted or on more than 1 occasion, and
(c) consisting of 1 or more acts of the following, or a
similar, type
(i) contacting a person in any way, including, for
example, by telephone, mail, fax, email or through the
use of any technology
(ii) leaving offensive material where it will be found
by, given to or brought to the attention of, a person
(iii) giving offensive material to a person, directly or
indirectly
(iv) an intimidating, harassing or threatening act
against a person, whether or not involving violence or
a threat of violence
(v) an act of violence, or a threat of violence, against,
or against property of, anyone, including the
defendant; and
(d) that (i) would cause the stalked person
apprehension or fear, reasonably arising in all the
circumstances, of violence to, or against property of,
the stalked person or another person; or (ii) causes
detriment, reasonably arising in all the circumstances,
to the stalked person or another person.
There are no specific federal laws for stalking.
Queensland considered stalking as “unlawful” and it is therefore covered under civil laws.
QLD

Unlawful
stalking

Section 359B
of the
Criminal
Code Act
1899 (Qld)

Imprisonment
for 3 years.

Unlawful act.
No criminal
charge
applicable.

With the Tasmanian 21-year maximum penalty removed as an outlier, Victoria
had the highest maximum penalty for stalking of 10 years imprisonment. One
jurisdiction had five years, two had three years, two had two years and one had
one year imprisonment respectively. With an average maximum penalty of 3.71
years imprisonment, the data suggests the offense can attract a substantial
punishment term and may indicate that Australian law considers stalking a
‘moderate’ crime. However, stalking is considered unlawful (not illegal) in
Queensland and therefore no criminal charge or jail time is applicable. For this
reason, Queensland was not included in the quantitative analysis above. The broad
range of maximum penalties between ten years and no criminal charge may imply
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a national indecisiveness about the seriousness of the behaviour that may need to
be addressed with a more universal approach.
The internet is a public place in which laws that govern predatory behaviour in
real-life can be applied however, the internet can be written and read from
anywhere and therefore does not conform to jurisdictional boundaries. No
criminal sanction is attached for stalking under section 359B of the Criminal Code
Act 1899 (Qld), obstructing any grounds for police involvement despite how
severe the intimidating conduct may be. Remedies without potential
imprisonment may not adequately address the impact of malicious attacks on
victims or appropriately support journalists in a workplace often intertwined with
online abuse. A universal approach to stalking laws may more effectively deter
abusers.
Stalking has the potential to seep from online restraints to real-life scenarios that
jeopardise the personal safety of journalists. Escalation of such behaviours can be
demonstrated in the example of convicted Australian troll Zane Alchin, whose
slut-shaming of a girl on Tinder in 2015 evolved into breaking into the woman’s
home before demanding an apology in her son’s blood in 2020 (Sutton, 2020).
On 18 February 2021, an online petition by Sydney schoolgirl Chanel Contos
demanded change in Australia’s sex education curriculum (Hughes, 2021).
Thousands of current and former students shared stories of the sexual violence
they experienced as school students, and the petition received over 43,000
signatures (Teach Us Consent, 2021), which demonstrated this was a serious
problem at all levels of Australian society (Hughes, 2021). The petition prompted
schools to provide better education on consent earlier, from year three to year ten
(Hendriks, 2010). While this was not a change in legislation, control of the school
curriculum sits in the governance level of the Trolling Paradigm and so it is
appropriate to mention here. Better and more actively enforced laws for online
harassment that current policing does not prioritise may have the potential to
reduce more serious future crimes through early intervention strategies. Future
research may identify these online threats as precursors to help predict incidents
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that are likely to escalate to real-world violence and equip journalists with the
necessary tools to combat the developing threat (Posetti, Harrison & Waisbord,
2020).
Criminal laws for obscenity
Encompassed by the criminal law theme of obscenity, five sub-categories were
identified that include offensive language, offensive behaviour, disorderly
conduct, indecent material, and indecent exposure. None are embedded in federal
offences. An example of trolling in breach of each respective obscenity law is also
provided in the descriptive tables of Figures 43, 44 and 45 in this section.
International approaches to obscenity laws differ in severity; Germany has taken
a more resolute stance against both trolls and the platforms that host them
(Kirschbaum, 2016). The German legislation imposes heavy financial penalties on
social media companies whose self-regulation fails to delete abusive material
within 24 hours (McGoodan, 2017). The strict law requires hosting sites to take
down hate-speech and other forms of illegal speech within twenty-four hours or
face a potential 50-million-euro fine (McGoodan, 2017). Although critics suggest
tough laws lead to “overbroad censorship” and “privatises enforcement of the law”
by putting it in the hands of social media companies (Gorman, 2019, p. 259),
ultimately there is a fine balancing act when it comes to legislation. Complex and
confronting questions about the appropriate considered of free speech must be
discussed, scrutinised, and addressed
Figure 43
Australian criminal laws for offensive language that trolled journalists could use
derived from chapter 4.7 data

Jurisdiction
NSW

Criminal Laws for Offensive Language
Trolling Example: “I’ve seen saggier tits on a Pitbull” (Ford, 2016, p. 182)
Law
Section
Description
Offensive
language

Section 4A of
the Summary
Offences Act
1988 (NSW)

A person must not use offensive language in
or near, or within hearing from, a public
place or a school.
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Penalty
6 penalty
units
(equivalent to
$660 as of
June 2021)
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NT

Obscenity

Section 53 of
the Summary
Offences Act
1923 (NT)

QLD

Offensive,
obscene,
indecent,
or abusive
language

Section 6 of
the Summary
Offences Act
2005 (Qld)

SA

Indecent
language

Section 22 of
the Summary
Offences Act
1953 (SA)

TAS

Prohibited
language

Section 12 of
the Police
Offenses Act
1935 (Tas)

VIC

Obscene,
indecent,
threatening
language

Section 17 of
the Summary
Offences Act
1966 (Vic)

Any person who, in a public place, or within
the view or hearing of any person passing
therein: sings any obscene song or ballad, or
writes or draws any indecent or obscene
word, figure or representation, or uses any
profane, indecent, or obscene language, shall
be guilty of an offence.
A person must not commit a public nuisance
offence.
A person commits a public nuisance offence
if the person behaves in an offensive way.
A person behaves in an offensive way if:
(a) the person uses offensive, obscene,
indecent, or abusive language; and
(b) a person behaves in a threatening way if
the person uses threatening language.
A person who uses indecent or profane
language or sings any indecent or profane
song or ballad
(a) in a public place; or
(b) which is audible from a public place; or
(c) with intent to offend or insult any
person,
is guilty of an offence.
A person shall not, in any public place, or
within the hearing of any person in that
place:
(a) curse or swear
(b) use any profane, indecent, obscene,
offensive, or blasphemous language; or
(c) use any threatening, abusive, or insulting
words or behaviour calculated to provoke a
breach of the peace or whereby a breach of
the peace may be occasioned.
Any person who in or near a public place or
within the view or hearing of any person
being or passing therein or thereon
(a) writes or draws exhibits or displays an
indecent or obscene word figure or
representation;
(b) uses profane indecent or obscene
language or threatening abusive or insulting
words; or
(c) behaves in a riotous indecent offensive
or insulting manner (including behaviour
that involves a person exposing (to any
extent) the person's anal or genital region)
shall be guilty of an offence.
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Imprisonment
for 6 months,
a fine of
$2,000, or
both.
Imprisonment
for 6 months
or
10 penalty
units
(equivalent to
$1,334.50 as
of June 2021)
Fine of $250.

Imprisonment
for 3 years or
3 penalty
points
(equivalent to
$516 as of
June 2021)

Imprisonment
for 2 months
or 10 penalty
units
(equivalent to
$1,652.20 as
of June 2021)
for first
offence.
Imprisonment
for 3 months
or 15 penalty
units
(equivalent to
$2,478.30 as
of June 2021)
for second
offense.
Imprisonment
for 6 months
or 25 penalty
units
(equivalent to
$4,130.50 as
of June 2021)
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for third or
subsequent
offence.
There are no specific federal laws or state laws in ACT and WA for offensive language.

The Australian Capital Territory and Western Australia do not have any specific
laws in response to offensive language. Tasmania (included in this data set
analysis) had the highest maximum penalty of 3 years imprisonment or three
penalty units (equivalent to $516 as of June 2021) for offensive language. Four
jurisdictions had the option of imprisonment for a period of 6 months or less, or
financial reprimands. The remaining two jurisdictions had fines only. Although no
quantitative analysis can conclude an average sentence, the lack of criminal
defences for offensive language in two jurisdictions coupled with the potential for
perpetrators to avoid jail time in all jurisdictions suggests use of offensive
language is a ‘moderate’ crime. However, a broad range of maximum penalties,
from 3 years imprisonment to no relevant applicable law, may imply a national
indecisiveness about the severity of the behaviour or change social attitude to this
type of language.
Figure 44
Australian criminal laws for offensive behaviour that trolled journalists could use
derived from chapter 4.7 data
Criminal Laws for Offensive Behaviour
Trolling Example: “Go sit on a butcher’s knife so you can never reproduce” (Ford, 2016, p. 182)
Jurisdiction Law
Section
Description
Maximum
Penalty
ACT
Offensive
Section 392 of A person shall not in, near, or within the view 20 penalty
behaviour
the Crimes Act or hearing of a person in, a public place
units
1900 (ACT)
behave in a riotous, indecent, offensive or
(equivalent to
insulting manner.
$3,200 as of
June 2021)
NSW
Offensive
Section 4 of
A person must not conduct himself or herself
Imprisonment
conduct
the Summary
in an offensive manner in or near, or within
for 3 months
Offences Act
view or hearing from, a public place or a
or
1988 (NSW)
school.
6 penalty
units
(equivalent to
$660 as of
June 2021)
NT
Offensive
Section 47 of
Every person who is guilty:
Imprisonment
conduct
the Summary
(a) of any riotous, offensive, disorderly, or
for 6 months,
indecent behaviour, or of fighting, or using
a fine of
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Offences Act
1923 (NT)

QLD

Offensive
behaviour

Section 227 of
the Criminal
Code Act 1899
(Qld)

SA

Indecent
behaviour

Section 23 of
the Summary
Offences Act
1953 (SA)

TAS

Prohibited
behaviour

Section 21 of
the Police
Offenses Act
1935 (Tas)

VIC

Obscene,
indecent,
threatening
language
and
behaviour

Section 17 of
the Summary
Offences Act
1966 (Vic)

obscene language, in or within the hearing or
view of any person in any road, street,
thoroughfare or public place; (b) of
unreasonably causing substantial annoyance
to another person; or
(c) of unreasonably disrupting the privacy of
another person, shall be guilty of an offence.
Any person who:
(a) wilfully and without lawful excuse does
any indecent act in any place to which the
public are permitted to have access, whether
on payment of a charge for admission or not;
or
(b) wilfully does any indecent act in any place
with intent to insult or offend any person is
guilty of a misdemeanour.
A person who behaves in an indecent manner
(a) in a public place, or while visible from a
public place, or in a police station; or
(b) in a place, other than a public place or
police station, so as to offend or insult any
person, is guilty of an offence.
A person must not, wilfully and without
reasonable excuse, do any act or behave in a
manner that a reasonable person is likely to
find indecent or offensive in all the
circumstances, if that person knew or should
have known that his or her conduct was
being, or may have been, viewed by another
person.
Any person who in or near a public place or
within the view or hearing of any person
being or passing therein or thereon
(a) sings an obscene song or ballad;
(b) writes or draws exhibits or displays an
indecent or obscene word figure or
representation;
(c) uses profane indecent or obscene
language or threatening abusive or insulting
words; or
(d) behaves in a riotous indecent offensive or
insulting manner
shall be guilty of an offence.
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$2,000, or
both.

Imprisonment
for 2 years.

Fine of $250.

Imprisonment
for 1 year, 50
penalty points
(equivalent to
$8,600 as of
June 2021), or
both.
Imprisonment
for 2 months
or 10 penalty
units
(equivalent to
$1,652.20 as
of June 2021)
for first
offence.
Imprisonment
for 3 months
or 15 penalty
units
(equivalent to
$2,478.30 as
of June 2021)
for second
offense.
Imprisonment
for 6 months
or 25 penalty
units
(equivalent to
$4,130.50 as
of June 2021)
for third or
subsequent
offence.
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WA

Obscene
acts in
public

Section 202 of A person who does an obscene act in a public
the Criminal
place or in the sight of any person who is in a
Code Act
public place.
Compilation
Act 1913 (WA)
There are no specific federal laws for offensive behaviour.

Imprisonment
for 3 years

Offensive behaviour laws have the same fine (in South Australia) or higher
penalties (in all other jurisdictions) as offensive language laws. Western Australia
had the highest maximum penalty of three years imprisonment, Queensland had
two years, with all other six jurisdictions enabling the avoidance of jail time with
fines. Although no quantitative analysis can conclude an average sentence, data
suggests the Australian law considers offensive behaviour a ‘moderate’ crime.

Figure 45
Australian criminal laws for disorderly conduct that trolled journalists could use
derived from chapter 4.7 data
Criminal Laws for Disorderly Conduct
Trolling Example: A troll with the username Weev continuously relayed violent sexual fantasy about
sodomising women on IRC chat in December 2011 (Gorman, 2019)
Jurisdiction Law
Section
Description
Maximum
Penalty
NT
Disorderly Section 47 of Every person who is guilty:
Imprisonment
behaviour the Summary (a) of any riotous, offensive, disorderly, or
for 6 months
Offences Act
indecent behaviour, or of fighting, or using
or fine of
1923 (NT)
obscene language, in or within the hearing or
$2,000, or
view of any person in any road, street,
both.
thoroughfare or public place.
(b) of unreasonably causing substantial
annoyance to another person; or
(c) of unreasonably disrupting the privacy of
another person,
shall be guilty of an offence.
QLD
Public
Section 6 in
A person must not commit a public nuisance
Imprisonment
nuisance
the Summary offence.
for 6 months
Offences Act
A person commits a public nuisance offence if:
or 10 penalty
2005 (Qld)
(a) the person behaves in a disorderly way; or
points
(iv) an offensive way; or
(equivalent to
(v) a threatening way; or
$1,334.50 as
(vi) a violent way; and
of June 2021)
(b) the person’s behaviour interferes, or is
likely to interfere, with the peaceful passage
through, or enjoyment of, a public place by a
member of the public.
SA
Disorderly Section 7 of
A person who, in a public place or a police
Imprisonment
behaviour the Summary station:
for 3 months
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Offences Act
1953 (SA)

TAS

Public
annoyance

Section 13 of
the Police
Offenses Act
1935 (Tas)

VIC

Disorderly
conduct

WA

Disorderly
behaviour
in public

Section 17A
of the
Summary
Offences Act
1966 (Vic)
Section 74A
of the
Criminal Code
Act
Compilation
Act 1913
(WA)

(a) behaves in a disorderly or offensive
manner; or
(b) fights with another person; or uses
offensive language; or
(c) disturbs the public peace,
is guilty of an offence.
A person shall not, in a public place:
(a) behave in a violent, riotous, offensive, or
indecent manner
(b) disturb the public peace
(c) engage in disorderly conduct
(d) jostle, insult, or annoy any person
(e) commit any nuisance.
Any person who behaves in a disorderly
manner in a public place is guilty of an offence.

To behave in a disorderly manner includes
(a) to use insulting, offensive or threatening
language; and
(b) to behave in an insulting, offensive or
threatening manner.
A person who behaves in a disorderly manner
(a) in a public place or in the sight or hearing of
any person who is in a public place; or
(b) in a police station or lock-up
is guilty of an offence.
There are no specific federal or state civil laws in ACT or NSW for disorderly conduct.

or fine of
$1,250.

Imprisonment
for 3 months
or 3 penalty
points
(equivalent to
$516 as of
June 2021)
10 penalty
units
(equivalent to
$1,652.20 as
of June 2021)
Fine of
$6,000.

Northern Territory and Queensland had the highest maximum penalty of six
months imprisonment, South Australian and Tasmania had three months’
imprisonment, and Victoria and Western Australia had fines only. There were no
specific laws in the Australian Capital Territory or New South Wales.
While a single abusive comment can be unpleasant or offensive, it may not cause
a victim notable distress. However, a challenge of public spaces online is the
potential onslaught of harassment a single person can be subjected to from
multiple users over time (Jane, 2015). As such, legal responses can be difficult and
often ineffective for journalists to adopt against multiple trolls (Powell & Henry,
2015). Although academic research has found that women and non-heterosexuals
are more likely to experience abusive behaviours online (Powell & Henry, 2015),
the potential impact of trolling extends to all journalists who navigate the online
space as a fundamental part of their job. Extended periods of harassment can
discourage victims and inhibit equal participation. However, as extensive parts of
our lives are fused with online interactions, both socially and professionally, the
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law should provide protection.
Thomas et al (2015) compared trolling on public websites with crimes involving
bystander apathy. In the context of trolling, they defined active bystanders as key
stakeholders who can challenge harassment and abuse through reporting
violations of community standards and speaking up in support of victims. They
described social media companies as ‘corporate bystanders’ that can curb
disorderly conduct by enforcing policies. As explained in chapter 4.6 of this thesis
(on p. 202), social media hosts can improve responses to trolling both proactively
with the implementation of artificial intelligence, and reactively through quicker
removal of offensive commentary after a complaint has been made. Powell and
Henry (2015) encourage social media companies to take more proactive steps to
create meaningful and enforceable community standards as part of a synthesised
systems approach combating the malicious abuse they host.
Criminal laws for indecency
Indecency laws are presented in Figures 46 and 47 below. An example of trolling
in breach of the law is also provided.
Figure 46
Australian criminal laws for indecent material that trolled journalists could use
derived from chapter 4.7 data
Criminal Laws for Indecent Material
Trolling Example: Australian sports presenter Erin Molan received hordes of indecent and offensive threats
to rape her underage daughter (Molan, 2020)
Jurisdiction Law
Section
Description
Maximum
Penalty
SA
Indecent Section 33 of
A person who
Imprisonment
or
the Summary
(a) deposits indecent or offensive material in a
for 6 months
offensive Offences Act
public place or, except with the permission of
or fine of
material 1953 (SA)
the occupier, in or on private premises; or
$20,000.
(b) exhibits indecent material to a person so as
to offend or insult that person; or
(c) delivers or exhibits indecent or offensive
material to a minor (other than a minor of
whom the person is a parent or guardian)
is guilty of an offence.
There are no specific federal laws or state laws in ACT, NSW, NT, QLD, TAS, VIC and WA for indecent
material.
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South Australia is the only jurisdiction to specify a standalone law for indecent
material; however, trolling content of this nature has the potential to fall under
the three umbrella laws governing obscenity for other jurisdictions.

Figure 47
Australian criminal laws for indecent exposure that trolled journalists could use
derived from chapter 4.7 data
Criminal Laws for Indecent Exposure
Trolling Example: Australian feminist writer Clementine Ford screenshotted and published messages from
men sending her abuse, unsolicited dick pics, or misguided requests for nudes (Bruce-Smith, 2017)
Jurisdiction Law
Section
Description
Maximum
Penalty
ACT
Indecent
Section 392 of A person who offends against decency by the
Imprisonment
exposure
the Crimes Act exposure of his or her person in a public
for 1 year, 20
1900 (ACT)
place, or in any place within the view of a
penalty units
person who is in a public place, commits an
(equivalent to
offence.
$3,200 as of
June 2021), or
both.
NSW
Obscene
Section 5 of
A person shall not, in or within view from a
Imprisonment
exposure
the Summary
public place or a school, wilfully and
for 6 months
Offences Act
obscenely expose his or her person.
or 10 penalty
1988 (NSW)
units
(equivalent to
$1,100 as of
June 2021)
NT
Indecent
Section 50 of
Any person who offends against decency by
Imprisonment
exposure
the Summary
the exposure of his person in any street or
for 6 months,
Offences Act
public place, or in the view thereof, shall be
a fine of
1923 (NT)
guilty of an offence.
$2,000, or
both.
QLD
Wilful
Section 9 in
A person in a public place must not wilfully
Imprisonment
exposure
the Summary
expose his or her genitals, unless the person
for 1 year or
Offences Act
has a reasonable excuse. It is a circumstance
40 penalty
2005 (Qld)
of aggravation for this section for a person to points
wilfully expose his or her genitals so as to
(equivalent to
offend or embarrass another person.
$5,338 as of
June 2021)
SA
Indecent
Section 23 of
A person who, in a public place, or while
Imprisonment
behaviour the Summary
visible from a public place or from occupied
for 6 months
Offences Act
premises, wilfully does a grossly indecent act, or a fine of
1953 (SA)
whether alone or with another person, is
$2,500.
guilty of an offence.
TAS
Prohibited Section 21 of
A person must not, wilfully and without
Imprisonment
behaviour the Police
reasonable excuse, do any act or behave in a
for 1 year, 50
Offences Act
manner that a reasonable person is likely to
penalty points
1935 (Tas).
find indecent or offensive in all the
(equivalent to
circumstances, if that person knew or should
$8,600 as of
have known that his or her conduct was
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VIC

Sexual
exposure

WA

Indecent
act with
intent to
offend

Section 19 of
the Summary
Offences Act
1966 (Vic)

being, or may have been, viewed by another
person.
A person (A) commits an offence if:
(a) A exposes (to any extent) A's genitals; and
(b) A intends to expose (to any extent) A's
genitals; and
(c) the exposure is sexual; and
(d) the exposure is in, or is within the view of,
a public place.
A person who does an indecent act in any
place with intent to insult or offend any
person is guilty of a crime.

Section 204 of
the Criminal
Code Act
Compilation
Act 1913 (WA)
There are no specific federal laws for indecent exposure.

June 2021), or
both.
Imprisonment
for 2 years.

Imprisonment
for 1 year or a
fine of
$12,000.

Victoria had the highest maximum penalty for indecent exposure of two years
imprisonment, four jurisdictions had one year imprisonment or a fine, and three
had six months imprisonment or a fine. With an average maximum penalty of 0.93
years imprisonment, the data suggests the offense can attract a lower punishment
term and may indicate that Australian law considers indecent exposure a
‘moderate’ crime.
In response to escalating incidents of indecent exposure online, the Australian
government introduced Federal intimate image laws in 2018 (De Fina & Haider,
2019. The Enhancing Online Safety Act (Non-Consensual Sharing of Intimate
Images) Act 2018 (Cth) amends the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) by inserting
section 474.17A. Also known as revenge porn laws, but more accurately known as
image-based sexual abuse laws, the section criminalised the transmission, making
available, publication, distribution, advertisement, or promotion of “private
sexual material” as defined in the Act, without the affected person’s consent.
Although their introduction received significant media traction, their relevance is
not widely applicable to journalists whose abusers are more often strangers or
former associates who would not have access to naked photos of them. For this
reason, these laws were excluded from the data set.
A study by the International Women’s Media Foundation (2018) stated
“overwhelming” (Ferrier, 2018, p. 48) female journalists report regularly
receiving sexually explicit images, comments, emails, or text messages during the
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course of a regular day at work, as reflected in the findings in chapter 4.1 of this
study (on p. 30). Ranging from unsolicited photographs of the sender’s genitals to
repeated sexual requests, the constant barrage of graphic content has become a
normalised “common part” of contemporary journalism (West, 2015, para. 2).
Anonymity is a reoccurring obstruction to the prosecution of perpetrators. In
these cases, legislative action against social media organisations is the only
available legal avenue. This strategy has had limited success in the Australian
courts.
Critics have suggested that the burden of prosecution for trolling should not be
placed exclusively on victims, and law enforcement officers should play a more
active role in policing applicable laws (Citron, 2014; Greig, 2016; Jane 2015;
Gorman, 2019; Molan 2020). Because they are so rarely used successfully,
indecency laws have been described as “pathetic”, “piecemeal” and “completely
inadequate” by Nigel Phair, the director of Centre for Internet Safety at the
University of Canberra and former long-time Australian Federal Police officer
(Phair, as cited in Gorman, 2019, p. 115). As a person with extensive knowledge
and personal experience on such an issue, Phair expressed grave concerns about
current law enforcement processes. When it comes to police, he suggested, “their
days are full of policing terrestrial crimes” and frankly they are “still trying to come
to grapple with what cyberhate is… let alone building the capacity and capability
to investigate such matters” (p. 115). Australian police may require further
training about application of relevant laws to trolling incidents as suggested in
interviews with Mark Pearson and Mark Polden and other supporting literature
(Jane 2015; Greig, 2016; Gorman, 2019; Molan 2020).
Criminal laws for vilification
There are two types of vilification: unlawful vilification, which is a civil matter, and
serious vilification, which is a criminal offence. Unlawful vilification holds no
criminal charge and is covered under Australian civil laws. If the unlawful
vilification includes a threat of harm to a person or their property, or inciting
others to threaten physical harm to a person or their property, it is a criminal
offence. This is called serious vilification and is a police matter (Queensland
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Human Rights Commission, 2021). For ease of comparison, the study grouped all
vilification laws together within the civil law discussion section.
Flowchart of Australian civil laws
Two critical requirements must be met before a civil legal pathway can commence.
These requirements are: the identity of the troll must be known, and troll must be
located in Australia. An additional key consideration is the economic status of the
troll. Civil law, also known as private law, concerns the rights and obligations of
journalists in their relationship with other individuals and companies. As
explained by Pearson and Polden (2015): “such cases usually result in courts
ordering the unsuccessful party to perform or refrain from some action or make
some payment in compensation for damage they have caused” (p. 66). These
actions can include publishing apologies or retractions, refraining from publishing
or removing online content. If the abuser does not have adequate finances to
warrant pursuing damages, a lawsuit against the social media company that hosts
the trolling content could be considered. If removal of the content is a priority, a
civil case may still be pursued at the expense of the victim, the employer or
insurance. Debate surrounds the fairness of the current Australian civil laws,
which can burden the victim with hefty legal fees (Gittins, 2017), further straining
the already delicate state of their mental health. A possible solution to this would
be payment of legal fees by media employers, but that would still leave freelance
journalists vulnerable. If a troll is being sued, breaching, defying, or ignoring a civil
court order may become a criminal matter, by way of the law of contempt
(Pearson & Polden, 2019). These three key considerations were included in the
constructed flowchart of Australian civil laws displayed in Figure 48 over the two
pages that follow.
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Figure 48 Flowchart of civil laws that trolled journalists could use derived from chapter 4.7 data
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Descriptive tables of Australian civil laws
Through thematic analysis of qualitive and quantitative data results, the study
identified three civil law themes of defamation, personal injury and vilification in
addition to the seven criminal law themes described prior. Each theme was
investigated to determine which Australian laws journalists could use to seek
damages against a perpetrator under each individual category. No maximum
penalty is listed as the amount of damages varies depending on the circumstances
of each particular case. The study provides one example of trolling for each civil
law theme. The findings are categorised by theme, then by jurisdiction, and are
presented in the descriptive tables that follow. Each table is followed by a brief
discussion to provide context for critical analysis.
Australian vilification laws
For ease of comparison, the study grouped all vilification laws together and briefly
re-described their differences before the analysis and discussion in the following
section. There are two types of vilification: unlawful vilification, which is a civil
matter, and serious vilification, which is a criminal offence. Unlawful vilification
that holds no criminal charge and is covered under Australian civil laws. If the
unlawful vilification includes a threat of harm to a person or their property, or
inciting others to threaten physical harm to a person or their property, it is a
criminal offence. This is called serious vilification and is a police matter
(Queensland Human Rights Commission, 2021). Australian laws divide vilification
into six sub-categories that include racial, religious, sexuality, gender-identity,
HIV/AIDS, and disability vilification. Both serious vilification (criminal) and civil
vilification laws that journalists could use to prosecute a troll for each category
will be discussed collectively.
Australian laws for racial vilification
As defined by the Australian Human Rights Commission (2021a) “racial
discrimination is when a person is treated less favourably than another person in
a similar situation because of their race, colour, descent, national or ethnic origin
or immigrant status” (para. 1), whereas racial vilification is “doing something in
public based on the race, colour, national or ethnic origin of a person or group of
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people which is likely to offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate” (para. 6). Racial
hatred is universally addressed as an offensive and prohibited act under
Australian legislation, however, while such behaviour may be unlawful it is not
necessarily a criminal offence under the legislation as described in in Figure 49
below. An example of trolling in breach of the law also provided.
Figure 49
Australian laws for racial vilification that trolled journalists could use derived from
chapter 4.7 data
Australian Laws for Racial Vilification
Trolling Example: “You pathetic fucking black cunt” (Participant 1 in section 4.2 of this study)
Section 46P of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth) allows journalists to make
complaints to the Race Discrimination Commissioner who in 2021 was Chin Tan, or the Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Social Justice Commissioner who in 2021 was June Oscar.
Criminal Laws
Jurisdiction

Law

Section

Description

ACT

Vilification

Section 67A of
the Criminal
Code 2002
(ACT)

SA

Racial
vilification

Section 4 of
the Racial
Vilification Act
1996 (SA)

WA

Conduct
intended to
incite racial
animosity or
racist
harassment
Conduct
intended to
racially
harass

Section 77 of
the Criminal
Code Act
Compilation
Act 1913 (WA)

A person commits an offence if
(a) the person intentionally carries out an act; and
(b) the act is a threatening act; and
(c) the person is reckless about whether the act
incites hatred toward, revulsion of, serious
contempt for, or severe ridicule of, a person or
group of people on the ground of any of the
following:
(i) race
(d) the act is done other than in private; and
(e) the person is reckless about whether the act is
done other than in private.
A person must not, by a public act, incite hatred
towards, serious contempt for, or severe ridicule of,
a person or group of persons on the ground of their
race by
(a) threatening physical harm to the person, or
members of the group, or to property of the person
or members of the group; or
(b) inciting others to threaten physical harm to the
person, or members of the group, or to property of
the person or members of the group.
Any person who engages in any conduct, otherwise
than in private, by which the person intends to
create, promote or increase animosity towards, or
harassment of, a racial group, or a person as a
member of a racial group, is guilty of a crime.

WA

Section 80A of
the Criminal
Code Act

Any person who engages in any conduct, otherwise
than in private, by which the person intends to
harass a racial group, or a person as a member of a
racial group, is guilty of a crime.
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Penalty
50 penalty
points
(equivalent to
$8,000 as of
June 2021).

Imprisonment
for 3 years, a
fine of $5,000,
or both.

Imprisonment
for 14 years.

Imprisonment
for 5 years.
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Compilation
Act 1913 (WA)
“Unlawful” Civil Laws
Federal

Unlawful
offensive
behaviour
because of
race, colour
or national
or ethnic
origin
Unlawful
racial
vilification

Section 18C of
the Racial
Discrimination
Act 1975 (Cth)

It is unlawful for a person to do an act, otherwise
than in private, if:
(a) the act is reasonably likely, in all the
circumstances, to offend, insult, humiliate or
intimidate another person or a group of people; and
(b) the act is done because of the race, colour or
national or ethnic origin of the other person or of
some or all of the people in the group.
NSW
Section 20C of It is unlawful for a person, by a public act, to incite
the Antihatred towards, serious contempt for, or severe
Discrimination ridicule of, a person or group of persons on the
Act 1977
ground of the race of the person or members of the
(NSW)
group. In this Division, ‘public act’ includes:
(a) any form of communication to the public,
including speaking, writing, printing, displaying
notices, broadcasting, telecasting, screening and
playing of tapes or other recorded material, and
(b) the distribution or dissemination of any matter
to the public with knowledge that the matter
promotes or expresses hatred towards, serious
contempt for, or severe ridicule of, a person or
group of persons on the ground of the race of the
person or members of the group.
QLD
Unlawful
Section 124A
A person must not, by a public act, incite hatred
racial
of the Antitowards, serious contempt for, or severe ridicule of,
vilification
Discrimination a person or group of persons on the ground of the
Act 1991 (Qld) race, religion, sexuality or gender identity of the
person or members of the group.
SA
Racial
Section 73 of
The act of racial victimisation means a public act
victimisation the Civil
inciting hatred, serious contempt or severe ridicule
Liability Act
of a person or group of persons on the ground of
1936 (SA)
their race but does not include
(a) publication of a fair report of the act of another
person; or
(b) publication of material in circumstances in
which the publication would be subject to a defence
of absolute privilege in proceedings for defamation;
or (c) a reasonable act, done in good faith, for
academic, artistic, scientific or research purposes or
for other purposes in the public interest (including
reasonable public discussion, debate or expositions)
TAS
Unlawful
Section 19 of
A person, by a public act, must not incite hatred
inciting
the Antitowards, serious contempt for, or severe ridicule of,
hatred
Discrimination a person or a group of persons on the ground of the
Act 1998 (Tas) race of the person or any member of the group.
VIC
Unlawful
Section 7 of
A person must not, on the ground of the race of
racial
the Racial and another person or class of persons, engage in
vilification
Religious
conduct that incites hatred against, serious
Tolerance Act
contempt for, or revulsion or severe ridicule of, that
2001 (Vic)
other person or class of persons.
No specific religious vilification laws in relation to online abuse in NT.

Unlawful act.
No criminal
charge
applicable.

Unlawful act.
No criminal
charge
applicable.

Unlawful act.
No criminal
charge
applicable.
The total
amount of the
damages that
may be
awarded for
the same act
or series of
acts cannot
exceed
$40,000

Unlawful act.
No criminal
charge
applicable.
Unlawful act.
No criminal
charge
applicable.

Of the six vilification themes identified, racial vilification accrued the highest
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number of specified criminal laws, totalling four. Racial vilification was considered
illegal in three jurisdictions. Western Australia had a significantly higher
maximum penalty for inciting racial vilification of 14 years imprisonment. South
Australia was the only other jurisdiction with potential jail time, set at three years.
Five jurisdictions considered racial vilification an “unlawful act” to which no
criminal charge is applicable. This may indicate that Australian law considers
racial vilification a ‘less serious’ crime. On analysis of Australian Capital Territory
law, the study identified section 72 of the Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT) clearly
states, “unlawful act provides no basis for civil action”. This statement is noted as
an outlier; unlawful acts do provide the basis for civil action under Federal, New
South Wales, Queensland, Tasmania, and Victoria jurisdictions.
Racial vilification laws are not often successful
Each of the nine Australian jurisdictions addresses hate speech in different ways
with varying levels of intensity, and the absence of a unified criminal policy
highlights the fine line between opinion and bigotry. Although these laws are
aimed to prohibit inciting hatred or ridicule, data from a 2021 report by the
Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission revealed that in 20
years, only one successful racial vilification prosecutions had been successful in
Victoria (Cotrell v Smith, 2019). A 2019 ABC article by Sarah Jane Bell, retrieved
within the archival evidence of this chapter, was of particularly significant insight.
Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commissioner Kristen Hilton
explained that current laws burdened the victim with the onus to prove the troll’s
behaviour and would instigate further hateful conduct by a third person and this
“threshold for meeting the vilification test is simply too high” (Hilton, as cited in
Bell, 2021, para. 16) and “needed to be changed” (para. 19). Hilton explained “the
reason many enquiries were not progressed was because, under the current act,
the victim needed to be able to name the person who allegedly vilified the victim”
(para. 21), which was often difficult to obtain for abuse that occurred online.
Hilton labelled the current Victorian legislation “convoluted and cumbersome”
(para. 31). Although public awareness of the impact of vilification is growing,
online incidents continue to rise, indicating legal reform is required to find a better
balance between free speech and vilification prevention: but legislation is only
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part of the problem. As Ackoff’s (1974) System Theory that underpins this study
suggests, legislative change in conjunction with community awareness and
education is the key to more effective prevention strategies.
Extensive exemption list
Australian legislation has an extensive list of public interest exemptions to racial
vilification laws. In a further amendment of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975
(Cth), the Racial Hatred Act 1995 (Cth) permits multiple exclusions including
words said in reasonably good faith in the performance or exhibition of artistic
work; statements, publication and discussions of scientific and academic purpose
or genuine public interest; and fair and accurate reporting. However, section 18D
noted a further exemption: “a fair comment on any event or matter of public
interest if the comment is an expression of a genuine belief held by the person
making the comment.” The study questions the use of this exemption as a trolling
defence and suggests abusive racial comments should be considered unlawful,
irrelevant of the troll’s belief that the comments are true. A troll’s genuine belief
of the truth of an abusive comment should not affect its unlawful status.
Considering the trolling example of Australian AFL player Adam Goodes
(Blackwell, 2015) who was frequently abused by opponents’ fans both verbally
and online, the study suggests that whether Goodes’s abusers held a genuine belief
that his appearance was similar to an ape should be irrelevant to their label as
unlawful. The study suggests a more appropriate measure to determine the lawful
status of abuse should be consideration of the pain and suffering these comments
caused the victim. Although the study grants the notion the public should have a
right to freely express their thoughts and opinions, this should not be permitted if
it is at the expense of another person’s emotional and mental well-being. The
study suggests the growing acknowledgement of the grave impacts racial abuse
can have on victims may warrant a review of these laws.
Outlier
Racial hatred is universally addressed as an offensive and prohibited act under
Australian legislation; however, while such behaviour may be unlawful, it is not
necessarily a criminal offence under the legislation and does not necessarily
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provide the grounds for civil action. Section 72 of the Discrimination Act 1991
(ACT) clearly states, “unlawful act provides no basis for civil action” and highlights
such laws may more accurately be a list of guidelines, with minimal consequences
for those who choose not to abide by them.
Andrew Bolt case study
Although racial vilification is ‘unlawful’ in Victoria, a notable Australian case study
is the class action against journalist Andrew Bolt. Under section 18C of the
Australian Human Rights Commission, a complaint was made about two articles
by Andrew Bolt that implied light-skinned people who identified as Aboriginal did
so for personal gain (Ritchie, 2011). The first ‘It’s so hip to be black’ was published
by the Herald Sun newspaper and republished on websites The Herald and Weekly
Times under the title ‘White is the new black’ on April 15, 2009 (Eatock v Bolt).
The second article ‘‘White fellas in the black’ was published by the same news
organisations on August 21, 2009, in both print and online (Eatock v Bolt). The
Federal Court of Australia found that the article had breached section 18C and
ordered that the Herald Sun and Weekly Times publish an article of equal
prominence to publicise the court’s decision. The plaintiff, Pat Eatock, did not seek
compensation and only sought a declaration from the court that the writing and
publishing of the articles was unlawful, an apology, an order preventing
republication, and for the articles to be taken down from websites. Therefore, Bolt
was not prosecuted, convicted, fined, jailed, or even made to pay compensation for
his actions. The news organisation (not Bolt) was ordered to pay substantial legal
costs, although the exact amount was not made public.
The price of free speech is that society accepts that people should generally be
able to make offensive commentary; however, there are limits. Education is a key
strategy in building a culture of tolerance and non-discrimination, and the law is
one useful tool that helps to achieve this by setting out appropriate standards of
conduct. People are more likely to speak out in public against racism if the law
supports their position and, conversely, are less likely to engage in racial
vilification if the law makes it unlawful (Human Rights Law Centre, 2014). In this
way, the law is an important tool that complements education to combat racism.
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It is also important to provide access to legal remedies for victims of racial
vilification. Groups that experience racial vilification are often unable to
participate in the public debate on an equal footing with others and racial
vilification can have the perverse impact of causing affected people and groups to
retreat from public participation (Human Rights Law Centre, 2014). The Andrew
Bolt case involved Australia’s most widely read columnist unreasonably and in
bad faith engaging in conduct reasonably likely to racially offend, insult, humiliate
and intimidate light-skinned Aboriginal people. The law provided an important
tool to address this in a way that public debate was unable to.
Australian laws for religious vilification
Religious vilification is less frequently discussed than racial vilification but it is
succinctly defined by Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission
(2021) as: “when a person behaves in a way that encourages hatred, revulsion or
ridicule of another person, because of the other person's religion” (para. 3). Such
behaviours can diminish the dignity and self-worth of a victim, affect an
individual’s ability to contribute to society, and undermine community harmony
and social cohesion. Australian religious vilification laws are presented in Figure
50 below with an example of trolling in breach of the law also provided.
Figure 50
Australian laws for religious vilification that trolled journalists could use derived
from chapter 4.7 data
Australian Laws for Religious Vilification
Trolling Example: “Poofter Muslims like you receive the death penalty in your country, go home”
(Participant 5 in section 4.2 of this study)
Section 46P of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth) allows journalists to make
complaints to the Race Discrimination Commissioner Chin Tan (in 2021) or Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Social Justice Commissioner June Oscar (in 2021).
Criminal Laws
Jurisdiction Law
Section
Description
Maximum
Penalty
ACT
Vilification Section 67A of A person commits an offence if
50 penalty
the Criminal
(a) the person intentionally carries out an act;
points
Code 2002
and
(equivalent
(ACT)
(b) the act is a threatening act; and
to $8,000
(c) the person is reckless about whether the act
as of June
incites hatred toward, revulsion of, serious
2021)
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contempt for, or severe ridicule of, a person or
group of people on the ground of any of the
following:
(i) religious conviction
(d) the act is done other than in private; and
(e) the person is reckless about whether the act
is done other than in private.
“Unlawful” Civil Laws
Federal
Unlawful
offensive
behaviour
because of
race,
colour or
national
or ethnic
origin
QLD
Unlawful
racial
vilification

Section 18C of
the Racial
Discrimination
Act 1975 (Cth)

Section 124A
of the AntiDiscrimination
Act 1991 (Qld)

TAS

Unlawful
inciting
hatred

Section 19 of
the AntiDiscrimination
Act 1998 (Tas)

VIC

Unlawful
racial
vilification

Section 7 of
the Racial and
Religious
Tolerance Act
2001 (Vic)

It is unlawful for a person to do an act, otherwise
than in private, if:
(a) the act is reasonably likely, in all the
circumstances, to offend, insult, humiliate or
intimidate another person or a group of people;
and
(b) the act is done because of the race, colour or
national or ethnic origin of the other person or of
some or all of the people in the group.
A person must not, by a public act, incite hatred
towards, serious contempt for, or severe ridicule
of, a person or group of persons on the ground of
the race, religion, sexuality or gender identity of
the person or members of the group.
A person, by a public act, must not incite hatred
towards, serious contempt for, or severe ridicule
of, a person or a group of persons on the ground
of the religious belief or affiliation or religious
activity of the person or any member of the
group.
A person must not, on the ground of the race of
another person or class of persons, engage in
conduct that incites hatred against, serious
contempt for, or revulsion or severe ridicule of,
that other person or class of persons.

Unlawful
act.
No
criminal
charge
applicable.

Unlawful
act.
No
criminal
charge
applicable.
Unlawful
act.
No
criminal
charge
applicable.
Unlawful
act.
No
criminal
charge
applicable.

No specific religious vilification laws in relation to online abuse in NSW, NT, SA and WA

At a federal level, Section 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) makes it
unlawful to offend someone based on their religious conviction, but not a crime.
Serious religious vilification was considered illegal in the Australian Capital
Territory only, with the maximum penalty consisting of a fine with no jail time.
Religious vilification was considered an unlawful act to which no criminal charge
was applicable and commencing civil claims for compensation is the only option
in four jurisdictions. An additional four jurisdictions did not specify any law in
relation to religious vilification. The data may indicate that Australian law
considers religious vilification a ‘less serious’ crime.
Australian religious vilification laws are lenient in comparison to countries where
religious expression is practised more widely as a fundamental part of social
Chapter 4.7 Legal responses results and discussion

327

culture. Focussing on Australia’s blasphemy laws, senior lecturer in constitutional
law at Western Sydney University Luke Beck (2017) explains, “the crime of
blasphemy is not about vilifying or inciting hatred against people on the basis of
their religion, it is about protecting God and Christian doctrine from scurrilous
commentary, and Christian religious sensibilities from offence” (para. 5).
Therefore, Australia’s blasphemy laws, which Queensland and Western Australia
abolished, are not included in this section, but are considered for comparison with
more disciplinary international laws for global contextualisation. In 2021, eight
Islamic countries of Nigeria, Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan, Somalia, Mauritania,
Saudi Arabia, and Brunei, it is a criminal offense to publicly doubt or deny the
existence of God or Allah or to criticise religious laws such as Sharia. Offenses are
considered capital offence (Humanists International, 2021). Although most of
these countries have signed international agreements to treat all citizens equally,
these laws fail to respect the rights of atheists and those with differing beliefs.
Prison time can be served in an additional 47 countries for criticisms of faith,
including academic study of the origins of religions. Although Australia is a nondenominational country, widespread multi-culturalism provides a rich and
diverse range of religious expressions. Legislation should prioritise inclusiveness,
respect cultural diversity, and protect the right to express ideologies free from
abuse.
Australian laws for disability vilification
The definition of disability in the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) is
deliberately broad and does not require any assessment of the severity, type,
permanency, or when or how it was acquired. In addition, the disability may not
be current and could be in the past, future or imputed. Disability discrimination is
a rare type of trolling about a journalist who is discriminated against for having a
disability; however, it is hard to envision a circumstance in which the troll had the
power to implement the discrimination. While disability vilification is also not
considered commonly applicable, it was raised as a potential legal avenue in
interviews with Mark Polden in this chapter and is therefore briefly explored. Of
particular importance for this section, the study recognised spokesperson and
Australian journalist Nas Campanella, who is the current disability affairs reporter
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for the ABC. Australian disability vilification laws are presented in Figure 51
below.

Figure 51
Australian laws for disability vilification that trolled journalists could use derived
from chapter 4.7 data
Australian Laws for Disability Vilification
Trolling Example: “WTF is that? Looks like something that was partially digested by my dog” (Findlay, 2016)
Section 46P of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth) allows journalists to make
complaints to the Disability Discrimination Commissioner, a position held in 2021 by Dr Ben Gauntlett.
Criminal Laws
Jurisdiction Law
Section
Description
Maximum
Penalty
ACT
Vilification
Section 67A of A person commits an offence if
50 penalty
the Criminal
(a) the person intentionally carries out an act;
points
Code 2002
and
(equivalent
(ACT)
(b) the act is a threatening act; and
to $8,000
(c) the person is reckless about whether the act as of June
incites hatred toward, revulsion of, serious
2021)
contempt for, or severe ridicule of, a person or
group of people on the ground of any of the
following:
(i) disability
(d) the act is done other than in private; and
(e) the person is reckless about whether the act
is done other than in private.
“Unlawful” Civil Laws
Federal

TAS

Unlawful
direct
disability
discrimination

Section 5 of
the Disability
Discrimination
Act 1992 (Cth)

Unlawful
inciting
hatred

Section 19 of
the AntiDiscrimination
Act 1998 (Tas)

For the purposes of this Act, a person (the
discriminator) discriminates against another
person (the aggrieved person) on the ground of
a disability of the aggrieved person if, because
of the disability, the discriminator treats, or
proposes to treat, the aggrieved person less
favourably than the discriminator would treat
a person without the disability in
circumstances that are not materially different.
A person, by a public act, must not incite hatred
towards, serious contempt for, or severe
ridicule of, a person or a group of persons on
the ground of any disability of the person or
any member of the group.

Unlawful
act.
No
criminal
charge
applicable.

Unlawful
act.
No
criminal
charge
applicable.
No specific disability vilification laws in relation to online abuse NSW, NT, QLD, SA, VIC and WA

The study notes sustained abuse by a person or group would be required for a
disability vilification claim to go to court. Disability vilification is illegal in the
Australian Capital Territory only, with the maximum penalty consisting of a fine
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with no jail time. Disability vilification is stated as an unlawful act in two other
jurisdictions (Federal and Tasmania), which are outlined under civil laws later in
this chapter. Six jurisdictions did not specify any related law. The data may
indicate that Australian law considers disability vilification a ‘less serious’ crime
or that it is covered by other legislation.
The lack of universal disability anti-vilification laws in Australia highlights a gap
in the national statutory regime and bridging this gap is suggested by Cullen,
Mandikos and Vario (2010) as a starting point towards redressing society’s
negative perceptions of people with disabilities, and thereby also addressing some
of the great difficulties that confront people with disabilities. Although 1981 was
formally recognised as the ‘International Year of Disabled Persons’ and was
dedicated to raising public awareness of the systematic exclusion and
stigmatisation of people with disabilities (Cullen, Mandikos & Vario, 2010), over
40 years later in 2021, the general attitude and social perception of people with
disabilities remains largely unchanged. While derogatory comments such as ‘you
are a spastic’ and ‘retarded’ (Chapter 4.2 findings on p. 54) are often made in jest,
they are nevertheless evidence of a problem with the way disability is perceived
within society, and remarks about disabilities are still used as an expression of
contempt and derision in contemporary discourse (Tillers, 2020). Given that one
in six, or 4.4 million Australians, live with a disability (Australian Institute of
Health and Welfare, 2020) and 35.9% of Australia’s 8.9 million households include
a person with disability, which includes mental health (Australian Network on
Disability, 2021), the absence of protection by any criminal laws is disconcerting,
considering this portion represents Australia’s largest minority group and
arguably one of the most vulnerable.
Australian laws for sexuality vilification
Sexuality vilification is defined as: “communications made in public that incite
hatred towards, serious contempt for, or severe ridicule of, a person or group of
people on the ground of their sexual orientation” (Australian Human Rights
Commission, 2021b) and may include graffiti, comments made on radio or
television, web pages with public access or verbal abuse in a public place. These
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laws are presented in Figures 52 below. Sexuality vilification, gender identity
vilification and HIV/AIDS vilification are discussed in collaboration after the three
tables that follow.
Figure 52
Australian laws for sexual vilification that trolled journalists could use derived from
chapter 4.7 data
Australian Laws for Sexuality Vilification
Trolling Example: “Fat-arsed whore who can’t get laid” (Ford, 2016, p. 172)
Section 46P of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth) allows journalists to make
complaints to the Sex Discrimination Commissioner, a position in 2021 held by Kate Jenkins.
Criminal Laws
Jurisdiction Law
Section
Description
Maximum
Penalty
ACT
Vilification
Section 67A of A person commits an offence if
50 penalty
the Criminal
(a) the person intentionally carries out an act;
points
Code 2002
and
(equivalent
(ACT)
(b) the act is a threatening act; and
to $8,000
(c) the person is reckless about whether the act as of June
incites hatred toward, revulsion of, serious
2021)
contempt for, or severe ridicule of, a person or
group of people on the ground of any of the
following:
(i) sex characteristics or sexuality
(d) the act is done other than in private; and
(e) the person is reckless about whether the act
is done other than in private.
“Unlawful” Civil Laws
Federal

NSW

Unlawful
discrimination
on the ground
of sexual
orientation

Section 5A of
the Sex
Discrimination
Act 1984 (Cth)

Unlawful
homosexual
Vilification

Section 49ZT
of the AntiDiscrimination

For the purposes of this Act, a person (the
discriminator) discriminates against another
person (the aggrieved person) on the ground of
the aggrieved person’s sexual orientation if, by
reason of:
(a) the aggrieved person’s sexual orientation;
or
(b) a characteristic that appertains generally to
persons who have the same sexual orientation
as the aggrieved person; or
(c) a characteristic that is generally imputed to
persons who have the same sexual orientation
as the aggrieved person;
the discriminator treats the aggrieved person
less favourably than, in circumstances that are
the same or are not materially different, the
discriminator treats or would treat a person
who has a different sexual orientation.
It is unlawful for a person, by a public act, to
incite hatred towards, serious contempt for, or
severe ridicule of, a person or group of persons
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criminal
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QLD

Unlawful
sexuality
vilification

TAS

Unlawful
inciting
hatred

Act 1977
(NSW)
Section 124A
of the AntiDiscrimination
Act 1991 (Qld)

on the ground of the homosexuality of the
person or members of the group.
A person must not, by a public act, incite hatred
towards, serious contempt for, or severe
ridicule of, a person or group of persons on the
ground of the race, religion, sexuality or gender
identity of the person or members of the group.

Section 19 of
the AntiDiscrimination
Act 1998 (Tas)

A person, by a public act, must not incite hatred
towards, serious contempt for, or severe
ridicule of, a person or a group of persons on
the ground of the sexual orientation or lawful
sexual activity of the person or any member of
the group.
No specific sexuality vilification laws in relation to online abuse in NT, SA, VIC and WA

charge
applicable.
Unlawful
act.
No
criminal
charge
applicable.
Unlawful
act.
No
criminal
charge
applicable.

Sexuality vilification is considered illegal in the Australian Capital Territory only,
with the maximum penalty consisting of a fine with no jail time. Sexuality
vilification is an unlawful act in four other jurisdictions (Federal, New South
Wales, Queensland, and Tasmania). An additional four jurisdictions (Northern
Territory, South Australia, Victoria, and Western Australia) did not specify any
related law. The data may indicate that Australian law considers sexual vilification
as a ‘less serious’ crime.
Australian laws for gender identity vilification
Gender identity vilification is defined as “communications made in public that
incite hatred towards, serious contempt for, or severe ridicule of, a person or
group of people on the ground of their sex and/or gender identity” (Australian
Human Rights Commission, 2021b). Relevant Australian legislation is presented
in Figure 53 below.
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Figure 53
Australian laws for gender identity vilification that trolled journalists could use
derived from chapter 4.7 data
Australian Laws for Gender Identity Vilification
Trolling Example: “Trannies getting forgery won’t change your gender, it will only turn you into a deformed
freak” (Gibbs, 2015)
Section 46P of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth) allows journalists to make
complaints to the Sex Discrimination Commissioner, a position in 2021 held by Kate Jenkins.
Criminal Laws
Jurisdiction Law
Section
Description
Maximum
Penalty
ACT
Vilification
Section 67A of A person commits an offence if
50 penalty
the Criminal
(a) the person intentionally carries out an act; points
Code 2002
and
(equivalent
(ACT)
(b) the act is a threatening act; and
to $8,000
(c) the person is reckless about whether the
as of June
act incites hatred toward, revulsion of, serious 2021).
contempt for, or severe ridicule of, a person or
group of people on the ground of any of the
following:(i) gender identity
(d) the act is done other than in private; and
(e) the person is reckless about whether the
act is done other than in private.
“Unlawful” Civil Laws
Federal
Unlawful
Section 5B of
For the purposes of this Act, a person (the
Unlawful
discrimination the Sex
discriminator) discriminates against another
act.
on the ground Discrimination person (the aggrieved person) on the ground
No
of gender
Act 1984 (Cth) of the aggrieved person’s gender identity if, by criminal
identity
reason of:
charge
(a) the aggrieved person’s gender identity; or
applicable.
(b) a characteristic that appertains generally
to persons who have the same gender identity
as the aggrieved person; or
(c) a characteristic that is generally imputed
to persons who have the same gender identity
as the aggrieved person
the discriminator treats the aggrieved person
less favourably than, in circumstances that are
the same or are not materially different, the
discriminator treats or would treat a person
who has a different gender identity.
Federal
Unlawful
Section 5C of
For the purposes of this Act, a person (the
Unlawful
discrimination the Sex
discriminator) discriminates against another
act.
on the ground Discrimination person (the aggrieved person) on the ground
No
of intersex
Act 1984 (Cth) of the aggrieved person’s intersex status if, by criminal
status
reason of:
charge
(a) the aggrieved person’s intersex status; or
applicable.
(b) a characteristic that appertains generally
to persons of intersex status; or
(c) a characteristic that is generally imputed
to persons of intersex status
the discriminator treats the aggrieved person
less favourably than, in circumstances that are
the same or are not materially different, the
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discriminator treats or would treat a person
who is not of intersex status.
NSW
Unlawful
Section 38S of It is unlawful for a person, by a public act, to
Unlawful
transgender
the Antiincite hatred towards, serious contempt for,
act.
vilification
Discrimination or severe ridicule of:
No
Act 1977
(a) a person on the ground that the person is a criminal
(NSW)
transgender person, or
charge
(b) a group of persons on the ground that the
applicable.
members of the group are transgender
persons.
QLD
Unlawful
Section 124A
A person must not, by a public act, incite
Unlawful
gender
of the Antihatred towards, serious contempt for, or
act.
identity
Discrimination severe ridicule of, a person or group of
No
vilification
Act 1991 (Qld) persons on the ground of the race, religion,
criminal
sexuality or gender identity of the person or
charge
members of the group.
applicable.
TAS
Unlawful
Section 19 of
A person, by a public act, must not incite
Unlawful
inciting
the Antihatred towards, serious contempt for, or
act.
hatred
Discrimination severe ridicule of, a person or a group of
No
Act 1998 (Tas) persons on the ground of the gender identity
criminal
or intersex variations of sex characteristics of
charge
the person or any member of the group.
applicable.
No specific gender identity vilification laws in relation to online abuse in NT, SA, VIC and WA

Gender identity vilification is considered illegal in the Australian Capital Territory
only, with the maximum penalty consisting of a fine with no jail time. Gender
identity vilification is an unlawful act in four jurisdictions (Federal, New South
Wales, Queensland, and Tasmania). An additional four jurisdictions (Northern
Territory, South Australia, Victoria, and Western Australia) did not specify any
related law. The data may indicate that Australian law considers gender identity
vilification as a ‘less serious’ crime.
Australian laws for HIV/AIDS vilification
HIV/AIDS vilification is defined as “inciting hatred towards, revulsion of, serious
contempt for, or severe ridicule of, a person or group of people on the ground of
their HIV/AIDS status (meaning a person who has the Human Immunodeficiency
Virus or Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome)” (Australian Human Rights
Commission, 2021b) as presented in Figure 54 below.
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Figure 54
Australian laws for HIV/AIDS that trolled journalists could use derived from chapter
4.7 data
Australian Laws for HIV/AIDS Vilification
Trolling Example: “Poofterism should be illegal, there’s no cure for that illness you know” (Participant 5 in
section 4.2 of this study)
Section 46P of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth) allows journalists to make
complaints to the Sex Discrimination Commissioner, a position in 2021 held by Kate Jenkins.
Criminal Laws
Jurisdiction Law
Section
Description
Maximum
Penalty
ACT
Vilification
Section 67A of A person commits an offence if
50 penalty
the Criminal
(a) the person intentionally carries out an act;
points
Code 2002
and
(equivalent
(ACT)
(b) the act is a threatening act; and
to $8,000
(c) the person is reckless about whether the act
as of June
incites hatred toward, revulsion of, serious
2021)
contempt for, or severe ridicule of, a person or
group of people on the ground of any of the
following:
(i) HIV/AIDS status
(d) the act is done other than in private; and
(e) the person is reckless about whether the act
is done other than in private.
“Unlawful” Civil Laws
Federal
Unlawful
Section 5 of
For the purposes of this Act, a person (the
Unlawful
direct
the Sex
discriminator) discriminates against another
act.
disability
Discrimination person (the aggrieved person) on the ground of
No
discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) a disability of the aggrieved person if, because of criminal
the disability, the discriminator treats, or
charge
proposes to treat, the aggrieved person less
applicable.
favourably than the discriminator would treat a
person without the disability in circumstances
that are not materially different.
NSW
Unlawful
Section 49ZXB It is unlawful for a person, by a public act, to
Unlawful
HIV/AIDS
of the Antiincite hatred towards, serious contempt for, or
act.
vilification
Discrimination severe ridicule of a person or group of persons
No
Act 1977
on the ground that the person is, or members of
criminal
(NSW)
the group are HIV/AIDS infected or thought to
charge
be HIV/AIDS infected (whether or not actually
applicable.
HIV/AIDS infected).
TAS
Unlawful
Section 19 of
A person, by a public act, must not incite hatred
Unlawful
inciting
the Antitowards, serious contempt for, or severe ridicule act.
hatred
Discrimination of, a person or a group of persons on the ground No
Act 1998 (Tas) of any disability of the person or any member of criminal
the group.
charge
applicable.
No specific HIV/AIDS vilification laws in relation to online abuse in NT, QLD, SA, VIC and WA

HIV/AIDS vilification was considered illegal in the Australian Capital Territory
only, with the maximum penalty consisting of a fine with no jail time. HIV/AIDS
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vilification was considered an unlawful act to which no criminal charge is
applicable in three jurisdictions. An additional five jurisdictions did not specify
any related law. The data may indicate that Australian law considers HIV/AIDS
vilification as a ‘less serious’ crime.
Discussion
Increasing media and scholarly attention has discussed the implications of sexual
harassment online revealing women, along with the lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender, gender diverse, intersex, queer, asexual and questioning community
are the predominant targets (Powell & Henry, 2017). These claims were
supported by interviews with ten Australian trolled journalists in chapter 4.1 (on
p. 30). Although campaigns such as #MeToo have prioritised sexual harassment
that occurs in person, when it occurs online, the applicability of existing legislation
is altered, and this presents difficulties for law enforcement (Silver Sweeney,
2014; Citron, 2014). The emerging grey area has allowed abuse to flourish and its
impacts on victims to be ignored (West, 2015; Williams; 2016). This study
highlights the persistent and pervasive problem that inhibits online equality and
suggests the scope of sexual harassment may be an indicator of a broader pattern
of gender inequality and misogyny. As reflected by the feminist paradigm of this
study, trolling behaviours are embedded in hegemonic masculine stereotypes and
are a manifestation of gender power relations that serve to reinforce heterosexual
and patriarchal ideologies.
An example arose in a 2004 case study when Sydney radio hosts John Laws and
Steve Price were found to be in breach of homosexual vilification under the AntiDiscrimination Act 1997 (NSW). Listener Gary Burns had lodged a complaint after
a discussion on radio 2UE about a gay couple on the television program The Block.
This complaint process excludes the impact of offensive comments on members
of the public who do not wish to pursue legal action at their own expense. This
study suggests the laws should look at ways to punish vilification without the need
for members of the public to personally initiate legal processes, a finding of this
study also noted by Gelber and McNamara (2016). Price referred to the two men
as “young poofs” and said that on the “uncut” version of The Block, “they could do
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all sorts of grubby things at 11 o’clock at night.” Laws also referred to them as “a
couple of young poofs” and said: “I don’t know what’s happened to Kerry
[Packer]’s taste” (Burns v Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd & Ors, 2004). The NSW
Administrative Decisions Tribunal stated, “even if done in good faith and in the
public interest [the comments were] not reasonable” and the pair were forced to
issue an on-air apology, a written apology to be printed in The Sydney Morning
Herald and pay Mr Burns legal costs. In addition, 2UE made a $10,000 donation to
the HIV-AIDS charity the Bobby Goldsmith Foundation and promote the
foundation with community service advertisements (AAP, 2008). However,
payment of damages by way of compensation was not awarded to Mr Burns. The
study highlights the onus on someone taking offense, rather the law working
proactively, to curb such vilification, a significant legal issue for future research to
extend on.
Australia civil laws for personal injury claims against troll
Personal injury damages include “death, pre-natal injury, impairment of a
person’s physical or mental condition and disease caused by the fault of another
person” as defined in section 11 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA). Although no
laws exist at federal level, Figures 55, 56, 57 and 58 describe Australian civil laws
a journalist could implement to seek personal injury damages against a troll for
online abuse.
Figure 55
Australian civil laws for damaged for past economic loss that trolled journalists
could use derived from chapter 4.7 data
Jurisdiction
ACT

NSW

Australian Civil Laws for Damages for Past Economic Loss
Law
Section
Description
Damages Section 33 of the
In assessing damages for loss of earnings in relation to a
for loss
Civil Law
claim, the court must disregard earnings above the limit of 3
of
(Wrongs) Act
times average weekly earnings a week.
earnings 2002 (ACT)
Loss of earnings means past economic loss because of loss of
earnings or the deprivation or impairment of earning
capacity.
Damages Section 12 of the
This section applies to an award of damages for past
for past
Civil Liability Act
economic loss due to loss of earnings or the deprivation or
economic 2002 (NSW)
impairment of earning capacity, or
loss
In the case of any such award, the court is to disregard the
amount (if any) by which the claimant’s gross weekly
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earnings would (but for the injury or death) have exceeded
an amount that is 3 times the amount of average weekly
earnings at the date of the award.
NT
Damages Section 20 of the
In assessing damages to be awarded for:
for loss
Personal Injuries
(a) past pecuniary loss due to loss of earnings or the
of
(Liabilities and
deprivation or impairment of earning capacity;
earning
Damages) Act
A court must disregard the amount (if any) by which the
capacity
2003 (NT)
injured person's gross weekly earnings would, but for the
personal injury, have exceeded an amount that is 3 times
average weekly earnings as published before 1 January
preceding the date on which the assessment is made.
QLD
Damages Section 54 of the
In making an award of damages for loss of earnings,
for loss
Civil Liability Act
including in a dependency claim, the maximum award a court
of
2003 (Qld)
may make is for an amount equal to the limit.
earnings
The limit is an amount equal to the present value of 3 times
average weekly earnings per week for each week of the
period of loss of earnings.
SA
Damages Section 54 of the
If the injured person was incapacitated for work, damages
for loss
Civil Liability Act
for loss of earning capacity are not to be awarded in respect
of
1936 (SA)
of the first week of the incapacity.
earning
Total damages for loss of earning capacity (excluding interest
capacity
awarded on damages for any past loss) are not to exceed the
prescribed maximum.
TAS
Damages Section 26 of the
Where a person is entitled to damages in respect of loss of
for loss
Civil Liability Act
earning capacity, a court must not award those damages on
of
2002 (Tas)
the basis the person was, or may have been capable of,
earning
earning income at greater than 3 times the adult average
capacity
weekly earnings as last published by the Australian Bureau
of Statistics before damages are awarded.
VIC
Damages Section 28F of the This section applies to an award of damages for past
for past
Wrongs Act 1958
economic loss due to loss of earnings or the deprivation or
economic (Vic)
impairment of earning capacity.
loss
The maximum amount of damages that may be awarded for
each week of the period of loss of earnings is an amount that
is 3 times the amount of average weekly earnings at the date
of the award.
WA
Damages Section 11 of the
In assessing damages for loss of earnings, the court is to
for loss
Civil Liability Act
disregard earnings lost to the extent that they would have
of
2002 (WA)
accrued at a rate of more than 3 times the average weekly
earnings
earnings at the date of the award.
Loss of earnings means past economic loss due to loss of
earnings or the deprivation or impairment of earning
capacity.
There are no specific federal laws for damages for past economic loss.
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Figure 56
Australian civil laws for damaged for future economic loss that trolled journalists
could use
Jurisdiction
ACT

NSW

NT

NT

QLD

SA

Australian Civil Laws for Damages for Future Economic Loss
Law
Section
Description
Damages for
Section 33 of the In assessing damages for loss of earnings in relation to a
loss of
Civil Law
claim, the court must disregard earnings above the limit of
earnings
(Wrongs) Act
3 times average weekly earnings a week.
2002 (ACT)
Loss of earnings means future economic loss because of
loss of earnings or the deprivation or impairment of
earning capacity.
Damages for
Section 12 of the This section applies to an award of damages:
future
Civil Liability Act (a) for future economic loss due to the deprivation or
economic loss 2002 (NSW)
impairment of earning capacity, or
(b) for the loss of expectation of financial support.
In the case of any such award, the court is to disregard the
amount (if any) by which the claimant’s gross weekly
earnings would (but for the injury or death) have
exceeded an amount that is 3 times the amount of average
weekly earnings at the date of the award.
Damages for
Section 20 of the In assessing damages to be awarded for:
loss of
Personal Injuries
(a) future pecuniary loss due to the deprivation or
earning
(Liabilities and
impairment of earning capacity; or
capacity
Damages) Act
(b) the loss of expectation of financial support,
2003 (NT)
A court must disregard the amount (if any) by which the
injured person's gross weekly earnings would, but for the
personal injury, have exceeded an amount that is 3 times
average weekly earnings as published before 1 January
preceding the date on which the assessment is made.
Future
Section 21 of the A court may award damages for future pecuniary loss only
pecuniary
Personal Injuries
if satisfied by the claimant that the assumptions about the
loss
(Liabilities and
injured person's future earning capacity, or the occurrence
Damages) Act
of other events on which the award is to be based, accord
2003 (NT)
with the injured person's most likely future circumstances
had the personal injury not occurred.
If a court is satisfied under subsection (1) about the
claimant's assumptions, it must adjust the amount of
damages for future pecuniary loss (as assessed on those
assumptions) by reference to the percentage possibility
that the events might have occurred regardless of the
personal injury.
In awarding damages for future pecuniary loss, the court
must state the assumptions on which the award is based
and the relevant percentage by which damages have been
adjusted.
Calculating
Section 57 of the When assessing an amount of damages as a lump sum for
present value Civil Liability Act a future loss or gratuitous services, the amount must be
of future loss
2003 (Qld)
the present value, calculated using the prescribed discount
rate, of the future loss or gratuitous services.
Lump sum
Section 55 of the (a) an injured person is to be compensated by way of lump
compensation Civil Liability Act sum for loss of future earnings or other future losses; and
for future
1936 (SA)
(b) an actuarial multiplier is used for the purpose of
losses
calculating the present value of the future losses, then, in
determining the actuarial multiplier, a prescribed discount
rate is to be applied.
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TAS

Damages for
loss of
earning
capacity

Section 28A of
the Civil Liability
Act 2002 (Tas)

If an award of damages is to include any component
assessed as a lump sum for future loss, the present value
of that future loss is to be qualified by adopting –
(a) a discount rate of 5 per cent; or
(b) if another discount rate is prescribed, that other
discount rate.
VIC
Damages for
Section 28F of
This section applies to an award of damages:
future
the Wrongs Act
(a) for future economic loss due to the deprivation or
economic loss 1958 (Vic)
impairment of earning capacity; or
(b) for the loss of expectation of financial support.
The maximum amount of damages that may be awarded
for each week of the period of loss of earnings is an
amount that is 3 times the amount of average weekly
earnings at the date of the award.
WA
Damages for
Section 11 of the In assessing damages for loss of earnings, the court is to
loss of
Civil Liability Act disregard earnings lost to the extent that they would have
earnings
2002 (WA)
accrued at a rate of more than 3 times the average weekly
earnings at the date of the award.
Loss of earnings means future economic loss due to loss of
prospective earnings or the deprivation or impairment of
prospective earning capacity.
There are no specific federal laws for damages for future economic loss.

Figure 57
Australian civil laws for damaged for superannuation loss that trolled journalists
could use derived from chapter 4.7 data
Jurisdiction
NSW

QLD

TAS

Australian Civil Laws for Damages for Superannuation Loss
Law
Section
Description
Damages for
Section 15C of
The maximum amount of damages that may be awarded
loss of
the Civil Liability for economic loss due to the loss of employer
superannuation Act 2002 (NSW)
superannuation contributions is the relevant percentage
entitlements
of damages payable (in accordance with this Part) for the
deprivation or impairment of the earning capacity on
which the entitlement to those contributions is based.
The relevant percentage is the percentage of earnings
that is the minimum percentage required by law to be
paid as employer superannuation contributions.
Damages for
Section 56 of the The maximum amount of damages that may be awarded
loss of
Civil Liability Act to an employee for economic loss due to the loss of
superannuation 2003 (Qld)
employer superannuation contributions is the relevant
entitlements
percentage of damages payable (in accordance with this
part) for the deprivation or impairment of the earning
capacity on which the entitlement to the contributions is
based.
The relevant percentage is the percentage of earnings
that is the minimum percentage required by a written
law to be paid on the employee’s behalf as employer
superannuation contributions.
Damages for
Section 25 of the The maximum amount of damages that may be awarded
loss of
Civil Liability Act for economic loss due to the loss of employer
superannuation 2002 (Tas)
superannuation contributions is the relevant percentage
entitlements
of damages payable for the deprivation or impairment of
the earning capacity on which the entitlement to those
contributions is based.
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There are no specific federal laws or state laws in ACT, NT, SA, VIC, and WA for damages for
superannuation loss.

Figure 58
Australian civil laws for damaged for non-economic loss that trolled journalists
could use derived from chapter 4.7 data
Australian Civil Laws for Damages for Non-Economical Loss (Pain and Suffering)
Jurisdiction
Law
Section
Description
Cap on
damages (as
of August
2021)
ACT
Damages for
Section 99 of In deciding damages for non-economic loss, $350,000
non-economic the Civil Law a court may refer to earlier decisions of
loss
(Wrongs) Act that or other courts for the purpose of
2002 (ACT)
establishing the appropriate award in the
proceeding.
For that purpose, the parties to the
proceeding or their lawyers may bring the
court’s attention to awards of damages for
non-economic loss in those earlier
decisions.
This section does not change the rules for
deciding other damages. In this section:
non-economic loss includes the following:
(a) pain and suffering
(b) loss of amenities of life
(c) loss of expectation of life
NSW
Damages for
Section 16 of No damages may be awarded for non$687,000
non-economic the Civil
economic loss unless the severity of the
loss
Liability Act
non-economic loss is at least 15% of a most
2002 (NSW)
extreme case.
The maximum amount of damages may be
awarded only in a most extreme case.
NT
Damages for
Section 27 of A court must not award damages for non$432,500
nonthe Personal
pecuniary loss if the court determines the
pecuniary
Injuries
degree of permanent impairment to be less
loss
(Liabilities
than 5% of the whole person.
and
When awarding damages for nonDamages)
pecuniary loss, a court must award the
Act 2003
following amount:
(NT)
(a) if the court determines the degree of
permanent impairment to be 85% or more
of the whole person – the maximum
amount:
(b) if the court determines the degree of
permanent impairment to be not less than
15% and not more than 84% of the whole
person – the relevant percentage of the
maximum amount on a sliding scale.
QLD
Calculating
Section 62 of For an injury arising after 1 December
No maximum
general
the Civil
2002, general damages must be calculated
damages
Liability Act
by reference to the general damages
2003 (Qld)
calculation provisions applying to the
period within which the injury arose.
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SA

Damages
mental harm

Section 53 of
the Civil
Liability Act
1936 (SA)

TAS

Damages for
non-economic
loss (general
damages)

Section 28 of
the Civil
Liability Act
2002 (Tas)

VIC

Fixing
damages for
non-economic
loss
Damages for
nonpecuniary
loss (general
damages)

Section 28G
of the
Wrongs Act
1958 (Vic)
Section 9 of
the Civil
Liability Act
2002 (WA)

WA

Damages may only be awarded for mental
harm if the injured person
(a) was physically injured in the accident
or was present at the scene of the accident
when the accident occurred; or
(b) is a parent, spouse, domestic partner or
child of a person killed, injured or
endangered in the accident.
Damages may only be awarded for pure
mental harm if the harm consists of a
recognised psychiatric illness.
Damages may only be awarded for
economic loss resulting from consequential
mental harm if the harm consists of a
recognised psychiatric illness.
In determining damages for non-economic
loss, a court may refer to earlier decisions
of that or other courts for the purpose of
establishing the appropriate award in the
proceedings.
For that purpose, the parties to the
proceedings or their counsel may bring the
court's attention to awards of damages for
non-economic loss in those earlier
decisions.
The maximum amount of damages that
may be awarded to a claimant for noneconomic loss is $577,050.

If the amount of non-pecuniary loss is
assessed to be not more than Amount A for
the year in which the amount is assessed,
no damages are to be awarded for nonpecuniary loss.
If the amount of non-pecuniary loss is
assessed to be more than Amount A but not
more than Amount C for the year in which
the amount is assessed, damages for nonpecuniary loss are not to be awarded in an
amount that is more than the excess of the
amount assessed over Amount A.
Non-pecuniary loss means:
(a) pain and suffering; and
(b) loss of amenities of life; and
(c) loss of enjoyment of life; and
(d) curtailment of expectation of life; and
(e)bodily or mental harm.
There are no specific federal laws for damages for non-economic loss.

No maximum

$350,000

$577,050

$407,500

The study identified the cap for damages for non-economic loss in six jurisdictions.
New South Wales had the highest cap of $687,000 and the Australian Capital
Territory and Tasmania had the lowest, set at $350,000. The caps increase over
time and the figure is set by the Attorney General of each state or territory;
however, there are some provisions for aggravated damages, which can be higher.
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Queensland and South Australia do not have maximum damages and provisions
are calculated applying to the period within which the injury arose. The universal
adoption of this maximum amount may suggest a national consensus about the
attributed severity of personal injury claims.
Legal debate about personal injury claims for online abuse continues to play out
in court. In a 2020 defamation case, Kellie Smith and Stacey Isaac were ordered to
pay a combined total of $150,000 for ten social media posts they made about a
wedding planner Tristan Moy. The courts awarded damages for three purposes:
personal distress, injury to personal and business reputation, and vindication of
reputation (Moy v Smith & Isaac, 2020). Media coverage of successful cases has
begun to influence public understanding of the laws. However, the continued
presence of trolling online suggests limited impact.
Australian civil laws for duty of care against employer
Under civil laws for personal injury, journalists can seek damages against their
employer under the grounds the media organisation failed in their duty of care to
intervene and protect the victim. These laws are described in Figure 59 below;
however, no laws are specified at federal level.
Figure 59
Australian civil laws for duty of care that trolled journalists could use derived from
chapter 4.7 data
Jurisdiction
ACT

Law
Mental
harm
duty
of care

Civil Laws for Duty of Care
Section
Description
Section 34 of the
A person (the defendant) does not owe a duty to another person
Civil Law (Wrongs) (the plaintiff) to take care not to cause the plaintiff mental harm
Act 2002 (ACT)
unless a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would
have foreseen that a person of normal fortitude in the plaintiff’s
position might, in the circumstances of the case, suffer a
recognised psychiatric illness if reasonable care were not taken.
For the application of this section in relation to pure mental
harm to a person, the circumstances of the case to which the
court must have regard include:
(a) whether or not the mental harm was suffered as the result of
a sudden shock; and
(b) whether the plaintiff witnessed, at the scene, a person being
killed, injured, or put in danger; and
(c) the nature of the relationship between the plaintiff and
anyone killed, injured, or put in danger; and(d)whether or not
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NSW

Duty
of care

Section 5B of the
Civil Liability Act
2002 (NSW)

QLD

Breach
of
duty

Section 9 of the
Civil Liability Act
2003 (Qld)

SA

Mental
harm
duty
of care

Section 33 of the
Civil Liability Act
1936 (SA)

there was a pre-existing relationship between the plaintiff and
the defendant.
For the application of this section in relation to consequential
mental harm to a person, the circumstances of the case to which
the court must have regard include the nature of the bodily
injury out of which the mental harm arose.
This section does not affect the duty of care a person (the
defendant) has to another person (the plaintiff) if the defendant
knows, or ought reasonably to know, that the plaintiff is a
person of less than normal fortitude.
A person is not negligent in failing to take precautions against a
risk of harm unless:
(a) the risk was foreseeable (that is, it is a risk of which the
person knew or ought to have known), and
(b) the risk was not insignificant, and
(c) in the circumstances, a reasonable person in the person’s
position would have taken those precautions.
In determining whether a reasonable person would have taken
precautions against a risk of harm, the court is to consider the
following (amongst other relevant things):
(a) the probability that the harm would occur if care were not
taken,
(b) the likely seriousness of the harm,
(c) the burden of taking precautions to avoid the risk of harm,
(d) the social utility of the activity that creates the risk of harm.
A person does not breach a duty to take precautions against a
risk of harm unless:
(a) the risk was foreseeable (that is, it is a risk of which the
person knew or ought reasonably to have known); and
(b) the risk was not insignificant; and
(c) in the circumstances, a reasonable person in the position of
the person would have taken the precautions.
In deciding whether a reasonable person would have taken
precautions against a risk of harm, the court is to consider the
following (among other relevant things):
(a) the probability that the harm would occur if care were not
taken;
(b) the likely seriousness of the harm;
(c) the burden of taking precautions to avoid the risk of harm;
(d) the social utility of the activity that creates the risk of harm.
A person (the defendant) does not owe a duty to another person
(the plaintiff ) to take care not to cause the plaintiff mental harm
unless a reasonable person in the defendant's position would
have foreseen that a person of normal fortitude in the plaintiff's
position might, in the circumstances of the case, suffer a
psychiatric illness.
For the purposes of this section:
(a) in a case of pure mental harm, the circumstances of the case
to which the court is to have regard include the following:
(i) whether or not the mental harm was suffered as the result of
a sudden shock;
(ii)whether the plaintiff witnessed, at the scene, a person being
killed, injured or put in peril;
(iii) the nature of the relationship between the plaintiff and any
person killed, injured or put in peril;
(iv) whether or not there was a pre-existing relationship
between the plaintiff and the defendant;
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TAS

Breach
of
Duty

Section 11 of the
Civil Liability Act
2002 (Tas)

TAS

Mental
harm
duty
of care

34 of the Civil
Liability Act 2002
(Tas)

VIC

Duty
of care

Section 28F of the
Wrongs Act 1958
(Vic)

(b) in a case of consequential mental harm, the circumstances of
the case include the nature of the bodily injury out of which the
mental harm arose.
This section does not affect the duty of care of a person (the
defendant) to another (the plaintiff) if the defendant knows, or
ought reasonably to know, that the plaintiff is a person of less
than normal fortitude.
A person does not breach a duty to take reasonable care unless:
(a) there was a foreseeable risk of harm (that is, a risk of harm
of which the person knew or ought reasonably to have known);
and
(b) the risk was not insignificant; and
(c) in the circumstances, a reasonable person in the position of
the person would have taken precautions to avoid the risk.
In deciding whether a reasonable person would have taken
precautions against a risk of harm, the court is to consider the
following (among other relevant things):
(a) the probability that the harm would occur if care were not
taken;
(b) the likely seriousness of the harm;
(c) the burden of taking precautions to avoid the risk of harm;
(d) the potential net benefit of the activity that exposes others to
the risk of harm.
A person ("the defendant") does not owe a duty to another
person ("the plaintiff") to take care not to cause the plaintiff
mental harm unless a reasonable person in the position of the
defendant ought to have foreseen that a person of normal
fortitude might, in the circumstances of the case, suffer a
recognised psychiatric illness if reasonable care were not taken.
For the purpose of the application of this section in respect of
pure mental harm, the circumstances of the case include the
following:
(a) whether or not the mental harm was suffered as the result of
a sudden shock;
(b) whether or not there was a pre-existing relationship
between the plaintiff and the defendant.
For the purpose of the application of this section in respect of
consequential mental harm, the circumstances of the case
include the nature and extent of personal injury suffered by the
plaintiff.
This section does not require the court to disregard what the
defendant knew or ought to have known about the fortitude of
the plaintiff.
A person is not negligent in failing to take precautions against a
risk of harm unless:
(a) the risk was foreseeable (that is, it is a risk of which the
person knew or ought to have known); and
(b) the risk was not insignificant; and
(c) in the circumstances, a reasonable person in the person's
position would have taken those precautions.
In determining whether a reasonable person would have taken
precautions against a risk of harm, the court is to consider the
following (amongst other relevant things):
(a) the probability that the harm would occur if care were not
taken;
(b) the likely seriousness of the harm;
(c) the burden of taking precautions to avoid the risk of harm;
(d) the social utility of the activity that creates the risk of harm.
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WA

Mental
harm
duty
of care

Section 55 of the
Civil Liability Act
2002 (WA)

A person (the defendant) does not owe a duty of care to another
person (the plaintiff) to take care not to cause the plaintiff
mental harm unless the defendant ought to have foreseen that a
person of normal fortitude might, in the circumstances of the
case, suffer a recognised psychiatric illness if reasonable care
were not taken.
For the purpose of the application of this section in respect of
pure mental harm, the circumstances of the case include the
following:
(a) whether or not the mental harm was suffered as the result of
a sudden shock;
(b) whether the plaintiff witnessed, at the scene, a person being
killed, injured or put in peril;
(c) the nature of the relationship between the plaintiff and any
person killed, injured or put in peril;
(d) whether or not there was a pre-existing relationship
between the plaintiff and the defendant.
For the purpose of the application of this section in respect of
consequential mental harm, the circumstances of the case
include the personal injury suffered by the plaintiff.
This section does not require the court to disregard what the
defendant knew or ought to have known about the fortitude of
the plaintiff.
There are no specific federal laws or NT laws for damages for duty of care.

In addition to chapter 4.2’s findings (on p. 54), academic research (Citron, 2014;
Jane, 2015; Phillips, 2015) and mainstream media (Bartlett, 2013; Greig, 2016;
Williams, 2016; Tuohy, 2019; Molan, 2020; Hyland, 2021) have now documented
the emotional and psychological distress that online abuse has on all genders,
presenting a serious workplace issue for Australian newsrooms. In-depth analysis
of specific responses to trolling by The Sydney Morning Herald, News.com and ABC
were discussed in chapter 4.6 (on p. 202); however, the slow implementation of
strategies, and the absence of universal approach, suggests some Australian
newsrooms could be exposed to potential duty of care claims.
Landmark case
One such example occurred on February 22, 2019, in the landmark case YZ (a
pseudonym) v The Age Company Limited. The County Court of Victoria awarded
$180,000 in damages to a former (unnamed) journalist at The Age. In a world first,
the judge ruled the newsroom was responsible for the journalist's PTSD because
it failed to provide a safe workplace (Edraki & Carrick, 2019). In damning witness
evidence, the editorial training manager of The Age voiced frustration at being
unable to persuade management to implement a suitable training and support
program in comparison to the ABC, which had had a peer-support program in
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place for a decade (Ricketson & Wake, 2019). Recommendations for media outlets
to seriously consider risk management programs that include training programs,
peer support and self-recognition symptoms are no longer novel; however,
prioritising their value and implementing these strategies within Australian
newsrooms is varied and discussed in chapter 4.6 (on p. 202).
Post-Traumatic Stress
Historically, the idea of journalists suing their employers for occupational posttraumatic stress was unheard of and newsroom culture dictated that journalists
performed any task required of them without question (Ricketson & Wake, 2019).
This newsroom culture developed as a key contributor to journalists feeling
unable to express concerns about workplace trauma for fear of appearing
unsuitable to the profession (Oakham, 2004; Ricketson & Wake, 2019). However,
the seminal case emerged as a catalyst for widespread debate criticising the lack
of accountability altered by media organisations for similar cases of psychiatric
injury caused by online abuse endured in the workplace. The landmark ruling
against The Age could have far-reaching implications for newsrooms and force
them to reconsider their duty of care when it comes to trauma and mental health
of employees (Edraki & Carrick, 2019). In another milestone case on October 23,
2019, Seven Network was forced to pay House Rules reality TV contestant Nicole
Prince damages for psychological injury caused by the online abuse she received
after appearing on the show. The constant barrage including threats of physical
assault made her fearful for her life, compromised her personal safety and
obstructed her ability to obtain work (Chung, 2019). Although the precedent has
been set for journalists to sue employers for trolling-related post-traumatic stress,
there is no evidence of widespread use of this pathway in the current media
landscape (as at June 2021), but this does not rule out the existence of such cases.
Executive director of the Dart Centre for Journalism and Trauma Bruce Sharpio
suggests they “usually get settled out of court” (Sharpio, as cited in Edraki &
Carrick, para. 18) and are therefore not accessible in retrievable archival evidence.
Systems approach is required
While giving evidence at the 2018 hearing of the Australian Senate enquiring into
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the adequacy of existing offences in the Commonwealth Criminal Code and of state
and territory criminal laws to capture cyberbullying, law firm Maurice Blackburn
argued in order to protect journalists who are required to communicate online as
part of their work, there should be: “enforceable sanctions against employers who
fail in the duty of care to provide a safe workplace for their employees” (as cited
in Gorman, 2019, p. 81). However, employment lawyer, Josh Bornstein proposed
the responsibility for maintaining a safe social media space “should probably not
fall solely on employers” (Bornstein, as cited in Gorman, 2019, p. 71), which
resonates with a multilayered approach to the workplace health and safety issue
of cyberhate in support of Ackoff’s (1974) Systems Theory. Although research by
Posetti in 2018 had established training modules for larger news organisation
such as Nine (formerly Fairfax Media), Nine refused to provide a copy of for
analysis in this study. As Posetti was unavailable for an interview during the
duration of this study, a booklet funded by United Nations Educations Scientific
and Cultural Organisation’s (UNESCO) and made by Ireton and Posetti (2018)
called, Journalism, 'fake news' and disinformation: A handbook for journalism
education and training, was obtained for analysis. However, as previously
discussed (on p. 238), the information provided was vague, did not provide
relevant workplace training and was of minimal use for employers and working
journalists in Australia. Specific guidelines determining best-practice remain a
widely debated and not yet adequately resolved issue of the Australian
contemporary media landscape. Duty of care legislation and workers’
compensation are interwoven; however, duty of care claims must prove the
employer is at fault.
Australian civil laws for workers compensation
Workers’ compensation is legislation that provides financial compensation for
employees injured at work (Oxford English Dictionary, 2021) to cover employee
wages while they are not fit for work, in addition to medical expenses and
rehabilitation (Fair Work Australia, 2021). Australian workers’ compensation and
injury management schemes are based on a ‘no-fault’ principle, which means
trolled journalists who suffered a psychological harm do not have to establish that
their employer was at fault or negligent to make a claim (Work Cover WA, 2021).
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Under civil laws for personal injury, journalists can also seek damages from
employees and insurance companies under workers compensation. Due to the
length of these documents, individual descriptions were excluded from the data
set. The acts for each jurisdiction are listed in the following table, however, there
are no acts specified at federal level or in the Northern Territory.
Figure 60
Australian civil laws worker’s compensation that trolled journalists could use
Australian Civil Laws for Workers Compensation
Law
Section
Workers’
Section 31 of the Workers Compensation Act 1951 (ACT)
Compensation
NSW
Workers’
Section 149 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW)
Compensation
QLD
Workers’
Section 33 of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation
Compensation Act 2003 (Qld)
SA
Workers’
Section 30 of the Return to Work Act 2014 (SA)
Compensation
TAS
Workers’
Section 32 of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation
Compensation Act 1988 (Tas)
VIC
Workers’
Section 8 of the Workers Compensation Act 1958 (Vic)
Compensation
WA
Workers’
Section 18 of the Workers’ Compensation and Injury
Compensation Management Act 1981(WA)
There are no specific federal or NT laws for workers compensation.
Jurisdiction
ACT

There are no studies that confirm the most effective strategies for managing
online harassment (Slaughter & Newman, 2020) and proposed anti-trolling laws
in 2022 are debated and further criticised to potentially “worsen online abuse”
(Karp, 2022, para. 1). However, failure to protect journalists from abuse resulting
in personal injury provides the grounds for workers’ compensation claims. As
outlined by the Dart Centre for Journalism and Trauma, several claims have been
successfully prosecuted on the basis, “the worker failed to establish that the risk
of suffering a recognisable psychiatric was reasonably foreseeable” by the
employer (Knoester, 2014, para. 14). This causative link was first brought to light
in the seminal study by psychologist Cait McMahon (1993) who found not only do
journalists report quite serious trauma at the time of covering stories of a critical
nature, but they also continued to experience residual effects afterwards, with
some of the symptoms in the realm of post-traumatic stress and acute stress
disorders. McMahon went on to establish the Australasian branch of the Dart
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Centre for Journalism and Trauma six years later in 1999, compiling academic
research to cultivate a more universal acceptance about the potential impacts of
post-traumatic stress within the contemporary journalism community. Growing
documented evidence soon warranted consideration in Australian courtrooms,
and while the courts commonly deal with such claims, it was not until February
22, 2019, in the previously discussed case of YZ (a pseudonym) v The Age Company
Limited, that journalists were considered to fall within this scope. Although the
case was not about trolling and was not the first time a journalist had sued over
occupational post-traumatic stress, it was the first time one had succeeded and set
the precedent for future verdicts (Edraki & Carrick, 2019). Common-law claims
for psychiatric injury suffered in the workplace are often the most complex and
difficult matters for personal injury practitioners (Knoester, 2014).
Civil laws for defamation
Prior to the internet, the impact of defamation law was largely limited to national
borders; therefore, conflicts that arose as a result of different cultural
interpretations of rights and responsibilities in relation to freedom of expression
were uncommon (Dare, 2005). Cross-cultural disputes of this nature were most
often articulated through defamation suits between traditional publishers, with
the plaintiffs most often being wealthy individuals or corporations (Dare, 2005).
However, the potential for cross-cultural disputes has increased dramatically with
the rapid expansion of the internet. Part of growing up is learning to take
responsibility for comments that are hurtful: defamation law reflects that lesson
(Worrall, 2020). Discussions about how to best define and implement defamation
laws in a journalism workplace, intertwined with active online dialogue, continues
in mainstream media and extends into current academic debates in 2021. Each
Australian state or territory has their own respective defamation act that depicts
what constitutes defamation and although there is no specific federal law, in 2005,
the unification of state laws synchronised responses from all jurisdictions. Due to
the length of the currently used 2005 defamation legislation, individual
descriptions were excluded from the data set in Figure 61 below, but in summary
govern “the wrong of injuring another’s reputation without good reason or
justification” (p. 219) as defined by Pearson and Polden (2019). As an example,
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the case study Cullen v White 2005 is further explored in the discussion that
follows. The Media Entertainment and Arts Alliance voiced grave concerns about
the mounting necessity for defamation law reform in 2018 and, given the vast
changes in technology in the 16 years since 2005, continued pressure from
multiple stakeholders saw reform as long overdue (Todd et al, 2020), and in 2020
commenced amendments to the model defamation provisions. The defamation
reformation ensured “Australia’s laws received a makeover for the digital age”
(Shaw, 2021). The study therefore notes the following 2005 laws will be updated
in the near future and are currently in their second stage of review as of August
2021.
Figure 61
Australian civil laws for defamation that trolled journalists could use
Civil Laws for Defamation
Trolling Example: Dr Trevor Cullen became the target of a sustained campaign of online harassment
and defamation by US resident Bill White, accusing him of a range of offences, including paedophilia
and academic fraud. On September 3rd, 2003, Dr Cullen was awarded $95,000 in damages. with the
Court finding that "the conduct of the defendant can be attributed only to a conscious desire on his part
to cause the plaintiff the maximum amount of damage, hurt and embarrassment by what amounts to a
campaign of deliberately offensive vilification" (Dare, 2005, p. 7)
Jurisdiction
Law
Section
ACT
Defamation
Defamation Act 2001 (ACT)
NSW
Defamation
Defamation Act 2005 (NSW)
NT
Defamation
Defamation Act of 2006 (NT)
QLD
Defamation
Defamation Act 2005 (Qld)
SA
Defamation
Defamation Act 2005 (SA)
TAS
Defamation
Defamation Act 2005 (Tas)
VIC
Defamation
Defamation Act 2005 (Vic)
WA
Defamation
Defamation Act 2005 (WA)
There are no specific federal laws for defamation.

Defamation in this context is the legal term for reputational damage that can result
from trolling attacks about the character and activities of a journalist. However, it
is more commonly committed by journalists. Abusive commentary that emerged
on comment streams below news articles and on social media platforms such as
Facebook and Twitter can easily be accessed by the public and has the potential
to tarnish a journalist’s reputation, impacting both professional and social realms.
The instantaneous nature of the internet does not require truth to be established
before publishing, facilitating the swift spread of deceptive comments that can
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inflict damage. Although specific remarks may be removed, the accrued harm may
linger and impede a journalist’s employment potential. Examples had become so
widespread the term “Twibel” was coined by blending Twitter and libel in 2014
(Placid, Wynekoop & Feicht, 2016).
Defamation case study – Professor Trevor Cullen
A notable example is that of Professor Trevor Cullen, a supervisor of this study,
whose case sparked interest in trolling as an investigative topic. Cullen became
the target of a sustained campaign of online harassment and defamation by United
States resident Bill White, with a range of fabricated accusations of paedophilia
and academic fraud. On September 3rd, 2003, the Supreme Court ruled the
conduct of the defendant could only be attributed to a conscious desire to cause
the maximum amount of damage, hurt and embarrassment to the plaintiff, by what
amounted to a campaign of deliberately offensive vilification (Dare, 2005). Cullen
was awarded $95,000 in damages (Cullen v White 2003); however, difficulties in
registering the judgement in the United States meant the judgement could not be
satisfied, with Cullen quoted US$350,000 with no assurance of success to pursue
the damages in the United States. Despite the verdict, the residual emotional
impact remained. As highlighted on the criminal law flowchart, problems arise
with the legal process when the abuser does not live in the same country as the
victim. This is common to incidents that emerge in online spaces; however, only
sporadic cases have been successful including Dow Jones & Company Inc v Gutnick
on December 10, 2002. Reactions from media and technology groups after the
ruling were particularly critical, suggesting the decision represented a threat to
freedom of expression on the Internet and a deterrent to online publication
(Garnett, 2003). However, the landmark case represented the first major
opportunity for an Australian court to examine the application of the rules of
private international law to Internet conduct.
Chilling effect of defamation laws
Although not directly related to its scope of trolled journalists, the study
acknowledged an emerging problem between defamation law and news reporting
that was unpacked for a brief discussion. Labelled as a war on journalism (Media

Chapter 4.7 Legal responses results and discussion

352

Entertainment Arts Alliance, 2018), sentiments suggested inadequate legislation
has supressed press freedom in Australia. However, journalists who resort to this
law to prosecute trolls could spark an interesting debate on their relationship to
audience critique. Although the laws are under review in 2021, current
defamation action against media organisations often requires substantial legal
expenses to protect against potential damages. These costs further strain media
organisations already burdened with profitability struggles in the wake of digital
disruptions on traditional revenue models. Along with this economic impact,
defamation laws had a chilling effect on reporting in Australia (Taylor & Karp,
2019), and can intimidate journalists from covering legitimate news stories in the
public interest and applying scrutiny to the rich and powerful because of fears
their work may result in costly and lengthy litigation. When the risk of defamation
law can be leveraged to muzzle the media in such a way, both democracy and press
freedom are jeopardised. This would make it harder to pursue defamation.
Defamation against media organisations for trolling
Debate arose within mainstream media and academia about whether websites
and online platforms should be considered publishers, and therefore be held liable
for the abuse they host. A landmark case identified by the study is that of Voller v
Fairfax Media, Nationwide News and Sky News (2019) NSWSC 766, which
demonstrated publishers could be held liable for abusive comments made by a
third party. On June 24, 2019, former Northern Territory youth detainee Dylan
Voller won a defamation case against three of Australia’s largest media
organisations Fairfax Media, Nationwide News and Sky News after abusive
comments were made on the Facebook pages of The Sydney Morning Herald, The
Australian, Sky News, The Bolt Report and The Centralian Advocate. The court
upheld claims that the newsrooms should have recognised the significant risk of
defamatory observations after publishing the article and failed to effectively
monitor or hide malicious commentary (McKinnell, 2019). Occasional comment
moderation was not considered sufficient, particularly for media organisations of
significant size with extensive resources, and strategies should have been
implemented by the newsrooms to ensure a more robust and deliberate attempt
at monitoring discourse (Taylor, 2020). With a final dismissal by the New South
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Wales Court of Appeal on June 1, 2020, the decision set a new precedent that had
wide-ranging ramifications for Australian media companies, which could now be
held responsible for the comments of users who engage with the content they
produce (Worrall, 2020). The Court of Appeal’s majority ruling explained,
“defamation is an actionable wrong that lies in the publication to a reader, listener
or observer of matter that injures another person’s reputation,” and does not
require intention. Critics suggested the verdict “stretched common-sense
intuition” (Worrall, 2020, para. 3) and would require newsrooms to heavily invest
in more comment moderation. Left exposed under the new ruling, the verdict
opened the avenue for trolled journalists to sue media organisations that
encouraged user engagement resulting in defamatory trolling content. Media
companies were not just responsible for the content written by their journalists
but were now considered the ‘publishers’ of comments made by readers on their
social media accounts and could be sued for such comments.
Defamation against online platforms for trolling
Debate arose in mainstream media (Kiss & Arthur, 2013; Bauckhage, 2014) and
academia (Laurenson, 2015) about whether online platforms should be
considered publishers and therefore be held liable for the abuse they host.
Although Google voiced concerns and argued search engines should not be
required to be gatekeepers of defamatory content (Taylor & Karp, 2019), the
following cases illustrate they can be held liable under Australian law. A key case
setting precedence for corporations to be held liable for defamation claims is the
2015 case of Duffy v Google Inc. In the landmark trial, South Australian Dr Janice
Duffy was awarded $100,000 plus interest in general damages, a decision upheld
after appeal (Google Inc v Duffy, 2017). This case marked a new legal era, one that
held publishers accountable for defamatory material made by others on their
platform. Although a subordinate publisher, Google was considered liable, a
verdict that opened pathways for defamation cases against social media
platforms, moving discussions of liability back into the media spotlight.
Facilitating the publication of defamatory commentary may now constitute as
participation providing the grounds for prosecution under Australian civil law.
More recently in the case of Defteros v Google 2020, Google was ordered to pay
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$40,000 in damages to a Melbourne lawyer after a Supreme Court of Victoria
ruling found the internet giant was a ‘publisher’ and had defamed the man.
Defamation against social media companies for trolling
Social media platforms were not considerable factors when the eight state and
territories unified their defamation legislation in 2005 as Twitter did not exist at
the time, and Facebook was in its early stages and not yet popular in Australia in
its first two years of operation. Although issues of cyberbullying and workplace
harassment in Australia were high in the public consciousness in 2021 (Diaz,
2021), there is no universal agreement about the accountability for social media
companies that host such abuse and debates about which stakeholders should be
held accountable for trolling abuse continues to develop in court. The study
identified two key Australian lawsuits that set the precedent for social media
companies to be held liable for abusive content on their platforms. The Meggit v
Hardy 2012 case demonstrated that an international social media corporation
could be prosecuted under Australian legislation (Black, 2014). This landmark
case was the first under Australian law to see a social media company sued for
defamation. In February 2012, Joshua Meggit commenced a lawsuit against
Twitter after being wrongly identified as the author of a hate blog directed at
writer and TV personality Marieke Hardy. Although Meggitt and Hardy reached a
confidential legal settlement (Black, 2014), the broader issue of Twitter’s moral
culpability and legal responsibility for defamatory tweets began to emerge in
public discourse. Precedents set by the Gutnick v Dow Jones 2002 case held that a
cause of action for defamation arises in all places where the story can be read,
permitting international corporations to be prosecuted in Australian courts.
Therefore, Twitter could be held liable in Australia for publication of tweets on its
platform, although the company is based in the United States. The case highlighted
that although disclaimers in the terms and conditions offer some legal protection,
they do not provide absolute immunity. This case marked one of the first of its
kind to hold a platform liable for abusive commentary, rather than an individual
perpetrator. The study notes international laws vary, and particularly differ in the
United States. Section 230 of their Communications Decency Act provides
immunity from liability for providers and users of an “interactive computer
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service” who publish information provided by others. However, in Australia, there
is no such equivalent exemption, and social media platforms must rely on
“innocent dissemination” as a defence or clause 91 of Schedule 5 of the
Broadcasting Services Act 1992, which provides a general limitation of liability for
internet service providers and content hosts from Australian State and Territory
laws for material hosted on behalf of another. While these provisions clearly apply
to internet service providers, their extension to provide immunity for social media
platforms was considered unlikely (Black, 2014). Academic and lawyer, Simon
Black, was a vocal critic in 2014 and suggested that online intermediaries should
not be held liable for the action of their users, and further legal reform was
required to protect social media hosts. In further criticism of the practicality of
such a responsibility, Black (2014) argued platforms would either be forced to
pass on the considerable cost of monitoring to the public or withdraw from
Australia altogether and warned the potential punishment of social media
companies for abusive content may act as a powerful disincentive to innovative
new services being developed and based in Australia. More balanced suggestions
propose legislature should only impose additional levels of liability upon online
intermediaries after they are advised of defamatory comments and fail to respond
(Black, 2014). Although Australian law had detailed provisions for offers to make
amends for defamation, legislation struggled to keep up with rapid technological
advances over the past few decades; however, the Gutnick v Dow Jones 2002 case
exposed, and the Meggitt v Hardy 2012 case solidified, the potential strength of
Australia’s existing defamation law with respect to online intermediaries and
platforms.
Calls for Australian law reform in response to trolling
As most Australian legislation was written before the advent of the internet,
criticisms about of its effectiveness in contemporary journalism practice often
make comparisons to other countries. While Australian laws predominantly focus
on physical violence, German laws frame hate speech and online defamation as
serious crimes that require hosts to remove content within 24 hours of
notification or face fines of 50 million euro (Lomas, 2020). Although the study
notes this is not a perfect resolution, the strategy emerged from more nuanced
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conversations and coherent policy positions than the current Australian
legislation. Consistent external pressures from campaigning and widespread
media coverage compelled Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison to promise
an increased maximum penalty for trolling in 2019 if re-elected (Murphy, 2019).
This defamation law bill supported actions by the like of Australian Minister for
Defence Peter Dutton against refugee activist Shane Bazzi over tweet that labelled
him a ‘rape apologist’ (Karp, 2021, November). Inclusion as a central electoral
strategy illustrated the understanding and importance of anti-trolling policies
within public opinion at the time. Commenting on the announcement, interviewee
for this study Dr Jennifer Beckett (2019) argued there seemed to be “little
understanding” within the Coalition and across the political spectrum “about the
impact of online abuse in the real world and how to effectively regulate social
media platforms”. Although Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg himself called for
regulation, Beckett (2019) stressed the need for government vigilance to not fall
into the trap of regulating social media providers in ways they want to be
regulated. Journalists require good policy from politicians from which to create
informed and constructive legislation. As part of a systems approach (Ackoff,
1974), a commitment to international cooperation on global policy is a critical
requirement of future law reform, in addition to appropriate resourcing and
training for those who deal with the consequences of platform misgovernance
including police, social workers and educators. Although legislative promises
provided some comfort for trolling victims, the mooted policies are still being
discussed as of August 2021. After years of calls from activists, legislative reform
has begun to shift the focus from coping mechanisms for victims to punishments
for perpetrators.
Proposed new Australian laws in response to trolling
The heightened tenor, tone and velocity of trolling pressured the government to
respond after the number of reports submitted to the eSafety Commission
surpassed youth cyber-bullying reports over the Covid-19 period (Dagg, 2021). In
a historical legislative and social milestone, the Australian Government committed
$39.4 million to a cyber abuse takedown scheme on October 12, 2020 (DudleyNicholson, 2020) and announced it would introduce tough new laws in response
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to trolling on December 23, 2020 (Davey, 2020). The landmark Online Safety Bill
2021 was presented to parliament in February 2021 and was heralded as the
world’s first cyber abuse takedown laws (Visentin, 2020). Although the laws have
not yet passed in August 2021, cross-party support suggest they are likely to be
passed by the conclusion of 2021 (Wilson, 2021). Individuals who abuse, threaten,
intimidate, or vilify others online would now face fines of up to $111,000 (Molan,
2020) and could “lose their home” (Tamworth, 2021, para. 11) if they are unable
to pay. If the bill passes corporations such as Facebook and Twitter who refuse to
take down offensive material or reveal the identities of perpetrators face fines of
$555,000 (Davey, 2020). Social networks will have 24 hours to remove vile,
menacing messages reported by the Australian eSafety Commissioner, a position
held in 2021 by Julie Inman Grant (Dudley-Nicholson, 2020). The Bill also provides
more power to unmask internet trolls, with Grant (2020) commenting, “[as] we
know that anonymity is often a facet of trolling [these laws] will allow us to compel
the social media sites to give us device information and other information so we
can track down the identity of the troll” (Grant, as cited in Macmillan, 2020, para.
10). It was vital that Australians now had an advocate with powers to force social
networks to remove online abuse, as the tech firms were often slow to address
harmful online content. Supporters suggest that the online disinhibition effect will
be hindered once the assurance of anonymity is removed, and the potential of reallife consequences are more widely understood. As suggested in Panic by
Australian journalist and author David Marr (2013), a fear of harsh penalties can
act as an effective deterrent for negative behaviours. Although legislation is
clearer about the illegality of abusive conduct in the real world, public discourse
suggests that such behaviours online should likewise be criminal (Molan, 2020).
Australian journalist and advocate for the new laws Erin Molan (2020) highlighted
society now moves seamlessly between both worlds suggesting “what we deem
acceptable behaviour in the real world needs to be reflected in the online space”
(para. 13). Prior coping strategies suggested victims abstain from interacting
online; however, the new laws express reviewed sentiments that demand the
perpetrators be the ones removed from the platforms. Critical debate proposed
the need for balanced legislation that considered concerns about potential
restrictions on freedom of speech (Tamworth, 2021). However, advocates
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strongly opposed suggestions that the proposed laws would stifle free expression
(Molan, 2020), and stressed the laws would not prevent users from disagreeing,
expressing opinions, being highly critical of others or just being mean; more
accurately, the laws would punish serious offences. Unbridled free speech,
including hate speech, threats, racism and misogyny, can can discourage
participation and lead to suppression of speech as the voices of victims can be left
unprotected. This study recognises the inherent difficulty in striking a balance
between enabling freedom of expression and protecting people from the harms
associated with online trolling. The dilemma is in determining this optimum level
of regulation without undermining the principles of free speech. Social media
often brings to the surface the reality of the human condition, and this ugliness
expressed online must be addressed. To tackle such a social issue, the law requires
higher standards for digital civility. Abuse can have devastating impacts on
victims, leading to lingering emotional and mental distress that the new proposed
laws begin to address more adequately.
Summary
New legislation may be part of the solution, but it is not an effective standalone
solution. Although the current harassment law of “using a carriage service to
menace or offend” has been around for 26 years, both the vast number of victims
and the sustained and endemic presence of abusive commentary online suggests
the current legislation is not an effective deterrence strategy. However, layering
additional legislation on top of existing laws may not be the sole solution, and the
problem needs to be addressed through a holistic lens. This chapter aimed to
provide a clear pathway for journalists who wish to commence a legal process
against a troll. While victims can report incidences, criminal legislation is only as
effective as the policing of the existing laws. A critical part of the problem is the
knowledge of the application of existing laws, and responsiveness of law
enforcement officers. The study suggests further resources may need to be
allocated to police for further education and training about how to investigate and
prosecute online offenders. The study also recommends that specified legislative
pathways for trolling be provided to Australian journalists by newsrooms and
educational institutions, such as those outlined in this chapter, to aid navigation
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of the difficult legal process.
This chapter analysed relevant Australian laws that a trolled journalist could use
to prosecute a troll. Legislation and legal action sit at the governance level of the
systems model, but in order to be effective, laws need to be understood, enforced,
and used by all stakeholders in the trolling paradigm. Action at all levels of the
systems model is required to ensure this understanding, enforcement, and use.
For example, action by educators to ensure journalists and student journalists
understand how the existing legislation can be used would sit at the
support/peer/community level of the framework. While perpetrators heeding the
law and victims using the legislation would be at the individual level of the
framework. Education and communication are the key to coordinating responses
to enhance their effectiveness. This illustrates how awareness of the
interconnectedness allows for a coordinated responses and can enhance the
effectiveness of actions at each level. The concluding chapter frames trolling as a
‘wicked problem’ and discusses the importance of communication and education
to enhance harmonisation of responses to trolling.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This study provides a comprehensive analysis of the impact of trolling on
journalists in the Australian news media between 2015 and 2021, mapping its
emergence and responses to it. The timing of this study was fortuitous, given the
rapid growth of technological innovation and subsequent economic restructures
of journalism globally over the period of this study. By 2015, trolling had
cemented itself as a complex social issue, prevalent in media discourses yet rarely
examined in academic research. In a world where journalists are required to have
an online presence, a cyber culture had emerged where vicious and frequent
trolling is commonplace, and rape threats are regularly received in response to
journalistic practice. The literature review established that the cost of cyberhate
is more than simple hurt feelings: trolling can result in job loss as well as poor
mental health. This study’s findings verify this knowledge. ‘Wicked problems’ such
as trolling are complex, dynamic, and difficult to navigate. Thus, any resolution
strategies must be addressed in a collaborative approach by multiple key
stakeholders.
At its most fundamental level, this thesis concerns the difficulties involved in
navigating the journalism profession at a time when online participation is a
workplace requirement and yet working in this space often provokes malicious
abuse from hostile trolls. In practice, there are problems with reconciling the
competing demands faced by social media platform companies and online
publishers, as the functionality that allows them to instantaneously publish news
to a wide audience, results in them being difficult spaces in which to control
targeted abuse. Although current debate continues to discuss the intricate balance
between two conflicting principles of freedom of expression and the right to
protect oneself from harm, this study dives into these murky waters to uncover
the impacts on Australian journalists subjected to trolling as a routine corollary of
journalistic practise. The rapidly changing media ecosystem sees abuse
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distributed in ways that are difficult for individual users and hosts to monitor and
challenging for lawmakers to regulate and enforce.
A grounded theory approach, informed by Ackoff’s (1974) Systems Theory, was
used to investigate the impact of trolling on victims and responses by anti-trolling
campaigners, Twitter, Facebook, newsrooms, and the legal profession. Ackoff’s
theory suggests that social problems cannot be resolved by considering
stakeholders in isolation, and that a multi-site and multi-level approach to a
problem is more likely to succeed. The research process included interviews with
ten trolled journalists, and content analysis of a range of relevant archival
evidence, such as news articles, statements by social media platforms, and
Australian legislation. Where professional insight into the results of the content
analysis was required, the research included interviews with relevant experts.
This thesis aimed to illustrate the very real damage that abusive commentary can
inflict on a victim for simply doing their job, and to analyse various response
strategies implemented by key stakeholder groups in combatting online abuse.
The rich data presented in this thesis has achieved these objectives. The study is
divided into seven chapters, framed by an introduction, that explain systems and
grounded theory, and this conclusion. First, the literature review provided an
historical background of trolling in the Australian news media. This descriptive
outline of its progression to the commencement of this thesis in 2015 was the
starting point for the reflection and critique in the chapters that follow. The
findings were then presented in three parts with the first mapping the emergence
of the phenomena in the Australian news media, the second exploring the impacts
of trolling through in-depth interviews with ten Australian trolled journalists, and
the third investigating responses from key stakeholder groups including antitrolling campaigns, Twitter, Facebook, Australian newsrooms, and legislation.
This final chapter concludes the thesis with a summary of critical findings which
provides groundwork future research can extend.
Chapter 4.1 mapped the emergence of trolling in the Australian media industry
and from this foundation, considered how the epidemic of online vitriol mirrors a
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broader network of fractures within current social, political, and economic
ideologies as also argued by Phillips (2015). The chapter examined how the
expanded capacity for instantaneous communication has escalated the potential
for conflict. Increased interactive functions of Web 2.0 that aimed to promote
constructive discourse were hijacked by trolls, who used the new avenues to send
targeted abuse to victims. Comment sections on news websites and social media
platforms blossomed but quickly became cesspools of hate and bigotry. Trolling
flourished because of the known absence of consequences of a behaviour with
potentially devastating consequences. Conventional rules of conversation and
human interaction are often altered in the online domain, with some users more
willing to insult and abuse when masked by anonymity and some happy to abuse
under their real identities.
The thematic content analysis of 528 news articles revealed critical time periods
in the evolution of trolling which are, in chronological order, the embryonic period,
incubation period, manifestation period, social problem period, social epidemic
period and saturation period. Findings illustrated that most victims are female and
more vulgar insults and aggressive threats are commonly directed at women.
Analysis showed that of the nature of the abuse directed at journalists whose
gender identities were redacted or omitted from 118 of the articles was consistent
with them being female. But without any means of confirming this portion as
female, this crucial data may indicate that the true scope of the gender skew
described in chapter 4.1 is underplayed. Examination of the evolution of trolling
in the Australian news media revealed commonalities with age-old enactments of
violence, now played out in the online realm. The trolls’ desire to hurt and disrupt
the communication of selected victims to strengthen their sense of power has
been compared with the social psychology of conventional schoolyard bullying
(Maunder & Crafter, 2018). The sheer scale of online content further exacerbates
the trolling problem for which journalists are often outmatched and unprepared.
In chapter 4.2 on the impacts of trolling, the research sought to broaden the
understanding of trolling by conceptualising malicious commentary as targeted
abuse that can deeply affect victims and manifest into real-life experiences such
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as depression and job loss. The research described the severity and vulgarity of
comments and threats that are predominately directed towards female journalists
and considered how such incidents affect their ability to conduct their work,
through thematic analysis of interviews with ten Australian journalists who selfidentify as being trolled. Participants revealed that anger and aggression
commonly not tolerated or accepted offline began to permeate the online user
experience. By documenting tangible impacts including stress, anxiety, and
changes to work practices, the research showed that the effects of trolling cannot
be reduced to those in the virtual world or regarded as separate from reality, as
contemporary communication technologies intertwine both realms. This study
argued that new two-way communication models employed by news media
organisations are ethically problematic as they enable and often amplify
opportunities for unprecedented harm. The occurrence, frequency, commonality,
range, and severity of impacts suggest the true scope of the trolling problem is
currently not adequately addressed and presents as a worrying concern for career
longevity and the welfare of journalists. Through descriptions of personal and
professional behavioural impacts, the study revealed that while some journalists
ceased writing for a period of time, others became emotionally hardened and often
relied on resilience as their primary, or sole, coping strategy. Although
technological features play an important role in mediating and shaping trolling
abuse and its impact, the persistence of poorly regulated platforms continues to
enable the haunting and repeated attacks on victims while they perform basic
workplace duties. Such systemic fractures expose a broken system that requires
coordinated change from multi-level stakeholder groups within the complex
trolling paradigm.
The literature review found unfettered free markets routinely manifest social
problems including the gender pay and promotion gap and the rise in
casualisation in journalism employment, which particularly affect women. From a
feminist perspective, chapter 4.3’s campaign response analysis illustrated that
gender-based abuse of women online can be considered an inevitable aspect of an
unregulated system. This study described how anonymity has exacerbated the
trolling problem through the dehumanisation of internet users, but the underlying
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root cause is likely to be imbedded far deeper within social ideologies. In context,
it is understandable that the first anti-trolling campaigns that emerged to combat
the abuse were feminist, and the study described their evolution in the Australian
news media. In accord with feminism’s main intention to stimulate public
awareness of gender imbalances that may not yet be recognised or collectively
understood by the general population, cumulative examples of journalists
speaking out about their personal experiences provided a ‘perfect storm’ for
raising awareness about trolling. Considering Foucault’s (1971) theory of the
episteme, which describes the significance of optimal timing for a social problem
to attain public recognition and media traction, the #mencallmethings campaign
went viral on August 30, 2011, and emerged as a pivotal point, shaping public
perceptions, and cementing trolling as a recognised social problem, and marking
itself as the campaign from which all other anti-trolling campaigns followed. In
2015, there were four racial-based campaigns in a clustered group indicating a
continued presence of deep-rooted discrimination in contemporary Australian
culture. Government responses were not provoked until “Dolly’s Law” campaign
on January 3, 2018, after 14-year-old Amy “Dolly” Everett committed suicide after
suffering continued online abuse. The chapter explained the limited impact the
early isolated campaign had, compared with the success of a number of campaigns
that ran together and were collectively more difficult for society to ignore. It is the
cumulative effect of social movements that creates public discourse, provokes
community debate, incites criticism, and prompts academic inquiry, resulting in
widespread social condemnation. Over time the persistence of multi-layered
campaigns and activism ultimately influenced the Australian public to re-evaluate
its standing on the escalating trolling problem.
With the rise of social media, the distinction between socially accepted behaviours
within both private and public spheres has become less clear. Social media
companies have been instrumental in dissolving traditional boundaries between
the two realms, encouraging users to openly express and share personal thoughts
and emotions, with minimal, or sometimes no, mediation. While some newsrooms
had expected an online presence to both publish and promote work, this in turn
opened the floodgates and exposed journalists to abusive personal attacks for
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simply doing their job. Current social media platforms belong to private
companies subject to limited government regulation, and technologies that collect
and sell user information are increasing. The platforms seem simultaneously
overwhelmed by, or rather indifferent to, the rise of violent and hateful content
despite frequent announcements about efforts to improve.
Chapter 4.4 on Twitter’s response documents journalists’ widespread frustration
with Twitter’s inconsistent enforcement of policies that tolerate and permit
abusive content on its service, and its subsequent refusal to publicly explain or
account for its action and decisions. The study described Twitter’s twelve
responses to trolling on its platform and revealed Twitter was the least-regulated
of the two social media platforms investigated, allowing the publication of violent,
bullying, demeaning, or otherwise antagonistic material. Prior to March 23, 2015,
Twitter relied on a user-monitoring model in which victims were required to
report abusive commentary that would then be flagged for external moderation.
This protracted self-regulation process facilitated the presence, and amplified the
frequency, of trolling on the platform. While the chapter set out the few policy,
management and feature responses to trolling by Twitter, it also explained why
corporations are often uninterested in making their platforms safer by setting and
policing clearer boundaries of acceptable behaviours. The chapter illustrated that
Twitter was a direct beneficiary of the circulation of disruptive content through
increased engagement on its service, and the data suggested that Twitter may
have made a selective decision prior to 2015 to delay its response to trolling. It
was not until the negative effects of trolling on Twitter’s popularity and
commercial viability became evident on February 2, 2015, that any responsive
action was initiated. By examining financial motives, the study highlighted that
both the intention and effect of hosting such vitriolic commentary was to attract
attention, provoke discussion and increase platform usage. Like Twitter, many
social media platforms are often complicit in this process, as contemporary
business models depend on a consistent flow of user engagements to entice and
retain financial revenue from advertisers. When increased traffic equates to
higher profit margins, companies can, and do, face ethical dilemmas, and prioritise
trending posts regardless of the offensive or discriminatory nature of their
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content. In 2021, extreme trolling content, including rape and violent imagery, are
now more readily removed by Twitter’s quality filter and artificial intelligence
technology, probably not out of goodwill, but to ensure users continue to engage
with and interact on the platform.
Although social media companies can connect marginalised groups in a positive
and liberating experience (Day, 2020), the Facebook response chapter described
how Facebook’s interactive function was leveraged by trolls and became a fertile
environment for malicious and offensive abuse. Facebook was once heralded as
the keystone for social connectivity, but failures to eliminate widespread abuse on
the platform have seen it become a playground for vitriol and hate-speech,
although recent actions have aimed to improve trolling on its platform. The study
acknowledged Facebook’s attempts to address multiple stakeholders involved in
trolling and cyber-bullying, and grouped responses into five categories: support
strategies, feature strategies, functional strategies, research strategies and
corporate approach strategies, which were independently described and explored.
While proactive moderation strategies using artificial intelligence are developing,
effective policing remains difficult, and the onus of moderation predominately
falls on users. However, the sheer scale of hate speech on the internet makes it
impractical to place the burden solely on victims to report each incident, and more
resources could be allocated by social media platforms to better protect their
users. Some users have shifted online interactions on the platform exclusively to
within Groups or on Pages that are moderated voluntarily by administrators.
In the absence of a consensus or concerted democratic effort to uphold the
principles of mutual respect, Facebook risks further becoming an unruly space
where trolling thrives. The difficulty for the platform is developing a response to
online vitriol that finds a middle ground between ignoring abuse and removing
the interactive functions that facilitate it. From a feminist perspective, the study
considered Facebook’s misogynistic origins, examining resources delegated to
combatting abuse on its platform. Online discrimination, particularly sexism and
racism, faced by women and minority groups in contemporary media has a lot to
do with the male-dominated corporations within which the harassment takes
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place. This persistent power of the patriarchy was illustrated in the #MeToo
movement. Ultimately, social media platforms, from their founding objectives to
their present-day functions, are a culmination of white, patriarchal, elite practices
and the continued dominant presence of abusive commentary suggests that
misogyny is still firmly entrenched in the contemporary media space. Although
recent media scrutiny has shaped and accelerated a more robust attitude towards
the trolling epidemic, there are limits to what can be done by hosting platforms
alone. Nonetheless, there is still a scarcity, if not absence, of concrete resolution
strategies because it is a systemic problem that needs action on all levels.
Trolling is now a central part of the current Australian news media landscape, with
the remaining comment sections on reputable news sites being routinely filtered
by journalists and moderators for insults and defamation. In addition, social media
accounts now being watched more carefully since the High Court decision in
September 2021 that holds news outlets responsible for comments on their Pages
(Byrne, 2021). This is a significant workplace problem for Australian journalists.
The study demonstrated that, in 2015, an online culture had emerged where
vicious and frequent trolling was commonplace, and where rape threats had
become a predictable default response to journalistic practice (Bartlett, 2013;
Greig, 2016; Phillips, 2015; Citron, 2014; West, 2015; Williams, 2016; Tuohy,
2019; Hyland, 2021). The newsroom response chapter identified ten newsrooms’
responses to trolling, from basic website feature upgrades to workplace
procedural changes that considered the emotional and behavioural impacts of
trolling. The ABC was identified a global leader in the hard-line response to trolling
and other Australian newsrooms were much slower to respond, opting for usergenerated content moderation methods for several years until the sporadic
introduction of machine-learning software. The #StopTheTrolls campaign
launched by The Daily Telegraph on September 11, 2012, was identified as a
significant newsroom response. The campaign received widespread public praise,
international media traction and global recognition, and emerged as the catalyst
for a shift in public perception of trolling’s prevalence from isolated anecdotal
evidence to a recognised social epidemic that required urgent and extensive
responses from multiple stakeholder groups. The chapter further unpacked the
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round-the-clock and resource intensive process of comment moderation and
highlighted the Australian newsroom Crikey, which only permits comments
during business hours when a comment moderator is on duty. Although the initial
aims of comment sections were to facilitate respectful and informative discussions
by deleting insults, defamation and hate speech, the expense of manual
moderation has made the process more costly, and even large teams found them
difficult to police at scale.
While interactive two-way communication functions enable and drive revenue
streams, academic discussions about their sustainability and ethics prompted
newsrooms to reassess their value. In doing so several publications adjusted or
removed their comment features. These included at least 22 news media outlets.
However, the continued presence of comment streams on some publications
illustrates varied opinions in the current media industry. Debate still ensues about
whether the positives of free speech and reader engagement outweigh the risk of
the trolls’ vitriol. Some newsrooms opted to handball comment moderation and
monitoring to social media companies to deal with, and bear legal responsibility
for, but a recent High Court decision has closed this loophole (Karp, 2021,
September) and placed responsibility back in the newsrooms’ remit. The chapter
described how deflecting responsibility to social media organisations did not
address the trolls’ underlying motives or acknowledge the true scale of online
abuse in contemporary journalistic practice. More accurately and more likely, the
underlying problem with trolling in newsrooms emerged from an accumulation of
resource concerns, including strained staffing, insufficient finances, and
inadequate technical aptitude that in unison, newsrooms could no longer cope
with. Despite suggestions from eleven newsrooms that social media was a more
appropriate environment for audience conversation (ABC, 2012; ABC, 2017;
Popular Science, 2013; CNN. 2014; Reuters, 2014; Mic, 2014; Recode, 2014; The
Week, 2014; The Verge, 2015; The Daily Dot, 2015; NPR, 2016; Al Jazeera English,
2017), Facebook and Twitter were not exemplary regulators at the time and the
chapter concluded newsrooms simply could not cope with the onslaught of vexing
commenters through internal means. Although multiple strategies have been
adopted to varying degrees, the continued presence and virulence of trolling in
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the current media landscape suggests these approaches have not yet been
successful in reducing abuse to a manageable level and do not provide any
protection for freelance journalists.
The legal response chapter analysed the relevant current Australia legislation and
found that while a range of statutes can be drawn upon, use of them (to date) in
relation to trolling has been scarce, with experts suggesting that more education
of the public and law enforcement officers would enhance legal protection. At
present, there is no Australian law, statute or common, specific to trolling;
however, criminal laws of sedition, libel and hate speech, and civil laws of
harassment, stalking, defamation, discrimination, vilification, blasphemy, and
obscenity can be drawn upon for prosecution. Although the current harassment
law of “using a carriage service to menace or offend” has been around for 26 years,
both the vast number of victims and the sustained and endemic presence of
abusive commentary online suggest the current legislation is not an effective
deterrent. The research presented the complex, lengthy process that trolled
journalists must navigate when commencing judicial action against a troll. In an
extension on Pearson and Polden’s (2019) published work, the chapter presented
two flowcharts, one criminal and one civil, to distil complex legislative procedures
into a practical guide that trolled journalists can refer to when seeking to
prosecute their abusers. The study illustrated how arduous legal pathways had
proven too daunting for some victims, including high-profile case Zoe Quinn.
Analysis of Australian laws that journalists could use when trolled showed
existing measures within the Australian legislative system are not yet adequate or
effective in preventing online trolling or ensuring sufficient reparation for its
victims. Scholarly and societal sources implicitly agree on the harmful effects of
trolling (Phillips, 2015; Jane, 2015; Citron, 2014; Barnes, 2018) but fall short on
any recommendations for its resolution. Although acknowledgment of trolling as
a recognised social problem is a start, there is still a long way to go until lagging
legislative reform is updated, implemented, and proven as an effective
preventative strategy. The study illustrated that law reform should be considered
in integration with social theory models, such as the deterrent effect discussed by
David Marr (2015), which suggests perpetrators are more likely to abstain from
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negative behaviour if significant criminal charges are attributed to the act. Trolling
remains a legal grey area, and the review of Australian laws that journalists could
use when trolled found a disconnect between applicable legislation and the broad
public understanding about how such laws are implemented and enforced. The
public, and in particular Australian journalists, need adequate policies that
recognise the dynamic nature of trolling and its real-life impact. The law is, of
course, not the only tool for combatting malicious commentary online; however,
it is recognised as a critical stakeholder that is fundamental for future proactive
and preventative methods. Online aggression remains a challenging phenomenon
for authorities and public policy makers to manage, and layering new legislation
announced in 2021 on top of existing laws may be part of the solution, but not be
the sole solution. A critical part of the problem is the knowledge of the application
of existing laws, and responsiveness of law enforcement officers.
This study concludes that continued discussions, both academic and social, about
the meaning, harm, and potential solutions to addressing the trolling problem are
critical to raise awareness, educate the public and continue to retain pressure on
the key stakeholders to act. As discussed in the literature review and echoed
throughout every section of this thesis, education of professionals in all
stakeholder groups, such as journalists, lawyers, police, councillors, newsroom
managers, can change attitudes and stimulate action. Education can foster
synergetic relationships between stakeholder groups that could enable malleable
approaches to evolve in response to fluctuating dynamics of the online
environment.
This thesis brings together perspectives and contributions that go beyond a purely
scholarly interest, including activist and journalistic engagements. The study
contributes, in particular, to a consideration of the social impact of trolling and the
steps that journalists can take when encountering it as part of their work or
personal life. The publication of this data aims to stimulate and facilitate future
research on this aspect of online discussions. There is still much work to be done
to ensure that journalists, readers, and commenters can have respectful and
engaging discussions online without the fear of personal attacks. I hope
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journalists, as well as moderators, educators, newsrooms, social media
organisations and Australian legislative bodies and media audiences, benefit from
this research.
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Appendix one

2 Bradford
Street
Mount
Title of thesis:
Lawley
Western
A study of the emergence, impacts and responses to trolling in the
Australia
Australian news media.
6050
(618) 9370
6446
My name is Delysha Pick and I am a PhD student enrolled in a Doctor of Philosophy at
www.ecu.ed
Edith Cowan University in Perth, Western Australia.
u.au
INFORMATION LETTER TO PARTICIPANTS

You are invited to take part in this research project, which I am conducting as part of the
requirements of my doctorate. The research project has ethics approval from the
Faculty of Education and Arts Ethics Sub-Committee.
This project aims to study of the impacts of trolling on journalists and what is bestpractice in Australia.
If you choose to take part in the project you will asked to a series of semi-structured
interview questions. The interview will be recorded and transcribed and should take no
longer than one hour to complete.
All information collected during the research project will be treated confidentially and
will be coded so that you remain anonymous. All data collected will be stored securely
on ECU premises for five years after the project has concluded and will then be
confidentially destroyed. The information will be presented in a written report, in which
your identity will not be revealed. You may be sent a summary of the final report on
request.
I do not anticipate any risks associated with participating in this research project.
Participation in this project is voluntary and you are free to withdraw at any time and
there will be no penalty for doing so.
If you would like to take part in the project, you will first be sent a consent form via
email. By reply to the email, and agreeing to an appropriate interview time, this will
indicate you have read the consent form and that you give permission for your answers
to be analysed in this project.
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If you have any questions about the research project or require further information you
may contact the following:
Student Researcher: Delysha Pick

Supervisor: Kayt Davies

Supervisor: Trevor Cullen

If you have any concerns or complaints about the research project and wish to talk to an
independent person, you may contact:
Research Ethics Officer
Edith Cowan University
270 Joondalup Drive
JOONDALUP WA 6027
Phone:
Email: research.ethics@ecu.edu.au
Thank you for your time,
Yours sincerely,

Delysha Pick
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Appendix two

2 Bradford
Street
Mount
CONSENT FORM
Lawley
Western
Title of Thesis:
Australia
6050
A study of the emergence, impacts and responses to trolling in the Australian news
(618) 9370
media.
6446
www.ecu.ed
u.au
•
I have been provided with a letter explaining the research project and I
understand the letter.
•
I have been given the opportunity to ask questions and all my questions
have been answered satisfactorily.
•
I am aware that I can contact Trevor Cullen or Kayt Davies if I have any
further queries, or if I have concerns or complaints. I have been given
their contact details in the Information Letter.
•
I understand that participating in this project will involve answering a
set of semi-structured interview questions, that will be recorded and
transcribed.
•
I understand that the researcher will be able to identify me but that all
the information I give will be coded, kept confidential and will be
accessed only by the researcher and his/her supervisor.
•
I am aware that the information collected during this research will be
stored in a locked cabinet at ECU for 5 years after the completion of the
project and will be destroyed after that time.
•
I understand that I will not be identified in any report, thesis, or
presentation of the results of this research.
•
I understand that I can withdraw from the research at any time without
penalty.
•
I freely agree to participate in this project:
Please note by returning the questionnaire online, this will illustrate you have
read and agreed to the terms and conditions of this consent form.
No written signature is required.
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Appendix three
Semi-structured interview questions addressing research Question 2 “What are the impacts for trolled journalists in the Australian news media?”
1. How prevalent do you feel is trolling in your workplace?
2. How prevalent do you feel in journalism in general?
3. What are your thoughts on the suggestion trolling is on the rise?
4. Can you suggest any reasons for this?
5. How do you feel trolling has affected you emotionally?
6. How do you feel trolling has affected you at work?
7. How do you feel trolling has affected your writing?
8. At times have you filtered what you write due to this?
9. What are your views on the "don't feed the trolls" advice?
10. What are your views on the “freedom of speech” defence of trolls?
11. Can you give examples of the trolling language or phrases you've experienced?
12. Was there any support offered in the workplace?
13. Was there any support systems in place in the workplace in regards to trolling?
14. What are the workplace procedures in regards to trolling?
15. What advice would you give another person experiencing trolling?
16. What support helped best?
17. Do you know of anyone who has received compensation at present, in your
newsroom or other?
18. What are your views on trolling being considered for workplace trauma?
19. Is there anything else you would like to add?

Appendices

420

